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SUMMARY 
The legal historical development of fairness in the South African common law of 
contract is investigated in the context of the political, social and economic 
developments of the last four centuries. It emerges that the common law of 
contract is still dominated by the ideologies of individualism and economic 
liberalism which were imported from English law during the nineteenth century. 
Together with the theories of legal positivism and formalism which are closely 
related to parliamentary sovereignty and the classical rule of law, these ideals 
were transposed into the common law of contract through the classical model of 
contract law which emphasises freedom and sanctity of contract and promotes 
legal certainty. This approach resulted in the negation of the court’s equitable 
discretion and the limitation of good faith which sustain the social and economic 
inequalities that were created under colonialism and exacerbated under apartheid 
rule. In stark contrast, the modern human rights culture grounded in human dignity 
and aimed at the promotion of substantive equality led to the introduction of 
modern contract theory in other parts of the world. The introduction of the 
Constitution as grounded in human dignity and aimed at the achievement of 
substantive equality has resulted in a sophisticated jurisprudence on human 
dignity that reflects a harmonisation between its Western conception as based on 
Kantian dignity and ubuntu which provides an African understanding thereof. In 
this respect, ubuntu plays an important role in infusing the common law of contract 
with African values and in promoting substantive equality between contracting 
parties in line with modern contract theory. It is submitted that this approach to 
human dignity should result in the development of good faith into a substantive 
rule of the common law of contract which can be used to set aside an unfair 
contract term or the unfair enforcement thereof.  
 
 KEY TERMS 
Bona fides; classical law of contract; contractual autonomy; equality; equity; 
fairness; freedom; good faith; human dignity; human dignity as empowerment, 
human dignity as constraint; Kantian ethics; modern theory of contract law; open 
norms; public policy; rule of law; sanctity of contracts; social justice and 
transformation; substantive equality; transformative constitutionalism; ubuntu. 
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The values of ubuntu … if consciously harnessed can become central to the 
process of harmonising all existing legal values and practices with the 
Constitution. Ubuntu can therefore become central to a new South African 
jurisprudence and to the revival of sustainable African values as part of the 
broader process of the African renaissance. 
 Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 11 
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•  Old authorities are cited in the text according to the accepted convention. For 
example: Gaius Inst 4 11. The short form of the source from which the text is 
quoted is stated directly thereafter. For example: Gaius Inst 4 11 (quoted from 
De Zulueta (1958) Institutes of Gaius part 1). 
 
•  A journal article in the text is cited in a short form containing the surname of the 
author, the year of the publication, the abbreviated journal title and the relevant 
page number. For example: Bennett 2011 PELJ 30. The full reference is given 
in the bibliography after the short form, except for the journal title, which is also 
given in the abbreviated form (the full name of an abbreviated journal title is 
listed in the table of abbreviations at the end of the bibliography). For example:  
 Bennett 2011 PELJ 
 Bennett TW “Ubuntu: an African equity” 2011 14-4 PELJ 30-61.  
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•  A court case in the text is cited in a shortened form containing the case name. 
For example: Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers. The full reference 
of the case is given in the footnotes and bibliography. For example: Everfresh 
Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC).  
  
•  A statute in the text is cited in full. For example: Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008. Citation thereafter refers to the name of the statute or an abbreviated 
form indicated in the text itself. The full reference of the statute is given in the 
bibliography. For example: Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
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CHAPTER 1 LEGAL HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 
 
Anyone who wishes to describe the history of South African private law is 
inevitably confronted with the dilemma that this development occurred 
within the context of discrimination and oppression. For there can be no 
doubt that private law was a structural part of the system of domination in 
South Africa.1 
 
1 1 FIRST IMPORTANT QUESTION: WHY?  
The research topic of this thesis was selected after reading Justice Yacoob’s 
minority judgment in the constitutional court case of Everfresh Market Virginia v 
Shoprite Checkers. Specifically, his following remarks summarise the core issue to 
be addressed in this research project, and as I will return to it from time to time, I 
quote it in full below: 
 
The values embraced by an appropriate appreciation of ubuntu are also 
relevant in the process of determining the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Constitution. The development of our economy and contract law has 
thus far predominantly been shaped by colonial legal tradition 
represented by English law, Roman law and Roman Dutch law. The 
common law of contract regulates the environment within which trade 
and commerce take place. Its development should take cognisance of 
the values of the vast majority of people who are now able to take part 
without hindrance in trade and commerce. And it may well be that the 
approach of the majority of people in our country place a higher value on 
negotiating in good faith than would otherwise have been the case. 
Contract law cannot confine itself to colonial legal tradition alone.2 
 
The question I would like to address with this thesis is how the Africanisation (or 
decolonisation)3 of the common law of contract can be addressed, and more 
                                            
1  Zimmerman & Visser “Introduction: South African law as a mixed legal system” in Zimmerman 
& Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 5.  
2  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 23.  
3  This process is described by Lemmer & Olivier 2000 De Jure 140 as follows:  
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specifically, how this can be accomplished through the harmonisation of ubuntu 
and good faith in the common law of contract. As will be illustrated throughout this 
chapter and the next,4 the most appropriate way to approach this issue is by 
investigating how ubuntu as an underlying constitutional value should inform the 
development of good faith in the common law of contract.5  
 
First, however, it is necessary to address why this must be done. Why should a 
Western law concept rooted in Roman law be harmonised with an African one? 
What is the purpose of this harmonisation and what does this mean for the 
common law of contract?  
 
These are complicated questions that require a good understanding of the legal 
historical development of fairness6 in the South African common law of contract 
                                                                                                                                    
On liberation of the Other from political, economic and cultural oppression, the new 
system usually foregrounds the historically marginalised subject, their language, 
culture and values. The silent majority is empowered and the decolonisation of the 
mind (and rewriting history from the perspective of the Other) becomes a priority. In 
the current South African context this empowerment can be referred to as an African 
Renaissance … In a nutshell, the aim of all post-colonial strategies is to empower 
those discourses which have historically been marginalised by various forms of 
political oppression.  
4  The next chapter deals with the legal historical development of fairness in the South African 
common law of contract. 
5  How ubuntu should be used to develop the concept of good faith in the common law of 
contract is addressed in ch 3 of this thesis. 
6  Throughout this thesis the term “fairness” is used to denote the amorphous concept implied in 
legal principles ranging from bona fides to equity intended to realise justice in contract. This 
application is in line with the communis opinio doctorum (see Willett Fairness in consumer 
contracts (2016) para 1.1 who refers to Smith (ed) Atiyah’s Introduction to law of contract 
(2006) ch 12; Collins Law of contract (2003) chs 2, 12 & 13; Whittaker & Zimmerman (eds) 
Good faith in European contract law (2000); Brownsword et al (eds) Good faith in contract 
(1999); Forte Good faith in contract and property law (1999); Deakin & Michie (eds) Contracts, 
cooperation and competition (1997); Halson (ed) Exploring boundaries of contract (1996); 
Wightman Contract: a critical commentary (1996); Willett (ed) Aspects of fairness in contract 
(1996); Beatson & Friedman (eds) Good faith and fault in contract law (1995); 
Wilhelmsson Social contract law (1994); Brownsword et al (eds) Welfarism in contract law 
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with reference to the political, social and economic context in which these 
developments took place. Specifically, this investigation should take place against 
the backdrop of the general historical development of the South African law with 
specific emphasis on the general historical development of the common law of 
contract, the customary law in general and the respective underlying ideologies of 
both legal systems. This is the aim of this chapter.  
 
In the next chapter, the historical development of fairness in the South African 
common law of contract will be discussed in order to elaborate on the outline 
created here.  
 
Finally, this chapter does not constitute an exhaustive critical discussion of the 
issues raised, but rather aims to give an account of these developments to the 
extent necessary to address the research problem.  
 
1 2 SOUTH AFRICA AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM 
From Justice Yacoob’s remarks above,7 it can be deduced that the South African 
law of contract is part of a legal system that can be described as a mixed legal 
system.8 First, it is a mixture between Western and African law.9 In this context, 
                                                                                                                                    
(1994)). This is also the position in the South African context (see Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract (2016); Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016); Sharrock Business transactions 
law (2016); Eiselen & Naudé “Introduction and overview of the Consumer Protection Act” in 
Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (OS, 2014); Hutchison & 
Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012)). For an introduction of new terminology see Barnard 2006 Law 
and Critique 153-170; Barnard 2005 SAJHR 278-292; Barnard Critical legal argument for 
contractual justice (2005). 
7  As quoted in the text at n 2 supra. 
8  See also Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 12; Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 24-25; 
Church & Church 2008 Fundamina 1; Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 51; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 71; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 188; 
Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 219; Zimmerman “Good faith and 
equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 517; 
Church 1996 Fundamina 309; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 41-42. 
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African law refers to what is usually called African customary or indigenous law.10 
The concept of ubuntu originates from this source of law.11 The Western law 
component is rooted firmly in the Romano-Germanic (civil law) tradition but has 
been influenced by the Anglo-American (common law) tradition as well.12 The 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law traditions form part of the civil law tradition, while 
the English law is part of the common law tradition.13 Good faith originated in 
Roman law14 and arrived in South Africa as part of the Roman-Dutch law.15  
 
Both these mixtures are relevant to the research topic. This chapter starts with a 
discussion of customary law as its history in South Africa predates the arrival of 
the two Western law traditions.16  
 
                                                                                                                                    
9  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 12; Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 45; Van 
Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 24-25; Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 52, 54; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 188; Sanders 1981 CILSA 328. 
10  The term “customary law” is used throughout this thesis except where the context requires 
otherwise (cf n 24 infra). 
11  See the discussion in para  1 3 2 2 infra. 
12  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 12; Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 24; Church et al Human 
rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 54; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 71-72; Thomas 
2004 Fundamina 188; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 35; Sanders 1981 CILSA 328; Hahlo & 
Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 41-42. 
13  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 54; Sanders 1981 
CILSA 328. 
14  For a discussion on the introduction and development of good faith (bona fides) in Roman law 
see ch 4 infra. 
15  See the discussion in para  1 4 2 2 infra. 
16  In the words of Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 58: “[i]f the 
indigenous system is to be regarded as part of South African legal history this is where one 
should begin”. 
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1 3 EARLIEST SOUTH AFRICAN INHABITANTS AND THEIR LAWS 
1 3 1 Inhabitation of South Africa by the San, the KhoiKhoi and the Bantu 
speaking people 
From what historians and archaeologists can gather from the scattered evidence 
available,17 hunter-gatherers (predecessors of the San) already populated various 
areas of Southern Africa 14 000 years ago.18 In addition, it would appear that 
predecessors of the KhoiKhoi obtained livestock from the Bantu speaking 
communities in northern Botswana and moved south into South Africa more than 
2 000 years ago.19 There is further evidence which suggests that around 
1 700 years ago Bantu speaking farmers moved into South Africa with their 
livestock.20 Therefore, it is safe to assume that South Africa was populated by 
these people long before any Europeans settled in South Africa.21 As a result, 
their descendants are regarded as the indigenous people of South Africa.22 Today, 
                                            
17  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 2. 
18  Swart “Die eerste mense” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika 
(2007) 6; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 11. 
19  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 11-12; Swart “Die eerste mense” in 
Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika (2007) 6; Van Niekerk Interaction 
of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 11. 
20  Whitelaw “Die oorsprong van boerdery in Suid-Afrika” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe 
geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika (2007) 22; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western 
law (1995) 16. See also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 12 who states 
that Bantu speaking tribes populated various areas of South Africa by AD 1 000. 
21  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 29; Woolman & Swanepoel 
“Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.2(a); 
Barnard-Naudé “Sources of law and legal authority” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in 
South Africa (2012) 145; Devenish 2005 TSAR 547. 
22  Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 21-22. Various terms have been used to describe this 
group of people, including “natives”, “black people” and “Africans”. The term “indigenous 
people” is used throughout this thesis except where the context requires otherwise (see 
Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 10, 19-20 on the issues surrounding the different terms in this 
respect). Today, the Bantu (now referred to as “African”) speaking peoples of South Africa can 
be sub-divided into main and sub-groups according to language and culture, namely the Nguni 
group (consisting of the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele groups), the Tsonga group (also 
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the indigenous population of South Africa constitutes approximately 80% of the 
South African population.23 
 
1 3 2 Nature and characteristics, and underlying values of customary law 
1 3 2 1 Nature and characteristics of customary law 
Bennett explains that customary law24 “derives from social practices that the 
community concerned accepts as obligatory”.25 Thus, customary law refers to the 
indigenous legal systems which are followed by the indigenous people of South 
Africa.26  
 
Three features of customary law must be mentioned. First, customary law (in its 
original form) is an unwritten source of law that is passed from generation to 
generation and developed through oral tradition.27 Secondly, the oral tradition 
                                                                                                                                    
referred to as the Shangaan), the Sotho group (consisting of the Pedi, Sotho and Tswana 
groups) and the Venda group (Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law in 
Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 22; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract law (2010) 19). 
23  According to the most recent estimate the African population constitutes 80,8% of the South 
African population (Stats SA Mid-year population estimates (2016) 2). 
24  “Customary law” is the preferred term as it is used in ss 39(2) & 211(3) of the Constitution 
although the term “indigenous law” appears in s 1(4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
and is defined as “the law or custom as applied by the Black tribes in the Republic” (Bekker 
“Nature and sphere of African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to 
legal pluralism (2014) 19; Bennett Customary law (2004) 34 n 1).  
25  Bennett Customary law (2004) 1-2. See also Du Plessis “The historical functions of law: 
developments after 1500” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 110. 
26  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 5 n 1; Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 19. For a more in-
depth critical discussion of the problems in defining the term “customary law” see Bekker 
“Nature and sphere of African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to 
legal pluralism (2014) 18-19; Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 27-32; 
Olivier et al “Indigenous law” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 32 (2009) para 1; Thomas & Tladi 
1999 CILSA 355. 
27  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 9; Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 27; 
Onyango African customary law (2013) 31; Barnard-Naudé “Sources of law and legal authority” 
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ensures flexibility in that customary law adapts to changes in the political and 
socio-economic sphere. As explained by Bennett: 
 
[C]ustomary law is always up to date, because, ancient though it may 
seem, no custom is ever older than the memory of the oldest living 
person. Systems of custom therefore have the remarkable ability to allow 
forgotten rules to sink into oblivion, while simultaneously accepting new 
rules to take their place, always on the understanding that the new is 
old.28 
 
Thirdly, the rules of customary law are used as a general guide to make decisions 
within a specific factual matrix.29 Bennett explains that once a general rule has 
been expounded upon and applied to the facts of the case, the rule returns to its 
general form.30 As a result, the doctrine of stare decisis31 is unknown in customary 
                                                                                                                                    
in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 145; Church et al Human rights 
from a comparative perspective (2007) 64; Bennett Customary law (2004) 2-4; Thomas & Tladi 
1999 CILSA 356; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 14; Hahlo 
& Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 317; Elias Nature of African customary law (1956) 2; 
Brookes History of native policy (1924) 172. Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” 
in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 9 n 23 defines oral 
tradition as “unwritten communications of the past through legends, emblems, songs and 
poems”.  
28  Bennett Customary law (2004) 2. See also Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary 
law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 20-21; Himonga & 
Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 31; Du Plessis “The historical functions of law: 
developments after 1500” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 110; 
Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 21; Gluckman Judicial 
process among the Barotse (1955) 24.  
29  Bennett Customary law (2004) 3. See also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa 
(2014) 26; Gluckman Judicial process among the Barotse (1955) 24. 
30  Bennett Customary law (2004) 3. 
31  The term stare decisis can be translated as “abide by, adhere to, decided cases” (Hiemstra & 
Gonin Trilingual legal dictionary (2008) 292). Barnard-Naudé “Sources of law and legal 
authority” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 134 explains that the 
doctrine means that “when a court hears a matter, it must take into account previous 
judgments in similar cases which other courts have already decided in the past”. See also 
Bennett Customary law (2004) 3; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 29.  
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law.32 Thus, customary law is regarded as a non-specialised legal system and the 
rules of customary law are not always clear-cut and immutable.33  
 
As a result of the oral tradition there is little written information available on the 
historical development of the customary law, especially for the period predating 
the arrival of the Dutch in 1652.34 This is also true in respect of historical writings 
dealing with its underlying values.35 Furthermore, although the oral tradition is still 
followed in present times,36 the status, nature and application of the customary law 
were influenced by the arrival of the Dutch,37 the colonisation by the British,38 the 
unification of South Africa39 and apartheid.40 Consequently, the written sources 
that are available are at best interpretations of customary law and not necessarily 
a true reflection thereof.41  
                                            
32  Bennett Customary law (2004) 3; Gluckman Judicial process among the Barotse (1955) 23. 
33  Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 24; Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 64; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 39, 
249; Sanders 1981 CILSA 334. 
34  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 9; Du Plessis “The historical functions of law: developments after 
1500” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 110; Church et al Human 
rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 58; Bennett Customary law (2004) 1-2; Thomas 
2004 Fundamina 188.  
35  Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 376. 
36  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 5 referring to the “living customary law” which she defines as “the law 
that is actually applied by indigenous people” and which “often conflicts with the official 
customary law that is applied by the State courts or entrenched in legislation” (at n 3). See also 
Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 27-35; Church et al Human rights from 
a comparative perspective (2007) 64; Bennett Customary law (2004) 4; Van Niekerk 
Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 14, 37. 
37  Cf para  1 4 infra dealing with settlement of the Dutch at the Cape. 
38  Cf para  1 5 infra dealing with the colonisation of the Cape by the British. 
39  Cf para  1 6 infra dealing with the unification of South Africa. 
40  Thomas & Tladi 1999 CILSA 356 (cf para  1 7 infra dealing with apartheid). 
41  Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 24-25; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African 
jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 440-441; Bennett 
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1 3 2 2 Underlying values of customary law 
Despite the above problems and the fact that each community has its own laws, it 
is generally agreed that the laws of the different indigenous communities share the 
same broad principles.42 For that reason, the ideology of African customary law 
has been described as follows: 
 
[I]ndigenous law is regarded as communal or socialist, and in this respect 
the emphasis is on the principle of social solidarity, the essence of which 
is the preservation of the group or community. This African ideology of 
communitarianism … may be traced to the traditional society which is 
intrinsically group-oriented and sets great store by traditional African 
values such as religion and popular consensus in government.43 
 
In line with this ideology, dispute resolution in customary law aims and attempts to 
preserve and advance social harmony within relationships.44  
                                                                                                                                    
Customary law (2004) 5-7; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law 
(1995) 22-23; Thomas & Tladi 1999 CILSA 356; Bennett & Peart Sourcebook of African 
customary law (1991) 1. 
42  Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 23; Bekker “Nature and sphere of 
African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 18; 
Bennett “Application and ascertainment of customary law” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 38; Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 63; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 441; Sanders 1981 CILSA 333; Brookes History of native policy 
(1924) 173. Cf n 22 supra for a summary of the various African communities in South Africa. 
43  Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 36. See also Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law 
in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 21, 27; Berat (ed) 
Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 26; Du Plessis “The historical functions of law: 
developments after 1500” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 110-
111; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 64; Devenish 2005 
TSAR 548-549; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2006) 37; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 
248-249; Sanders 1981 CILSA 333; Brookes History of native policy (1924) 175. 
44  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 26; Du Plessis “The historical functions of 
law: developments after 1500” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa 
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It is important to note that although customary law is group-oriented the interests 
of the individual are still important in traditional African culture.45  Specifically, the 
concept of ubuntu accentuates the relationship between the individual and the 
community.46 The concept of ubuntu is regarded as an underlying value of all 
indigenous communities in South Africa and it is closely related to the ideologies 
referred to above.47 The original meaning of ubuntu is difficult to determine as “it is 
impossible to trace the exact denotation of the term in its vernacular origins”.48 
This is especially due to the oral tradition followed by the indigenous communities 
and it is reflected in the saying that ubuntu is “shrouded in a ‘kaross of mystery’”.49  
 
It has been argued that the historical roots of ubuntu can be traced to small-scale 
societies in Africa50 and that initially it applied to relationships between family and 
friends.51 It has also been proposed that originally ubuntu denoted the “essence of 
being human” which included both the positive and negative attributes of a 
person.52 In an attempt to construct some sort of written history of ubuntu, Gade 
                                                                                                                                    
(2012) 111; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2006) 451; Bennett & Peart Sourcebook of African customary law (1991) 83. 
45  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 64; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ 
African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 37; Van Niekerk 
1998 CILSA 167; Sanders 1981 CILSA 333; Brookes History of native policy (1924) 175 
quoting a memorandum by Mr T Shepstone Jr (dated 1880).  
46  Van Niekerk 1998 CILSA 167. 
47  Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 371; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & 
Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 441; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 1-2; Van Niekerk 1998 
CILSA 167; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 250. 
48  Bennett 2011 Loyola Law Review 711. 
49  Bennett 2011 Loyola Law Review 711. 
50  Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2006) 441; Van Niekerk 1998 CILSA 168. 
51  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 31; Coertze 2001 
South African Journal of Ethnology 113-114. 
52  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 31; Coertze 2001 
South African Journal of Ethnology 113. 
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conducted an extensive literary survey of the use of the word in the available 
texts.53 He found the earliest written reference to ubuntu dating to 1846.54 He 
perused many of the texts and found that in the early texts (between 1846 and 
1980) ubuntu was mostly described as “human nature”, “humanity” and 
“humanness”.55 Sometimes it also denoted the following meanings: “goodness of 
nature”, “good moral disposition”, “virtue”, “sense of common humanity”, “true 
humanity”, “reverence for human nature”, “essential humanity”, “kindly simple 
feeling for persons as persons”, “liberality”, “a person’s own human nature”, 
“generosity”, “human feeling”, “humaneness”, “good disposition”, “good moral 
nature”, “personhood”, “kindness”, “humanity (benevolence)”, “personality”, 
“human kindness”, “the characteristic of being truly human”, “greatness of soul”, “a 
feeling of human wellbeing” and “capacity of social self sacrifice on behalf of 
others”.56 From these descriptions it can be concluded that ubuntu emphasises 
the concepts of humanity and morality as an integral part of indigenous 
communities.  
 
Today, it is usually expressed with reference to the Zulu proverb “umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu” or the Xhosa saying “ubuntu ungamntu ngabayne abantu”.57 
These expressions have been translated as “persons depend on persons to be 
persons”, “a person depends on other people to be a person” or “a person is a 
person by or through other people”.58 Sometimes, the Sotho word “botho” is used 
                                            
53  Gade 2011 SA Journal of Philosophy 303-329. 
54  Gade 2011 SA Journal of Philosophy 306. 
55  Gade 2011 SA Journal of Philosophy 307.  
56  Gade 2011 SA Journal of Philosophy 307-308. 
57  Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 29; Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho 
in developing a consensual South African legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der 
werkelijkheid (2007) 31; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & 
Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 441 n 14; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2. 
58  Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 29 n 70; Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-
botho in developing a consensual South African legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) 
Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 31; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2. 
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which derives from the Sotho expression “motho ke motho ba batho ba bangwe”.59 
A more comprehensive explanation on the meaning of ubuntu and these 
expressions is provided by Van Niekerk: 
 
[U]buntu can be understood only within the context of the world view of 
indigenous people. They regard the world as an integrated whole of 
nature, life on earth and the after-life. People on earth should live in 
harmony with each other, with nature, and with the gods and the 
ancestors. To maintain this harmonious state of affairs, the interests of 
the individual, as a component of the collectivity, should be looked after. 
The individual’s dignity, health and social welfare should be protected. 
But her welfare is only one side of the coin, the other side being the 
welfare of the community. And in that lies the essence of ubuntu: the 
welfare of the individual is inextricably linked to the welfare of the 
collectivity and that, in turn, is inextricably linked to an harmonious 
relationship with the ancestors and with nature. Although man is at the 
centre of things, man can be defined only in relation to other men. And 
the community can likewise be defined only with reference to its 
individual members.60 
 
Therefore, ubuntu recognises the interdependence between the individual and the 
community and aims to achieve social harmony between community members. 
However, this social harmony does not come at the expense of the individual but 
rather exists because the individual is placed at the centre of the community and 
her dignity and welfare must be protected and promoted.  
 
                                            
59  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 31; Pieterse 
“‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 441 
n 14; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2. The term “ubuntu” is used throughout this thesis as it is the term 
used in most legal writings (cf the discussion on ubuntu as a legal concept in para  1 8 4 infra). 
60  Van Niekerk 1998 CILSA 168 (footnotes omitted). See also Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African 
jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 444. 
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Consequently, ubuntu has been linked with the ideas of humanism61 and 
socialism,62 although this link should be made with reference to the intellectual 
tradition of African humanism and socialism.63 Both these elements are captured 
by South African philosopher Mabogo More in his description of ubuntu: 
 
In one sense, ubuntu is a philosophical concept forming the basis of 
relationships, especially ethical behaviour. In another sense, it is a 
traditional politico-ideological concept referring to socio-political action. 
As a moral or ethical concept, it is a point of view according to which 
moral practices are founded exclusively on consideration and 
enhancement of human well-being; a preoccupation with human welfare. 
It enjoins that what is morally good is what brings dignity, respect, 
contentment, and prosperity to others, self, and the community at large 
… Ubuntu is a demand for respect for persons no matter what their 
circumstance may be. 
 
In its political-ideological sense it is a principle for all forms of social or 
political relationships. It enjoins and makes for peace and social harmony 
by encouraging the practice of sharing in all forms of communal 
existence.64 
 
As the focus of this thesis is the harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu in the 
common law of contract, a detailed investigation into the specific rules and 
principles of the customary law of contract fall outside the scope of this thesis. As 
                                            
61  Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2006) 445; Bekker 2006 SAPL 334; More “Philosophy in South Africa under and after 
apartheid” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 156; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2; 
Van Niekerk 1998 CILSA 167-168. 
62  Cornell 2010 SAPL 383; More “Philosophy in South Africa under and after apartheid” in Wiredu 
(ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 156; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 3. 
63  Cornell 2010 SAPL 383; Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & 
Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 445; More “Philosophy in South Africa under and after 
apartheid” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 156. 
64  More “Philosophy in South Africa under and after apartheid” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to 
African philosophy (2004) 156-157. See also the references to More’s definition of ubuntu in 
Cornell & Van Marle 2015 Verbum et Ecclesia 2-3; Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in 
Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 6-7; Cornell 2010 SAPL 396. 
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will be illustrated throughout this thesis, ubuntu’s present contribution to the 
common law of contract lays in the values it encapsulates and how these values 
could be used to critique and develop the underlying values of the common law of 
contract. As stated by Pieterse: 
 
Ubuntu indeed represents the crux of African philosophy and as such 
mandates closer scrutiny in the quest for extracting authentically African 
jurisprudential values. … Ubuntu’s contribution to South African 
jurisprudence lies in the theoretical values it embraces, and this is the 
context in which it should be studied.65 
 
Therefore, the discussions on ubuntu in this thesis will focus on these aspects in 
the following manner. The introduction and development of ubuntu as a legal 
concept in the South African common law is investigated later in this chapter.66 
The influence of ubuntu in the common law of contract is analysed in the next 
chapter.67 In chapter three, the judicial descriptions of ubuntu are illuminated with 
reference to writings in African philosophy68 and it is investigated how ubuntu, as 
an underlying constitutional value,69 could be used to inform the expression of the 
founding constitutional values in the common law of contract.70 Finally, the 
emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract is further 
illuminated by comparing its introduction and development in the South African law 
to that of good faith in the Roman law of contract.71 
 
                                            
65  Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2006) 442. 
66  See para  1 8 4 infra. 
67  See para  2 3 3 infra. 
68  See para  3 2 5 infra. 
69  In this thesis, ubuntu is referred to as an underlying constitutional value and reference to the 
founding constitutional values refer to the constitutional values of human dignity, equality, 
freedom and the rule of law (see the discussion in para  1 8 2 infra). 
70  See ch 3 infra. 
71  See ch 4 infra. 
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1 4 ARRIVAL OF THE DUTCH AND ROMAN-DUTCH LAW (1652-1795) 
1 4 1 Activities of the Dutch East India Company 
The Dutch were the first to settle in South Africa with the arrival of Jan van 
Riebeeck in April 1652.72 He was sent by the Dutch East India Company73 with 
instructions to establish a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope74 for the 
ships of the company headed from the Netherlands to the East Indies and back.75 
The Dutch East India Company was a private commercial entity owned by a 
number of shareholders with the aim to make profit76 and was characterised by 
the monopolistic mercantilism prevalent at that time.77 The intention of the Dutch 
East India Company was not to colonise South Africa but to run a safe 
                                            
72  Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 2.2(b); Bennett Customary law (2004) 35; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 188; 
Terreblanche History of inequality in South Africa (2002) 153; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 
227; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 567; Boucher “The Cape under the 
Dutch East India Company” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 
61; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 2. Prior to this period, various Europeans were 
active along the coast of South Africa but did not settle (Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of 
South Africa (2014) 31-32; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective 
(2007) 55; Giliomee “In goeie geselskap” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe geskiedenis van 
Suid-Afrika (2007) 40; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 226-227; Boucher “The age of 
exploration” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 55-60; Walker 
History of South Africa (1947) ch 1). 
73  Originally known as the Vereenigde Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie and abbreviated 
as “VOC” (Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 534; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South 
Africa (1960) 10). 
74  Named by Van Riebeeck in accordance with his instructions from the Dutch East India 
Company (Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 571; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South 
Africa (1960) 2). The term “Cape” is used throughout this thesis. 
75  Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 2.2(b); Bennett Customary law (2004) 35; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 188; Hahlo & 
Kahn South African legal system (1991) 567; Boucher “The Cape under the Dutch East India 
Company” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 61; De Wet Ou 
skrywers in perspektief (1988) 18; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 3. 
76  Schutte “Company and colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795” in Elphick & Giliomee (eds) Shaping 
of South African society (1992) 284-285; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 11. 
77  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 3; Boucher “The Cape under the Dutch East India 
Company” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 62.  
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refreshment station to provide water and food to its ships at low cost.78 
Accordingly, its initial policy towards the indigenous people79 was one of non-
aggression and pro-trade.80  
 
In order to stimulate agricultural production, “letters of freedom” were given to 
certain employees of the company and they were encouraged to settle and farm in 
the Cape and given land for this purpose from 1657.81 They became known as 
freeburghers82 although all their commercial activities were strictly supervised and 
controlled through licences and supervision which was characteristic of the 
                                            
78  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 33; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 134; 
Giliomee “In goeie geselskap” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika 
(2007) 42; Schutte “Company and colonists at the Cape, 1652-1795” in Elphick & 
Giliomee (eds) Shaping of South African society (1992) 285, 288ff; Boucher “The Cape under 
the Dutch East India Company” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa 
(1988) 61; Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African constitution (1935) 5; 
Kilpin Romance of a colonial parliament (1930) 5. 
79  Specifically, the Khoikhoi (called “Hottentots” by the Dutch) and the San (called “Bushmen” by 
the Dutch) (Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 6; Thomas 2008 
Fundamina 137 n 31; Elphick & Malherbe “The Khoisan to 1828” in Elphick & Giliomee (eds) 
Shaping of South African society (1992) 4; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 4). 
80  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 37; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 134; 
Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African constitution (1935) 5 quoting an 
early proclamation from Kilpin Romance of a colonial parliament (1930) 9-10: “It was 
recognised that collisions with the natives were not in the Company’s interest, and the Council 
strove its utmost to prevent them. One of its first acts was to proclaim that ‘should any one ill-
treat, beat, or push a native – whether he be right or wrong – he shall in the presence of the 
latter receive fifty lashes’; and it even went so far so to prohibit any European from making ‘a 
sour face’ at a native”. 
81  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 33; Woolman & Swanepoel 
“Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.2(b); 
Guelke “Freehold farmers and frontier settlers, 1657-1780” in Elphick & Giliomee (eds) 
Shaping of South African society (1992) 66; Schutte “Company and colonists at the Cape, 
1652-1795” in Elphick & Giliomee (eds) Shaping of South African society (1992) 289; Boucher 
“The Cape under the Dutch East India Company” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history 
of South Africa (1988) 62; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960)  3; Eybers (ed) Select 
constitutional documents (1918) xviii. 
82  Also called free-men or burghers (Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) xviii). 
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mercantilism of that time.83 This was the beginning of the permanent settlement at 
the Cape.84 In addition, the company imported slaves to provide a cheap and 
easily controlled labour force.85 
 
1 4 2 Introduction and characteristics of Roman-Dutch law 
1 4 2 1 Introduction of Roman-Dutch law at the Cape 
It was decided that the law of Holland (the main province in the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands) would be applied in the Cape.86 Van der Linden describes the 
law of Holland as follows: 
 
[A]ny general law of the land, or any local ordinance having the force of 
law, or any well-established custom [that] can be found affecting it (1). 
                                            
83  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 3. See also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South 
Africa (2014) 35; Guelke “Freehold farmers and frontier settlers, 1657-1780” in Elphick & 
Giliomee (eds) Shaping of South African society (1992) 70; Schutte “Company and colonists at 
the Cape, 1652-1795” in Elphick & Giliomee (eds) Shaping of South African society 
(1992) 289. 
84  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 55. 
85  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 33. These slaves where imported from 
various places along the trade posts of the Dutch East India Company (Berat (ed) Thompson’s 
history of South Africa (2014) 36; Boucher “The Cape under the Dutch East India Company” in 
Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 63, 70; Sachs Justice in South 
Africa (1973) 20; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 3). For a more detailed exposition 
on the slave trade and slavery in South Africa see Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South 
Africa (2014) 42-44; Armstrong & Worden “The slaves, 1652-1834” in Elphick & Giliomee (eds) 
Shaping of South African society (1992) 109-183. For an analysis of the law of slavery in the 
Cape see De Beer 1996 Fundamina 222-235. 
86  Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 2.2(d); Thomas 2004 Fundamina 188-189 (referring to De Wet Ou skrywers in 
perspektief (1988) 5-6): “An earlier request by the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, 
JP Coen, for instruction concerning what law to apply, was answered with the reply ‘the law of 
Holland’”. See also Fagan “Roman-Dutch law in its South African historical context” in 
Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 38-39; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 
(1992) 229-230; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 571ff; Visagie Regspleging 
en reg aan die Kaap (1969) 63-78; Visagie 1963 Acta Juridica 149; Hahlo & Kahn Union of 
South Africa (1960) 13; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 2. 
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The Roman law, as a model of wisdom and equity (2), is, in default of 
such a law, accepted by us through custom in order to supply this 
want (3).87 
 
This system of law was called Roman-Dutch law88 since it constituted an 
amalgamation between “medieval Dutch law, mainly of Germanic origin, and the 
Roman law of Justinian, as adapted in the ‘Reception’”.89  Thus, the Roman-Dutch 
law forms part of the Romano-Germanic (civil) law tradition. 
 
1 4 2 2 Characteristics and nature of Roman-Dutch law 
It is important to take note of the following characteristics of the Roman-Dutch law 
that arrived at the Cape. First, in Roman-Dutch law equity was part of the law and 
did not constitute a separate system of law apart from the common law.90 The 
courts would have recourse to equity where Roman-Dutch law principles on the 
issue did not exist.91 Therefore, equity had a subsidiary function in the absence of 
                                            
87  Juta (tr) Van der Linden’s Institutes of Holland (1897) 1 1 4. Cf Grotius Inleidinge 1 2 22 (as 
found in Lee (tr) Grotius’ Jurisprudence of Holland (1926)). See further Thomas 2006 
Fundamina 259; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 72; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 189.  
88  Apparently so named by Simon van Leeuwen who used it as a sub-title of his Paratitula juris 
novissimi (1652) and as the title of his Roomsch Hollandsch Recht (1664) (Hahlo & Kahn 
South African legal system (1991) 330; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 2). 
89  Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 329. See also Woolman & Swanepoel 
“Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.2(d); Hahlo 
& Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 47; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 3. 
90  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 519 where he states: “Roman-Dutch law was, in itself, inherently 
equitable; equity was not a body of rules outside of and apart from the ‘common law’, but 
thoroughly pervading and informing it”. See also Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 63; Devenish 2005 TSAR 552 esp n 42; Church 1996 Fundamina 310; 
Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 136-137; Erasmus 1989 SALJ 671-672; 
Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 48 n 28. 
91  Van der Keessel Th 24: “In the total absence of local law, of custom and of the subsidiary law 
of which we have spoken, we ought to have recourse to Natural Equity” (quoted from 
Lorenz (tr) Select theses of the Laws of Holland by Van der Keessel (1855)); Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones ad 1 2 22 (as found in Van Warmelo et al (eds) Van der Keessel Voorlesinge 
(1961)); Voet Commentarius 1 1 6 (as found in Gane (tr) Selective Voet (1955)); Huber 
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clear laws.92 Furthermore, Grotius defined equity as a virtue that can be used to 
correct deficiencies resulting from the universality of laws.93 It had a regulatory or 
corrective function and was used to intervene where adherence to the strict rules 
of the law would result in injustice.94 Grotius’ views were adopted by other Roman-
Dutch writers like Paulus Voet,95 Ulrik Huber,96 Johannes Voet,97 Dionysius van 
der Keessel98 and Johannes van der Linden.99 Consequently, this regulatory and 
                                                                                                                                    
Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 1 1 17, 18 & 21 (as found in Gane (tr) Huber’s 
jurisprudence of my time (1939)); Grotius Inleidinge 1 2 22 (as found in Lee (tr) Grotius’ 
Jurisprudence of Holland (1926)). See also Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 301-302; Du Plessis 
2002 THRHR 405. 
92  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 301-302; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 405. 
93  Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406 referring to Grotius Prolegomena juri Hollandico praemittenda 3 
as contained in Feenstra 1967 TR 444. The relevant text reads as follows: “Proprie vero et 
singulariter aequitas est virtus voluntatis correctrix ejus in quo lex deficit propter universitatem; 
aequum autem est ipsum quo lex corrigitur” (Feenstra 1967 TR 479). It was later discovered 
that the Prolegomena juri Hollandico praemittenda was nothing other but Grotius’ much 
published work De Aequitate (Scholtens & Feenstra 1974 TR 202). The corresponding text in 
De Aequitate 1 3 has been loosely translated by Heron Introduction to the history of 
jurisprudence (1860) 138: “Equity is properly and simply a virtue of the will, corrective of that 
wherein the Law is deficient on account of its universality. That is equitable by which the law is 
corrected”. See also Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 136 referring to Grotius 
De Aequitate 1 3. 
94  Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406; Neels 1998 TSAR 714; Du Toit 1976 TRW 43-44. Grotius based 
his ideas on those of Aristotle (Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal 
system (1991) 136; Du Toit 1976 TRW 44). See para  4 4 1 2 infra dealing with Aristotle’s 
writings on fairness. 
95  Voet De Statutis 3 4 1-10 as quoted in Neels 1998 TSAR 714. See also Du Plessis 2002 
THRHR 406. 
96  Huber Heedensdaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 1 1 12-21 (as found in Gane (tr) Huber’s 
jurisprudence of my time (1939)). See also Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406; Du Toit 1976 
TRW 47. 
97  Voet Commentarius 1 1 5-6 & 5 1 51 (as found in Gane (tr) Selective Voet (1955)). See also 
Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406; Neels 1998 TSAR 714-715; Du Toit 1976 TRW 47. 
98  Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad 1 2 22 (Th 24) (as found in Van Warmelo et al (eds) Van der 
Keessel Voorlesinge (1961)). See also Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406; Du Toit 1976 TRW 47. 
99  See Van der Linden’s supplement to Voet Commentarius 1 1 6 (as found in Gane (tr) Selective 
Voet (1955) 10 n (a)). Van der Linden specifically refers to Grotius De Aequitate 1 3 (cf n 93 
supra). See also Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406; Du Toit 1976 TRW 47-48. 
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corrective function of equity was part of the Roman-Dutch law that arrived at the 
Cape.100  
 
The concept of good faith (bona fides) in the Roman-Dutch law of contract was 
one of the legal institutions originating from the concept of equity and arrived at 
the Cape as part of the Roman-Dutch law.101 In Roman-Dutch law, all contracts 
were considered bonae fidei.102 According to Grotius this meant that the parties 
“are mutually bound to everything which good faith reasonably and equitably 
demands”.103 Zimmerman argues that the concept of good faith instilled the law of 
contract with “an equitable spirit”.104 Furthermore, the principles of freedom and 
sanctity of contract (also referred to as pacta sunt servanda) formed part of the 
Roman-Dutch law that arrived in South Africa, although it was applied within a 
mercantilist and monopolistic environment and tempered by the application of 
good faith.105 The historical development of good faith and the principles of 
                                            
100  Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 406; Du Toit 1976 TRW 46. 
101  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 519. See also Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the 
South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht 
(2014) 148; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 
(1996) 218. 
102  Decker’s annotation to Van Leeuwen’s Roomsch Hollandsch Recht 4 2 1 (as found in Kotzé 
(tr) Simon van Leeuwen’s Commentaries (1923) 12). See also Thomas “The changing fortunes 
of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) Historische 
wortels van het recht (2014) 148; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser 
(eds) Southern Cross (1996) 220. 
103  Grotius Inleidinge 3 15 9 (quoted from Lee (tr) Grotius’ Jurisprudence of Holland (1926)). See 
also Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 
(1996) 220. 
104  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 519. See also Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the 
South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht 
(2014) 148; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross 
(1996) 218. 
105  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 138. For a detailed exposition of the historical development of the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda in Roman and Roman-Dutch law see Visser 1984 SALJ 641-
655 and the authorities listed there. 
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freedom and sanctity of contract in the South African common law of contract is 
analysed in the next chapter.106 
  
Secondly, the doctrine of stare decisis was not part of Roman-Dutch law and 
although previous decisions were regarded as persuasive they did not have the 
force of law: 
 
Roman Dutch jurisprudence, while it recognises the value of certainty in 
judicial sentences, and inculcates the precept that previous decisions 
should not be lightly departed from, also teaches the principle that a 
previous decision, which has been shown to be erroneous, ought not be 
followed.107  
 
The inherent equity of Roman-Dutch law and the absence of a strict stare decisis 
doctrine meant that the Roman-Dutch writers frequently looked at different 
sources for guidance and made free use of them.108 Accordingly, Hahlo and Kahn 
argue that Roman-Dutch law was flexible and not hampered by unnecessary 
technicalities and formalities.109 As time passed, the Roman-Dutch law that arrived 
at the Cape was amended by the enactment of various legislative instruments but 
retained its basic Roman-Dutch law character.110  
 
                                            
106  See para  2 2 3 infra. 
107  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 29 quoting Kotzé 1917 SALJ 285-287. Hahlo & 
Kahn South African legal system (1991) 240 state that during the Dutch East India Company’s 
rule in the Cape there was no adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. See also Thomas 
2011 Litnet Akademies 240; Thomas 2006 Fundamina 253; Dolezalek Stare decisis (1989); 
Visagie Regspleging en reg aan die Kaap (1969) 70; Wessels 1920 SALJ 269.  For more detail 
on the role of judicial precedent in Roman and Roman-Dutch law see Kotzé 1917 SALJ 280-
287. 
108  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 48. See also De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 236; 
Visagie Regspleging en reg aan die Kaap (1969) 73-76; Wessels 1920 SALJ 267-277. 
109  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 48. 
110  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 55; Bekker Seymour’s 
customary law (1993) 1. For more detail see De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 268-271; Hahlo 
& Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 13-16. 
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1 4 3 Relationship between Roman-Dutch law and customary law 
Initially, the administration of justice at the Cape was managed by a tribunal 
consisting of Van Riebeeck and employees of the Dutch East India Company.111 
Later, a Justitie ende Chrijghsraet was established to deal with legal questions.112 
At first, the jurisdiction of the Justitie ende Chrijghsraet (and subsequently the 
Raad van Justitie113) was limited to employees of the company.114 However, as 
time passed, it also exercised jurisdiction over freeburghers,115 slaves, 
manumitted slaves116 and Khoikhoi.117 Fagan remarks that the incorporation of the 
Khoikhoi, an indigenous community, under Dutch jurisdiction illustrates “the 
changing nature of the Dutch settlement”118 and consequently its departure from 
                                            
111  Fagan “Roman-Dutch law in its South African historical context” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 38; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 233; Visagie 1963 Acta 
Juridica 120; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 12.  
112  Fagan “Roman-Dutch law in its South African historical context” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 38; Visagie 1963 Acta Juridica 120; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South 
Africa (1960) 12. 
113  For more detail on the development of the Raad van Justitie see Visagie 1963 Acta 
Juridica 120-128. 
114  Fagan “Roman-Dutch law in its South African historical context” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 38. 
115  De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 234. 
116  They were referred to as “free blacks” and mainly consisted of former slaves with Indian and 
Indonesian roots, but also from Madagascar and other parts in Africa (Boucher “The Cape 
under the Dutch East India Company” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South 
Africa (1988) 65). 
117  Devenish 2005 TSAR 550; Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 217; Fagan 
“Roman-Dutch law in its South African historical context” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 38; Elphick Kraal and Castle (1977) 127, 181-188; Sachs Justice in 
South Africa (1973) 18. The earliest recorded case where Roman-Dutch law was applied to the 
Khoikhoi took place in 1672 (Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 217; 
Elphick & Malherbe “The Khoisan to 1828” in Elphick & Giliomee (eds) Shaping of South 
African society (1992) 17). However, between themselves the indigenous people continued to 
live according to customary law (Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in 
Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 9). 
118  Fagan “Roman-Dutch law in its South African historical context” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 38. 
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the company’s initial policy of non-aggression and pro-trade in their dealings with 
the indigenous people.119 
 
As Roman-Dutch law was now regarded as the common law of the land and 
applied to disputes involving indigenous people, it marked the start of the unequal 
relationship between the Roman-Dutch based legal system and customary law.120 
Bennett argues that the unequal relationship between customary law and the 
Roman-Dutch based legal system was made even worse by declining resources, 
disease and forced labour suffered by the KhoiKhoi as well as their continual 
conflicts with the Dutch.121 Furthermore, as time passed, the KhoiKhoi would 
intermingle with the slave population and be absorbed into the coloured population 
of the Cape.122 The San were largely hunted down and those who survived moved 
into the interior of South Africa.123 All these factors contributed to the non-
recognition of customary law because the living culture of the KhoiKhoi and San 
became weak and consequently it has been proposed that “there was no law to 
recognize”.124 As will be seen below, this unequal relationship persisted and was 
further advanced under British rule.  
 
                                            
119  Cf the discussion in the text at n 80 supra. 
120  Bennett Customary law (2004) 34-35 
121  Bennett Customary law (2004) 35. See also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa 
(2014) 38-39; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 58; 
Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 21-22; Boucher “The Cape 
under the Dutch East India Company” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South 
Africa (1988) 71-72. 
122  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 6; Devenish 2005 TSAR 548. However, 
they also intermingled with Europeans who arrived at the Cape and some of the Bantu tribes in 
the area (Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 6). 
123  Bennett Customary law (2004) 35. See also Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 58; Devenish 2005 TSAR 548; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law 
and Western law (1995) 22. 
124  Bennett Customary law (2004) 35. See also Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 58; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 4. 
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1 5 ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH AND ENGLISH LAW (1795-1909) 
1 5 1 Introduction 
Generally, the history of the South African law during the British colonisation is 
discussed in the context of the four colonies and independent states (Cape, Natal, 
Transvaal and Orange Free State) which were created during this period. Such a 
division allows for a more or less chronological history of the development of the 
South African law, and therefore, the same outline is followed in this section. 
 
1 5 2 Cape Colony  
1 5 2 1 British colonisation of the Cape 
The British colonisation of South Africa was initiated by the first occupation of the 
Cape in 1795.125 There was a brief interlude from 1803 to 1806 when the Cape fell 
under the Batavian Republic.126 The second British occupation took place from 
1806 to 1814.127 Thereafter, the Cape was formally ceded to Great Britain in terms 
of the Convention of London dated 13 August 1814.128  
 
                                            
125  See Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 3 for an extract of the articles of 
capitulation in this respect. See also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 52; 
Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 569; De Wet Ou skrywers in perspektief 
(1988) 29; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 4.  
126  See Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 13-16 for extracts of the proclamation 
and the two articles of capitulation in this respect. See also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of 
South Africa (2014) 52; A le Cordeur “The occupation of the Cape, 1795-1854” in Cameron & 
Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 78. The Batavian Republic was the 
successor to the United Provinces of the Netherlands at that stage (De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 
(1992) 239; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 569 n 23; De Wet Ou skrywers in 
perspektief (1988) 30; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 5).  
127  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 52; A le Cordeur “The occupation of the 
Cape, 1795-1854” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 79. 
128  Convention between Great Britain and the United Netherlands signed at London on 
13 August 1814 as found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 19-23. See 
also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 52; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 
242; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 570; De Wet Ou skrywers in perspektief 
(1988) 32; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 5.  
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1 5 2 2 Retention of Roman-Dutch law 
It was the established practice of that time and incorporated as a rule into English 
law that the laws of a conquered country, if suitably civilised, remained in force 
until the conqueror of that country altered them: 
  
[F]or if a King come to a Christian Kingdom by conquest, seeing that he 
hath vitae et necis potestatem, he may at his pleasure alter and change 
the laws of that kingdom: but until he doth make an alteration of those 
laws the ancient laws of that kingdom remain. But if a Christian King 
should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under his 
subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that 
they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of 
nature, contained in the decalogue…129 
 
In accordance with this rule, the British retained the existing Roman-Dutch based 
legal system as the common law applicable in the Cape colony130 because it was 
                                            
129  Calvin’s Case (1572-1616) 7 Co rep 1a, 77 ER 377 at 17B, 398. The exception regarding the 
laws of infidels subsequently overruled by Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204, 98 ER 1045 at 
209, 1047-1048: “the laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are altered by 
the conqueror: the absurd exception as to pagans, mentioned in Calvin’s case, shews the 
universality and antiquity of the maxim.” See further Bennett “Application and ascertainment of 
customary law” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 37; 
Thomas 2008 Fundamina 134; Bennett Customary law (2004) 35 esp n 4; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 243; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 575; De Wet 
Ou skrywers in perspektief (1988) 29-30; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 17.  
130  S 31 of the Charter of Justice of 1832, an extract of which can be found in Eybers (ed) Select 
constitutional documents (1918) 114-119. See further Bennett “Application and ascertainment 
of customary law” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 37; 
Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den 
Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 148; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 135-
136; Zimmerman “‘Double cross’: Comparing Scots and South African law” in Zimmerman & 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 16; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 237-238, 243-244, 
247; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 575;  Erasmus 1991 SALJ 268; A le 
Cordeur “The occupation of the Cape, 1795-1854” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history 
of South Africa (1988) 76. 
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regarded as a civilised system of law.131 Bennett argues that any other legal 
system was ignored and that the application of the Roman-Dutch based law in 
matters involving slaves and the KhoiKhoi continued.132  
 
1 5 2 3 English influences on the administration of justice 
It also became apparent that the British were not going to leave the existing legal 
system unaltered.133 The English legal system was based on the Anglo-American 
common law tradition which differed substantially from the civil law tradition on 
which the Roman-Dutch law was based. As explained by Thomas: 
 
Since English-educated practitioners had to apply a Roman-law based 
system, the development of the Roman-Dutch law in the Cape Colony 
was entrusted to lawyers trained in another legal system, in another legal 
tradition, in another country and in another language.134 
 
Although the British retained the existing legal system as the common law of the 
Cape colony,135 many other changes were made to the judicial organisation and 
the administration of justice with the introduction of the Charters of Justice of 1827 
and 1832 as well as other legislative enactments: the Supreme Court of the Cape 
of Good Hope was introduced and replaced the Raad van Justitie;136 court judges 
                                            
131  Bennett Customary law (2004) 35 and SALC Project for harmonisation of common and 
indigenous law (1999) 6 referring to Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1887) 3 NZ Jur (NS) 78. 
See also Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 58. 
132  Bennett Customary law (2004) 35, esp n 6. See also Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of 
South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 107; Bekker Seymour’s 
customary law (1993) 1. 
133  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 17. 
134  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 136. See also Thomas 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia 5; Du Bois 2004 
International Journal of Legal Information 221-222; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 260. 
135  Cf the discussion in the text at n 130 supra.  
136  S 2 of the Charter of Justice of 1832. See Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the 
South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht 
(2014) 148; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 136; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 72; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 246; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 246; Hahlo & Kahn South 
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had to be appointed from the ranks of British barristers or advocates;137 pleadings 
and proceedings in the superior courts had to be drafted and conducted in 
English;138 the Dutch procedural law was replaced by the English civil procedural 
law;139 and the English law of evidence was applied in the courts.140  
 
Of specific importance is the fact that the English distinction between courts of law 
and courts of equity was not introduced.141 The English court of equity (the 
Chancellor’s Court) was developed in order to soften the harsh consequences of 
the inflexible and formal English private common law including the law of 
contract.142  Equity in this sense refers not only to the general meaning of justice 
                                                                                                                                    
African legal system (1991) 577; A le Cordeur “The occupation of the Cape, 1795-1854” in 
Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 87. 
137  S 3 of the Charter of Justice of 1832. See Thomas 2014 Fundamina 909; Thomas “The 
changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al 
(eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 148; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 136; Hawthorne 
2006 Fundamina 72; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 246; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South 
Africa (1960) 20. 
138  S 32 of the Charter of Justice of 1832. See Thomas 2008 Fundamina 136; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 247; A le Cordeur “The occupation of the Cape, 1795-1854” in 
Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 87; Hahlo & Kahn Union of 
South Africa (1960). 
139  S 46 of the Charter of Justice of 1832. See Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 36; 
Thomas 2008 Fundamina 136; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 72; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 
(1992) 247-248; A le Cordeur “The occupation of the Cape, 1795-1854” in Cameron & Spies 
(eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 87; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa 
(1960) 18-19. 
140  Ordinance 72 of 1830 (C). See Thomas 2008 Fundamina 136-137; Hawthorne 2006 
Fundamina 72; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 247; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal 
system (1991) 577; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 19. 
141  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 146; Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 36; Church et al Human rights 
from a comparative perspective (2007) 55; Thomas 2006 Fundamina 257; Zimmerman “Good 
faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 217; Erasmus 1991 
SALJ 269.  
142  For more detail on the development of equity in English law see Thomas 2006 Fundamina 
253-254; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 66-67; Erasmus 1991 SALJ 267-268. For a 
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and fairness, but also “a system of rules and doctrines supplementing statutory 
and common law”.143 As Roman-Dutch law with its inherent equity was retained as 
the applicable law in the Cape, there could be no separate jurisdiction for law and 
equity.144  
 
What then was the role of equity in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good 
Hope? In an attempt to answer this question Thomas perused the early Cape law 
reports and found that they referred to equity on a regular basis.145 Sometimes the 
references were used to denote equity in the general non-technical sense of the 
word i.e. fairness.146 More significantly, he also found cases where equity was 
referred to as a separate legal system as found in English law.147 In addition, he 
found a number of references to authorities on equity in English and American 
law.148 He argues that the English barristers and judges interpreted and applied 
Roman-Dutch law restrictively which resulted in a vacuum that was filled by 
English law including English equity jurisprudence.149 This leads him to the 
                                                                                                                                    
discussion on the role of equity in eighteenth century English contract law see Barnard Critical 
legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 49-53. 
143  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 253. See also Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in 
Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 145-146. 
144  Erasmus 1991 SALJ 269 quoting a letter by Viscount Goderich: “It results from this 
determination the Office of Chancellor as a distinct Judicial Office will not be established by the 
Charter of Justice”. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 36. 
145  See Thomas 2006 Fundamina 258-259 and the sources referred to by him. See also Thomas 
“The changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et 
al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 148. 
146  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 258 and the cases referred to by him in Annexure “A” of his article. 
These included cases decided prior to the changes made by the British in respect of the legal 
administration at the Cape. 
147  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 259 and the cases referred to by him in Annexure “B” of his article. 
148  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 259 stating that references included Fonblanque on Equity, Chitty’s 
Equity Index and Story (the cases in which these references appear are listed in Annexure “C” 
of his article). See also Thomas 2014 Fundamina 907-915 on the influence of American law on 
the nineteenth century Cape common law. 
149  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 261. See also Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the 
South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht 
(2014) 148. 
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conclusion that the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope did in fact exercise 
an equitable jurisdiction.150 
 
However, he shows that the Supreme Court’s equitable jurisdiction was limited as 
time passed.151 He refers to the 1876 case of Mills and Sons v Trustees of 
Benjamin Bros where it is stated as follows: 
 
Now it is quite true that this Court is a Court of Equity as well as of 
Common Law, but it can administer equity only so far as it is consistent 
with the principles of Roman-Dutch law.152 
 
Almost three decades later, the court expounded upon this position in Estate 
Thomas v Kerr: 
 
The remark is often been made that this Court is a Court of equity as well 
as of law, and the remark is perfectly just, although not exactly in the 
same sense in which it would apply to the practice of the Courts in 
England. In this country there has never been a separation between the 
two modes of administering remedial justice, but the power of the Court 
to exercise an equitable jurisdiction is so far as it is not inconsistent with 
the fixed principles of the Dutch law has been repeatedly recognised. 
Where the Court has to elect between the rigid application of a rule of the 
old law to a case not clearly contemplated by that law, and the 
application of an equitable principle which does not defeat the old law but 
prevents any injustice from its rigid application, the Court would be quite 
justified in choosing the latter alternative.153 
 
Therefore, Thomas argues that initially the Supreme Court exercised an equitable 
jurisdiction, but that the court limited its own equity jurisdiction in order to ensure 
                                            
150  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 260 and the cases referred to him in n 72. 
151  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 260. See also Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the 
South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht 
(2014) 148-149. 
152  Mills and Sons v Trustees of Benjamin Bros 1876 6 Buch 121. 
153  Estate Thomas v Kerr and another 1903 20 SC 366. See also Hahlo & Kahn South African 
legal system (1991) 138. 
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legal certainty.154 As will become clear, legal certainty was an important goal in 
English law. Thomas further argues that this limitation was not intended to negate 
the ideas of equity in Roman-Dutch law as a concept that could be used to 
address injustices that resulted from the strict adherence to rules of law.155 
However, these developments set the scene to negate the corrective function of 
equity and have been used to argue “that the South African courts are not courts 
of conscience”.156 As will be seen below,157 this further negation of the role of 
equity in the South African law is related to the theory of legal positivism.158 
 
A drastic change from the flexible Roman-Dutch legal system was the introduction 
of the doctrine of stare decisis by the British.159 This doctrine was not introduced 
through the enactment of legislation but by the judges of the Supreme Court who 
were trained in English law.160 This is most probably because it was such an 
important part of the English law and promoted legal certainty: 
 
                                            
154  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 258ff, esp 260. 
155  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 261-262. This can also be deduced from the court’s discussion in 
Estate Thomas v Kerr and another 1903 20 SC 366 (quoted at n 153 supra). 
156  Thomas 2006 Fundamina 261. This is illustrated in para 2 2 1 2 infra. 
157  See the discussion in the text at n 165 infra. 
158  Dolezalek Stare decisis (1989) 3. 
159  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 132; Thomas 2011 Litnet Akademies 240; Church et al Human rights from a 
comparative perspective (2007) 63; Thomas 2006 Fundamina 261; Erasmus “The interaction 
of substantive law and procedure” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 150; 
De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 249, 260; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 
240; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van Romeins-Hollandse reg (1983) 455; Hahlo & Kahn Union of 
South Africa (1960) 29. 
160  Zimmerman & Visser “Introdution: South African law as a mixed legal system” in Zimmerman & 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 15 shows that this happened as early as 1830 in the case 
of In re Taute 1830 1 Menz 497 where the court relied on its own previous decision. See also 
Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 132; Thomas 2011 Litnet Akademies 240; Thomas 2006 Fundamina 261; 
Erasmus “The interaction of substantive law and procedure” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 150; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 240-242; Hahlo 
& Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 29. 
37 
 
When we come to the common law of England we note that one of its 
leading characteristics is the weight attached to judicial precedent. In no 
country is such great authority or respect shown for previous judicial 
decisions as in England … This view is apparently based on the balance 
of convenience, it being considered that the unsettling of what has been 
once established and acted on outweighs the advantage to be derived 
from the introduction of the correct rule.161  
 
The strict adherence to the principle of stare decisis162 is also related to legal 
positivism163 and was made possible by the establishment of law reports.164 
 
Legal positivism165 as developed by the English philosophers Bentham and Austin 
was exported during the British colonisation.166 In this context, legal positivism 
refers to the idea “that laws are man-made commands issued by a sovereign and 
that there is no relation between law and morality”.167 It describes what the law is 
and not what it should be.168 This means that the rules of law must be identified, 
followed and applied without any consideration of the morals underlying the 
rules.169 One of the consequences of legal positivism is legal formalism which 
refers to the ideology that “all law is based on legal doctrine and principles which 
                                            
161  Kotzé 1917 SALJ 290. See also Dolezalek Stare decisis (1989) 1. 
162  See the discussion in the text at n 165 infra. 
163  Dolezalek Stare decisis (1989) 3. 
164  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 138. The oldest law reports in South Africa dates back to 1828 
(Menzies Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope 1828-1849).  
165  For a general exposition on the development and meaning of the theory of legal positivism 
(including its relevance in South African jurisprudence) see Kroeze “Legal positivism” in 
Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 62-83. 
166  Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den 
Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 149; Devenish 2005 TSAR 555; 
Thomas 2004 Fundamina 193; Bennett & Peart Sourcebook of African customary law 
(1991) 2-3; Brookes History of native policy (1924) 172-173.  
167  Thomas 2003 De Jure 111. See also Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law 
(2014) 41; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 74-75; Kroeze “Legal positivism” in Roederer & 
Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 65-66; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 193. 
168  Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 74-75. 
169  Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 75. 
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can be deduced from precedents”.170 Accordingly, there is only one correct way of 
deciding a case (according to the existing principles and rules and law) and it is 
not the court’s task to consider the relevant policy considerations or whether 
justice was achieved between the parties.171 Devenish and Thomas argue that 
these ideologies substituted the ideas of equity and morality as found in Roman-
Dutch law.172 These ideologies and their influence on the role of fairness in the 
South African common law of contract are discussed in the next chapter.173 
 
Related to the ideas of legal positivism which also arrived at the Cape with the 
British is the sovereign parliamentary system of government modelled on the 
Westminster model.174 Dicey defined English parliamentary sovereignty as 
follows: 
 
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less 
than this, namely that Parliament … has, under the English constitution, 
the right to make or unmake any law whatever: and, further, than no 
                                            
170  Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 76. See also Hoctor “Legal realism” in Roederer & Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 158; Botha 2001 THRHR (2) 375-376; Atiyah Rise and fall of 
freedom of contract (1979) 389. 
171  Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 76; Hoctor “Legal realism” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2006) 158; Botha 2001 THRHR (2) 375-376. For an account of these 
developments in the English law of contract see Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual 
justice (2005) 54-57. 
172  Devenish 2005 TSAR 555 stating that: “It took root in the native soil and unfortunately was to 
completely supplant the Roman-Dutch heritage of natural law of, inter alia, Grotius, Huber and 
Voet”. See also Thomas 2004 Fundamina 195 who argues that these ideologies “changed the 
character of South African private law” which resulted in the disappearance of bona fides from 
the South African law of contract. See, more recently, Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona 
fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van 
het recht (2014) 149. 
173  See the discussion in para  2 2 3 4 infra. 
174  Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 2.2(d); Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law 
and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 24; Devenish 2005 TSAR 556; Du Bois 2004 
International Journal of Legal Information 222. 
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person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.175 
 
Finally, with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, arrived the principle of the 
rule of law. The classical conception by Dicey is described with reference to three 
meanings:  
 
• … the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as 
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the 
existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide 
discretionary authority on the part of the government …; 
• … equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the 
ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law courts …;  
• … the law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries 
naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the source but the 
consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by 
the courts … thus the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of 
the land.176 
 
The first two meanings are relevant for this research topic.177 First, that the law is 
supreme and that all public power must be exercised in terms of the law and not 
arbitrarily.178 Secondly, that everyone is equal before the law and that law should 
                                            
175  Dicey Introduction to study of the law of the constitution (1965) 39-40. See also De Vos & 
Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 42; Barnard-Naudé “The post-
apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 24; Van 
der Vyver 1982 SALJ 561; Dugard Human rights (1978) 37-38; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South 
Africa (1960) 146. 
176  Dicey Introduction to study of the law of the constitution (1965) 202-203. See also De Vos & 
Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 78; Burns Administrative law (2013) 
105-106; Freedman “Constitutional law: structures of Government” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 
5(3) (2012) para 17; Dugard Human rights (1978) 37-38; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa 
(1960) 133. 
177  It must be remembered that there never was and still is no written British constitution (De Vos 
& Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 78). 
178  It is interesting to note that Dicey differentiated between arbitrary and discretionary decisions in 
explaining the role of equity in the English law: “Equity, which originally meant the 
discretionary, not to say arbitrary interference of the Chancellor, for the … purpose of securing 
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be applied equally to all persons irrespective of their status. Botha179 explains that 
the rule of law is based upon the generality and autonomy of the law. Generality 
refers to the fact that any government action (including decisions of the judiciary) 
should be based on clear and general rules that are known to the public and apply 
to everyone equally. Vague, open-ended and uncertain legal rules are not 
permitted because such rules can lead to arbitrary decisions. Therefore, the 
purpose of this conception of the rule of law is to ensure equality before the law 
and to protect the freedom of the individual against the abuse of state power.180 
Thus, it is more concerned with formal equality before the law.181 According to 
Botha,182 the autonomy of the law refers to the fact that the law is independent 
and detached from specific interests or any religious, moral, economic or other 
non-legal norm or belief. Therefore, this conception of the rule of law is based on 
the belief that law and politics do not mix and hence the judiciary is independent 
from the other organs of state and must ensure that these organs of state act 
according to the law. Furthermore, the judiciary must itself act within the confines 
of the law and merely apply these clear and general rules to a specific case. 
Accordingly, courts are not allowed to make legal rules or become concerned with 
policy considerations which results in a formal understanding of the rule of law as 
grounded in legal positivism and formalism.   
 
The consequence of the importation of parliamentary sovereignty and this 
conception of the rule of law was that judges at the Cape had no authority to test 
                                                                                                                                    
substantial justice between the parties in a given case” (Dicey Introduction to study of the law 
of the constitution (1965) 381). As such, equity had a role to play in promoting the rule of law. 
179  Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 524. See also Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 166. 
180  Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 10; Freedman “Constitutional law: structures 
of Government” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 5(3) (2012) para 17; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 524; 
Dugard Human rights (1978) 37. 
181  The idea of formal equality is discussed in more detail in para  1 8 2 2 infra. 
182  Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 524-525. See also Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court 
Review 166. 
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the morality or substance of any legislation passed by the Cape colonial 
parliament.183  
 
1 5 2 4 English influences on the existing substantive law 
The English law exerted a direct influence on the substantive law of the colony, for 
example by the introduction of English mercantile law.184 It also exerted an indirect 
influence as evidenced by frequent references to English law rules in case law.185 
This is also true in respect of the South African common law of contract186 and this 
aspect is investigated in detail in the next chapter.187 
 
Furthermore, with the British imperial system came the new age of industrialism 
which involved the ideologies of individualism and capitalism.188 The idea of 
capitalism is related to the ideas of legal positivism and was developed by the 
Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith during the eighteenth century.189 
Thomas highlights that the English law of contract arriving in South Africa was 
                                            
183  Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in 
South Africa (2012) 24; Devenish 2005 TSAR 556; Van der Vyver 1982 SALJ 562. 
184  Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 576-577. See also Van der Merwe et al “The 
Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 150-154; 
Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137; Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 222; 
De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 261; Erasmus 1989 SALJ 669; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South 
Africa (1960) 19-20; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 20. 
185  Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 578. See also Van der Merwe et al “The 
Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 150; Thomas 
2008 Fundamina 138; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 260; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch 
law (1953) 20. 
186  Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 9ff; Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South 
Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 106, 108-109; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract law (2010) 36-37; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 262; Hahlo & Kahn South African 
legal system (1991) 578; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 443-444. 
187  See paras  2 2 3 4 (in the context of good faith) &  2 2 4 1 (in the context of public policy) infra. 
188  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137; A le Cordeur “The occupation of the Cape, 1795-1854” in 
Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 80-82. 
189  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 194; Thomas 2003 De Jure 110; 
Atiyah Rise and fall of freedom of contract (1979) 324ff. 
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based on and reflected the ideas of individualism and capitalism.190 The theories 
of individualism and capitalism were translated into the law of contract through an 
emphasis on the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract. Together with the 
theories of legal positivism and formalism as well as the system of parliamentary 
sovereignty, this resulted in the idea that the unfairness of a contract was not a 
matter for the courts but the business of the parties. As long as the parties 
complied with the formal requirements for an agreement it was binding.191 These 
changes in the common law of contract are discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter.192 
 
1 5 2 5 English influences in respect of indigenous people and the slave 
population 
In addition, the British moved away from the monopolistic mercantilism which was 
characteristic of the Dutch East India Company193 and implemented changes 
according to their policy of free trade and labour as developed out of their liberal 
capitalist ideologies.194 These changes were noticeable in respect of the position 
of indigenous people and slaves in the Cape colony. In 1828, the British 
introduced an ordinance to improve the situation of the colonial subjects of colour 
and to ensure equal treatment for all free persons within the Cape.195 It protected 
                                            
190  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137; Thomas 2004 Fundamina 194. See also Berat (ed) 
Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 56-57. 
191  Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den 
Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 149.  
192  See paras  2 2 3 4 (in the context of good faith) &  2 2 4 1 (in the context of public policy) infra.  
193  Cf the discussion in the text at n 77 supra.  
194  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 56-57; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137; Du 
Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 222; Le Cordeur “The occupation of the 
Cape, 1795-1854” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 80. 
195  Ordinance 50 of 1828 (C) as found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 26-
28. See Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 60; Church et al Human rights 
from a comparative perspective (2007) 58; Devenish 2005 TSAR 553; Bennett Customary law 
(2004) 35; A le Cordeur “The occupation of the Cape, 1795-1854” in Cameron & Spies (eds) 
Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 82-83; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 5; 
Linington (ed) Rogers’ native administration in the Union (1949) 200. 
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the rights of “Hottentots and other free persons of colour”196 in that it prohibited 
“restraints as to their residence, mode of life, and employment” and “compulsory 
services” to which other colonial subjects were not subject.197 It confirmed their 
competency to purchase and own land198 and contained measures to ensure that 
they were not forced into labour and that they received payment for wages in 
money and not liquor or tobacco.199 However, Bennett argues that this ordinance 
actually advanced the non-recognition of customary law because it entailed the 
application of Cape colony law to all disputes as the application of any other legal 
system would be regarded as discriminatory.200 Nevertheless, this did not prevent 
the indigenous people from continuing “to act and live in accordance with their 
traditional laws and customs”.201 
 
In line with their policy of free trade and labour, the British were also against 
slavery.202 The British parliament first passed the Act for the Abolition of the Slave 
Trade in 1807 which declared slave trading in Africa unlawful.203 Almost three 
                                            
196  The term “hottentots” referred to the Khoikhoi people (cf n 79 supra). 
197  S 2 of Ordinance 50 of 1828 (C). 
198  S 3 of Ordinance 50 of 1828 (C). 
199  S 4-6 of Ordinance 50 of 1828 (C). 
200  Bennett Customary law (2004) 35. See also SALC Project for harmonisation of common and 
indigenous law (1999) 6. 
201  Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 2-3. See also Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal 
pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 9. 
202  This attitude in respect of the Cape can be seen in art 8 of the Convention of London of 13 
August 1814 (cf n 128 supra) where it is stated that “[t]he Prince Sovereign of the United 
Netherlands, anxious to co-operate, in the most effectual manner, with His Majesty the King of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, so as to bring about the total abolition of the 
trade in slaves on the coast of Africa, and having spontaneously issued a Decree on the 15th of 
June, 1814, wherein it is enjoined, that no ships or vessels whatever, destined for the trade in 
slaves, be cleared out or equipped in any of the harbours or places of His dominions, nor 
admitted to the forts or possessions on the coast of Guinea, and that no inhabitants of that 
country shall be sold or exposed as slaves, - does moreover hereby engage to prohibit all His 
subjects in the most effectual manner and by the most solemn laws, from taking any share 
whatsoever in such human traffic” (my emphasis). 
203  (47 Geo 3 session 1 c 36). This statute came into effect in 1808 (Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137 
n 31). See also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 57. 
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decades thereafter, slavery was abolished in the Cape from 1 December 1834 by 
the Act for the Abolition of Slavery204 also passed by the British parliament.205  
 
These changes resulted in the dissatisfaction of the Dutch inhabitants in the 
Cape.206 The Dutch inhabitants were “[d]isturbed by the grant of equal civil rights 
to the coloured people and slave emancipation, resentful of an alien government 
and its discipline, [and] fearful of anglicisation”.207 From 1836 onwards, a number 
of large and organised groups moved out of the colony in what became known as 
the Great Trek.208 Some of the Trekkers (also called Voortrekkers or Boers) 
moved into Natal where a small British community was trading at Port Natal but 
they did not stay long and later moved north.209 The Great Trek also resulted in 
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205  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 58; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 137; 
Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 58; Devenish 2005 
TSAR 553; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 248; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system 
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208  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 67-69; 88; Van der Merwe et al “The 
Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 117; De Bruyn 
“The Great Trek” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 127; 
Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 6. 
209  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 90; Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of 
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para  1 5 3 infra. 
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the establishment of the two Trekker or Boer republics, the Orange Free State and 
the Transvaal which laid the foundation of Afrikaner culture.210 The two Boer 
republics are discussed below.211  
 
During the early period of British colonisation, the British expanded the colony of 
the Cape into the east where they encountered Xhosa-speaking people.212 These 
people posed a greater threat to the British than the Khoikhoi and the San and 
after the area (known as British Kaffraria) was occupied during 1846-1847,213 the 
British realised that non-recognition of the indigenous people’s customary law 
would be impractical.214 As a result, the British let the traditional leaders rule the 
local inhabitants in terms of customary law.215 However, in 1854, this policy 
changed to one where the British attempted to persuade the local inhabitants to 
give up their customary ways in favour of Christianity and British ideas of what 
society should look like.216 As part of this policy, magistrates were given the sole 
responsibility to administer justice between the indigenous people on the basis of 
the law applicable in the Cape colony.217 However, the system was so unworkable 
                                            
210  Thomas 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia 6; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 139; Devenish 2005 
TSAR 557; De Bruyn “The Great Trek” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South 
Africa (1988) 127. 
211  See paras  1 5 4 &  1 5 5 infra.  
212  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 75; Bennett Customary law (2004) 35; 
Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 5. 
213  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 76; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 138 n 39; 
Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 319. 
214  Bennett Customary law (2004) 36; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 37; Hahlo & Kahn Union of 
South Africa (1960) 319. 
215  Bennett Customary law (2004) 36. See also Van Niekerk 2010 Fundamina 472 n 1; Church et 
al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 59; Van Niekerk Interaction of 
indigenous law and Western law (1995) 57-58; Church Marriage and women in 
Bophuthatswana (1989) 113. 
216  Bennett Customary law (2004) 36. See also Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 59; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 319; Church Marriage and 
women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 113. 
217  This was confirmed by the Cape Supreme Court in Tabata v Tabata 1887 5 SC 329. See also 
Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 59; Bennett Customary 
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that the magistrates in the area simply continued to decide cases according to 
customary law.218 This position was relieved in small part by the application of 
customary law in matters of succession.219 Although the general policy of non-
recognition was criticised, it remained in force until 1927.220 
 
With the occupation and annexation of the Transkeian territories between 1877 
and 1894,221 the British followed a different approach which was inspired by the 
Shepstonian system222 applicable in Natal.223 This was due to the remoteness of 
                                                                                                                                    
law (2004) 36; Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 227; Hahlo & Kahn 
Union of South Africa (1960) 319.  
218  Bennett Customary law (2004) 36 referring to a report by a magistrate cited in Brookes History 
of Native Policy (1924) 183-184. See also Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in 
Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 9; Church et al Human rights 
from a comparative perspective (2007) 59; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and 
Western law (1995) 58; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 37; Church Marriage and women in 
Bophuthatswana (1989) 114; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 319. 
219  Native Succession Act 18 of 1864 (C) & Native Successions Ordinance 10 of 1864 (British 
Kaffraria). See Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker 
(eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 8; Van Niekerk 2010 Fundamina 472 n 1; Church et 
al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 59; Bennett Customary law (2004) 36; 
Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 58; Van Niekerk 1990 
Codicillus 37; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 114; Hahlo & Kahn 
Union of South Africa (1960) 319 esp n 6. British Kaffraria was incorporated into the British 
colony in 1866 (Incorporation of British Kaffraria Act 3 of 1865 (C) as found in Eybers (ed) 
Select constitutional documents (1918) 59-61; see also Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South 
Africa (2014) 80). 
220  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 9; Bennett Customary law (2004) 36; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 37; 
Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 114-115. See also para  1 6 3 infra in 
respect of the position after 1927. 
221  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 59; Bennett Customary 
law (2004) 36; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 319. See also Eybers (ed) Select 
constitutional documents (1918) 65 (annexation of Transkeian territories in 1879), 68 
(annexation of Tembuland in 1885), 69 (annexation of Xesibe Country in 1886), 70 (annexation 
of Rode Valley in 1887), 76 (annexation of Pondoland in 1894). 
222  The Shepstonian system is discussed in para  1 5 3 2 infra. 
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the region and the fact that there were few Europeans resident in the area.224 The 
colonial courts in these areas were permitted to apply customary law in disputes 
between the indigenous people225 but certain indigenous practices such as 
initiation dances and witchcraft were prohibited.226 Furthermore, customary law 
was applicable in so far as it was not repugnant to “the general principles of 
humanity observed throughout the civilised world”.227 
 
In the northern parts of the Cape, specifically in Bechuanaland, the British 
permitted the traditional leaders to apply customary law in disputes between 
members of their communities.228 This was later confirmed officially and traditional 
leaders were granted exclusive civil jurisdiction.229  
 
                                                                                                                                    
223  Bennett Customary law (2004) 36; SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous 
law (1999) 7; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 4; Linington (ed) Rogers’ native 
administration in the Union (1949) 200-201. For a detailed exposition of the native policy in 
respect of Transkei see Brookes History of native policy (1924) ch 4.  
224  Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 38. 
225  See Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 320 n 10 for a list of the statutes dealing with 
the application of customary law in the Transkeian territories. See also Van Niekerk 2010 
Fundamina 472 n 1; Bennett Customary law (2004) 36; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous 
law and Western law (1995) 60; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 116; 
Linington (ed) Rogers’ native administration in the Union (1949) 201; Kennedy & Schlosberg 
Law and custom of the South African constitution (1935) 403; Brookes History of native policy 
(1924) 187. 
226  Bennett Customary law (2004) 36; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law 
(1995) 60; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 38; Brookes History of native policy (1924) 187. 
227  Van Niekerk 2010 Fundamina 472 n 1; Bennett Customary law (2004) 36; Brookes History of 
native policy (1924) 187. 
228  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 59; Bennett Customary 
law (2004) 37; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 61;  
Linington (ed) Rogers’ native administration in the Union (1949) 201. 
229  Ss 20, 31-33 of Proc 2 of 1885 (British Bechuanaland). See Church et al Human rights from a 
comparative perspective (2007) 59; Bennett Customary law (2004) 37; Church Marriage and 
women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 116; Linington (ed) Rogers’ native administration in the 
Union (1949) 201; Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African constitution 
(1935) 403. 
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1 5 3 Natal Colony 
1 5 3 1 Retention of Roman-Dutch law 
After the arrival of the Trekkers in Natal in early 1838, the British occupied and 
annexed the district of Natal in 1844-1845.230 It was decided that the Roman-
Dutch law as “accepted, and administered by the legal tribunals of the Colony of 
the Cape of Good Hope” would be the law of Natal.231 Subsequently, the law of 
Natal was influenced by the law laid down by the Cape courts and English law 
played an important role in the development of the law of Natal.232 English law 
rules were imported directly and indirectly.233 In addition, the judges in Natal were 
more willing to look at English law for guidance than in other regions of South 
Africa.234 
 
1 5 3 2 Approach in respect of indigenous people and their laws  
The annexation of Natal caused the Trekkers to leave the area which resulted in a 
small British population and a large indigenous group.235 The non-recognition of 
                                            
230  The relevant letter patent (dated 31 May 1844) and proclamation (dated 21 August 1845) can 
be found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 182-183, 183-184. For more 
background on the circumstances leading to the annexation of Natal see Berat (ed) 
Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 92-93; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 250; 
De Bruyn “The Great Trek” in Cameron & Spies (eds) Illustrated history of South Africa (1988) 
135; Welsh Roots of segregation (1973) 7ff; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 6; Lee 
Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 11. 
231  Ordinance 12 of 1845 (C) as found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 227-
229. See De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 250; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system 
(1991) 576 n 52; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 24; Lee Introduction to Roman-
Dutch law (1953) 11.  
232  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 24-25. See also De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 
(1992) 251; Spiller History of the District and Supreme Courts of Natal (1986) 83. 
233  Spiller History of the District and Supreme Courts of Natal (1986) 88-89; Hahlo & Kahn Union 
of South Africa (1960) 24-25. 
234  Spiller History of the District and Supreme Courts of Natal (1986) 90-93; Hahlo & Kahn Union 
of South Africa (1960) 24-25. 
235 Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 97; Church et al Human rights from a 
comparative perspective (2007) 60; Bennett Customary law (2004) 37; Church Marriage and 
women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 121; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 321. 
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customary law was not a practical option for the small British population who were 
intimidated by the large number of indigenous people.236 These circumstances led 
to the first policy of indirect rule of customary law in South Africa.237  
 
The new regime was introduced in Natal Ordinance 3 of 1849238 that repealed the 
Cape ordinance aimed at improving the situation of the colonial subjects of 
colour239 to the extent necessary in order to permit the indigenous people “to 
administer justice towards each other as they had been used to do in former 
times”.240 The customary law was not to be abrogated except where “repugnant to 
the general principles of humanity recognized throughout the whole Civilized 
World”.241 In addition, the ultimate administrative and judicial authority vested in 
the British Crown242 and the ordinance introduced the office of the Lieutenant-
Governor, regarded as the Supreme Chief of all Natives, who were granted “all the 
power and authority which, according to the laws, customs, and usages of the 
natives, are held and enjoyed by any supreme or paramount native chief”.243 As 
this regime was the initiative of the Diplomatic Agent and Secretary of Native 
                                            
236  Bennett Customary law (2004) 38; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 319. 
237  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 98; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 141. For a 
detailed exposition of native policy in Natal see Brookes History of native policy (1924) ch 3. 
238  An extract from the ordinance can be found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents 
(1918) 235-238. 
239  Ordinance 50 of 1828 (C). Cf the discussion in the text at n 195 supra. 
240  The Royal instruction dated 8 March 1848 as quoted in Ordinance 3 of 1849 (N). See also 
Thomas 2008 Fundamina 141; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective 
(2007) 60; Bennett Customary law (2004) 38; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and 
Western law (1995) 62; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 321-322. 
241  The Royal instruction dated 8 March 1848 as quoted in Ordinance 3 of 1849 (N). See also Van 
Niekerk 2010 Fundamina 472 n 1; Bennett Customary law (2004) 38; Hahlo & Kahn Union of 
South Africa (1960) 322. 
242  The Royal instruction dated 8 March 1848 as quoted in Ordinance 3 of 1849 (N) state that 
“[w]e do hereby reserve to Ourselves full power and authority as We from time to time shall 
see occasion, to amend the Laws of the said Natives, and to provide for the better 
administration of Justice among them, as may be found practicable”. See also Hahlo & Kahn 
Union of South Africa (1960) 321. 
243  S 4 of Ordinance 3 of 1849 (N). See Church et al Human rights from a comparative 
perspective (2007) 60; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 38. 
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Affairs, Theophilus Shepstone (known as Somtseu (Nimrod) to the Zulus), it 
became known as the Shepstonian system.244  
 
The Native Administration Law245 was introduced in 1875 and repealed 
Ordinance 3 of 1849. It was enacted to “make better provision for the 
Administration of Justice among the Native Population of Natal, and for the 
gradual assimilation of Native Law to the Laws of the Colony”.246 It established 
“Administrators of Native Law” courts where the administrators were from 
European descent,247 a Native High Court248 and a Court of Appeal.249 The civil 
jurisdiction of the African native chiefs was limited to certain instances (for 
example ownership of or succession to land), while all other civil matters fell under 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the Administrators of Native Law or the Native High 
Court.250 Section 5 confirmed that all matters must be adjudicated in accordance 
with customary law except where it worked “manifest injustice” or was “repugnant 
to the settled principles and policy of natural equity”.251 
 
                                            
244  Devenish 2005 TSAR 557; Bennett Customary law (2004) 38; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 38; 
Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 321; Brookes History of native policy (1924) 41. 
For a detailed account on the introduction of this regime see Welsh Roots of segregation 
(1973) ch 2; Brookes History of native policy (1924) ch 3. 
245  26 of 1875 (N) as found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 247-251.  
246  Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 247. 
247  Ss 2 & 3 of Law 26 of 1875 (N). 
248  S 7 of Law 26 of 1875 (N). This court normally consisted of a single judge but could be 
assisted by Administrators of Native Law, Native Chiefs or Native Officers (Hahlo & Kahn 
Union of South Africa (1960) 322). 
249  S 9 of Law 26 of 1875 (N). This court was a branch of the Supreme Court of the Colony and 
consisted of a judge of the Supreme Court, the Secretary for Native Affairs and the Native High 
Court judge himself (Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 322). 
250  S 5 of Law 26 of 1875 (N) as amended by s 2 of the Native Administration Law 44 of 1887 (N). 
See further Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 322-323. 
251  See also Thomas 2008 Fundamina 141; Bennett Customary law (2004) 38; Hahlo & Kahn 
Union of South Africa (1960) 322-323. 
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The next step in recognising customary laws was codification.252 There were 
various attempts to codify the customary law and a draft Code of 1878 became 
applicable in Zululand in 1887.253 This Code was not an accurate codification of 
customary law and drafted without consultation with the Zulu community.254 As a 
consequence, the Code was ignored to a certain extent in practice and disputes 
were adjudicated in accordance with the customary law as practised by the 
people.255 In the rest of Natal, the Code of Native Law was promulgated in terms 
of Law 19 of 1891.256 The Code did not codify the entire customary law applicable 
and in many instances did not reflect the actual customary law as practiced by the 
indigenous people.257 In addition, the Code could only be amended by legislation 
which made it rigid and out of step with changing circumstances.258 
 
The administration of justice in respect of the indigenous communities was 
consolidated in the Courts Act 49 of 1898.259 Section 80 confirmed the application 
of customary law to all civil cases between indigenous people subject to a 
repugnancy clause: 
 
                                            
252  For a more detailed account of the process of codification of customary law in Natal see 
Bennett Customary law (2004) 38-39; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 323. 
253  Bennett Customary law (2004) 39 n 33; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western 
law (1995) 64; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 38.  
254  Du Plessis “The historical functions of law: developments after 1500” in Humby et al (eds) Law 
and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 113. 
255  Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 122-123; Linington (ed) Rogers’ 
native administration in the Union (1949) 201. 
256  Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 259. See also Kennedy & Schlosberg Law 
and custom of the South African constitution (1935) 404; Brookes History of native policy 
(1924) 192.  
257  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 323. See also Van der Merwe et al “The Republic 
of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 107-108; Church et al 
Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 60; Church Marriage and women in 
Bophuthatswana (1989) 123. 
258  Bennett Customary law (2004) 39 n 33; Linington (ed) Rogers’ native administration in the 
Union (1949) 201; Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African constitution 
(1935) 404. 
259  See Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 6. 
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All civil Native cases shall be tried according to Native laws, customs and 
usages, save so far as may be otherwise specially provided by law, or as 
may be of a nature to work some manifest injustice, or be repugnant to 
the settled principles and policy of natural equity…260 
 
1 5 4 Transvaal 
1 5 4 1 Roman-Dutch law as the applicable legal system 
With the Trekkers, the Roman-Dutch law arrived in the Transvaal and was 
adopted as the common law of the land.261 In terms of article 31 of the Thirty-three 
Articles confirmed by the Volksraad in 1849262 the “Hollandsche wet” would be 
applicable in the absence of any legislation “but only in a moderate way and 
according to the customs of South Africa and for the prosperity and welfare of the 
community”.263 The term “Hollandsche wet” was clarified in the first addendum to 
the Constitution of the South African Republic of 1859.264 It stated that the work of 
Van der Linden’s Koopmans Handboek was binding, and where not sufficiently 
                                            
260 The section provided for certain exemptions: “except that all cases arising out of trade 
transactions of a nature unknown to Native law shall be adjudicated upon according to the 
principles laid down by the ordinary colonial law in such cases: Provided that nothing in this 
section shall be deemed to extend the operation of any law of limitation or prescription of 
action to any case to which but for this Act such law would not have applied.” See Bekker 
Seymour’s customary law (1993) 6; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana 
(1989) 124; Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African constitution 
(1935) 404. 
261  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 139; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 575-576 esp 
n 52; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 21. 
262  As found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 349-356. See also Wildenboer 
2015 Fundamina 457. 
263  Art 31 as translated by Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 356. See also 
Wildenboer 2015 Fundamina 465; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 251; Hahlo & Kahn South 
African legal system (1991) 575-576 esp n 52; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 21. 
For a detailed discussion on the application of art 31 by the courts in a number of cases see 
Wildenboer 2015 Fundamina 469-475. 
264  As found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 416-417. See also Wildenboer 
2015 Fundamina 466. 
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clear or it did not deal with the relevant issues, Van Leeuwen’s Roomsch 
Hollandsch Recht and De Groot’s Inleidinge would apply.265  
 
Hahlo and Kahn argue that it was not pure Roman-Dutch law as found in these 
texts that applied, but rather the Roman-Dutch law as administered in the Cape.266 
They state that Cape case law was quoted in the early law reports on a frequent 
basis and included further references to English and Scottish law.267 Furthermore, 
the courts did not consider themselves confined by the three Roman-Dutch texts 
referred to above, but also looked at other Roman-Dutch writers and 
commentators.268 Finally, there was a tendency to borrow from Cape 
legislation.269 
 
1 5 4 2 Approach in respect of indigenous people and their laws 
In respect of the position of customary law, initially the indigenous people were 
subject to the same laws as the other inhabitants of the Transvaal.270 Later, a firm 
and consistent policy on customary law emerged with Law 4 of 1885 which aimed 
to maintain control over the indigenous people.271 This Law established a court 
                                            
265  Arts 1 & 2. See also Wildenboer 2015 Fundamina 466-467; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 139-
140; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 252; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system 
(1991) 575-576 esp n 52; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 21. 
266  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 22. See also Wildenboer 2015 Fundamina 470. 
267  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 22. See also Wildenboer 2015 Fundamina 469. 
268  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 22. See also Wildenboer 2015 Fundamina 469. 
269  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 23. See also Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of 
South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 149. 
270  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 60; Bekker Seymour’s 
customary law (1993) 5; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39; Church Marriage and women in 
Bophuthatswana (1989) 125; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 324-325. 
271  An extract of this statute can be found in Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 5. See 
Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 60-61; Bennett Customary 
law (2004) 39; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 125; Hahlo & Kahn 
Union of South Africa (1960) 325; Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African 
constitution (1935) 404. For a detailed exposition of native policy in Transvaal during this time 
see Brookes History of native policy (1924) ch 5. 
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system for the administration of justice between indigenous people.272 Native 
commissioners were appointed in larger native populated areas with jurisdiction 
over disputes between indigenous people and in smaller areas the local 
magistrates were appointed as Native commissioners ex officio.273 In respect of 
the applicable law, section 2 provided the following: 
 
The laws, habits and customs hitherto observed among the Blacks shall 
continue to remain in force in this Republic as long as they have not 
appeared to be inconsistent with the general principles of civilization 
recognized in the civilized world.274 
 
In addition, section 5 prohibited the application of customary law if it resulted in 
injustice or was in conflict with accepted principles of natural justice.275 
Furthermore, the State President was appointed as the paramount chief and 
granted with “full power, right and authority to review the proceedings in any case, 
and if necessary to annul or to amend the judgment”.276 Except for a number of 
minor changes, this system was applicable until 1927.277 
 
                                            
272  Bennett Customary law (2004) 39; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39; Church Marriage and 
women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 126. 
273  Bennett Customary law (2004) 39; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 5; Van Niekerk 
1990 Codicillus 39. 
274 As quoted by Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 5. See also Van Niekerk 2010 
Fundamina 472 n 1; Bennett Customary law (2004) 39; Bekker Seymour’s customary law 
(1993) 5; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana 
(1989) 125; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 325; Linington (ed) Rogers’ native 
administration in the Union (1949) 201; Brookes History of native policy (1924) 193. 
275  See Bennett Customary law (2004) 39; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 5; 
Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 126. 
276  S 6 as quoted by Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 5. See also Van Niekerk 1990 
Codicillus 39; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 325. 
277  Bennett Customary law (2004) 40; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 6. See para  1 6 3 
infra in respect of the position after 1927. 
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1 5 4 3 British annexation and consequences 
When the British annexed the Transvaal in 1900278 the existing legal system was 
retained.279 It was proclaimed that “[t]he Roman-Dutch law except in so far as it is 
modified by legislative enactments shall be the law of this Colony”.280 Thereafter, 
an extensive reception of Cape legislation followed.281  
 
1 5 5 Orange Free State  
1 5 5 1 Roman-Dutch law as the applicable legal system 
As with the Transvaal, the Roman-Dutch law system was adopted in the Orange 
Free State. Article 56 of the Constitution of the Orange Free State of 1854282 held 
that “[t]he Roman-Dutch law shall be the principal law” in the absence of any other 
legislation.283 Again, the term “Roman-Dutch” had to be clarified: 
 
That the Roman-Dutch law is accepted as the fundamental law of this 
State in so far as it was found in force in the Cape Colony at the time of 
the appointment of the English judges, in the place of the previously 
existing Council of Justice, and not to include any new laws and 
institutions, local and general, which may have been introduced into 
Holland and which are not based on or are in conflict with the old Roman-
Dutch law as expounded in the text-books of Voet, Van Leeuwen, Grotius 
                                            
278  Proc 15 of 1900 (T) as found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 514-515. 
279  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 24; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law 
(1953) 12. 
280  Proc 14 of 1902 (T). See Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective 
(2007) 56 n 52; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 253; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa 
(1960) 24; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 12; Eybers (ed) Select constitutional 
documents (1918) 515. 
281  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 24. See also Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of 
South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 149-150. 
282  As found in Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 285-296. 
283  Art 56 as translated by Eybers (ed) Select constitutional documents (1918) 295. See also 
Thomas 2008 Fundamina 140; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 254; Hahlo & Kahn South 
African legal system (1991) 576 n 52; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 22. 
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De Papegaai, Merula, Lybrecht, Van der Linden, Van der Keessel and 
the authorities cited by them. 284 
 
Similarly to the law in the Transvaal, the law in the Orange Free State was also 
influenced directly and indirectly by the law applicable in the Cape.285 
 
1 5 5 2 Approach in respect of indigenous people and their laws 
Church et al argue that the Orange Free State had a consistent policy on 
customary law and that is was one of non-recognition.286 Hahlo and Khan maintain 
that it was not necessary for the Orange Free State to recognise customary law as 
it only dealt with “the overflow from adjoining native areas”.287 However, two areas 
populated by indigenous communities necessitated a measure of recognition of 
customary law. First, the Chief in the Witzieshoek Native Reserve was authorised 
to apply customary law in civil disputes between community members,288 and 
secondly, specific recognition was given to customary marriages in the Thaba 
‘Nchu reserve.289  
                                            
284  Art 1 of Ordinance 1 of 1856 (O) as translated by Wessels in History of Roman-Dutch law 
(1908) 369-370. See also De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 254; Eybers (ed) Select 
constitutional documents (1918) 301-311). 
285  Cf the discussion in the text at n 266 supra. See further Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of 
South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 149; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 254-255. 
286  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 60. See also Church 
Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 124; Brookes History of native policy 
(1924) 181, 195. Contra Bennett Customary law (2004) 40. 
287  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 327. See also Church et al Human rights from a 
comparative perspective (2007) 60; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western 
law (1995) 67. 
288  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 142; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law 
(1995) 68; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana 
(1989) 124; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 327; Linington (ed) Rogers’ native 
administration in the Union (1949) 201-202; Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the 
South African constitution (1935) 405. 
289  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 60; Van Niekerk Interaction 
of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 68; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39; Brookes 
History of native policy (1924) 194. 
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1 5 5 3 British annexation and its consequences 
When the British annexed the Orange Free State in 1900290 the existing legal 
system was retained.291 Similar to the position in the Transvaal, it was decided 
that “[t]he Roman-Dutch law shall be the common law of the Colony in so far as it 
has been introduced into, and is applicable to South Africa”.292 As with the 
Transvaal, an extensive reception of Cape legislation followed.293 
 
1 6 UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SEGREGATION (1910-1947) 
1 6 1 Establishment of the Union and its legal ideologies 
As explained above, prior to the establishment of the Union of South Africa, South 
Africa consisted of four separate British colonies, namely the Cape, Natal, the 
Orange River Colony (Orange Free State) and the Transvaal.294 After the South 
African War, representatives of the four colonies met in a national convention in 
October 1908 which culminated in the South Africa Act295 which was passed by 
the British parliament in September 1909.296 The Union of South Africa was 
proclaimed on 31 May 1910, and by the Statute of Westminster in 1931, it granted 
sovereign independence.297 Its constitutional model was based on the English 
                                            
290  The proclamation for the annexation of the Orange Free State can be found in Eybers (ed) 
Select constitutional documents (1918) 344-345. 
291  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 56; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 255; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 24; Lee Introduction 
to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 12. 
292  S 1 of Ordinance 3 of 1902 (O) as quoted by Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 24. 
293  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 24. See also Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of 
South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 149-150. 
294  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 7. 
295  (9 Edw 7 c 9). 
296  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 115, 149-152; Devenish 2005 TSAR 559; 
De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 255; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 571; 
Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 7; Lee Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (1953) 13. 
297  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 160; Devenish 2005 TSAR 562; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 255; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 571; Van der 
Vyver 1982 SALJ 570; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 7. 
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the courts followed a legal positivistic 
approach: 
 
In adopting a unitary state for South Africa, the architects of the Union 
adopted the Westminster paradigm, involving a potentially sovereign 
parliament and the jurisprudence of positivism as exemplified by 
Bentham, Austen, Dicey and in more recent times Kelsen and Hart. The 
essence of positivism is that it maintains a separation between law and 
morality. This jurisprudence was to have an inordinate detrimental 
influence on legal and jurisprudential development in South Africa.298  
 
It would also seem that this approach included the classical rule of law as 
contained in Dicey’s first two premises.299 Finally, the courts strictly adhered to the 
doctrine of stare decisis300 and the capitalist system introduced by the British was 
retained.301 
 
1 6 2 Unification of the common law 
Prior to the unification of South Africa, each colony had its own legal system and 
section 135 of the South Africa Act provided that the existing law in the four 
colonies would remain in force until repealed or amended.302 The different 
systems did not substantially deviate from each other as they were all based on 
                                            
298  Devenish 2005 TSAR 561. See also Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in 
Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.2(d); De Vos & Freedman (eds) 
South African constitutional law (2014) 53; Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa 
(2014) 150; Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and 
legal skills in South Africa (2012) 25; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 73-74; Erasmus 1989 SALJ 
671; Van der Vyver 1982 SALJ 570-572. 
299  Wessels AJA in Krohn v The Minister of Defence of the Union of South Africa and the Special 
Court under Martial Law Regulations Pretoria 1915 AD 207 referring to the first two premises 
of Dicey’s definition with approval. See also Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 133. 
Cf the discussion in the text at n 176 supra.  
300  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 133; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 242. 
301  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 155. 
302  See also De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 256. 
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Roman-Dutch law (as influenced by English law) and had borrowed from each 
other over the years.303  
 
The centralisation of the legislative powers, subsequent legislation enacted as well 
as the establishment of the Appellate Division did much over the years to address 
the differences in law that existed across the provinces.304 Furthermore, it should 
be noted that after the unification of South Africa, the strong influence of English 
law waned and there was a movement to return to the Roman-Dutch law 
heritage.305 This included the establishment of Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
subjects at a number of South African universities, the introduction of books and 
journals dealing with Roman-Dutch law in South Africa, translations of old sources 
from Latin and Dutch into English, and the willingness of the courts to promote 
Roman-Dutch law.306 
 
1 6 3 Unification of the recognition of customary law 
More needs to be said about the customary law, as its recognition differed 
substantially from colony to colony.307 The differences in law across the Union 
                                            
303  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 25. Cf the discussions supra in paras  1 5 3 1 
(Natal),  1 5 4 1 (Transvaal) &  1 5 5 1 (Orange Free State). 
304  Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 25. See also De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 256-
257. 
305  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 203-204; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective 
(2007) 56; Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 224; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 263-264; Sanders 1981 CILSA 330. The debate surrounding this 
issue was generally referred to as the “purist-pollutionist debate” (Van Niekerk 2010 
Fundamina 473). 
306  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 56; De Vos 
Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 263-264; Sanders 1981 CILSA 330. 
307  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 8; Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) 
Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 108; Olivier et al “Indigenous law” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA 
Vol 32 (2009) para 3; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 61; 
Bennett Customary law (2004) 40; SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous 
law (1999) 9; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 72; Hahlo & 
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caused confusion and uncertainty.308 Furthermore, the Union government had 
other concerns that had to be dealt with: 
 
Social and political changes in the African population were beginning to 
challenge white rule … Africans formed a sizeable urban proletariat; 
many were educated and they were active in forging political 
associations.309 
 
The government’s solution to this problem was to advance and develop the 
segregation policies that existed before unification.310 First, the Natives (later 
“Black”) Land Act311 was introduced in 1913 which prohibited indigenous people to 
buy or lease land outside specific “scheduled” areas.312 The enactment of this 
statute established a framework for segregation and later apartheid.313 Thereafter, 
the Native (later “Black”) Administration Act was enacted in 1927 “to re-establish 
traditional authority”.314 However, its main aim was to establish a separate system 
                                                                                                                                    
Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 327. Cf the discussions in paras  1 5 2 5 (Cape),  1 5 3 2 
(Natal),  1 5 4 2 (Transvaal) &  1 5 5 2 (Orange Free State) supra. 
308  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 108; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 61; 
Bennett Customary law (2004) 40; SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous 
law (1999) 9; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 72; Church 
Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 127; Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa 
(1960) 327.  
309  Bennett Customary law (2004) 41.  
310  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 61; Bennett Customary law 
(2004) 41; SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous law (1999) 9. 
311  This Act was repealed in 1991 (cf discussion in the text at n 364 infra). 
312  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 163; Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African 
customary law (2014) 10; Bennett Customary law (2004) 41; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 146; 
SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous law (1999) 10. For more detail see 
Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African constitution (1935) 468-472. 
313  SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous law (1999) 10. For more detail on 
this statute and its effect on the indigenous population see Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of 
South Africa (2014) 163-166. 
314  Bennett Customary law (2004) 41; SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous 
law (1999) 10; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 72-73; 
Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the South African constitution (1935) 405-406. 
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for the administration of justice to mirror the policy of segregation in land 
ownership.315 This Act replaced the different statutes governing customary law in 
South Africa.316 It provided customary law with a separate but unequal status to 
that of common law.317 Similar to the Shepstonian system, the Governor-General 
was appointed as “the supreme chief of all Natives” with the necessary powers to 
exercise this authority over the indigenous people and their laws.318 A separate 
court system was established, consisting of traditional leaders and native 
commissioners.319 The courts of the traditional leaders could apply customary law 
only,320 while the courts of the native commissioners were granted with 
discretionary powers to apply the customary or common law in civil disputes 
between indigenous people in respect of “questions of customs followed by 
Natives”.321 Furthermore, customary law was applied provided it did not conflict 
with the principles of public policy or natural justice.322  
 
                                            
315  SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous law (1999) 10. See also Himonga 
& Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 11; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law 
and Western law (1995) 72; Church Marriage and women in Bophuthatswana (1989) 134. 
316  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 8; Olivier et al “Indigenous law” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 32 (2009) 
para 3; Bennett Customary law (2004) 41; Bekker Seymour’s customary law (1993) 7; Van 
Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39. 
317 Olivier et al “Indigenous law” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 32 (2009) para 3; Thomas 2008 
Fundamina 142; Bennett Customary law (2004) 41; Thomas & Tladi 1999 CILSA 356. 
318  S 1. 
319  Ch 2. See also Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 11-12; Thomas 2008 
Fundamina 142; Bennett Customary law (2004) 41; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39. 
320  S 12 (1). 
321  S 11(1). See also Bennett Customary law (2004) 41-42. 
322  S 11(1). See also Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 12; Olivier et al 
“Indigenous law” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 32 (2009) para 3; Thomas 2008 Fundamina 142; 
Thomas & Tladi 1999 CILSA 356; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law 
(1995) 73; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 39; Kennedy & Schlosberg Law and custom of the 
South African constitution (1935) 406. 
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1 7 NATIONAL PARTY RULE AND APARTHEID (1948-1993)323 
1 7 1 Introduction of apartheid and its ideologies 
The National Party based their election campaign on the ideology of apartheid and 
won the election in 1948.324 The four main ideas of apartheid have been described 
as follows: 
 
First, the population of South Africa comprised of four “racial groups” – 
White, Coloured, Indian, and African – each with its own inherent culture. 
Second, Whites, as the civilized race, were entitled to have absolute 
control over the state. Third, white interests should prevail over black 
interests; the state was not obliged to provide equal facilities for the 
subordinate races. Fourth, the white racial group formed a single nation, 
with Afrikaans- and English-speaking components, while Africans 
belonged to several (eventually ten) distinct nations or potential nations – 
a formula that made the white nation the largest in the country.325 
 
The new government started building on earlier segregation legislation and 
introduced more apartheid orientated laws.326 Specifically, the elimination of voting 
rights of the indigenous people and coloureds can be mentioned.327 This was in 
stark contrast with international human rights developments, specifically the 
                                            
323  For a detailed historical exposition of the apartheid era in South Africa see Berat (ed) 
Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) ch 6. 
324  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 187; Woolman & Swanepoel 
“Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.2(h); 
Thomas 2008 Fundamina 145; Lodge “Die Afrikanernasionaliste aan die bewind” in Giliomee & 
Mbenga (eds) Nuwe geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika (2007) 310. 
325  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 190. See also Lodge “Die 
Afrikanernasionaliste aan die bewind” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe geskiedenis van 
Suid-Afrika (2007) 314ff. 
326  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 190 and the legislation referred to there; 
Thomas 2008 Fundamina 145 esp n 102 listing various pieces of apartheid legislation. See 
further Lodge “Die Afrikanernasionaliste aan die bewind” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe 
geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika (2007) 314ff. 
327  For more detail see Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 190-193; Woolman & 
Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 
2.2(h); Lodge “Die Afrikanernasionaliste aan die bewind” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe 
geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika (2007) 311-316. 
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adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that same year328 which is 
based on the principle of human dignity329 and enshrines a number of universally 
recognised human rights including the right to equality330 and a number of 
freedom protecting human rights.   
 
1 7 2 Legal culture under apartheid 
These changes were enabled by the system of parliamentary sovereignty and 
legal positivism inherited from the British colonial rule.331 This included a formal 
understanding of the rule of law which differed from Dicey’s classical definition.332 
Under apartheid the rule of law required only that decisions were made by the 
application of existing legislative provisions and rules of law irrespective of their 
procedural or substantive equality.333 Also absent was the idea that everyone is 
equal before the law and subject to the same laws. This conception of the rule of 
law permitted the white minority to enact, execute and enforce racist and violent 
                                            
328  1948 (GA Res 217A (III)). 
329  Preamble. 
330  Art 7 which states as follows: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any 
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination.” 
331  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 190-191; Barnard-Naudé “The post-
apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 25-26; 
Devenish 2005 TSAR 559; Van der Vyver 1982 SALJ 572. Cf the discussion in para  1 5 2 3 
supra. 
332  See Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 133-136 for a detailed discussion of how the 
rule of law under the apartheid government differed from the Diceyan conception of the rule of 
law (cf the discussion in the text at n 176 supra). 
333  Michelman “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman & 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 11.1(a); Krüger 2010 PELJ 479; Currie & De Waal 
(eds) New constitutional and administrative law (2001) 76. 
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laws.334 Formally, the idea of rule of law included the idea that a public power may 
not be exercised ultra vires or arbitrary335 but in practice this was another matter: 
 
It is notorious both that the meaning of ‘arbitrary’ underwent contraction 
and that the stringency of the demand for clear parliamentary 
authorization underwent dilution under the stress of apartheid-era 
realpolitik.336 
 
Eventually, a slightly more moderate view was proposed, namely that as long as a 
law is properly enacted it is lawful and binding but this still excluded any 
adjudication on the law’s substance.337 Therefore, it has been argued that the rule 
of law under apartheid is better described as “rule by law”.338  
 
Subsequently, the legal culture of the apartheid era has been described as 
follows: 
 
[C]onservative and positivist, with judicial deference to the executive and 
to parliamentary sovereignty; formalistic, technical and authoritarian; and 
‘of reasoned argument’ and justification.339 
 
This approach also included strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis.340 
                                            
334  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 79. For some examples of 
such laws see the discussion by Hahlo & Kahn Union of South Africa (1960) 133-136. 
335  Michelman “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman & 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 11.1(a); Krüger 2010 PELJ 479.  
336  Michelman “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman & 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 11.1(a) n 5. 
337  Grenfell Promoting the rule of law (2013) 106; Schmid “Thickening the rule of law in transition: 
the constitutional entrenchment of economic and social rights in South Africa” in Kristjánsdóttir 
et al (eds) International law in domestic courts (2012) 62; Dugard Human rights (1978) 43-44. 
338  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 78-79; Grenfell Promoting 
the rule of law (2013) 106; Krüger 2010 PELJ 479; Dyzenhaus 2007 SALJ 738; Dugard Human 
rights (1978) 43. 
339  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 29. See also Davis & 
Klare 2010 SAJHR 407; Langa 2006 Stell LR 353, 356-357; Du Bois 2004 International Journal 
of Legal Information 225-226; Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 316; Klare 1998 SAJHR 157-158, 168. 
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1 7 3 Establishment of and developments during the South African 
Republic  
When South Africa became a republic in 1961, the system of parliamentary 
sovereignty was retained and the government persisted in enacting laws and 
implementing actions in line with their apartheid ideology.341 These included rigid 
pass laws, forced removals, racially zoned group areas as well as segregation in 
respect of education, participation in sports, modes of transportation, public 
amenities and so forth.342 As the apartheid ideology advocated segregation of the 
races but not equal rights and services for all, the socio-economic conditions 
experienced by the indigenous people were appalling. For example, they earned 
lower wages than their white counterparts and did not enjoy the same job 
opportunities as whites.343 This meant that they did not have adequate access to 
the necessary nutrition and housing. Also, the health system was largely used for 
the benefit of whites,344 other public services for the indigenous people were far 
inferior to those of whites,345 and their education system was also of a lower 
quality.346 These conditions were further compounded by the far reaching powers 
of the government to arrest and detain without trial as well as their power to ban 
                                                                                                                                    
340  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 133; Hahlo & Kahn South African legal system (1991) 242. 
341  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 53; Barnard-Naudé “The 
post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 25; 
Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 56; Hahlo & Kahn South 
African legal system (1991) 571. 
342  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 193-197. See also Woolman & 
Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) 
para 2.2(i); Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal 
skills in South Africa (2012) 23; Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 2-6. 
343  Defined as “the lowest sum on which a household could possibly live in South African social 
circumstances” (Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 202). 
344  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 202-203. 
345  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 201. 
346  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 196-197. 
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any organisation or prevent the holding of meetings of any sort.347 In addition, the 
exercise of these powers were usually characterised by physical violence and 
torture.348 As a result, an extremely unequal society was created. 
 
During this time, the nationalist regime promoted a specific type of Afrikaner 
culture: 
 
Their [the Afrikaners’] language was unique and most Afrikaners 
experienced little but the Nationalist world perspective from cradle to 
grave: at home, in Afrikaans-language schools and universities, in Dutch 
Reformed churches, in social groups, on radio and television, and in 
books and newspapers. In particular, their schools imbued them with a 
political mythology derived from a historiography that distorted the past 
for nationalist purposes. For example, it made heroes out of the border 
ruffians who were responsible for the Slagtersnek rebellion in 1815, and 
it associated God with the victory of the Afrikaner commando over the 
Zulu at the battle of Blood River on December 16, 1838.349 
 
In line with this type of ideology, the movement to purify the South African law of 
English law influences and to return to the Roman-Dutch law heritage was strong 
at this time.350 This debate would continue into the 1980s,351 but eventually it was 
accepted that purifying the South African common law from all English law 
                                            
347  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 199. See also Van der Vyver 1982 SALJ 
576-577. 
348  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 198-200. See also Van der Vyver 1982 
SALJ 577. 
349  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 198. 
350  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 210; Thomas 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia 6; Church et al Human rights from a 
comparative perspective (2007) 56; Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal 
Information 224-225; Church 1996 Fundamina 309; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 265.  
351  Van Niekerk 2010 Fundamina 473 n 5 and the literature cited there. 
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influences was impractical.352 As a consequence, the English law influence on the 
South African common law of contract can still be observed today.353 
 
1 7 4 Deterioration and fall of apartheid 
The actions of the apartheid government were not implemented without 
resistance. Local resistance came in different forms and included criticism of the 
apartheid system (by the church, certain universities, organisations, writers and 
artists), political resistance by political parties and black trade union 
movements.354 Internationally, apartheid was also condemned355 which included 
the institution of economic sanctions against the South African government.356 By 
the 1980s the apartheid regime was deteriorating.357  
 
This forced the government to make judicial reforms in respect of the recognition 
of customary law.358 As part of these reforms, section 11(1) of the 
Black Administration Act was repealed but re-enacted as section 45A(1) of the 
Magistrate’s Courts Act.359 Thereafter, a more detailed reform of customary law 
                                            
352  Van der Merwe et al “The Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide (2012) 204; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 56; 
Church 1996 Fundamina 309; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis (1992) 267-268. 
353  This idea is explored throughout the next chapter. 
354  For a discussion of the most important resistance movements see Berat (ed) Thompson’s 
history of South Africa (2014) 204-213; Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in 
Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.3. 
355  For a more detailed discussion see Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 213-
220. 
356  See Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 233-234. 
357  Bennett Customary law (2004) 42. For a detailed discussion of this period (1978-1989) see 
Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) ch 7. 
358  SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous law (1999) 12. 
359  See also Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 16; Olivier et al “Indigenous 
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was undertaken which culminated in the enactment of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988.360 Of specific relevance is section 1(1): 
 
Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state or 
indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with 
sufficient certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to 
the principles of public policy or natural justice… 
 
Although customary law was still subject to a repugnancy clause,361 it is important 
to note that customary law could now be applied by any court.362 In addition, the 
court could take judicial notice of customary law.363 Further legislative reforms 
included the repeal of the Black Land Act in 1991.364  
 
The resistance to apartheid increased and when it became clear that South Africa 
was on the brink of a civil war, negotiations began to end apartheid.365 The 
negotiations culminated in the enactment of the interim Constitution366 and a 
                                            
360  Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 16; SALC Project for harmonisation of 
common and indigenous law (1999) 13. 
361  Himonga & Nhlapo (eds) African customary law (2014) 16; Church et al Human rights from a 
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20; Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 7. 
366  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
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national election in April 1994 which was open to all races.367 The African National 
Congress Party won the majority vote and Nelson Mandela became the first 
African president of South Africa.368 
 
1 8 NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1994 TO DATE) 
1 8 1 Constitutional supremacy 
The final Constitution369 came into force on 4 February 1997,370 recognises that 
South Africa is a sovereign democratic state and acknowledges the supremacy of 
the Constitution.371 Therefore, the system of parliamentary sovereignty ended and 
was substituted with constitutional sovereignty.372 This means that the Constitution 
is the supreme law of the country and any law or conduct inconsistent with the 
                                            
367  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 263. See also Woolman & Swanepoel 
“Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.4(d); 
Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in 
South Africa (2012) 20; Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 7; Lodge “Die 
Afrikanernasionaliste aan die bewind” in Giliomee & Mbenga (eds) Nuwe geskiedenis van 
Suid-Afrika (2007) 407-408. 
368  Berat (ed) Thompson’s history of South Africa (2014) 264. See also Woolman & Swanepoel 
“Constitutional history” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.4(d); 
Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in 
South Africa (2012) 14. 
369  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. All references to “the Constitution” in this 
thesis refer to this statute unless indicated otherwise. 
370  For more detail on the enactment and certification process of the final Constitution see Currie 
& De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 6-7; Woolman & Swanepoel “Constitutional history” in 
Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 2.5. 
371  S 1. 
372  Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 2; De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 26; Michelman “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the 
Constitution” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 11.1(c) & 11.3(c)(ii); 
Burns Administrative law (2013) 95; Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby 
et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 26; Liebenberg Socio-economic rights 
(2010) 1. 
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Constitution is invalid.373 The Constitutional Court has explained the supremacy of 
the Constitution as follows: 
 
There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is 
the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force 
from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.374 
 
1 8 2 Objective normative value system: Founding constitutional values 
Section 1 of the Constitution states that the Republic of South Africa is founded 
upon the following values:  
 
(a)  Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement    
  of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular     
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.375 
  
The inclusion of these values means that the Constitution establishes “an 
objective normative value system” which guides the introduction of new laws and 
the application and development of existing laws.376 The values of human 
                                            
373  S 2 of the Constitution. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 2, 9; De Vos 
& Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 26, 54-55; Burns Administrative law 
(2013) 96; Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal 
skills in South Africa (2012) 26. 
374  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and another: In re ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
375  S 1 of the Constitution. See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law 
(2014) 26. 
376  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African 
Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 324. See further 
the discussion in para  1 8 3 2 infra. 
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dignity377, equality and freedom are of particular importance in the Constitution378 
and the Constitutional Court has described these three values as “conjoined, 
reciprocal and covalent” and “foundational to the Republic”.379  
 
These three constitutional values as well as the constitutional value encapsulating 
the principle of the rule of law are particularly relevant for the purposes of this 
research topic. For ease of reference, these four constitutional values are referred 
to as the founding constitutional values in this thesis.380 Specifically, chapter three 
constitutes a critical discussion of these values as they are expressed in the 
                                            
377  Throughout this thesis the term “human dignity” is used rather than referring to “dignity”. First, 
this is the term used in the Constitution (see ss 1, 7(1), 36(1) & 39(1)). Although, s 10 of the 
Constitution speaks of “dignity” in the provision itself, it is entitled “human dignity”. Secondly, 
generally, there is a difference in meaning of the two terms:  
Dignity in general … is a term of many meanings. It applies to all sorts of carriers, 
human and non-human, and indicates primarily certain distinctive qualities which 
given them a rank above others that do not have these qualities. In fact, dignity in the 
general sense is a matter of degree. It reflects an aristocratic picture of reality in the 
tradition of the “Great Chain of Being” with higher and lower dignities. Such dignity is 
subject to change, to increase and decrease: it can be gained and lost. It finds its 
expression in such dignities as are conferred on “dignitaries” through honors or titles, 
and can be expressed in dignified or undignified comportment.  
Human dignity is a very different matter. It implies the very denial of an aristocratic 
order of dignities. For it refers to the minimum dignity which belongs to every human 
being qua human. It does not admit of any degrees. It is equal for all humans. It 
cannot be gained or lost. In this respect human dignity as a species of dignity differs 
fundamentally from the genus (Spiegelberg as quoted in Beyleveld & Brownsword 
Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 50). 
 Thirdly, the above description of “human dignity” is similar in meaning to that provided in s 10 
of the Constitution which provides that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected”. 
378  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 324. 
379  S v Mamabolo (E TV and others intervening) 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) para 41. See also Albertyn 
“Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global 
values (2015) 324-325. 
380  This is in order to differentiate between these values and ubuntu which is referred to as an 
underlying constitutional value (see the discussion in para  1 8 4 3(a) infra). 
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common law of contract. However, at this stage, it is necessary to mention a 
number of ideas in respect of the values of human dignity, equality and the rule of 
law.  
 
1 8 2 1 Human dignity381 
Human dignity is the first constitutional value mentioned in section 1, and it has 
been argued, that it is the most important of all the constitutional values.382 Human 
dignity is regarded as the core value of the Constitution and the most important 
human right383 from which all the other human rights derive.384 In S v 
Makwanyane it was held that human dignity (together with the right to life) is “the 
most important of all human rights”.385 In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs the 
court explained the importance and role of human dignity as follows: 
 
The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot therefore be 
doubted. The Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which 
human dignity for black South Africans was routinely and cruelly denied. 
It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy respect for 
the intrinsic worth of all human beings. Human dignity therefore informs 
constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a 
value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights.386  
 
                                            
381  The constitutional value of human dignity is investigated in more detail in para  3 2 infra. 
382  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 326. 
383  Human dignity is also an enforceable right in terms of s 10 of the Constitution (quoted in n 377 
supra). This thesis focusses on the role of human dignity as a foundational constitutional value. 
The reasons for this approach is set out in para  3 2 1 infra.  
384  De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 418; Hawthorne 2011 SAPL 432; Botha 2009 Stell LR 196-197; 
Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 230.  
385  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 144 (see also paras 328-329 forming 
part of the separate judgment of Justice O’Regan). 
386  Dawood and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others; Shalabi and another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and others; Thomas and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2000 3 
SA 936 (CC) para 35. 
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1 8 2 2 Equality 
The “achievement of equality” is enshrined as a foundational constitutional value 
in section 1 of the Constitution. Although equality is also an enforceable right in 
terms of section 9, this thesis focusses on the role of equality as a foundational 
constitutional value.387 However, as the Constitutional Court has provided content 
to equality with reference to the wording in section 9, reference will be made to 
this provision where necessary to illuminate the court’s approach to the 
constitutional value of equality.388 At this stage, it is important to note that the 
constitutional value of equality refers to both formal and substantive equality.  
 
(a) Formal equality 
The Constitution contains liberal elements as various human rights are enshrined 
therein.389 Therefore, the Constitution establishes a liberal democracy.390 
Specifically, section 9(1) provides that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. This is usually referred to as 
formal equality before the law.391 Formal equality assumes that everyone is equal 
to each other and therefore any differentiation in treatment (for example based on 
race or gender)392 is irrational and arbitrary.393 Therefore, inequality can be 
                                            
387  The reason for this approach is set out in para  3 2 1 infra. 
388  Cf the discussion dealing with the Constitutional Court’s approach to the constitutional value of 
equality in para  3 3 3 infra. 
389  See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 28; Liebenberg 
Socio-economic rights (2010) 35; Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in 
developing a consensual South African legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der 
werkelijkheid (2007) 48. 
390  Du Plessis “Interpretation” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 32.3(c)(iv); Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) 
Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 29-30. 
391  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c) n 26; Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) 
Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 28; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 159. 
392  S 9 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the following grounds: race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
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eradicated by granting the same rights and entitlements to everyone, in 
accordance with the same “neutral” standard of measurement.394 Accordingly, it 
does not take account of the actual lived social and economic circumstances of 
the person or group and advances a formal approach to law (i.e. legal 
formalism).395 Consequently, it denotes a formal prohibition against 
discrimination.396 
 
(b) Substantive equality 
Although the Constitution contains liberal elements and provides for formal 
equality before the law, it is not purely liberal.397 It also aims to achieve 
substantive equality in law.398 Substantive equality recognises that inequality is 
rooted in the existing social and economic differences within the society.399 It 
                                                                                                                                    
393  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & 
Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 421. 
394  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 213; De Vos “Equality, 
human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law 
(2014) 421. 
395  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 213-214; De Vos 
“Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 421; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 166. Cf the discussion in the text at 
n 170 supra. 
396  De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 421. 
397  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 28; Barnard-Naudé “The 
post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 32, 
39. See also Klare 1998 SAJHR 152. 
398  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 28; Du Plessis 
“Interpretation” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 32.3(c)(iv); Barnard-
Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South 
Africa (2012) 28; Langa 2006 Stell LR 352; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880; Moseneke 2002 
SAJHR 314; Klare 1998 SAJHR 154. 
399  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 213; Liebenberg Socio-
economic rights (2010) 98; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 159-160. 
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requires an understanding of the social and economic conditions that create and 
reinforce inequality within the society in great part exacerbated by the centuries of 
the legally sanctioned perpetuation of inequality.400 Subsequently, it involves an 
investigation into the surrounding context, specifically the actual lived, social and 
economic conditions of the relevant persons or groups.401 This entails a move 
away from legal formalism based on formal equality towards a consideration of the 
equality of the outcome i.e. the impact of the act and the harm it creates.402 This 
allows the law to treat people differently when such differentiation ensures equality 
of outcome.403 Whether differentiation would lead to equality of outcome must be 
determined with reference to the aim of the specific right and its underlying 
values.404 
 
The idea of substantive equality can be identified in a number of constitutional 
provisions. The Preamble of the Constitution recognises “the injustices of our past” 
and adopts the Constitution as the supreme law of the country in order to “[h]eal 
the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights” and to “[i]mprove the quality of life of 
all citizens and free the potential of each person”.405 Also, as was seen above, 
                                            
400  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 98. 
401  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 213; Liebenberg Socio-
economic rights (2010) 98; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 528-
529.  
402  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 213; Botha 2001 THRHR 
(3) 528-529. 
403  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 213; De Vos “Equality, 
human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law 
(2014) 421; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 160. 
404  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(c). 
405  See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 33; Liebenberg 
Socio-economic rights (2010) 25; Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 313; Klare 1998 SAJHR 150; 
76 
 
section 1(a) of the Constitution lists “the achievement of equality” as one of its 
founding values.406 Most importantly, section 9(2) provides that: 
 
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.407 
 
Finally, the Constitution entrenches a number of socio-economic rights that 
promote substantive equality408 and includes rights that deal with freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession;409 labour relations;410 housing;411 health care, 
food, water and social security;412 children’s socio-economic rights;413 
education;414 language and culture;415 and detained persons’ socio-economic 
rights.416 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 160. Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al 
(eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 32 & Langa 2006 Stell LR 352 refer to the 
Postamble of the interim Constitution which states that the interim Constitution provides “a 
historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, 
untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development for all South Africans, irrespective of 
colour, race, class, belief or sex”.  
406  My emphasis. See also Klare 1998 SAJHR 153-154. 
407  See also Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.4(a); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 214 n 19; Bhana & 
Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880. 
408  Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 35. 
409  S 22 of the Constitution. 
410  S 23 of the Constitution. 
411  S 26 of the Constitution. 
412  S 27 of the Constitution. 
413  S 28(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
414  S 29 of the Constitution. 
415  Ss 30-31 of the Constitution. 
416  S 35(2)(e) of the Constitution.  
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Therefore, the Constitution aims to achieve substantive equality and establish an 
egalitarian society by addressing the social and economic injustices of the past.417 
 
1 8 2 3 Rule of law 
In respect of the constitutional value of the rule of law, two aspects can be 
mentioned at this stage. In the first place the Constitutional Court has confirmed 
that the rule of law in terms of the Constitution embodies the principle of 
legality.418 This includes that any exercise of public power must comply with the 
Constitution and arbitrary decisions and abuses of discretionary powers are not 
permitted.419 Specifically, the judiciary is bound to the rule of law and section 165 
of the Constitution provides as follows: 
 
The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or 
prejudice.420 
 
Secondly, however, the meaning of the rule of law under the Constitution goes 
further than the classical conception by Dicey based on formal equality before the 
                                            
417  See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880. 
418  Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and others 2013 1 SA 248 (CC) para 12; Albutt 
v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and others 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 49; 
Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health and another 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) 
para 49; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and another: In re ex parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 20; President of 
the Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union and others 2000 
1 SA 1 (CC) para 38; Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and others v Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council and others 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 56. See also De Vos & 
Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 82; Burns Administrative law (2013) 
108; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 535. 
419  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 83; Freedman 
“Constitutional law: structures of Government” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 5(3) (2012) para 21; 
Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 535-536. 
420  See also Van Rooyen and others v The State and others (General Council of the Bar of South 
Africa intervening) 2002 5 SA 246 (CC) para 18. See further De Vos & Freedman (eds) South 
African constitutional law (2014) 84. 
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law.421 It is also concerned with the impact of the law on the affected persons and 
the substantive content thereof,422 specifically in view of the Constitution’s aim to 
achieve substantive equality as discussed above. This has resulted in the 
Constitution being described as transformative423 and the process through which 
these ideals are achieved is called “transformative constitutionalism”. Klare 
defines transformative constitutionalism as follows: 
 
[A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical 
context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country’s 
political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism 
connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through 
nonviolent political processes grounded in law. I have in mind a 
transformation vast enough to be inadequately captured by the phrase 
“reform”, but something short of or different from “revolution” in any 
traditional sense of the word. In the background is an idea of highly 
egalitarian, caring, multicultural community, governed through 
participatory, democratic processes in both the polity and large portions 
of what we now call the “private sphere”.424  
                                            
421  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 84. See also Burns 
Administrative law (2013) 106. 
422  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 84. See also Burns 
Administrative law (2013) 106-107; Krüger 2010 PELJ 483-484; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 534-
535. 
423  See e.g. Road Accident Fund and another v Mdeyide 2011 2 SA 26 (CC) para 125; Minister of 
Finance and another v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 142; Soobramoney v Minister 
of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8; Du Plessis and others v De Klerk and 
another 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 157; S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 
para 262. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 214; De Vos & Freedman 
(eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 27; Michelman “The rule of law, legality and the 
supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) 
para 11.3(c)(i); Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and 
legal skills in South Africa (2012) 32; Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 24; Davis & 
Klare 2010 SAJHR 404; Langa 2006 Stell LR 351; Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 316.  
424  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150. See also Du Plessis “Interpretation” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 32.3(c)(iv); Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in 
Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 39; Van der Merwe et al “The 
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Specifically, he argues that this process requires a different judicial mind-set when 
interpreting the Constitution and developing the law in line with constitutional 
values: 
 
Judicial mindset and methodology are part of the law, and therefore they 
must be examined and revised so as to promote equality, a culture of 
democracy and transparent governance. Accordingly, the drafters cannot 
have intended dramatically to alter substantive constitutional foundations 
and assumptions, yet to have left these new rights and duties to be 
interpreted through the lens of classical legalist methods. They cannot 
have assumed that the document’s [Constitution’s] loft ambitions would 
be interpreted according to, and therefore constrained by, the intellectual 
instinct and habits of mind of the traditional common or Roman-Dutch 
lawyer trained and professionally socialized during the apartheid era.425  
 
Although Klare accepts that the Constitution aims to protect individual rights and 
freedoms, he contends that it is also committed to egalitarian social transformation 
in the private sphere.426 Consequently, the Constitution should be interpreted in 
order to achieve egalitarian social transformation in the private field.427 
Accordingly, any interpretation and application of the law should promote the 
realisation of socio-economic rights, and hence substantive equality, within the 
relevant historical and political context.428 Therefore, it has been argued that 
                                                                                                                                    
Republic of South Africa” in Palmer (ed) Mixed jurisdictions worldwide (2012) 148; Liebenberg 
Socio-economic rights (2010) 24. 
425  Klare 1998 SAJHR 156. See also Du Plessis “Interpretation” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 32.3(c)(iv); Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in 
Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 39; Davis & Klare 2010 
SAJHR 405-406, 411. 
426  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150-152, 155-156. See also Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 371; Davis & Klare 
2010 SAJHR 404; Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 4; Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 314; Botha 2001 
THRHR (3) 535; Albertyn & Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 249. 
427  Klare 1998 SAJHR 151.  
428  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150, 156. See also Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in 
Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 39; Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 314; 
Albertyn & Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 251ff. 
80 
 
transformative constitutionalism involves “the levelling of the economic playing 
fields that were so drastically skewed by the apartheid system”.429 
 
More importantly, this means that this form of interpretative approach involves the 
consideration of values external to the legal texts under consideration. As stated 
by Justice Mokgoro in S v Makwanyane: 
 
The interpretive task frequently involves making constitutional choices by 
balancing competing fundamental rights and freedoms. This can often 
only be done by reference to a system of values extraneous to the 
constitutional text itself … To achieve the required balance will of 
necessity involve value judgments. This is the nature of constitutional 
interpretation.430 
 
This is a stark departure from the conservative legal culture of the apartheid era 
which was formalistic, legal positivistic, entailed strict adherence to the doctrine of 
stare decisis, supposedly “value neutral” and based on parliamentary 
sovereignty.431 Rather, transformative constitutionalism requires that judges 
should acknowledge that their judgments are value-based, political and moral in 
nature: 
 
While the policy under apartheid legal culture was to deny these 
influences on decision-making, our constitutional legal culture requires 
that we expressly accept and embrace the role that our own beliefs, 
opinions and ideas play in our decisions. This is vital if respect for court 
                                            
429  Langa 2006 Stell LR 352 as referred to with approval by Himonga “Exploring the concept of 
ubuntu in the South African legal system” in Kischel & Kirchner (eds) Ideologie und 
Weltanschauung im Recht (2012) 15. 
430  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 302-304 as quoted by Klare 1998 
SAJHR 157-157. See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law 
(2014) 30; Langa 2006 Stell LR 353; Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 315; Botha 2001 THRHR 
(3) 535; Albertyn & Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 249. 
431  Cf discussion in the text at n 339 supra. See also Du Plessis “Interpretation” in Woolman & 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 32.3(c)(iv); Burns Administrative law (2013) 99; 
Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 43ff; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 529-530. 
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decisions is to flow from the honesty and cogency of the reasons given 
for them rather than the authority with which they are given.432  
  
Klare further argues that such an interpretation would not undermine the principles 
of legal constraint and the rule of law as this approach to interpretation “does not 
imply that the Constitution means whatever a decisionmaker ‘might wish it to 
mean’”.433 Rather, transformative constitutionalism requires that judges should 
substantiate their judgments in accordance with the political and moral values of 
the Constitution.434 In other words, judgments should be substantiated with 
reference to the “objective normative value system” established under the 
Constitution.435 This includes a legal interpretation committed to egalitarian social 
transformation which is sensitive to the social and historical context.436 Thus, the 
formal conception of the rule of law has been transformed into a more substantive 
model in terms of which “the rule of law is seen as an important mechanism for 
achieving a just society”.437   
 
Liebenberg argues that such a society cannot be achieved by addressing the 
inequalities created by apartheid only, but that these provisions indicate that the 
Constitution also aims to address new forms of disadvantage and marginalisation, 
                                            
432  Langa 2006 Stell LR 353. See also Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 408; Liebenberg Socio-
economic rights (2010) 46-48; Moseneke 2002 SAJHR 317;  Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 535; 
Klare 1998 SAJHR 158.  
433  Klare 1998 SAJHR 151. See also Barnard-Naudé 2013 SAJHR 470-471; Barnard-Naudé “The 
post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in South Africa (2012) 40; 
Langa 2006 Stell LR 357.  
434  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150-151, 171. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 63; 
Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 34, 47-48. Mention can also be made of s 39(1) 
which provides that courts must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
435  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54.  
436  Klare 1998 SAJHR 150-151. See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional 
law (2014) 33; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 539. 
437  Freedman “Constitutional law: structures of government” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 5(3) 
(2012) para 18. 
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for example xenophobia emerging in post-apartheid South Africa.438 This view is 
supported by Justice Langa: 
 
Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the world that 
creates a space in which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in 
which new ways of being are constantly explored and created, accepted 
and rejected and in which change is unpredictable but the idea of change 
is constant. This is perhaps the ultimate vision of a transformative, rather 
than a transitional Constitution. This is a perspective that sees the 
Constitution as not transformative because of its peculiar historical 
position or its particular socio-economic goals but because it envisions a 
society that will always be open to change and contestation, a society 
that will always be defined by transformation.439 
 
The courts’ approach to the rule of law in the common law of contract is discussed 
in the next chapter440 and critically analysed in chapter three.441 
 
1 8 3 Status and development of common and customary law under the 
Constitution 
1 8 3 1 Constitutional recognition of common and customary law 
The final Constitution formally recognises the common law442 and the customary 
law as sources of South African law: 
 
The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary 
law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.443  
                                            
438  Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 27-28. 
439  Langa 2006 Stell LR 354. See also Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 29; Cornell 2008 
Acta Juridica 18. 
440  See the discussion in para  2 3 2 infra. 
441  See the discussion in para  3 5 infra. 
442  The common law in this sense refers to the non-statutory law which consists of the rules of the 
Roman-Dutch based legal system as influenced by English law and developed by the South 
African courts over time (Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 54; 
Thomas & Tladi 1999 CILSA 355). 
443  S 39(3). 
83 
 
 
The constitutional recognition of customary law as a source of law is an important 
step in acknowledging and advancing the multicultural society of South Africa and 
promoting the project of transformative constitutionalism.444  
 
1 8 3 2 Constitutional development of common and customary law 
As the Constitution is regarded as the supreme law of the country445 it is only to be 
expected that the common and customary law are subject to the Constitution.446 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution states that when developing the common or 
customary law, the court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.447 This is referred to as indirect horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights448 and means that the common and customary law and their development 
are subject to the Constitution and its underlying values.449  
                                            
444  Klare 1998 SAJHR 155. See also Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 372; Keep & Midgley “The 
emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African legal culture” in 
Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 30; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 8. 
445  S 2 of the Constitution (cf the discussion in para  1 8 1 supra). 
446  The common and customary law is recognised “to the extent that they are consistent with the 
Bill” (cf s 39(3) quoted at n 443 supra).  
447  See also Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 409-410; Church & Church 2008 Fundamina 6; 
Ackermann 2000 HJIL 544. 
448  De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 342; Hutchison “The nature 
and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 36. Although s 8(2) of the 
Constitution provides for direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to natural or juristic 
persons, the courts have held that indirect application of the Bill of Rights to the common law is 
the most appropriate method when dealing with fairness in the law of contract (see para  2 3 2 
3 infra). Accordingly, the direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to issues dealing with 
the law of contract falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, the interpretation and 
interrelationship between these two sections remain controversial (see e.g. Woolman 
“Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) ch 31; Liebenberg  2008 
TSAR 465-466). For discussions on this controversy with reference to the law of contract see 
e.g. Du Bois 2015 Acta Juridica 284-299; Davis 2011 Stell LR 855; Rautenbach 2009 
TSAR 613-637; Bhana 2008 SAJHR 308-311. 
449  Woolman “Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e); 
Barnard-Naudé “The post-apartheid legal order” in Humby et al (eds) Law and legal skills in 
South Africa (2012) 26-27. 
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In respect of the development of the common law, the Constitutional Court in 
S v Thebus noted that there are at least two instances where the need to develop 
the common law in terms of section 39(2) arises: 
 
The first would be when a rule of the common law is inconsistent with a 
constitutional provision. Repugnancy of this kind would compel an 
adaptation of the common law to resolve the inconsistency. The second 
possibility arises even when a rule of the common law is not inconsistent 
with a specific constitutional provision but may fall short of its spirit, 
purport and objects. Then, the common law must be adapted so that it 
grows in harmony with the “objective normative value system” found in 
the Constitution.450 
 
Furthermore, when developing the common law, section 173 grants the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the high courts the 
inherent power to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of 
justice.  
 
In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security the Constitutional Court stated that 
the court’s obligation to develop the common law is not discretionary but rather a 
“general obligation”451 and is applicable whether the parties requested the court to 
develop the common law or not.452 Therefore, judges are obliged to change and 
develop existing laws to bring them in line with the rights and values of the 
                                            
450  S v Thebus and another 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) para 28. Cf the discussion on the objective 
normative value system of the Constitution in para  1 8 1 1 8 2 supra. 
451  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 39 referring to ss 39(2) & 173 of the Constitution. See 
also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 342; Currie & De Waal 
Bill of rights handbook (2014) 61; Woolman “Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e). 
452  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 36. See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 342; Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 61; Woolman 
“Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e). 
85 
 
Constitution.453 Davis and Klare argue that judges are required to promote 
constitutional values and that this involves more than ensuring that judge-made 
law conforms to the Constitution.454 Along the same lines, Cornell and Friedman 
describe section 39(2) as “one of the primary tools through which the Constitution 
is intended to do its revolutionary work”.455 This is because the development of the 
common law should take place within the project of transformative 
constitutionalism.456 In other words, the common law should be developed to 
promote the values and aims of the Constitution, specifically to establish a more 
egalitarian society. More specifically, transformation should take place in respect 
of legal rules governing the relationships between private persons.457 As explained 
by Liebenberg: 
 
Any attempt to shield common-law rules form judicial review in terms of 
constitutional rights and values will operate to entrench and perpetuate 
the power and privileged position of those who already enjoy access to 
socio-economic resources. And it will operate to reinforce the exclusion 
and marginalisation of those who currently lack the means to participate 
meaningfully in the social and economic institutions of society. This will 
entrench rather than transform South African’s legacy of colonialism and 
apartheid which systemically deprived black people of access not only to 
political power, but also of access to a range of socio-economic 
resources and services.458 
 
Recently, the Constitutional Court stated that the following factors must be 
considered when developing the common law in this respect: 
 
[A court] must (a) determine exactly what the common law position is; (b) 
then consider the underlying reasons for it; and (c) enquire whether the 
                                            
453  Langa 2006 Stell LR 357. 
454  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 410-411. See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 343-344; Woolman “Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e)(ii)(bb). 
455  Cornell & Friedman 2011 MLJ 2. 
456  Cf discussion in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra. See also Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 404-405. 
457  Cornell & Friedman 2011 MLJ 2.  
458  Liebenberg 2008 TSAR 465.  
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rule offends the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights and thus 
requires development.  Furthermore, it must (d) consider precisely how 
the common law could be amended; and (e) take into account the wider 
consequences of the proposed change on that area of law.459  
 
In addition, the courts have laid down the following limitations to this power. First, 
the common law must be developed incrementally and on a case by case basis: 
 
In exercising their powers to develop the common law, Judges should be 
mindful of the fact that the major engine for law reform should be the 
Legislature and not the Judiciary.460 
 
Secondly, the courts’ power to develop the common law is also constrained by the 
application of the principle of stare decisis. In Ex parte Minister of Safety and 
Security: In re S v Walters the Constitutional Court dealt with this issue in respect 
of court decisions “delivered after the advent of the constitutional regime”:461 
 
High courts are obliged to follow legal interpretations of the SCA 
[Supreme Court of Appeal], whether they relate to constitutional issues or 
to other issues, and remain so obliged unless and until the SCA itself 
                                            
459  Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Ltd and another 2016 1 SA 
621 (CC) para 39. 
460  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 36. See also Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Pretoria and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies and another, amici curiae) 2007 5 SA 
30 (CC) para 31: “Courts must be astute to avoid the appropriation of the Legislature’s role in 
law reform when developing the common law. The greater power given to the Courts to test 
legislation against the Constitution should not encourage them to adopt a method of common-
law development which is closer to codification than incremental, fact-driven development”. 
See further Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 63; Woolman “Application” in 
Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e)(iv). 
461  Presumably, the court was referring to post-1994 decisions (see Currie & De Waal Bill of rights 
handbook (2014) 64). See also Woolman “Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e)(x).  
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decides otherwise or this Court [the Constitutional Court] does so in 
respect of a constitutional issue.462 
 
In Afrox Health Care v Strydom the Supreme Court of Appeal further limited this 
power in respect of pre-constitutional court decisions.463 It held that such decisions 
dealing with the common law by the higher courts are binding except where in 
direct conflict with a constitutional provision or in cases dealing with normative 
standards like boni mores or public policy.464  
 
The rules and the relevant principles dealing with the application of the Bill of 
Rights to cases dealing with fairness in contracts are discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter.465 
 
1 8 3 3 Unequal relationship between common and customary law 
Although the Constitution recognises the customary law as a separate legal 
system with the same status of that of common law,466 this does not mean that 
                                            
462  Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and others: In re S v Walters 2002 2 SACR 105 (CC) 
para 61. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 64; Woolman “Application” 
in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e)(x). 
463  Again, the term “pre-constitutional decisions” (“pre-konstitusionele beslissings”) is not defined 
by the court (at paras 26-30) but it would seem it refers to pre-1994 decisions (Currie & De 
Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 65). 
464  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) paras 27-29. See also Currie & De Waal 
Bill of rights handbook (2014) 64-65; Woolman “Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 31.4(e)(x). The principles formulated in these two cases have 
been the subject of criticism (see e.g. Woolman & Brand 2003 SA Public Law 37-82 as 
supported by Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 85-86).  
465  See the discussion in para  2 3 2 infra. 
466  See also Gumede v The President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2009 3 SA 152 
(CC) para 22 in which the court confirmed that the customary law “lives side by side with the 
common law and legislation”; Mthembu v Letsela and another 1997 2 SA 936 (T) where the 
court stated that “customary law has been accepted by the framers of the Constitution as a 
separate legal and cultural system which may be freely chosen by persons desiring to do so”. 
See further Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law” in Rautenbach & Bekker 
(eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 18; Bennett “Application and ascertainment of 
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customary law is treated the same as common law. Section 211(3) of the 
Constitution states: 
 
The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject 
to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law. 
 
This means that customary law must not only be in line with the Constitution467 but 
it should also meet the requirements of section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act, namely that it must be readily ascertainable with sufficient 
certainty and not be opposed to the principles of public policy or natural justice.468  
 
Olivier et al criticise the retention of the repugnancy clause as an irregularity that 
should be repealed as public policy should in any event be determined with 
reference to the Constitution and its underlying values.469 In Mabuza v Mbatha, 
the court held a similar opinion: 
 
Unfortunately one still finds dicta referring to the notorious repugnancy 
clauses as though one were still dealing with a pre-1994 situation. Such 
dicta, in my view, are unfortunate. The proper approach is to accept that 
the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. Thus any custom 
which is inconsistent with the Constitution cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. In line with this approach, my view is that it is not necessary at 
all to say African Customary Law should not be opposed to the principles 
of public policy or natural justice. To say that is fundamentally flawed as it 
reduces African Law (which is practised by the vast majority in this 
country) to foreign law – in Africa!470 
                                                                                                                                    
customary law” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 38; 
Bennett 2011 PELJ 30; Bennett 2011 Loyola Law Review 709. 
467  Cf ss 39(2) & 39(3) as discussed supra. 
468  This section is quoted at n 360 supra. See also Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal 
pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 12; Olivier et al 
“Indigenous law” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 32 (2009) para 5.  
469  Olivier et al “Indigenous law” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 32 (2009) para 4 n 3.  
470  Mabuza v Mbatha 2003 4 SA 218 (C) para 30. A similar approach can be identified in Bhe and 
others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and others (Commission for Gender Equality as amicus 
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However, it would seem that customary law is still not equal in status to the 
common law as the development of customary law is still largely dominated and 
directed by common law or Western values.471 It is still seen through the lens of 
common law rules and values. Furthermore, the common law is rarely assessed 
from the viewpoint of customary rules and values.472 This is especially true for the 
South African common law of contract where customary law values have exerted 
no direct or indirect influence on the common law of contract until recently.473  
 
                                                                                                                                    
curiae); Shibi v Sithole and others; South African Human Rights Commission and another v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) paras 42-46. See 
also Woolman “Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) 
para 31.4(e)(x); Cornell Law and revolution in South Africa (2014) 76. 
471  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 6-7; Bennett 2011 PELJ 30; Bennett 2011 Loyola Law Review 709-
710; Thomas 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia 6-7. See also Alexkor Ltd and another v The 
Richtersveld Community and others 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) para 51; Mthembu v Letsela and 
another 1998 2 SA 675 (T) 688. 
472  Bennett 2011 PELJ 30. See also Van Niekerk 2010 Fundamina 474-476; Church & Church 
2008 Fundamina 4; Van Niekerk 1998 CILSA 160. 
473  Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 37. This is evidenced by the fact that most standard 
South African law of contract textbooks do not discuss the customary law of contract at all (see 
e.g. Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016); Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016); Hutchison 
& Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012)). The influence of ubuntu in the common law of contract is a 
recent development and discussed in para  2 3 3 infra. 
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Keep and Midgley refer to this dichotomy as a failure to develop a legal culture 
that reflects customary values.474 They further argue that a plural legal culture is 
necessary in order to legitimise the new legal system in South Africa.475 In the 
words of the Justice Sachs in S v Makwanyane: 
 
To begin with, I wish firmly to express my agreement with the need to 
take account of the tradition, beliefs and values of all sectors of South 
African society when developing our jurisprudence. 
… 
Above all, however, it means giving long overdue recognition to African 
law and legal thinking as a source of legal ideas, values and practice. We 
cannot, unfortunately, extend the equality principles backwards in time to 
remove the humiliations and indignities suffered by past generations, but 
we can restore dignity to ideas and values that have long been 
suppressed or marginalised.476 
 
This idea of a pluralistic culture is also reflected in the Preamble of the 
Constitution as it states that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our 
diversity”.477  
 
One of the ways to establish a plural legal culture is by incorporating indigenous 
values into the common law through the use of ubuntu as an underlying 
constitutional value which must be used when interpreting and developing the 
                                            
474  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 48 as supported by 
Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 370. 
475  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 48 as supported by 
Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 370. See also Mokgoro & Woolman 2010 SAPL 403; Mokgoro 1998 
PELJ 4-5; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law (1995) 326. 
476  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 361 & 365. See also Himonga et al 
2013 PELJ 393. 
477  My emphasis. See also Church & Church 2008 Fundamina 4. 
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existing South African common law.478 This is the approach that is followed in this 
thesis. 
 
1 8 4 Ubuntu as a legal concept 
1 8 4 1 Difficulty in defining ubuntu  
From the different meanings ascribed to ubuntu in the various written sources as 
set out by Gade earlier in this chapter, it emerges that ubuntu has been used in 
various contexts.479 Specifically, it was shown that ubuntu has been linked to the 
moral theory of humanism and the political and economic theory of socialism.480  
 
In the field of law, it is generally accepted that ubuntu is not easily definable.481 It 
has been argued that defining an African concept from an abstract point of view is 
contrary to “the very essence of the African world-view” which follows a more 
concrete approach.482 Nevertheless, the open-endedness of ubuntu is often cited 
as a major criticism against the use thereof as a legal concept.483 For others, the 
fact that ubuntu resists a precise definition is precisely what makes it valuable as a 
                                            
478  Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 370; Bennett 2011 PELJ 30; Bennett 2011 Loyola Law Review 710, 
712; Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South 
African legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 30; Pieterse 
“‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2006) 441; 
Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 1, 10.  
479  Cf the discussion in the text at n 54 supra. 
480  Cf the discussion dealing with the underlying values of the customary law in para  1 3 2 2 
supra. 
481  Bekker “Nature and sphere of African customary law in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) 
Introduction to legal pluralism (2014) 27; Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 374; Himonga “Exploring 
the concept of ubuntu in the South African legal system” in Kischel & Kirchner (eds) Ideologie 
und Weltanschauung im Recht (2012) 2; Mokgoro “Ubuntu as a legal principle in an ever-
changing world” in Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith & equity (2011) 1; Bennett 2011 Loyola 
Law Review 710; Bohler-Muller 2007 Obiter 591; Bekker 2006 SAPL 334; Bohler-Muller 2005 
SAPL 266; Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 273; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2; English 1996 SAJHR 641ff. 
482  Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2. This is in view of the flexible and dynamic nature of customary law (cf 
the discussion on the nature and characteristics of customary law in para  1 3 2 1 supra). 
483  Bekker 2006 SAPL 335; Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 260-261; English 1996 SAJHR 641ff. 
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principle that can be used in legal interpretation.484 I would like to add that 
criticisms levied at the open-endedness of ubuntu, to some extent, also ignore the 
fact that open norms485 have always played, and will always play, a role in the 
development of the law because “lawmakers cannot foresee every possibility and 
provide decisions on every eventuality”.486 Open norms play an important role in 
the interpretation and development of the law because they enable value 
judgments and reflect the fact that the classical conception of the rule of law is just 
“not flexible enough to cope with the complexities of modern society”.487 Thus, the 
introduction of ubuntu as an open norm that can be used in legal interpretation 
and development reflects the change in the South African legal culture from a 
conservative legal positivistic one under apartheid488 into a culture that promotes a 
value-based approach to law as envisaged by the Constitution.489  
 
That being said, it is still necessary to establish what values are embraced by 
ubuntu if it is going to be of any use in making value judgments. The specific 
values encapsulated by ubuntu are also the subject of some controversy which 
has resulted in additional criticism against its use as a legal concept.490 Therefore, 
                                            
484  Mokgoro “Ubuntu as a legal principle in an ever-changing world” in Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good 
faith & equity (2011) 1. See also Himonga “Exploring the concept of ubuntu in the South 
African legal system” in Kischel & Kirchner (eds) Ideologie und Weltanschauung im Recht 
(2012); Bohler-Muller 2007 Obiter 595. 
485  An open norm refers to a rule or standard that has no fixed or restricted meaning, can apply to 
various situations and enables value judgments (Hawthorne 2013 THRHR 300-301; Floyd 
“Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 177 n 9; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 
SALJ 868).  
486  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 300. 
487  Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 85; Mokgoro “Ubuntu as a legal principle in an ever-changing world” in 
Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith & equity (2011) 1-2. See also Bennett 2011 PELJ 48 who 
draws parallels between ubuntu and the concept of equity in English law (see again, para  1 5 2 
3 supra on the development of equity in English law). 
488  See the discussion dealing with the legal culture under apartheid in para  1 7 2 supra. 
489  Cf the discussion dealing with the constitutional value of the rule of law in para  1 8 2 3 supra. 
490  For example Keevy 2009 JJS 61-88 on ubuntu as a religious worldview that violates s 15(1) of 
the Constitution & Keevy 2009 JJS 19-58 on ubuntu as a part of African law and African 
thinking that is patriarchal in nature and against the foundational constitutional values.  
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the best approach to establish the values of ubuntu in the legal sphere is to focus 
on how ubuntu has been described and applied in court decisions. There are three 
reasons for this approach. First, the research topic focuses on the emerging and 
future role of ubuntu. Therefore, the emphasis is on ubuntu in its modern 
appearance. As stated by Pieterse: 
 
[A] return to its [ubuntu’s] pre-colonial state is neither practically nor 
ideologically feasible. Yet, certain of the values underlying pre-colonial 
thinking still reverberate through contemporary African society. Through 
engaging with these values, in their contemporary manifestations, a view 
emerges of law and society that might prove useful…491 
 
Secondly, the research topic addresses the emerging and future role of ubuntu in 
the common law of contract which means that the focus should be on how ubuntu 
has been described and applied in the legal sphere: 
 
Although ubuntu has not been defined with precision, the courts in South 
Africa have indicated their understanding of this concept. For this 
country’s legal system, the courts’ views are the most important as they 
invariably form the basis of decision-making and, ultimately, court 
precedents.492  
 
Thirdly, rather than trying to describe ubuntu in abstract terms, Bennett argues 
that the better approach is “to consider the ways and contexts in which the word is 
being used”.493 Therefore, a better understanding of ubuntu as a legal concept can 
be obtained by analysing the ways in which it has been constructed and applied in 
law.494  
 
                                            
491  Pieterse “‘Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in Roederer & Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2006) 439. See also Biko I write what I like (2004) 45; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 3. 
492  Himonga “Exploring the concept of ubuntu in the South African legal system” in Kischel & 
Kirchner (eds) Ideologie und Weltanschauung im Recht (2012) 2. 
493  Bennett 2011 PELJ 31. See also Bennett 2011 Loyola Law Review 710. 
494  Bennett 2011 PELJ 31. 
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In this chapter, the focus is on the introduction and development of ubuntu in the 
South African law generally. It starts with a discussion of how ubuntu was 
introduced into law and developed into a value underlying the interim Constitution 
followed by its development under the final Constitution. How ubuntu has been 
applied in the common law of contract is investigated in the next chapter.495 In 
chapter three, these judicial descriptions of ubuntu will be further illuminated with 
reference to academic writings in African philosophy.496  
 
1 8 4 2 Ubuntu under the interim Constitution 
(a) Introduction of ubuntu in the interim Constitution 
The first reference to ubuntu in South African law can be found in one of the 
concluding provisions of the interim Constitution under the heading “National unity 
and reconciliation”:  
 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the 
people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, 
which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of 
humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, 
guilt and revenge. 
 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for 
understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for 
retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation.497 
 
From this provision, it transpires that ubuntu was introduced into the official law as 
a restorative tool that can be used to correct the injustices of the past. Accordingly, 
the idea of ubuntu resonates with the project of transformative constitutionalism as 
discussed above.498 Its inclusion in the interim Constitution resulted in the 
                                            
495  Cf the discussion on the influence of ubuntu in the common law of contract in para  2 3 3 infra. 
496  Cf the discussion dealing with the philosophical writings on ubuntu in para  3 2 5 infra. 
497  My emphasis.  
498  Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 371. Cf the discussion in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra and see further 
para  3 5 infra. 
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adoption of African values and ideas into South African law which is also in line 
with the aim to establish a plural legal culture.499 
 
(b) Development of ubuntu under the interim Constitution 
Ubuntu was referred to in South African jurisprudence in the constitutional court 
judgment of S v Makwanyane dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty 
which was decided under the interim Constitution. At this stage, this case is 
discussed only to the extent necessary to show how ubuntu was introduced into 
law as a legal concept and to identify a number of aspects that are further 
investigated in chapter three of this thesis.500 
 
The court referred to the post-amble of the interim Constitution and the idea that 
this document should be interpreted according to the specific historical 
background of South Africa and in line with the ideals of ubuntu.501 As the interim 
Constitution did not provide a definition of ubuntu, Justice Langa provided the 
following explanation: 
 
It is a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community. It recognises a 
person’s status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community such 
person happens to be part of. It also entails the converse however. The 
person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value 
and acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it 
regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and 
co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.502  
                                            
499  Cf the discussion in para  1 8 3 3 supra.  
500  A detailed discussion of these aspects can be found in para  3 2 5 infra. 
501  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) esp para 263-264 (Justice Mahomed), but 
also paras 130-131 (Justice Chaskalson); 223-227 (Justice Langa); 237 (Justice Madala); 307-
308 (Justice Mokgoro); 374 n 231 (Justice Sachs). 
502  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224. Justice Mahomed’s ideas of 
ubuntu conformed in general to those of Justice Langa as he maintained that it involves the 
recognition of another’s “innate humanity” and “the reciprocity this generates in interaction 
within the collective community” (S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 263). 
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He further emphasised the link between ubuntu and human dignity: 
 
An outstanding feature of ubuntu in a community sense is the value it 
puts on life and human dignity … Respect for the dignity of every person 
is integral to this concept.503 
 
In her judgment Justice Mokgoro translated ubuntu as “humaneness” which she 
interpreted as “personhood and ‘morality’” and later “humanity and morality”.504 
She linked ubuntu to the proverb “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”505 (which 
translates as “a person is a person through other persons”)506 and stated that it 
describes “the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the 
survival of communities”.507 She further maintained that ubuntu encapsulates the 
values of “group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to 
basic norms and collective unity”.508 Finally, she held that the spirit of ubuntu 
stresses respect for human dignity and marked a change from confrontation to 
conciliation.509 Later she referred to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights510 which states that “human rights derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person” and stated that this “is not different from what the spirit of 
ubuntu embraces”.511 
 
In his judgment in the same case, Justice Madala emphasised that ubuntu 
encapsulates ideas of humaneness and stated that it also referred to social justice 
and fairness.512  
 
                                            
503  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225. 
504  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. See also Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 2. 
505  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
506  Cf discussion in the text at n 57 supra.  
507  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
508  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
509  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
510  1966 (GA res 2200A (XXI)). 
511  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 309. 
512  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 237. 
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More importantly, further remarks by Justices Madala and Mokgoro indicate that 
ubuntu should be regarded as a value underlying the interim Constitution and 
should be used when interpreting the Bill of Rights.513 Justice Madala stated that 
ubuntu “permeates the [interim] Constitution generally and more particularly chap 
3, which embodies the entrenched fundamental human rights”.514 Justice Mokgoro 
held that legislative interpretation in the new constitutional order would be 
“radically” different from that under apartheid.515 She argued that post-apartheid 
legislative interpretation must be value based516 and she envisaged that ubuntu 
could play an important role in this task:  
 
In interpreting the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, … an all-
inclusive value system, or common values in South Africa, can form a 
basis upon which to develop a South African human rights jurisprudence. 
Although South Africans have a history of deep divisions characterised 
by strife and conflict, one shared value and ideal that runs like a golden 
thread across cultural lines is the value of ubuntu – a notion now coming 
to be generally articulated in this country.517 
 
Justice Mokgoro therefore, regards ubuntu as a shared value that should be used 
to develop a new legal culture that incorporates a normative approach to 
constitutional interpretation.518 In other words, ubuntu is an underlying value of the 
Constitution and should be used in the project of transformative 
                                            
513  Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 377-378. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & 
Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 8-11. 
514  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 237.  
515  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 301. Her description of legislative 
interpretation under apartheid coincides with that discussed earlier in para  1 7 2 supra: “In that 
legal order, due to the sovereignty of Parliament, the supremacy of legislation and the absence 
of judicial review of parliamentary statutes, courts engaged in simple statutory interpretation, 
giving effect to the clear and unambiguous language of the legislative text, no matter how 
unjust the legislative provision”. 
516  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 302 (cf the quote at n 430 supra). 
517  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 302. See also Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 6. 
518  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 34. 
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constitutionalism.519 Ubuntu is treated as a value that embodies the spirit, purport 
and object of the Constitution.520 In this sense, ubuntu is viewed as an underlying 
value of the Constitution that exerts an indirect influence on the law.521  
 
Furthermore, the judgments of Justices Langa and Mokgoro indicate that ubuntu 
can aid in the proper understanding of human dignity as a core value of the 
Constitution.522 In this context, Keep and Midgley argue that human dignity as a 
core value of the Constitution must be interpreted as embracing the concept of 
ubuntu.523 The relationship between ubuntu and the constitutional value of human 
dignity is critically investigated in chapter three of this thesis.524 
 
1 8 4 3 Ubuntu under the final Constitution 
Although ubuntu is not mentioned in the final Constitution, it has remained a part 
of South Africa’s constitutional jurisprudence as evidenced by a number of 
constitutional court judgments.525 In this section, the judgments relevant to the 
research topic are discussed in a more or less chronological order to show how 
ubuntu has developed as a legal concept and a number of aspects are identified 
which are further investigated in chapter three.526 However, court judgments 
dealing with the role of ubuntu in the common law of contract are discussed in the 
                                            
519  Cf the discussion in para  1 8 2 3 supra. 
520  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 35. 
521  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 35. 
522  The discussions in the text at n 503 (Justice Langa) and n 509 (Justice Mokgoro) supra. The 
idea of human dignity as a core value of the Constitution is mentioned in para  1 8 2 1 supra 
and further elaborated upon in para  3 2 1 infra. 
523  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 35. 
524  Cf the discussion of the constitutional value of human dignity in para  3 2 infra. 
525  For example, see the collection of case extracts in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the 
law (2012). 
526  A detailed discussion of these aspects is contained in para  3 2 5 infra. 
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next chapter as they are better understood within the context of the historical 
development of fairness in the common law of contract.527 
 
(a) Ubuntu as an underlying value of the final Constitution 
For the purpose of this thesis, Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
needs to be discussed. In this case, the Port Elizabeth Municipality, after receiving 
a petition signed by 1 600 people, applied for the eviction of a group of people 
who, for a number of years, occupied privately owned land within the area of the 
municipality.528 In his judgment, Justice Sachs started off by sketching the 
constitutional and statutory context of the case. He referred to previous legislation 
dealing with unlawful occupiers prior to the introduction of the Constitution and the 
Roman-Dutch law principles of ownership.529 He explained how these rules were 
used to ensure residential segregation during the apartheid era and resulted in 
“large, well-established and affluent white urban areas co-existing, side by side, 
with crammed pockets of impoverished and insecure black ones”.530 He argued 
that this background is relevant when interpreting section 26(3) of the Constitution 
which prohibits the eviction from or demolishment of anyone’s home without a 
court order made after consideration of all the relevant circumstances.531  
 
Justice Sachs proceeded to argue that the interpretation of the Prevention of 
Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”) 
should be interpreted against this background as it was specifically enacted to 
overcome these previous abuses in respect of eviction proceedings.532 He stated 
that this meant a change from the “depersonalised processes” of past evictions to 
“humanised procedures that focused on fairness to all” and entails that the 
interests of both the owner and the unlawful occupier have to be taken into 
                                            
527  Cf the discussion on the influence of ubuntu in the common law of contract in para  2 3 3 infra. 
528  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 1-2. 
529  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 8-10. 
530  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 10. 
531  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 10. 
532  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 11. 
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account.533 This balancing act between the interests of the owner and the unlawful 
occupier has to take place within the context of the values and aims of the 
Constitution.534 In this respect, he specifically referred to the transformative aims 
of the Constitution to achieve social justice and equality.535  
 
Section 6 of PIE permits an eviction order if it is just and equitable to make the 
order after consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Justice Sachs 
emphasised the importance of taking account of the actual circumstances of each 
case: 
 
The combination of circumstances may be extremely intricate, requiring a 
nuanced appreciation of the specific situation in each case. … Each case 
accordingly has to be decided not on generalities but in the light of its 
own particular circumstances. Every situation has its own history, its own 
dynamics, its own intractable elements that have to be lived with (at least 
for the time being), and its own creative possibilities that have to be 
explored as far as reasonably possible.536  
 
Furthermore, the reference to “just and equitable” indicated a balancing of the 
interests of the owner and the unlawful occupier.537 Therefore, the court would 
have to consider extraneous factors (including morality, fairness, social values and 
circumstances which would bring about a fair and equitable judgment) and the 
specific facts of the case.538 The honourable judge also argued that the reference 
to justice and equity emphasises the philosophical and strategic aims of the Act.539 
Accordingly, Justice Sachs held that such an interpretation permitted the 
foundational values of the rule of law and the achievement of equality to be 
                                            
533  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 13. 
534  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 14-15. 
535  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 16-17, 35. 
536  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 31. 
537  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
538  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 33-34. 
539  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 35. 
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interactive, complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than in tension with 
each other.540  
 
This type of interpretation permitted the court to consider other values underlying 
the Constitution,541 and in doing so, Justice Sachs referred to the value of ubuntu: 
 
PIE expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and 
compassion into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to 
balance competing interests in a principled way and to promote the 
constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness 
and shared concern. The Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not 
islands unto ourselves. The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural 
heritage of the majority of the population, suffuses the whole 
constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a communitarian 
philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if 
not a structured, institutionalised and operational declaration in our 
evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, respect 
and concern.542 
 
Therefore, Justice Sachs confirmed the status of ubuntu as an underlying value of 
the final Constitution which should inform legal interpretation in accordance with 
the ideas of transformative constitutionalism.543 This is because Justice Sachs 
viewed ubuntu as part of the culture of the majority of the population that should 
now inform the legal convictions of the South African community. Accordingly, 
ubuntu is part of the legal convictions of the new constitutional community that 
should be considered when interpreting and developing the law in line with the 
constitutional values to establish a plural legal culture and in order to legitimise the 
                                            
540  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 35. 
541  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 36. 
542  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
543  See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law 
(2012) 18; Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 411; Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-
botho in developing a consensual South African legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) 
Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 34. 
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new legal system in South Africa.544 In addition, Justice Sachs used ubuntu to 
inform the constitutional value of human dignity when he stated that ubuntu 
“combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy” and that it refers to 
the development of a new society based on “human interdependence, respect and 
concern”.545 Specifically, Justice Sachs viewed human dignity as a collective 
concern: 
 
It is not only the dignity of the poor that is assailed when homeless 
people are driven from pillar to post in a desperate quest for a place 
where they and their families can rest their heads. Our society as a whole 
is demeaned when state action intensifies rather than mitigates their 
marginalisation.546 
 
In this way Justice Sachs was able to use ubuntu to endorse and promote the idea 
of substantive equality, especially in the context of socio-economic rights (in casu 
the right to housing).547  
 
In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties the High Court elaborated on the role 
of ubuntu in eviction proceedings, especially its role in informing or giving content 
to the value of human dignity.548 Judge Jajbhay referred to the decision in Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers and also linked the transformative aims 
of the Constitution to ubuntu.549 Like Justice Sachs, he emphasised the 
interconnectedness between community members and the responsibilities that 
                                            
544  See again the discussion on the unequal relationship between the customary and common law 
in para  1 8 3 3 supra. 
545  See also Himonga “Exploring the concept of ubuntu in the South African legal system” in 
Kischel & Kirchner (eds) Ideologie und Weltanschauung im Recht (2012) 2. 
546  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 18. See also 
Mokgoro & Woolman 2010 SAPL 403 n 10. 
547  Himonga “Exploring the concept of ubuntu in the South African legal system” in Kischel & 
Kirchner (eds) Ideologie und Weltanschauung im Recht (2012) 15 esp n 61. 
548  The high court’s judgment was overturned by the Constitutional Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 
others 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) in respect of the municipality’s obligation to create and implement 
a comprehensive housing plan. 
549  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 62. 
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flow from this interconnectedness to build a democratic, caring and egalitarian 
society.550 Specifically, he emphasised the responsibility of the community to 
respect the human dignity of each community member:  
 
[Ubuntu] recognises a person’s status as a human being, entitled to 
unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members 
of the community, that such a person may be a part of.551 
 
He argued that this responsibility includes “the capacity to express compassion, 
justice, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building, 
maintaining and strengthening the community”.552 In other words, the respect for 
the human dignity of each community member is integral in establishing and 
maintaining a harmonious community. Finally, he stated that “in the establishment 
of our constitutional values, we must not allow urbanisation and the accumulation 
of wealth and material possessions to rob us of our warmth, hospitality and 
genuine interests in each other as human beings”.553 Therefore, the idea that 
human dignity entails the responsibility of each community member to be 
concerned with the material well-being of other community members can be 
identified. In other words, ubuntu promotes the realisation of socio-economic rights 
as a collective concern and can be used as a critique against individualist and 
capitalist ideas in law.554 
 
The importance of the individual in the community in the context of ubuntu was 
further expanded upon by the Constitutional Court in MEC for Education, 
KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay.555 In this case, a school learner was prohibited by the 
school’s code of conduct from wearing a gold nose-stud in accordance with her 
                                            
550  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 62-63. 
551  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 63. 
552  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 63. 
553  City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 63. 
554  Himonga “Exploring the concept of ubuntu in the South African legal system” in Kischel & 
Kirchner (eds) Ideologie und Weltanschauung im Recht (2012) 15 esp n 61; Cornell & 
Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 19. 
555  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
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South Indian family traditions and culture. Justice Langa referred to the Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers case where Justice Sachs stated that 
“we are not islands unto ourselves” and stated that this idea is central to 
understanding the place of the individual in African culture.556 He cited the African 
philosopher Gyekye who wrote that “an individual human person cannot develop 
and achieve the fullness of his/her potential without the concrete act of relating to 
other individual persons”.557 According to Justice Langa: 
 
This thinking emphasises the importance of community to individual 
identity and hence to human dignity. Dignity and identity are inseparably 
linked as one’s sense of self-worth is defined by one’s identity. Cultural 
identity is one of the most important parts of a person’s identity precisely 
because it flows from belonging to a community and not from personal 
choice or achievement. And belonging involves more than simple 
association; it includes participation and expression of the community’s 
practices and traditions.558 
 
This case emphasises the interdependence between the individual and her human 
dignity and the community. It illustrates the importance of the individual in African 
culture and how the community must respect and support individual self-
realisation and how a person can only develop into a unique being through 
engagement with the community. Social harmony is not obtained by sacrificing the 
needs of the individual for the greater good of the community, but rather the 
greater good of the community is measured against the extent to which members 
of the community are respected and supported in their efforts to achieve self-
realisation.559  
 
(b) Role of ubuntu in developing the private law   
As ubuntu is an underlying value of the final Constitution, Davis and Klare reason 
that section 39(2) of the Constitution obliges the courts to “re-imagine all law in the 
                                            
556  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53. 
557  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53. 
558  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53. 
559  See also Mokgoro “Ubuntu as a legal principle in an ever-changing world” in Diedrich (ed) 
Ubuntu, good faith & equity (2011) 1-2. 
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spirit of ubuntu”.560 This means that ubuntu is relevant when developing the 
principles and rules in the private sphere.561 Again, this is line with the goal to 
establish a plural legal culture and to legitimise the new legal system in South 
Africa.562 However, it would seem that the private law sphere has been far less 
enthusiastic in its embrace and use of ubuntu.563 One of the few cases (outside 
the sphere of the law of contract)564 in which the meaning of ubuntu in the private 
sphere was applied and expanded upon is Dikoko v Mokhatla dealing with the 
appropriate remedy for a defamation action.565  
 
In her dissenting judgment, Justice Mokgoro emphasised the link between human 
dignity and ubuntu.566 She referred to the aim of customary law to restore 
“harmonious human and social relationships where they have been ruptured by an 
infraction of community norms”.567 Thus, she emphasised restorative justice rather 
than retributive justice.568 She argued that the monetary award should aim to 
restore the human dignity of the plaintiff rather than merely punishing the 
offender.569 She further held that courts should be proactive and encourage 
apology and mutual understanding where feasible: 
 
Because an apology serves to recognise the human dignity of the 
plaintiff, thus acknowledging, in the true sense of ubuntu, his or her inner 
                                            
560  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 411.  
561  Cornell & Friedman 2011 MLJ 4-5 prefer the term “common law” over the use of the term 
“private law”. I am agreement with their criticisms but use the term “private law” in this context 
as the term “common law” has been used earlier in this thesis in another context (cf the 
definition of “common law” in n 442).  
562  See again the discussion on the unequal relationship between customary and common law in 
para  1 8 3 3 supra. 
563  Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 400; Bennett 2011 PELJ 40; Bennett 2011 Loyola Law Review 717. 
564  The influence of ubuntu in the common law of contract is investigated in para 2 3 3 infra. 
565  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC). See also the discussion of this case by Himonga et al 
2013 PELJ 400. 
566  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 68. 
567  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 68. 
568  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 69. 
569  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 68. 
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humanity, the resultant harmony would serve the good of both the 
plaintiff and the defendant.570  
 
In his dissenting judgment, Justice Sachs also emphasised that ubuntu aims for 
restorative justice rather than relying on purely retributive principles.571 However, 
he maintained that neither the principles of restorative justice or ubuntu have to be 
restricted to its traditional sphere, namely criminal law.572 He asserted that ubuntu 
could and should be used in a creative way across various fields of law, including 
the private sphere.573 Specifically, he stated as follows: 
 
Ubuntu-botho is more than a phrase to be invoked from time to time to 
add a gracious and affirmative gloss to a legal finding already arrived at. 
It is intrinsic to and constitutive of our constitutional culture. Historically, it 
was foundational to the spirit of reconciliation and bridge-building that 
enabled our deeply traumatised society to overcome and transcend the 
divisions of the past. In present-day terms it has an enduring and creative 
character, representing the element of human solidarity that binds 
together liberty and equality to create an affirmative and mutually 
supportive triad of central constitutional values. It feeds pervasively into 
and enriches the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.574 
 
Therefore, both Justices Mokgoro and Sachs affirmed the link between ubuntu 
and restorative justice. Also, both are of the view that ubuntu does not operate 
only within the public sphere but can be used to promote constitutional values in 
laws governing relationships between private persons.575 Specifically, Justice 
Sachs is of the view that ubuntu could inform the constitutional value of human 
dignity in a manner that could bring together the constitutional values of freedom 
and equality in a more harmonious manner. This means that ubuntu can and 
                                            
570  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 69. 
571  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 114. 
572  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 115. See also Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 397. 
573  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 115-116. See also Bennett 2011 Loyola Law 
Review 710 who argues that ubuntu is a malleable, dynamic and changing concept.  
574  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 113. 
575  See also Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual 
South African legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 46. 
107 
 
should inform the constitutional value of human dignity in the law of contract in a 
way that would promote more harmony between the constitutional values of 
freedom and equality. Following Justice Sachs remarks, this thesis examines how 
ubuntu could inform the expression of the founding constitutional values in the 
common law of contract.576   
 
(c) Role of ubuntu in the harmonisation of Western and African values 
In Dikoko v Mokhatla, Justice Sachs compared the concept of ubuntu with that of 
the Roman-Dutch law remedy of amende honorable: 
 
Although ubuntu-botho and the amende honorable are expressed in 
different languages intrinsic to separate legal cultures, they share the 
same underlying philosophy and goal. Both are directed towards 
promoting face-to-face encounter between the parties, so as to facilitate 
resolution in public of their differences and the restoration of harmony in 
the community. In both legal cultures the centrepiece of the process is to 
create conditions to facilitate the achievement, if at all possible, of an 
apology honestly offered, and generously accepted.577 
 
According to Keep & Midgley, Justice Sach’s comparison between the remedies of 
and values underlying customary law and that of common law indicate that it may 
be possible to harmonise African and Western values.578 Referring to the remarks 
by Justice Sachs and the earlier case of Bophuthatswana Broadcasting 
Corporation v Ramosa,579 they argue that the harmonisation of African and 
                                            
576  This is the subject matter of ch 3 infra. 
577  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 116. 
578  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 47. 
579  In this case, the judge identified common values in passages from Confucius, the Bible and 
Roman law (Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation v Ramosa 1997 JOL 283 (B) 4-5; see 
also Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 390). Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 403 also refer to the minority 
judgment of Mogoeng in The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and others v McBride (Johnstone and 
others, amici curiae) 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) para 216 where it was stated that “[u]buntu gives 
expression to, among others, a biblical injunction that one should do unto others as he or she 
would have them do unto him or her”. 
108 
 
Western values is possible because they include universal or shared values.580 
They further argue that harmonisation is feasible when the focus shifts from the 
cultural and historical roots of the specific value to what the value seeks to 
accomplish.581 Specifically, they maintain that “[a] break from past domination of 
one school of thought over another must be emphasised and the notion of 
inclusivity that is inherent in ubuntu-botho makes it an ideal overarching vehicle for 
expressing shared values”.582  
 
Although establishing how the values embraced by ubuntu are similar to Western 
values is a good starting point, Bohler-Muller argues that how the values in ubuntu 
differ from Western values, is where ubuntu’s real transformative power lies: 
 
[U]buntu could be utilised to promote a different set of ideals for 
interpreting the Bill of Rights – ideals not rooted in Eurocentric thinking 
around atomistic individualism.583  
 
She concludes that ubuntu as a communitarian ethic can provide alternative 
values to liberal legalism.584 Therefore, in chapter three, similarities and 
differences are identified between the values of ubuntu and those underlying the 
common law of contract in order to propose how ubuntu could be used to develop 
the role of good faith in the common law of contract.  
 
                                            
580  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 47. See also 
Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 372; Van Niekerk Interaction of indigenous law and Western law 
(1995) 329. 
581  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 48. See also 
Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 372-373. 
582  Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 48. See also 
Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 370. 
583  Bohler-Muller 2005 SAPL 268. See also Kroeze 2002 Stell LR 260-261. 
584  Bohler-Muller 2005 SAPL 267. 
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1 9 CONCLUSION 
The South African common law has been described as Western law because it 
shares “a basic intellectual and jurisprudential tradition with other legal systems 
belonging to the Romano-Germanic and common-law families”.585 As a result, the 
South African common law is still largely dominated by and developed in 
accordance with Western laws and ideals.586 As explained by Rautenbach: 
 
In South Africa, the dominance of Western Law dates back to the time 
when the colonisers superimposed European law upon the indigenous 
legal systems. There was neither a desire by the local people, nor any 
degree of consciousness and voluntariness on their part to receive 
foreign law…587 
 
The recognition of customary law was closely related to the political developments 
in South Africa.588 Thomas emphasises that customary law was used “as a tool of 
colonialism and apartheid”.589 Customary law was always treated separately from 
common law590 and its application made subject to a repugnancy clause which 
meant that it had to conform to common law (Western) values.591 Therefore, 
customary law has been shaped, developed and influenced by common law ideas 
and rules but the values underlying customary law have exerted no influence on 
                                            
585  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 5 n 2. See also Thomas 2004 Fundamina 188. 
586  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 6-7; Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective 
(2007) 52-53; Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 34. 
587  Rautenbach “The phenomenon of legal pluralism” in Rautenbach & Bekker (eds) Introduction 
to legal pluralism (2014) 6. See also Van Niekerk 1990 Codicillus 35. 
588  SALC Project for harmonisation of common and indigenous law (1999) 20. 
589  Thomas 2008 Fundamina 142. See also Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal 
Information 228. 
590  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 52; Zimmerman & Visser 
“Introduction: South African law as a mixed legal system” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 12-13. 
591  Church et al Human rights from a comparative perspective (2007) 52; Thomas & Tladi 1999 
CILSA 356; Van Niekerk 1998 CILSA 160. 
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the common law.592 More importantly, the pre-constitutional history of the 
relationship between the common and customary law shows a prolonged and 
persistent marginalisation of the customary law and its underlying values which 
resulted in the belief that common law rules, principles and values are superior 
and more civilised than those found in customary law. Over the last four centuries, 
the South African law has reiterated this myth time and time again. Although much 
has been achieved under the new constitutional order to give customary law and 
its underlying values a rightful place in South African law, there is still much work 
ahead, especially in the more traditional and conservative contract law sphere.  
 
The historical development of the South African common law of contract follows 
the same pattern as the development of the South African common law593 and is 
grounded in what Justice Yacoob calls the “colonial legal tradition”.594 It is still 
firmly rooted in the civil law tradition (Roman-Dutch law) as influenced by the 
common law tradition, through English law and is based solely on Western values 
and ideologies.595 The customary law and its underlying values have had no direct 
or indirect influence on the South African common law of contract in the pre-
constitutional era. Customary law never influenced the South African common law 
of contract after the arrival of the Dutch nor during the British colonisation. It also 
did not exert any influence on the common law of contract during the period of the 
unification of South Africa or during apartheid thereafter.596  
 
After the introduction of the Constitution, ubuntu, as an underlying value of 
customary law, has played an increasingly important role in the development of 
the South African law and has itself developed into an underlying value of the 
Constitution which should be used when developing the common law of contract in 
line with the Constitution. Unfortunately, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, 
                                            
592  Du Bois 2004 International Journal of Legal Information 229. 
593  Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 34. 
594  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 23 
(quoted at n 2 supra).  
595  Van Huyssteen et al Contract law (2010) 34-37. 
596  This is illustrated in more detail throughout in the next chapter. 
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ubuntu has played a limited role and received a less than enthusiastic welcome in 
the common law of contract.597 Be that as it may, Justice Yacoob’s remarks598 
indicate that the time is ripe to consider how ubuntu should inform the role of good 
faith in the South African common law of contract. Why and how this proposal has 
come about, can only be fully understood against the historical development of 
fairness in the South African common law of contract which is the subject matter of 
the next chapter. 
                                            
597  The influence of ubuntu on the common law of contract is discussed in para  2 3 3 infra. 
598  Cf the discussion in para  1 1 supra. 
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CHAPTER 2 LEGAL HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FAIRNESS IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 
 
The rules of the law of contract reflect the attempts in the legal system to 
achieve a balance between relevant principles and policies so as to 
satisfy prevailing perceptions of justice and fairness, as well as 
economic, commercial and social expediency. For this reason, the law of 
contract has a dynamic and changing nature.599 
 
2 1 INTRODUCTION 
Before harmonisation of the concepts of good faith and ubuntu in the common law 
of contract can be attempted, it is necessary to understand what the current 
underlying values of the common law of contract are and how they are expressed 
through the concept of good faith. This is necessary in order to identify the 
problems and issues concerning the current role of good faith in the common law 
of contract and to investigate how ubuntu could address these deficiencies. This in 
turn requires an understanding of the legal historical development of the role of 
fairness600 in the South African common law of contract against the relevant 
political, economic and social background which was discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
 
Why this chapter investigates the legal historical development of fairness in the 
South African common law of contract and not only that of good faith and ubuntu 
also requires clarification. This is due to the way in which the courts have dealt 
with unfair contract terms and the unfair enforcement of contract terms. 
Throughout the years, the courts have utilised a number of open norms601 to 
address contractual unfairness. As already mentioned, open norms are necessary 
to address situations not foreseen by law.602 As further explained by Hawthorne: 
                                            
599  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 1.42. 
600  For an explanation on the use of the word “fairness” in this thesis see n 6 supra. 
601  An open norm refers to a rule or standard that has no fixed or restricted meaning, can apply to 
various situations and enables value judgments (cf the discussion in n 485 supra). 
602  Cf the discussion dealing with the difficulty in defining ubuntu in para  1 8 4 1 supra. 
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[T]he aim of the law is to provide protection for the interests of citizens 
who are entitled to the rule of law and not to be ruled by discretion. 
However, it is trite that lawmakers cannot foresee every possibility and 
provide decisions on every eventuality, and it is within this sphere 
between law and discretion that general clauses [i.e. rules that 
incorporate open norms] play a role.603 
 
Specifically, open norms are necessary in the common law of contract to address 
unfair contract terms and the unfair enforcement of contract terms not covered by 
the existing rules.604 The open norms used in the law of contract and relevant to 
this thesis include the exceptio doli generalis, good faith (bona fides), public policy 
informing the rules governing the legality of contracts, the objective normative 
value system established under the Constitution and more recently, ubuntu and 
fairness as contemplated in section 48 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
(hereafter “the CPA”). In order to understand the role of good faith and ubuntu in 
preventing unfair contracts and the unfair enforcement of contracts, it is necessary 
to comprehend how they relate to and have been used in conjunction with these 
other open norms in the common law of contract.  
 
This chapter consists of two parts, namely (1) development of fairness in the 
common law of contract prior to the Constitution and (2) development of fairness 
in the common law of contract after the Constitution. As with the previous chapter, 
                                            
603  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 300. General clauses can be defined as follows: “This refers to 
the rules which are not formulated by the legislature in a way which lends itself readily and 
directly to application, rules which need not even be written, i.e. rules which encapsulate the 
situation in vague terms and which may cover a large range of cases: abuse of rights or also 
unfairness” (Grundmann “General standards and principles, clauses generales and 
Generalklauseln in European Contract Law: a survey” in Grundmann & Mazeaud (eds) 
General clauses in European contract law (2006) 2-3 as quoted in Hawthorne 2014 
PELJ 2822). As was shown earlier, equity had a similar regulatory and corrective role in the 
Roman-Dutch law which arrived at the Cape (cf the discussion in para  1 4 2 2 supra). 
604  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 871 where they state that “it has always been the role of South 
African courts to develop the common law in cases where they are presented with a novel 
legal problem for which there is no legal precedent or authority, or where the common law 
appears to be out of step with the social and economic reality”.  
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this chapter does not constitute an exhaustive critical discussion of the issues 
raised, but rather aims to give an account of these developments to the extent 
necessary to address the research problem. 
  
2 2 FAIRNESS IN THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT PRIOR TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
2 2 1 Introduction 
As explained previously, the South African common law of contract is firmly rooted 
in Roman-Dutch law.605 The Roman-Dutch law was inherently equitable and the 
concept of bona fides infused Roman-Dutch law of contract with an equitable 
spirit. This equitable law of contract incorporating the concept of bona fides then 
arrived in South Africa with the Dutch. Therefore, fairness in South African 
contracts was assessed by the application of remedies that originated in Roman 
law and formed part of the Roman-Dutch law which arrived in South Africa during 
the seventeenth century. For the purposes of this thesis, the exceptio doli 
generalis and good faith (bona fides) must be discussed. Unfortunately, as will be 
seen below, these remedies were abolished or severely limited by the courts over 
time which resulted in a need for another open norm to address contractual 
unfairness. This was addressed by utilising the rules governing legality of 
contracts as informed by the open norm of public policy which was transplanted 
from English law.606 Therefore, the role of public policy in preventing contractual 
unfairness is also discussed.  
 
2 2 2 Exceptio doli generalis  
2 2 2 1 Introduction 
Before dealing with the development of the exceptio doli generalis in South African 
law, the introduction and application of this remedy and the development of the 
bona fidei contracts in Roman and Roman-Dutch law must be discussed. These 
discussions highlight only the most relevant issues for the purposes of this 
                                            
605  Cf again para  1 4 supra. 
606  See Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 300-320 in which she shows how the concept of public policy 
in the South African common law of contract was imported from English law. 
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chapter, but a more detailed discussion on the development of fairness in Roman 
law contracts is contained in chapter four of this thesis.  
 
2 2 2 2 Roman law  
In Roman law, contracts were either classified as stricti iuris or bonae fidei.607 The 
earlier so-called stricti iuris contracts were binding as long as the correct form was 
observed.608 This meant that even where a contract was induced by fraud the 
aggrieved party was bound to the contract as long as the formal requirements 
were met.609 In contrast, the later bonae fidei contracts required no formalities and 
their validity was based on the agreement (consensus) between the parties.610 
Furthermore, the formulae of the bona fide actions included a clause at the end 
instructing the judge to decide the case according to what the defendant ought to 
do or give “ex fide bona” (in good faith).611 Thus, the judge had to decide the case 
on the basis of the principle of good faith.612 Gaius explains that “the iudex 
                                            
607  Stein Buckland’s text-book of Roman law (1996) 413; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil 
law (1980) paras 393-394.  
608  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 424.  
609  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 263; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern 
Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 520-521; Zimmerman Law of 
obligations (1990) 663; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 424; Van 
Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 97; Nicholas Introduction to Roman 
law (1962) 164. 
610  Gaius Inst 3 136: “The reason why we say that in these cases the obligations are contracted by 
consent is that no formality whether of words or writing is required, but it is enough that the 
persons dealing have consented” (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). 
See also Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; Buckland Manual of 
Roman private law (1947) 277. 
611  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 263; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 200-201; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 140, 761-762; Dannenbring Kaser’s 
Roman private law (1984) 174; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; 
Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 95; Stein “Equitable principles in 
Roman law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 81; Schulz Roman 
legal science (1953) 51.  
612 Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 21; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 398; 
Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
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appears to be allowed complete discretion in assessing, on the bases of justice 
and equity, how much ought to be made good to the plaintiff”.613 In this context, 
good faith referred to honesty and fairness,614 which in turn denoted an objective 
and ethical standard of behaviour that was expected from the parties.615 As a 
result, fraud was actionable in bonae fidei contracts.616 
 
This resulted in a discrepancy between bonae fidei and stricti iuris contracts which 
was addressed by the introduction of the defence of fraud (exceptio doli) for the 
stricti iuris contracts.617 The exceptio doli provided for the insertion of the clause “if 
in this matter nothing has been or is being done dolo malo by Aulus Agerius” into 
the formula on the request of the defendant.618 Zimmerman distinguishes between 
                                                                                                                                    
(2000) 77; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 95.  
613  Gaius Inst 4 61 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). 
614  Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 374 sv “Bona fides”.  
615  Gaius Inst 3 137: “Further, in these contracts [consensual contracts] the parties are reciprocally 
liable for what each is bound in fairness and equity to perform for the other…” (quoted from De 
Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)); D 16 3 31pr where it is stated that “[t]he good faith 
that is required in contracts calls for level dealing in the highest degree” (quoted from Watson 
Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). See further Földi 2014 Fundamina 318 n 37; Földi 2007 
Annales Univ Budapest 58; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 399, Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
civil law (1980) para 394. 
616  Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 60; Buckland Manual of Roman private law 
(1947) 252. 
617  Thomas 2003 De Jure 107; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 663-664; Watson Law of the 
ancient Romans (1970) 60. For a detailed discussion of the introduction and development of 
the exceptio doli see Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 663ff; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) para 698-704; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) 
para 97. 
618  Gaius Inst 4 119 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958). See also 
Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 520; Aronstam Consumer protection (1979) 168-169; De Wet 
Estoppel by representation (1939) 83. 
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two instances that are contained in the formula.619 The first instance is fraudulent 
behaviour prior to the institution of the action (referring to the words “nothing has 
been … done”).620 Secondly, instances where the action itself constitutes fraud 
(referring to the words “is being done”).621 The first instance is commonly referred 
to as the exceptio doli specialis, while the latter is called the exceptio doli 
generalis.622 Initially, the exceptio doli was limited to fraudulent behaviour623 but as 
time passed the insertion of this defence (especially the exceptio doli generalis) 
“provided the judge with the same far-ranging discretion that he already had in 
bonae fidei iudicia”.624 In other words, the judge was required to resolve the 
contractual dispute in a fair and reasonable manner.625 Many years later, this is 
reflected in the following passage of the Digest: 
 
                                            
619  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 520. See also Aronstam 1979 THRHR 28; De Wet Estoppel by 
representation (1939) 83. 
620  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 520. See also Aronstam 1979 THRHR 28; De Wet Estoppel by 
representation (1939) 83. 
621  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 520. See also Aronstam 1979 THRHR 28; De Wet Estoppel by 
representation (1939) 83. 
622  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 27; Aronstam Consumer protection (1979) 169; De Wet Estoppel by representation 
(1939) 83. This distinction is a modern one and did not exist in Roman law (Aronstam 1979 
THRHR 28). 
623  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 665; Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 252.  
624  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 667. See also Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in 
modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 520; Dannenbring 
Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 176. For a detailed discussion of the introduction and 
development of the exceptio doli see Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 663ff; Van 
Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 698-704; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 97.  
625  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 263; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern 
Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 520; Zimmerman Law of 
obligations (1990) 668. 
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The praetor established this defence (sic) to the end that a person’s fraud 
should not benefit him through the medium of the civil law but contrary to 
natural equity.626 
 
2 2 2 3 Roman-Dutch law 
As time passed, the distinction between bonae fidei and stricti iuris contracts 
became less important.627 Finally, in Roman-Dutch law it was stated that all 
contracts were bonae fidei in character and based on consent: 
 
Further, we may also conveniently dispense with the division of contracts 
into stricti juris and bonae fidei, for according to our customs all contracts 
are considered to be bonae fidei, which necessarily follows, if we hold 
that with us all contracts are constituted by consent…628  
 
It seemed that the substantive content of the exceptio doli generalis “was 
absorbed into the requirement of good faith” which meant that the exceptio doli 
generalis was no longer needed.629 However, strangely enough the expression 
“exceptio doli” was still used in Roman-Dutch law.630 
 
                                            
626  D 44 4 1, Paul, Edict, book 71 (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). The 
original text speaks of “contra naturalem aequitatem”. See also Erasmus 1989 SALJ 674. 
627  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 27; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 521; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 671. 
628  Decker’s annotation to Van Leeuwen’s Roomsch Hollandsch Recht 4 2 1 (as found in 
Kotzé (tr) Simon van Leeuwen’s Commentaries (1923) 12). See also Hutchison “The nature 
and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 27; Zimmerman “Good 
faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 522; 
Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 220; 
Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 671; Aronstam Consumer protection (1979) 172; 
Aronstam 1979 THRHR 31.  
629  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and 
equity (1997) 522. See also Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & 
Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 27; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 102 & 509 where he 
states that the exceptio doli was inherent in all bonae fidei contracts. 
630  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 220. 
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2 2 2 4 South African law 
(a) Introduction and development  
It seemed that the exceptio doli also arrived in South Africa as part of the Roman-
Dutch law.631 Van Huyssteen refers to a case from 1827 where this exception was 
utilised as a defence to a claim.632 It is not clear from the case report why the 
defence was not successful, but Van Huyssteen argues that the use of this 
exception by the defence supports the proposition that the exceptio doli generalis 
was part of the law at the Cape.633 Furthermore, the exceptio doli generalis was 
also used to introduce various English law doctrines into the South African 
common law of contract during the early twentieth century when English law 
exerted an extensive influence on the substantive law at the Cape.634  
 
For a long time the status of the exceptio doli generalis was uncertain in South 
African law. There were some court decisions635 and academic writings636 that 
supported its application and other court decisions637 and academic writings638 
                                            
631  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 220. 
632  Van Huyssteen “Evaluering van die Kaapse regspraak met betrekking tot sekere beginsels en 
reëls van die materiële kontratereg” in Visagie et al Siviele Appèlhof en Raad van Justisie 
1806-1827 (1992) C 12 referring to JD Karnspek v H Hegers (1827) CJ 2149 420 (26/7/1827). 
633  Van Huyssteen “Evaluering van die Kaapse regspraak met betrekking tot sekere beginsels en 
reëls van die materiële kontratereg” in Visagie et al Siviele Appèlhof en Raad van Justisie 
1806-1827 (1992) C 12. 
634  For a detailed discussion on this issue see Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman 
& Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 221-231; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern 
Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 523-539. Cf para  1 5 2 4 supra. 
635  See e.g. Arprint Ltd v Gerber Goldschmidt Group South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 1 SA 254 
(A) 436-439; Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 2 SA 207 (W) 212-213; Paddock Motors (Pty) 
Ltd v Igesund 1976 3 SA 16 (A) 27; Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 1 SA 514 (A) 
535-537; Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 292-293. 
636  See e.g. Van der Walt 1986 SALJ 651; Van Warmelo 1981 De Jure 203-220; Kerr 1982 
THRHR 85-87; Kerr 1981 THRHR 91-94; Kerr 1981 THRHR 88-91; Kerr 1981 SALJ 158-162; 
Aronstam Consumer protection (1979) 181ff; Aronstam 1979 THRHR 28ff; Kerr 1971 SALJ 
408-411. 
637  See e.g. Novic and another v Comair Holdings Ltd and others 1979 2 SA 116 (W) 155-157; 
Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 436 (T) 437-
439; North Vaal Mineral Co Ltd v Lovasz 1961 3 SA 604 (T) 607-608. 
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that questioned its existence and application. Some legal scholars also argued 
that the exceptio doli generalis was used to address unfairness in contracts in 
South African law because the courts had limited the role of good faith to do so.639 
 
(b) Burial by the Appellate Division 
Finally, in 1988, this issue was settled by the Appellate Division in Bank of Lisbon 
and South Africa v De Ornelas. The respondents (two brothers) were joint 
managing directors of a company that obtained overdraft facilities from the 
appellant (“the Bank”).640 These overdraft facilities were secured with a number of 
security instruments against the individual respondents.641 After the respondents 
discharged the overdraft debt, they requested the cancellation and return of the 
securities given.642 The Bank refused because it claimed that the security 
instruments also served as security for a claim for contractual damages against 
the company of the respondents.643 The Bank alleged that it was entitled to hold 
onto the security instruments until the company had discharged its entire 
indebtedness (including the contractual damages) to the Bank.644 The 
respondents alleged that the Bank’s conduct amounted to dolus generalis 
because the Bank was relying on the wide wording used in the security documents 
to include a claim that was not in the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
security documents were executed.645  
 
                                                                                                                                    
638  See e.g. Olivier 1964 THRHR 26-28; De Wet Estoppel by representation (1939) 83-89. 
639  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 302; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 407. The limitation of the role of 
good faith in the South African law of contract is investigated in more detail in paras  2 2 3 4- 2 2 
3 6 infra. 
640  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 607. 
641  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 607. 
642  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 607-608. 
643  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 608. 
644  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 608. 
645  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 608. Extracts of the 
specific clauses in the various security documents are quoted in the judgment itself (at 608-
609). 
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The court had to decide on the applicability of the exceptio doli generalis to written 
contracts.646 After a lengthy and academic investigation into the development of 
the exceptio doli from Roman to Roman-Dutch law, the court came to the 
conclusion that the exceptio doli generalis never formed part of the Roman-Dutch 
law and therefore never became part of South African law.647 Subsequently, the 
parties were bound to the contractual provisions in the security instruments and 
the wording in them was wide enough to include the Bank’s right to retain the 
security documents in respect of the claim for contractual damages against the 
respondents’ company.648  
 
This decision was met with mixed reactions which included a considerable amount 
of criticism.649 Some academic writers argued that the exceptio doli was in fact 
part of the Roman-Dutch law and therefore did form part of the South African 
law.650 It was also argued, that even if this was not the case, the exceptio doli was 
incorporated into South African law by the acceptance of its existence by the 
courts and various academic writers.651 In other words, the courts were not limited 
by developments in Roman and Roman-Dutch law and had the power to decide 
that the exceptio doli generalis should be available in South African law.652 
Therefore, the court’s approach was criticised because it relied on historical 
developments rather than being sensitive to modern problems and the underlying 
                                            
646  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 592. 
647  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 605-607. 
648  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 608-609. 
649  See e.g. Lewis 2003 SALJ 332; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch 
law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 573-582; Zimmerman 1992 Stell LR 6-9; Kerr 
1991 SALJ 583-586; Lewis 1991 SALJ 262-264; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 676-
677; Lewis 1990 SALJ 26-44; Erasmus 1989 SALJ 675-677; Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 
235-242; Hawthorne & Thomas 1989 De Jure 143-154; Lambiris 1988 SALJ 644-651.  
650  Kerr 1991 SALJ 585; Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 238; Hawthorne & Thomas 1989 De 
Jure 144-150. See also Jansen JA’s minority judgment in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd 
v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 616-617. Contra Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in 
modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 550. 
651  Hawthorne & Thomas 1989 De Jure 150-152. See also Jansen JA’s minority judgment in Bank 
of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 616. 
652  Lambiris 1988 SALJ 647. 
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fundamental notion that open norms are necessary to cater for situations not 
foreseen by the existing legal rules.653 As explained by Van der Merwe et al: 
 
[H]owever necessary and acceptable a general legal rule may be, the 
need to qualify it for the sake of meeting the requirements of justice in a 
particular instance will always exist.654 
 
Along the same lines, some criticised the court’s decision as an attempt to keep 
the principle of equity out of the common law of contract.655 These last two 
criticisms are discussed in more detail in the next section dealing with the legal 
historical development of good faith in the South African common law of 
contract.656  
 
The controversy surrounding the existence of the exceptio doli generalis was 
further aggravated by the Appellate Division in the case of Van der Merwe v 
Meades657 which led Kerr to argue that the court’s endorsement of the replicatio 
doli generalis resulted in the revival of the exceptio doli generalis.658 
 
(c) Post-constitutional reburial by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
Two decades after the decision in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas, 
the reintroduction of the exceptio doli generalis was raised in an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court on the basis that the remedy would be in line with the values 
of the Constitution.659 The appeal was dismissed because the argument was 
                                            
653  Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 239. See also Hutchison “Good faith in the South African law 
of contract” in Brownsword et al (eds) Good faith in contract (1999) 221; Zimmerman 1992 
Stell LR 9; Hawthorne & Thomas 1989 De Jure 154. 
654  Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 239. 
655  Hawthorne & Thomas 1989 De Jure 150. See also Barnard 2006 Stell LR 393-394; 
Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and 
equity (1997) 573; Lewis 1990 SALJ 29. 
656  See para  2 2 3 infra. 
657  Van der Merwe v Meades 1991 2 SA 1 (A). 
658  Kerr 1991 SALJ 584-585. 
659  Crown Restaurant CC v Gold Reef City Theme Park (Pty) Ltd 2008 4 SA 16 (CC) para 3.  
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raised in the Constitutional Court as a court of first instance.660 Again, this decision 
resulted in some academic debate and criticism.661 Recently, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd reburied the 
exceptio doli generalis by confirming the decision in Bank of Lisbon and South 
Africa v De Ornelas.662  
 
As this research topic is limited to the harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu, a 
detailed and critical analysis of the role of the exceptio doli in the South African 
law and its possible reintroduction falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
2 2 3 Good faith (bona fides)  
2 2 3 1 Roman law  
At this stage it will suffice663 to reiterate664 that the formulae of the later bona fide 
actions included a clause at the end of the formula instructing the judge to decide 
the case according to what the defendant ought to do or give “ex fide bona” (in 
good faith).665 This meant that the judge had to decide the case on the basis of the 
principle of good faith666 and it appears that the judge was “allowed complete 
                                            
660  Crown Restaurant CC v Gold Reef City Theme Park (Pty) Ltd 2008 4 SA 16 (CC) paras 6-7.  
661  See e.g. Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 13; Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 481; 
Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 188-193; Kerr 2008 SALJ 241-248; Glover 
2007 SALJ 449-459.  
662  Bredenkamp v Standard Bank South Africa 2010 (SCA) paras 32-35. See also Van Huyssteen 
et al Contract (2016) para 9.259; Barnard-Naudé 2011 Stell LR 166-167. 
663  A detailed discussion of the introduction and development of the bonae fidei contracts in 
Roman law can be found in ch 4 of this thesis. 
664  Cf the discussion in para  2 2 2 2 supra. 
665  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 263; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 200-201; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 140, 761-762; Dannenbring Kaser’s 
Roman private law (1984) 174; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; 
Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 95; Stein “Equitable principles in 
Roman law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 81; Schulz Roman 
legal science (1953) 51.  
666 Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 21; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 398; 
Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
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discretion in assessing, on the bases of justice and equity, how much ought to be 
made good to the plaintiff”.667 In this context, good faith referred to honesty and 
fairness,668 which in turn denoted an objective and ethical standard of behaviour 
that was expected from the parties.669  
 
Bona fides also functioned as a tool to supplement lacunae in and correct 
deficiencies in the ius civile where the application of the existing rules would result 
in unfairness. The introduction of the exceptio doli for the stricti iuris contracts is 
an example of this role of bona fides in Roman law.670 
  
2 2 3 2 Roman-Dutch law 
The position in Roman-Dutch law was similar. Earlier in this thesis, it was stated 
that all contracts in Roman-Dutch law were bonae fidei which meant that the 
parties were bound to everything which good faith reasonably and equitably 
demanded.671 It was further mentioned that this included a subsidiary and 
corrective function where the existing rules did not cater for the specific situation 
or where the application of the existing rules would result in unfairness and 
injustice.672  
                                                                                                                                    
(2000) 77; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 95.  
667  Gaius Inst 4 61 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). 
668  Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 374 sv “Bona fides”.  
669  Gaius Inst 3 137: “Further, in these contracts [consensual contracts] the parties are reciprocally 
liable for what each is bound in fairness and equity to perform for the other…” (quoted from De 
Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)); D 16 3 31pr where it is stated that “[t]he good faith 
that is required in contracts calls for level dealing in the highest degree” (quoted from Watson 
Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). See further Földi 2014 Fundamina 318 n 37; Földi 2007 
Annales Univ Budapest 58; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 399, Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
civil law (1980) para 394. 
670  Cf the discussion on the introduction and development of the exceptio doli in Roman law in 
para  2 2 2 2 supra. 
671  Cf the discussion in paras  1 4 2 2 &  2 2 2 3 supra. 
672  Cf the discussion in para  1 4 2 2 supra. In Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 651 the following description of the role of bona fides in Roman-
Dutch law is found: “This meant that … the court had wide powers of complementing or 
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2 2 3 3 Early South African law prior to British influences (1806-1827) 
Van Huyssteen indicates that good faith was referred to in court decisions dealing 
with the common law of contract at the Cape in the period from 1806 to 1827 (i.e. 
prior to the British changes to the administration of justice).673 He indicates that it 
was referred to as an auxiliary argument and factor that had to be considered 
when determining whether a contract should be enforced or not.674 He also states 
that there are cases where good faith clearly played a central role.675  
 
2 2 3 4 Gradual negation of good faith and the importation of the classical model 
of contract law (1827-1909) 
The British changes to the administration of justice at the Cape were initiated in 
1827676 but it took some time before these influences were transposed into the 
common law of contract. Therefore, as late as 1852, the idea that a contract is 
void if it is contrary to good faith is reflected in the law reports. In Trustees, South 
African Bank v Prince,677 the bank had a mortgage over a property and the 
mortgagor was in arrears and in financial difficulty. Prince approached the bank 
and agreed to guarantee the bank against any deficiency that might arise on the 
                                                                                                                                    
restricting the duties of parties, of implying terms, in accordance with the requirements of 
justice, reasonableness and fairness”. 
673  Van Huyssteen “Evaluering van die Kaapse regspraak met betrekking tot sekere beginsels en 
reëls van die materiële kontratereg” in Visagie et al Siviele Appèlhof en Raad van Justisie 
1806-1827 (1992) C 9. Cf para  1 5 2 3 supra dealing with the English influences on the 
administration of justice at the Cape. 
674  Van Huyssteen “Evaluering van die Kaapse regspraak met betrekking tot sekere beginsels en 
reëls van die materiële kontratereg” in Visagie et al Siviele Appèlhof en Raad van Justisie 
1806-1827 (1992) C 9 referring to Van Niekerken v Horak (1823) CJ 1856 56 (21/8/1823) & 
Hoffman v Tesselaar (1808) CJ 1467 33 (11/08/1808) as examples. 
675  Van Huyssteen “Evaluering van die Kaapse regspraak met betrekking tot sekere beginsels en 
reëls van die materiële kontratereg” in Visagie et al Siviele Appèlhof en Raad van Justisie 
1806-1827 (1992) C 9-11 referring and discussing the case of JJ Smuts NO v F Mabille (1825) 
CJ 1999 37 (26/05/1825). 
676  Cf para  1 5 2 3 supra dealing with the English influences on the administration of justice at the 
Cape. 
677  1852 1 Searle 198. 
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sale of the property if the bank proceeded against the mortgagor. The bank 
proceeded, the mortgagor surrendered the estate and the property was sold by 
public auction to Prince. However, prior to the auction, Prince (with the assistance 
of the bank) induced the trustee of the insolvent estate to alter the conditions of 
the sale (which was fixed by a resolution of the creditors) to his benefit which 
resulted in him purchasing the property at a lessor price than it would have fetched 
if the conditions of the sale had not been altered. As this was to the detriment of 
the other creditors and the insolvent, the question arose whether the sale of the 
property was void because it was unjust towards the other creditors and the 
insolvent. In framing the question before the court, the court stated that the sale of 
the property would be void “if repugnant to justice, good faith, or good morals”.678 
After considering the above facts, the court held that the contract was “unjust and 
unconscientious” towards the other creditors and the insolvent, and consequently 
void.679 The court also held that the contract of sale was void because it was 
contrary to the policy of the applicable insolvent laws which aimed to protect the 
common interest of all the creditors.680 Accordingly, the idea of public policy as 
found in English law also played a role in the decision.681  
 
Then, in 1860, a more conservative approach can be identified in Dyason v 
Ruthven682 where the court had to consider whether a contract providing for an 
interest rate of twelve percent per year was usurious. There was no rule that set a 
maximum legal interest rate but the court held that the agreed interest rate could 
be reduced on proof of extortion or of actual or constructive fraud with reference to 
the particular circumstances of the case.683 In handing down his judgment, Judge 
Watermeyer made the following statement: 
 
                                            
678  Trustees, South African Bank v Prince 1852 1 Searle 205. 
679  Trustees, South African Bank v Prince 1852 1 Searle 205-206. 
680  Trustees, South African Bank v Prince 1852 1 Searle 206. 
681  See, in general, Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 300-320 on the origin of the concept of public 
policy in the South African law of contract.  
682  1860 3 Searle 282. 
683  Dyason v Ruthven 1860 3 Searle 310-312. See also Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 313; 
Wessels Law of contract vol 1 (1937) para 579. 
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When men contract it must be assumed that they know what they 
contract, and it would probably be difficult to obtain a rescission and 
restitution, unless proceedings nearly akin to fraud were established.684 
 
Hawthorne maintains that the decision was motivated by public policy685 and so a 
gradual shift can be identified from good faith to public policy as the standard 
against which the enforcement of a contract should be measured. Furthermore, 
the non-enforcement of a contract was now limited to cases of actual or 
constructive fraud or extortion which was a more stringent test than that required 
by bona fides. 
 
Finally, fifteen years later, in Reynolds v Donald Currie & Co686 the court referred 
to English law when it made the following statement: 
 
And to these stipulations the Courts of Law felt themselves compelled to 
give effect on the undeniable principle, that, in the absence of fraud or 
illegality, Courts of Justice are bound to give effect to conditions, 
however stringent and oppressive, to which the parties to a contract have 
deliberately agreed.687 
 
Questions regarding the fairness of a contract had to be decided with reference to 
the rules of illegality and public policy which did not prohibit the enforcement of 
unfair terms. In consequence, the role of good faith in addressing unfair contracts 
was severely limited. 
 
This is not surprising as this was also the year in which the English case of 
Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson was handed down. The 
                                            
684  Dyason v Ruthven 1860 3 Searle 310. 
685  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 313. 
686  1875 NLR 1. This case dealt with the enforcement of a clause included on a passenger ticket 
which excluded the carrier’s liability in respect of damages to the passenger’s baggage while 
stowed on a passenger ship on route from London to Natal. As previously indicated, the courts 
in Natal was much more willing to look to English law for legal guidance (cf the discussion in 
para  1 5 3 1 supra). 
687  Reynolds v Donald Currie & Co 1875 NLR. 
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following passage from this case is regarded as the locus classicus of the classical 
description of the principle of freedom of contract: 
 
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules 
which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, 
because if there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall 
have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when 
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public 
policy to consider – that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom 
to contract.688 
 
This model is referred to as the classical model of contract law689 which is based 
on the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract.690 Freedom of contract 
entails that the parties can decide whether, with whom and on what terms to 
contract which finds expression through consensus.691 This leads to the principle 
of sanctity of contract which refers to the idea that where a contract was entered 
into freely and where the terms thereof are not contrary to public policy it should 
be enforced.692 Sanctity of contract is sometimes still expressed by the Latin 
                                            
688  Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 465. 
689  For detailed expositions on the classical law of contract see Collins Law of contract (2003) 3-
10; Atiyah Rise and fall of freedom of contract (1979) 226ff. 
690  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 1.41; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in 
Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 23; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 348; Barnard-Naude 
2008 Constitutional Court Review 168; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; Pretorius 2003 
THRHR 640; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in 
Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 184; Zimmerman “Good 
faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity 
(1997) 551; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 164; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 576-577.  
691  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 1.41; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in 
Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 23; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 348; Bhana & 
Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; Pretorius 2003 THRHR 640; Tladi 2002 De Jure 308; Hawthorne 
1995 THRHR 163. 
692  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 1.41; Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 12-
13; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; Pretorius 2003 THRHR 640; Zimmerman Law of 
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phrase pacta sunt servanda.693 This conception of freedom of contract is 
succinctly described by Hawthorne: 
 
First of all, it is used to mean that persons should be free to negotiate the 
terms of their contracts without legislative interference. Secondly, the 
meaning attached is that where parties have concluded a contract, the 
terms of the contract should not be interfered with and should be given 
full effect. Thirdly, it has been interpreted to mean that a person should 
be free to select the parties he contracts with; and fourthly, that a person 
should be free to decide not to contract.694  
 
Accordingly, it promotes an individualistic approach to contracts that is based on 
the political philosophies of individualism and economic liberalism.695 
 
The classical approach to contract law further assumes that the contracting parties 
are in an equal bargaining position and therefore promotes formal equality.696 As 
Hawthorne explains: 
 
                                                                                                                                    
obligations (1990) 576-577. As explained by Adams & Brownsword Key issues in contract 
(1995) 217 (as quoted by Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 348 n 11): “According to the classical view, 
the social function of contract is not simply to facilitate exchange: contract is a vehicle for 
maximising economic self-interest. Contractors may legitimately pursue their own interests, 
prioritising their own interests against those of the other side, subject only to such minimal 
constraints as those pertaining to fraud and coercion”. 
693  Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 12; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in 
Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 23; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; 
Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 576.  
694  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 163. 
695  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and 
human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 185. See 
further the discussion in the text at n 710 infra dealing with the changing political, economic 
and social environment of that time. 
696  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23-24; Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 1; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; 
Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 301; Hawthorne 2003 THRHR 117; Pretorius 2003 THRHR 640; 
Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 163, 165. Cf the discussion dealing with formal equality before the 
law in para  1 8 2 2 supra. 
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Both classical contract law and the classical conception of the rule of law 
have as their point of departure that inequality between individuals is the 
result of natural differences and capabilities and that no legal system 
could be held accountable for recognising the formal equality of 
individuals.697 
 
Consequently, the classical model of contract law is not concerned with the 
respective bargaining position of the parties or the resulting unfairness of the 
bargain.698 As explained by Hawthorne, it “does not take into account the 
discrepancies in resources such as ownership, wealth and knowledge, which 
sustain inequality between the parties to a contract”.699 
 
In terms of the classical approach, good faith requires that the court should give 
effect to that which is agreed between the parties.700 In this way, the requirement 
of good faith is married to the ideas of freedom and sanctity of contract.701 In turn, 
this forms the basis of a formalistic approach to contracts as the courts need only 
concern themselves with the formal validity and enforceability of the contract as 
the substance of the contract has been agreed between the parties and must be 
honoured.702 Accordingly, the substantive unfairness of a contract is not a matter 
for the courts but the business of the parties.703 In other words, this approach to 
                                            
697  Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 79. See also Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 348. Cf the discussion on the 
classical conception of the rule of law in para  1 5 2 3 supra. 
698  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 165-166. 
699  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 166. See also Barnard-Naudé 2013 SAJHR 472-473. 
700  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23; Pretorius 2003 THRHR 640; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
701  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
702  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 348; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 76; Bhana & Pieterse 
2005 SALJ 867; Pretorius 2003 THRHR 640; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights 
and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 185; 
Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 577. 
703  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23; Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 2; Moseneke 2009 Stell LR 9; 
Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 76; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867; Pretorius 2003 
THRHR 640; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 577. 
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contracts promotes a self-regulating and self-correcting market where there is no 
or little state interference.704 
 
Consequently, the classical model of contract law prefers to deal with clear, 
unambiguous and certain rules instead of normative values like equity.705 By 
necessity, such an approach relies on the idea that the rules of law are absolute, 
neutral and can be deduced from legal precedent.706 Freedom and sanctity of 
contract are presented as neutral principles or absolute truths.707 It follows that the 
court then merely applies the neutral rules of law to ascertain whether a contract 
has been established, and once this has been done, the contract must be 
enforced.708 In this way, commercial and legal certainty is achieved.709 
 
Finally, these changes can be ascribed to the changing political and economic 
climate during and after the English colonisation.710 These have already been 
discussed in the previous chapter and can be summarised as follows: The 
negation of the court’s equity jurisdiction and the import of a strict stare decisis 
doctrine which were due to the increasing emphasis on legal certainty which in 
turn can be traced back to legal positivism and formalism.711 In turn, legal 
                                            
704  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 348; Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 2; Moseneke 2009 
Stell LR 9; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 77; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights 
and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 185. 
705  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
706  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 24; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867-868. 
707  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 24; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
708  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
709  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 23; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 867. 
710  Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den 
Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 149.  
711  Cf the discussion in para  1 5 2 3 supra dealing with the English influences on the 
administration of justice in the Cape colony during the nineteenth century. 
132 
 
positivism is closely related to the system of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
classical rule of law that arrived in South Africa with the British, and was adopted 
by the ideologies of individualism and capitalism.712 
 
Gradually, these principles where incorporated into the common law of contract by 
the courts as illustrated by the following remarks in A Trimble v Jameson & Co: 
 
[I]t was observed that the determination of what is contrary to the so-
called “policy of the law” necessarily varies from time to time. Many 
transactions are now upheld by Courts which a former generation would 
have avoided as being contrary to the supposed policy of the law. 
 
… judges are much less disposed nowadays than their predecessors 
were to undertake what practically amounts to legislation, for public 
policy equally requires that the utmost liberty of contracting be conceded, 
and judges may not lightly interfere with the freedom of contract.713  
 
This is also reflected in the reasoning of the court soon thereafter in Burger v 
Central South African Railways: 
 
[O]ur law does not recognise the right of a court to release a contracting 
party from the consequences of an agreement duly entered into by him 
merely because that agreement appears to be unreasonable”.714 
 
Eventually, by 1907, good faith was reduced to an underlying principle of the law 
of contract:  
 
As regards the good faith which is required in the fulfilment of contracts it 
may be laid down broadly, with respect to all contracts, that any loss 
                                            
712  Cf the discussion dealing with the English influences on the exsiting substantive law in the 
Cape colony during the nineteenth century (para  1 5 2 4 supra). 
713  A Trimble v Jameson & Co 1903 24 NLR 56 referring to Printing and Numerical Registering 
Company v Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 462. The earliest case that I could find that refers to 
Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson is St Marc v Harvey 1893 10 SC 267. 
714  Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 576 quoting English law. See also Bradfield 
Christie’s law of contract (2016) 15; Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 168. 
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suffered by either party by actual fraud on the part of the other will have 
to be made good by the latter, and from this liability the parties will not 
even be able to release themselves in advance by contract. For such 
fraud the Court may cancel the contract altogether.  
 
When it comes to a question of breach of faith falling short of actual 
fraud, no general rule can be laid down, inasmuch as different kinds of 
contract vary as to the degree of good faith which is required in their 
fulfilment.715 
 
It is also interesting to note that a number of contract law textbooks of that time do 
not mention good faith at all.716  
 
2 2 3 5 Good faith’s limited role during the Union (1910-1947) 
The role of good faith as an underlying principle of the common law of contract 
continued during the Union of South Africa. There were also cases in which the 
Appellate Division recognised and realised the principle of good faith.717 However, 
in 1925, the court in Weinerlein v Goch Buildings reiterated the limited role of 
equity in the South African law along the lines of that found in Mills and Sons v 
Trustees of Benjamin Bros (1876) and Estate Thomas v Kerr (1903):718 
 
Our common law, based to a great extent on the civil law, contains many 
an equitable principle; but equity, as distinct from and opposed to the 
law, does not prevail with us. Equitable principles are only of force in so 
                                            
715  Maasdorp Law of obligations (1907) 80. 
716  Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den 
Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 149 referring to Lee Introduction to 
Roman-Dutch law (1915). See also Roos & Reitz Principles of Roman-Dutch law (1909) as 
another example. 
717  MacDuff & Co Ltd (in Liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd 1924 
AD 573; Neugebauer & Co Ltd v Hermann 1923 AD 573-574. See also the discussion of these 
cases by Hawthorne 2001 THRHR 512; Olivier AJ in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike 
Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 (SCA) 319. 
718  In para  1 5 2 3 supra it was shown how these judgments resulted in the limitation of the 
Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope’s equity jurisdiction during the late nineteenth 
century. 
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far as they have become authoritatively incorporated and recognised as 
rules of positive law.719 
 
Furthermore, the classical model of contract law continued to play an important 
role in case law.720 How this model of contract law was married to the concept of 
good faith can be seen in the following extract from Wessels’ first edition of his 
The Law of Contract in South Africa in 1937: 
 
As the distinction between contracts bonae fidei and stricti juris is 
obsolete, and as all contracts are now bonae fidei, our law requires that 
they must be executed in good faith… The meaning of this is not only 
that there is no fraud and deceit, but that the execution of the contract 
must be in accordance with the real intention of the parties as revealed 
by the terms of the contract…721 
 
2 2 3 6 Good faith’s limited role under apartheid and the start of modern law of 
contract (1948-1993) 
Throughout the years the courts periodically reiterated that all contracts are bonae 
fidei in nature,722 used the principle of good faith to create new equitable rules and 
gave expression to it through various indirect methods (for example the 
                                            
719  Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 295. See also the discussion of this case by 
Hawthorne 2001 THRHR 512; Olivier AJ in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v 
Saayman 1997 (SCA) 319. 
720  See e.g. Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 73 referring to Printing and 
Numerical Registering Company v Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 465.  
721  Wessels Law of contract vol 1 (1937) para 1997 as referred to by Thomas “The changing 
fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den Berge et al (eds) 
Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 149. 
722  Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 1 SA 419 (A) 433; 
Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 651; 
Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 3 SA 16 (A) 28; Meskin NO v Anglo-American 
Corporation of SA Ltd and another 1968 4 SA 793 (W) 804. See also Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 
407; Hawthorne 2001 THRHR 512; Hutchison “Good faith in the South African law of contract” 
in Brownsword et al (eds) Good faith in contract (1999) 213.  
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interpretation of contract and ex lege and tacit terms).723 Again, these indirect 
methods were used because the classical model of contract law continued to play 
an important role under apartheid.724 It was only after the demise of the exceptio 
doli generalis in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas that the idea that 
good faith could be used to address unfair contracts received detailed attention.725 
To understand why this was the case, it is necessary to discuss the courts’ 
comments on the role of good faith in in the common law of contract. 
 
The court accepted that all contracts are bona fide726 which meant that “the 
contracting parties were bound to everything which good faith reasonably and 
equitably demanded”.727 However, it denied the existence of a general substantive 
rule based on equity. According to the court, there was no such remedy in Roman-
Dutch law because: 
 
… the Dutch Courts, unlike the English Courts … did not administer a 
system of equity as distinct from a system of law. Roman-Dutch law is 
itself inherently an equitable legal system. In administering the law the 
Dutch Courts paid due regard to considerations of equity but only where 
                                            
723  Hawthorne 2001 THRHR 512; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 172. For an overview on the influence 
of good faith in shaping the existing rules and doctrines of the South African law of contract 
see Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas 
and equity (1997) 552-572; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 241-254. 
724  See e.g. Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudré (Pty) Ltd 1997 4 All SA 482 (N) 492 referring to 
Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 465. See again para 
 1 7 1 supra for a general discussion on the nature and development of the South African law 
under apartheid. 
725  Thomas “The changing fortunes of bona fides in the South African law of contract” in Van den 
Berge et al (eds) Historische wortels van het recht (2014) 148; Hutchison “Good faith in the 
South African law of contract” in Brownsword et al (eds) Good faith in contract (1999) 214; 
Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and 
equity (1997) 550. Cf the discussion in para  2 2 2 supra. 
726  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 599, 601.  
727  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 601.  
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equity was not inconsistent with the principles of law. Equity could not 
override a clear rule of law.728 
 
The court stated that the position is the same under South African law.729 
Furthermore, the court denied that there was any evidence that the concept of 
bona fides developed to fulfil the function of the exceptio doli: 
 
I cannot find any support in Roman-Dutch law for the proposition that in 
the law of contract an equitable exception or defence, similar in effect to 
the exceptio doli generalis, was utilised under the aegis of bona fides.730 
 
The court based its argument on an historical analysis of the exceptio doli 
generalis in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. In doing this, the court ignored certain 
aspects of the role of equity in Roman-Dutch law. In the previous chapter, it was 
shown that the Roman-Dutch law that arrived in South Africa was inherently 
equitable and flexible, and that although previous decisions had persuasive value 
they did not have the force of law. This equity was not only of a subsidiary nature 
but also included a corrective function where adherence to the strict rules of law 
would result in injustice.731  
 
The court also ignored British influences on the role of equity in South African law. 
These were also discussed in the previous chapter and refer to the Supreme 
Court’s assumed equity jurisdiction which was limited in Mills and Sons v Trustees 
of Benjamin Bros and as further elaborated on in Estate Thomas v Kerr.732 Not 
surprisingly, the court referred to Estate Thomas v Kerr in support of its view that 
equity cannot override a clear rule of law but did not make any reference to the 
                                            
728  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 606.  
729  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 606.  
730  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 606. Jansen JA also 
conceded this in his minority judgment: “In our law the requisite of good faith has not as yet 
absorbed the principles of the exceptio doli” (at 616). 
731  See para  1 4 2 1 supra. 
732  See para  1 5 2 3 supra. 
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corrective function of equity.733 This in effect, negated the role of equity in the 
South African common law of contract to correct injustices that results from the 
strict adherence to rules of law. In other words, the court did not consider the role 
of equity on the existing rules in a comprehensive manner734 and attempted “to 
keep equity as a principle out of the law of contract”.735 
 
The court’s decision further does not actually deal with the underlying policy 
considerations.736 The issue of an equitable discretion must be assessed with 
reference the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract as well as legal 
certainty.737 As was seen in the previous chapter, the weight given to the public 
policy considerations of freedom and sanctity of contract and legal certainty 
resulted in negation of the role of equity during the British colonisation.738 It was 
also shown that these ideologies found their way into the South African common 
law of contract and continued to play an important role during the Union of South 
African and under apartheid.739 Therefore, it is not surprising that this type of 
approach can be identified in the court’s judgment.740 As remarked by Hawthorne: 
 
It is obvious in our case law that freedom of contract has dominated at 
the expense of social and economic realities. Most judges ignore the 
discrepancy between the formal requirements of freedom and equality 
                                            
733  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 606. See also 
Zimmerman 1992 Stell LR 7; Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 241.  
734  Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 241. See also Lewis 1991 SALJ 263. 
735  Hawthorne & Thomas 1989 De Jure 150. See also Lewis 2003 SALJ 333; Zimmerman “Good 
faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 573; 
Lewis 1990 SALJ 29. 
736  Lewis 2003 SALJ 333; Zimmerman 1992 Stell LR 9; Lewis 1991 SALJ 263; Erasmus 1989 
SALJ 676, esp n 59; Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 240. 
737  Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 240. See also Lewis 1990 SALJ 29 (esp n 12); Erasmus 1989 
SALJ 676-677. 
738  See paras  1 5 2 3 &  1 5 2 4 supra. 
739  See the discussions in paras  2 2 3 5 &  2 2 3 6 supra. 
740  Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 178; Lewis 2003 SALJ 331-332; Cockrell 
1992 SALJ 44. 
138 
 
and socio-economic reality, and continue to uphold the assumptions of 
the nineteenth century.741 
 
In contrast to this, judge of appeal Jansen in his minority judgment in Bank of 
Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas argued that the policy considerations of 
freedom and sanctity of contract and legal certainty are not absolute values and 
cited various examples in the common law of contract where these principles give 
way to other policy considerations based on equity.742 He further contended that 
the weight attached to them would depend on the specific socio-economic context 
and mentioned that in recent years the principle of freedom and sanctity of 
contract have become the subject of increasing attack as a result of “rampant 
inflation, monopolistic practices giving rise to unequal bargaining power and the 
large-scale use of standard form contracts”.743 
 
Hawthorne and Judge Jansen’s remarks refer to what is described as a modern 
concept of contract law which involves a paternalistic approach through the 
interference in private contracts in order to correct injustices resulting from 
unequal bargaining relationships and the use of standard term contracts.744 This 
more modern approach to the law of contract reflects greater changes in the 
political, economic and social environment. The industrial age created great 
discrepancies in economic power that resulted in the exploitation of vulnerable 
individuals and groups.745 In South Africa this was further compounded by 
                                            
741  Hawthorne 2001 THRHR 513. 
742  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 613-615 mentioning the 
court’s discretion to refuse a right to specific performance and the enforcement of restraints of 
trade and to reduce contractually agreed penalties as examples. 
743  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 613. See also Van der 
Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 240. 
744  Hawthorne 2008 SAPR 84; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 81; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 868; 
Pretorius 2003 THRHR 641-642; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch 
law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 575; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 167; Hahlo 
1981 SALJ 70. 
745  Hawthorne 2008 SAPR 80; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 526-527. 
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apartheid which created further political, economic and social inequality.746 This 
resulted in the inability of the formal conceptions of equality and the rule of law to 
prevent the exploitation of a contracting party in a weaker bargaining position.747 
In other words, reliance on the common law ideals of freedom and sanctity of 
contract in conjunction with a formalistic and positivistic approach by the courts 
has the effect of sustaining and promoting these inequalities.748 To correct these 
inequalities, state intervention is required which results in what is generally 
referred to as a social welfare state749 and aims to protect more vulnerable 
individuals and groups against economic and social exploitation.750 Botha 
describes these changes as follows: 
 
The pressures of democratisation and industrialisation gave rise to more 
overt state intervention in economic and social life. The shift from a 
liberal, supposedly non-interventionist state to a welfare state was 
necessitated both by the economic imperatives of the capitalist system, 
and by the need to preserve the legitimacy and stability of the liberal 
democratic state. On the one hand, the state had to intervene in the 
economy to correct market failures, and thus to ensure the success of 
the economic system. On the other hand, it became increasingly difficult 
to reconcile vast economic and social inequality with the liberal idea that 
society consists of free and equal individuals. The state therefore came 
under pressure to improve the social position of women, children and the 
poor through protective measures (eg labour legislation) and welfare 
entitlements.751 
 
                                            
746  Hawthorne 2008 SAPR 80. See also the discussion dealing with the apartheid era in para  1 7 
supra. 
747  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 348; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 526. 
748 Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 75-79 as supported by Louw 2013 PELJ 58. See also Davis & 
Klare 2010 SAJHR 411. 
749  Hawthorne 2008 SAPR 80 provides the following definition of a welfare state: “any state which 
is characterised by a high degree of government intervention in social and economic life and 
the existence of extensive regulatory frameworks and administrative apparatuses designed to 
further social, economic and political goals” (cf Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 526 n 13). 
750  Hawthorne 2008 SAPR 80. See further Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 81; Hahlo 1981 SALJ 70. 
751  Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 526-527. See also Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 83. 
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This would include not only legislative intervention752 but also a more normative 
approach to judicial adjudication.753 As explained by Bhana and Pieterse: 
 
[A]lthough parties still enjoy freedom of contract, normative 
considerations play a fairly important part in allowing the state an active 
role in preventing or curing any harm to the contracting parties 
themselves or to society in general… Such normative considerations are 
communitarian in nature. They acknowledge that contract does not 
operate in isolation, but that it forms part of the greater fabric of society. 
Society should therefore exercise some control over contract, so as to 
ensure social justice and equality.754 
 
Finally, these normative values should be flexible and open-ended in order to 
promote social justice and equality: 
 
The generality of legal norms is further eroded by the prevalence of 
discretionary regulation. Formal rules are often not flexible enough to 
cope with the complexity of modern societies, and are replaced by open-
ended standards, such as “good faith”, “good morals”, “reasonableness” 
and “public interest”. As a result, judges and officials enjoy a wide 
discretion in the application and interpretation of legal norms. This results 
in an increase in the range of facts considered relevant to a decision, and 
greater scope for individualised and context-specific decision-making”.755  
 
Returning to the decision in Bank of Lisbon and South African v De Ornelas, it can 
be argued that the court attempted to limit the use of open norms in the law 
contract. However, its remarks regarding the concept of bona fides left some 
uncertainty. As stated earlier, the court eliminated the exceptio doli and did not 
transfer its role to bona fides but held that all contracts are bonae fidei. Thus, it did 
not give any specific content to the principle of good faith in the common law of 
contract.756 This resulted in uncertainty in respect of the exact role of good faith in 
                                            
752  See the discussion in para  2 3 4 infra dealing with the enactment and application of the CPA. 
753  Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 80; Hahlo 1981 SALJ 70. 
754  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 868. 
755  Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 528. See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 868. 
756  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 19; Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 241. 
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preventing and correcting contractual unfairness.757 Consequently, the following 
question arose in academic literature: 
 
[W]as good faith a free-floating principle that permitted a court to 
intervene directly in contractual relations, or did it operate only indirectly, 
through established common-law rules and doctrines, such as those 
relating to public policy and the legality of contracts?758 
 
As will be seen below, the courts preferred the latter approach which brings the 
discussion to the rules dealing with the legality of contracts as informed by public 
policy.  
 
2 2 4 Legality of contracts and public policy 
2 2 4 1 Importation of public policy during the British colonisation (1827-1909) 
It was shown above how the role of good faith in addressing unfair contract terms 
was gradually negated until it was reduced to an underlying principle of the 
common law of contract. At the same time, the English concept of public policy 
was imported into the common law of contract in terms of which contracts contrary 
to public policy were illegal, and consequently void. However, unfair contract terms 
were not considered against public policy because public policy was defined 
conservatively and with reference to freedom and sanctity of contract as 
expressed in classical contract law.759 
 
                                            
757  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 27; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 545; Cockrell 1992 SALJ 55-56; Van der Merwe et al 1989 
SALJ 241-242. 
758  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 28. See further Brand & Brodie “Good faith in contract law” Zimmerman et al (eds) 
Mixed legal systems (2004) 94; Van der Merwe et al 1989 SALJ 242. 
759  Cf the discussion in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
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2 2 4 2 Public policy during the Union years (1910-1944) 
This state of affairs continued under the Union years.760 Although it was accepted 
that public policy varied from time to time, a guarded approach was taken. 
Wessels explains that the tendency of that time was “to restrict rather than to 
extend the principles by which contracts are avoided on the ground of public 
policy”.761 Again, the classical model of contract law can be identified in the 
standard contract law textbook published during this period: 
 
Freedom to enter into any contract is the policy of our law, and when 
once a valid contract has been entered into, the parties are bound 
thereby as by a law. Courts of law must therefore not lightly interfere with 
freedom to contract and seek to set aside contracts on the ground that 
they are against public policy.762 
 
2 2 4 3 Public policy during apartheid (1948-1993) 
This position continued during the apartheid years763 as illustrated by Hahlo’s 
following statement: 
                                            
760  See e.g. Van Rensburg v Staughton 1914 AD 328: “The position for him is no doubt hard; but 
those who enter into onerous or one-sided agreements have only themselves to thank. A court 
of law cannot assist them merely because the results are harsh”. See also Hawthorne 2006 
THRHR 50. 
761  Wessels Law of contract vol 1 (1937) para 497. See also Wessels Law of contract vol 1 (1937) 
para 2002 n 1 (as supplemented by Supplement 1 in Wessels Law of contract vol 2 (1937) 
1563): “The duty of the courts is to expound and not to expand public policy, and the doctrine 
should be invoked only in clear cases, in which the harm to the public is substantially 
incontestable and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds.” 
762  Wessels Law of contract vol 1 (1937) para 1997. In support of this proposition, he quotes 
Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 465 which is quoted 
in the text at n 688 supra. See further Wessels Law of contract vol 1 (1937) para 496; Wells v 
South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 73 (also referring to Printing and Numerical 
Registering Company v Sampson). 
763  See e.g. Wynns Car Care Products v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1991 2 SA 754 (A) 760; 
Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B N Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 1 SA 298 (A) 436; Grinaker Construction v 
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1982 1 SA 78 (A) 96; Haviland Estates (Pty) Ltd and 
another v McMaster 1969 2 SA 312 (A) 336; Sleightholme Farms (Pvt) Ltd v National Farmers 
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[P]rovided a man is not a minor or a lunatic and his consent is not vitiated 
by fraud, mistake or duress, his contractual undertakings will be enforced 
to the letter. If through inexperience, carelessness or weakness of 
character, he has allowed himself to be overreached, it is just too bad for 
him, and it can only be hoped that he will learn from his experience. The 
courts will not release him from the contract or make a better bargain for 
him. Darwinian survival of the fittest, the law of nature is also the law of 
the market place.764 
 
However, in 1984, the appeal court in Magna Alloys and Research (SA) v Ellis 
reconsidered the role of public policy. It confirmed that agreements that are in 
conflict with public policy are unenforceable and held that the content of public 
policy changes over time, that there is no closed list of agreements that are 
contrary to public policy and that the courts must determine whether an agreement 
is contrary to public policy or not.765 Therefore, it could be argued that the court 
viewed public policy as an open norm.766  
 
After the demise of the exceptio doli generalis in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa 
v De Ornelas in 1988, the courts quickly turned to the concept of public policy to 
address the need for an open norm to address contractual unfairness.767 In 1989, 
the court in Sasfin v Beukes held that unfair contracts should be dealt with in 
accordance with the rules and principles of legality and public policy. In this case, 
an anaesthetist (Beukes) granted a deed of cession in favour of a finance 
company (Sasfin) which placed Sasfin in complete control of his earnings. On 
notice of session to Beukes’ debtors Sasfin would be able to recover all of Beukes’ 
                                                                                                                                    
Union Mutual Insurance Society Ltd 1967 1 SA 13 (R) 18. See also the discussion of these 
cases by Hawthorne in 2006 THRHR 50-51. 
764  Hahlo 1981 SALJ 70 as quoted by Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 163 & 
Hawthorne 2006 THRHR 49. 
765  Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 891-893. See also Lubbe 
2004 SALJ 400 
766  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 400. See also Thomas “Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 177. 
767  Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2822; Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 303; Brand 2009 SALJ 75. 
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book debts and retain all amounts recovered, whether or not he owed any money 
to Sasfin. Beukes was incapable of ending this situation.768 
 
The court held that where a contract is contrary to public policy it should not be 
enforced.769 The court also accepted that public policy is a vague and contentious 
concept and difficult to determine (in other words an open norm), but argued that 
the interest of the community is of utmost importance to determine public policy: 
 
Agreements which are clearly inimical to the interests of the community, 
whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run counter to social or 
economic expedience, will accordingly, on the grounds of public policy, 
not be enforced.770 
 
Therefore, a court must not hesitate to declare a contract contrary to public policy 
when necessary.771 However, such power should be exercised with restraint:  
 
The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, however, 
be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty 
as to the validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate 
use of the power. One must be careful not to conclude that a contract is 
contrary to public policy merely because its terms (or some of them) 
offend one’s individual sense of propriety and fairness.772 
 
The court stressed that public policy generally favours freedom and sanctity of 
contract.773 However, the court should also take account of “the doing of simple 
                                            
768  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 7, 13-14. 
769  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 7 referring to Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 891. 
770  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 7-8. 
771  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9. 
772  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9. 
773  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9. In this respect, the court referred to Printing and 
Numerical Registering Company v Sampson 1875 LR 19 Eq 462 (as quoted at n 688 supra). 
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justice between man and man”.774 In balancing these policy considerations, the 
court concluded that the provisions of the contract were so unfair and 
unreasonable towards Beukes that the deed of cession was contrary to public 
policy and therefore unenforceable.775 The court was of the view that the contract 
relegated Beukes to the position of a slave: 
 
As a result Beukes could effectively be deprived of his income and 
means of support for himself and his family. He would, to that extent, 
virtually be relegated to the position of a slave, working for the benefit of 
Sasfin (or, for that matter, any of the other creditors). What is more, this 
situation could … have continued indefinitely at the pleasure of Sasfin (or 
the other creditors). Beukes was powerless to bring it to an end…776 
 
Therefore, the court preferred that unfair contracts should be dealt with in 
accordance with the rules and principles of public policy and legality.777 Although 
the judgment reiterated the importance of freedom and sanctity of contract, it 
accepted that these principles were not absolute and could be tempered by other 
policy considerations. Thus, Lubbe argued that finding a fair solution involves a 
balancing act between competing values.778 For Lubbe, such a balancing act 
needs to take place not only with reference to the interests of society (i.e. the 
importance of freedom and sanctity of contract and legal certainty in general) but 
also with reference to the specific interests of the contracting parties (i.e. “simple 
justice between man and man”).779 In this respect, the court confined itself to the 
specific interests of the parties as reflected in the contract terms themselves.  
                                            
774  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9 referring to Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 544 where 
it is stated “public policy should properly take into account the doing of simple justice between 
man and man”.  
775  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 18-19.  
776  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 13. 
777  Hawthorne 2013 Fundamina 303; Brand & Brodie “Good faith in contract law” Zimmerman et al 
(eds) Mixed legal systems (2004) 96; Hutchison “Good faith in the South African law of 
contract” in Brownsword et al (eds) Good faith in contract (1999) 225. 
778  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 13. See also Lewis 2003 SALJ 334. 
779  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 17. See also Floyd “Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 184; Lewis 2003 SALJ 334. 
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Furthermore, it is submitted that the balancing act will always be between policy 
considerations that support the enforcement of the contract on the one hand and 
policy considerations that support the non-enforcement of the contract on the 
other.  
 
Although the court did not refer to the principle of good faith, Lubbe argued for the 
use of good faith when dealing with public policy rather than the concept of “simple 
justice between man and man”.780 He criticised the concept of “simple justice 
between man and man” as being vague and open to abuse because it could hide 
the fact that a judge exercised an equitable discretion (presumably in accordance 
with her own individual sense of fairness).781 He argued that the principle of good 
faith would be a better counterweight against the principles of freedom and 
sanctity of contract.782 He argued that where a contractual term constitutes an 
unreasonable and one-sided promotion of one party’s own interests at the 
expense of the other party it may be contrary to the principles of good faith and 
consequently also against public policy.783 In other words, Lubbe was arguing that 
the principle of good faith should find expression in the concept of public policy. 
However, Lubbe’s argument is somewhat circular as all open norms (including 
good faith) must be given content by the courts, but it illustrates that these open 
norms, namely “simple justice between man and man”, “public policy”, “good faith” 
and as will be seen later “ubuntu”784 require some standard of fairness between 
contracting parties. 
 
Lubbe’s approach was followed by appeal judge Olivier in his minority judgment in 
Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika v Saayman.785 This case concerned 
                                            
780  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 17ff. 
781  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 17-18. 
782  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20. 
783  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20-21. Referred to with approval by Hutchison “Good faith in the South 
African law of contract” in Brownsword et al (eds) Good faith in contract (1999) 225; 
Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in Zimmerman & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 259-
260. 
784  See the discussion in para  2 3 3 infra. 
785  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA). 
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an old, frail and ill woman who signed a suretyship in favour of the bank to secure 
her son’s obligations to the bank. The majority held that the suretyship was 
unenforceable because the woman lacked contractual capacity.786 Appeal judge 
Olivier came to the same conclusion but based his decision on the principle of 
good faith.787 He reiterated that all contracts in South African law are bonae fidei 
and therefore governed by good faith.788 He held that there is an undeniable link 
between good faith, public interest and public policy and that good faith is based 
on the convictions of the community about what is fair and must be applied 
because public interest so requires.789 He further argued that the decision in Bank 
of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas did not limit the role of good faith in the 
common law of contract.790 Therefore, the court may apply the principles of public 
interest which includes the principle of good faith but conceded that this must be 
done wisely and carefully to prevent legal uncertainty and the arbitrary use of 
power based on the judge’s individual sense of fairness.791 He further held that 
public interest does not demand that a party should be held bound to an otherwise 
enforceable contract where such a contract does not meet the requirements of 
good faith.792  
 
Soon after this judgment, Olivier’s approach was followed by the Cape division in 
Miller v Dannecker.793 Later that same year, the Supreme Court of Appeal also 
referred to the minority judgment of Olivier with apparent approval.794 
                                            
786  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 318. 
787  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 318. 
788  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 321. 
789  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 321-
322, 326. 
790  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 323. 
791  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 324 
referring to Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9 (quoted at n 772 supra). 
792  Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 331. 
See also the discussion by Hutchison “Good faith in the South African law of contract” in 
Brownsword et al (eds) Good faith in contract (1999) 225-226. 
793  Miller and another NNO v Dannecker 2001 1 SA 928 (C) para 19. See also the discussions by 
Louw 2013 PELJ 54; Brand 2009 SALJ 80-81; Brand & Brodie “Good faith in contract law” 
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2 2 5 Concluding remarks 
From the above discussions it emerges that the exceptio doli generalis, good faith 
and public policy are all open norms which have been used to incorporate fairness 
into the South African common law of contract in order to address unfair contract 
terms not covered by the existing rules. Whenever the courts tried to close the 
existing open norms by striking down or limiting a rule that incorporated such 
norms, another rule was identified and used to ameliorate unfairness.  
 
As was seen in the previous chapter, the Constitution requires a more open-ended 
and normative approach to the interpretation and development of the existing 
law.795 Consequently, it was only a matter of time before the Constitution would 
positively influence the use of open norms in the common law of contract which is 
investigated in following next section. 
 
2 3 FAIRNESS IN THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT AFTER THE 
CONSTITUTION 
2 3 1 Introduction 
This section is dedicated to establish the influence of the Constitution on the role 
of fairness in the common law of contract to the extent necessary to address the 
research problem. It comprises three sections, namely (1) the influence of the 
Constitution on the common law of contract, (2) the influence of ubuntu, as an 
underlying constitutional value, on the common law of contract, and (3) the 
introduction of the CPA as a statute that aims to promote constitutional values in 
the common law of contract.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
Zimmerman et al (eds) Mixed legal systems (2004) 104-105; Lewis 2003 SALJ 336; 
Hawthorne 2003 SA Merc LJ 273. 
794  NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and others; Deeb and another v ABSA Bank 
Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 4 SA 928 (SCA) para 28 (obiter).  
795  See the discussion in para  1 8 2 3 supra. 
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2 3 2 Influence of the Constitution on the common law of contract 
2 3 2 1 Cape Provincial Division decisions 
The first case in the common law of contract that referred to the Constitution was 
Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust in which the court had to decide whether the 
actio quanti minoris was available in a trade-in agreement where the trade-in 
vehicle had a latent defect or where an innocently but incorrect dictum et 
promissum was made in respect of the trade-in vehicle.796  
 
In this case, the appellant (Janse van Rensburg) purchased a used motor vehicle 
from the respondent (Grieve Trust) and part of the payment was to be made by 
the trade-in of the appellant’s interest in another vehicle (valued as the difference 
between the trade-in value and the amount still owed on the vehicle). The 
appellant was under the bona fide mistaken belief that the trade-in vehicle was a 
1993 model, but actually it was a 1989 model. If the respondent had known that 
the vehicle was a 1989 model the trade-in value of the vehicle would have been 
less than that agreed and the respondent claimed a reduction of the purchase 
price for the trade-in vehicle being the difference between the two trade-in 
values.797 
 
Judge van Zyl extended the application of the actio quanti minoris to trade-in 
agreements because such an extension is “required by the principles of justice, 
equity, reasonableness and good faith inherent in our common law” and because 
public policy “demands that the relevant law be extended and adapted to meet the 
needs of modern commercial practice”.798 He argued that it would be inequitable 
that the seller would be liable for latent defects and misrepresentations relating to 
the vehicle while the purchaser would have no such liability in respect of the trade-
in vehicle.799 In this respect, the judge followed Olivier’s approach in his minority 
                                            
796  Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 316-317. 
797  Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 316-317. 
798  Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 325. 
799  Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 325. 
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judgment in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika v Saayman800 and 
maintained that this approach was in line with the values in the Constitution, with 
specific reference to the right of equality.801 In justifying the development of the 
common law in line with the values of the Constitution, he referred to 
sections 8(3)(a),802 39(2)803 and 173804 of the Constitution.805  
 
This was the first case in which the court acknowledged the constitutional 
mandate to develop the common law in line with the values of the Constitution.806 
It would seem that the court envisaged both direct and indirect horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights to matters of fairness in the common law of 
contract because it referred to section 8 (covering direct horizontal application) 
and sections 39(2) and 173 (dealing with indirect horizontal application). However, 
as will be seen below, the Constitutional Court later held that indirect application of 
the Bill of Rights to the common law is the most appropriate method when dealing 
with fairness in the common law of contract.807 Nonetheless, direct horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights to common law of contract matters remains a 
                                            
800  Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 325. Cf the discussion in the text at 
n 787 supra. 
801  S 9(1) of the Constitution: “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law”. 
802  S 8(3)(a) states that when a provision of the Bill of Rights is applied to a private person, a 
court, in order to give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights, must apply, or if necessary develop 
the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right. S 8(2) provides 
that the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person to the extent that it is applicable (taking 
into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right). See 
further Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 35-36.  
803  S 39(2) states that when “developing the common law” the court “must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. See again the discussion in para  1 8 3 2 supra. 
804  S 173 provides the higher courts with the inherent power “to develop the common law, taking 
into account the interests of justice”. See again the discussion in para  1 8 3 2 supra. 
805  Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 326. 
806  Hawthorne 2001 THRHR 516. 
807  See the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) in para  2 3 2 3 infra. 
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contentious issue.808 However, the court did recognise the creative role of good 
faith to adapt and extend existing rules and principles if so required by public 
policy, which concept the court linked the right of equality. Hawthorne argued that 
this meant that the court “actively recognised equity as a principle of the South 
African law of contract” in contrast to the view that equity is only considered in so 
far it does not conflict with the existing rules of law.809 
 
Thereafter followed Mort v Henry Shields-Chiat dealing with a mandate 
agreement.810 The question regarding the validity of the mandate on the basis of 
good faith was not raised properly by the parties and there was not sufficient 
evidence to invoke the principle of good faith, but the court dealt with this issue in 
an obiter comment.811 Judge Davis stated that the concept of good faith is shaped 
by the legal convictions of the community with reference to the constitutional 
values of dignity, equality and freedom.812 The principle of freedom supports the 
idea of freedom and sanctity of contract but the principles of equality and dignity 
support the idea that contracting parties “must adhere to a minimum threshold of 
mutual respect in which ‘the unreasonable and one-sided promotion of one’s own 
interest at the expense of the other infringes the principle of good faith to such a 
                                            
808  See e.g. Du Bois 2015 Acta Juridica 284-299; Davis 2011 Stell LR 855; Rautenbach 2009 
TSAR 613-637; Bhana 2008 SAJHR 308-311. Discussions of the issues surrounding direct 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to private persons can also be found in Woolman 
“Application” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) ch 31; Liebenberg 2008 
TSAR 465-466. 
809  Hawthorne 2001 THRHR 513. See also Hawthorne 2003 SA Merc LJ 273. 
810  The facts of the case were as follows: A minor was physically and mentally impaired due to a 
motor vehicle accident. His father entered into a mandate agreement with the respondent (a 
law firm) to claim damages on behalf of the minor against the Road Accident Fund (RAF). After 
the claim was settled, the RAF paid the settled amount into the respondents’ trust account and 
the respondent deducted a large amount as fees and costs (Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 
2001 1 SA 464 (C) 465-466). The court accepted that the mandate made provision for the 
deduction of the fees by the attorneys (Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 
473). 
811  Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 474-476.  
812  Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 474-475. 
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degree as to outweigh the public interest in the sanctity of contracts’”.813 
Therefore, the court must develop the common law of contract in line with the 
Constitution: 
 
In short, the constitutional State which was introduced in 1994 mandates 
that all law should be congruent with the fundamental values of the 
Constitution. Oppressive, unreasonable or unconscionable contracts can 
fall foul of the values of the Constitution.814 
 
The final Cape Provincial Division case which requires attention is Coetzee v 
Comitis.815 In this case, the court considered the constitutionality of the National 
Soccer League’s (NSL’s) rules which provided that a player wishing to play 
professional football (1) had to register with the NSL; (2) had to obtain a clearance 
certificate from his current club before he could be registered by the NSL as a 
player at a new club; (3) remained a registered player of his last club for 30 
months after the expiry of his contract during which period his former club is 
entitled to compensation if the player concludes a contract with a new club; (4) in 
the event that the two clubs cannot agree on the amount of compensation, the 
amount is be calculated by an arbitrator in terms of a pre-set formula; and (5) until 
the amount was set and paid, the player was unable to register with his new 
club.816  
 
Judge Traverso held that as a player is prevented from joining a new club until any 
compensation dispute between the two clubs is resolved, the situation is similar to 
that of a restraint of trade under a normal commercial employment contract.817 He 
stated that if the court determined that the NSL rules are contrary to public policy, 
                                            
813  Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 475. Cf the views of Lubbe discussed in the 
text at n 783 supra. 
814  Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 475 referring to Janse van Rensburg v 
Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) 325-326. See further the discussions by Hawthorne 2006 
Fundamina 78-79; Hawthorne 2003 SA Merc LJ 274; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 411; Du Plessis 
2002 De Jure 385-390. 
815  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C). 
816  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 15. 
817  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 29. 
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then the contract between the player and his former club which incorporate these 
rules is contrary to public policy and the “restraint of trade” should not be 
enforced.818  
 
Dealing with public policy, the court confirmed that considerations of public policy 
change with time and that in the new democracy where the Constitution is the 
supreme law “public policy should be considered against the background of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights”.819 Considering the effect of the NSL rules on 
the player’s dignity enshrined in section 10, the court held as follows: 
 
[A] player, in terms of the NSL rules, is helpless. He can give no input in 
respect of the transfer fee, and, if all else fails, he is at the mercy of an 
arbitrator who determines the compensation payable according to a 
formula for which there is no rational basis. The player would then be 
treated just like an object. His figures will be fed into the formula and an 
amount will pop up! Not very different from the manner in which the book 
value of a motor vehicle is determined! It is abundantly clear that the 
transfer fee thus determined bears no relation to any amount expended 
by the club in training the player. In my view, this procedure strips the 
player of his human dignity as enshrined in the Constitution.820 
 
Consequently, the court determined that the compensation regime in terms of the 
NSL rules constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade, was inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution, and therefore, invalid.821 The court’s decision meant 
that contract terms that infringed a person’s human dignity would be considered 
contrary to public policy, and hence, invalid and unenforceable.822  
 
                                            
818  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 32. 
819  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 31. 
820  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 34. 
821  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 41. 
822  See also the discussion of this case by Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 36.4(f); Botha 2009 Stell LR 202; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 422.  
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2 3 2 2 Supreme Court of Appeal decisions 
The issue dealing with the Constitution’s effect on the common law rules 
governing unfair contracts finally arrived in the Supreme Court of Appeal in the 
case of Brisley v Drotsky dealing with the enforceability of a non-variation 
clause.823 The court struck a damaging blow to the principle of good faith when it 
held that good faith was an abstract value underlying the substantive common law 
of contract and not an independent substantive rule that can be used to strike 
down a contract that would otherwise be enforceable.824 If this would be allowed, 
the court argued, it would mean that whether a contract would be enforceable or 
not would depend on what a particular judge viewed as fair and just.825 Therefore, 
the case would not be decided by the law, but by the judge.826 The court held that 
granting a judge such a discretion would ignore the principle of pacta sunt 
                                            
823  A lease agreement was concluded between the appellant (the lessee) and the respondent (the 
lessor). In terms of the agreement, the rent was payable in advance on the first of each month 
failing which the lessor was entitled to cancel the lease immediately. The agreement also 
contained a non-variation clause (i.e. a term stating the no alteration, variation or cancellation 
of any terms of the lease would be of any force unless in writing and signed by the parties). 
When the lessee failed to pay the rent timeously the first month, the lessor cancelled the lease 
and gave the lessee two weeks to vacate the leased property. An eviction order was granted 
which the lessee appealed. According to the lessee, there was a later oral agreement between 
herself and the lessor that entitled her to pay the rent as it would suit her for the first six months 
of the lease. Consequently, she argued that enforcing the non-variation clause would be 
unreasonable, unfair and contrary to the principle of good faith (Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 
(SCA) paras 1-5, 11). 
824  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 22 referring to Hutchison 2001 SALJ 743-744. The 
court (at paras 11-27) expressly rejected Olivier’s approach in Eerste Nasionale Bank van 
Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) (cf the discussion in the text at 
n 786 supra), as well of the views of the courts in Miller and another NNO v Dannecker 2001 1 
SA 928 (C) (cf the discussion in the text at n 793 supra), Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust 
CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) (cf the discussion in the text at n 814 supra) and Mort NO v Henry 
Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) (cf the discussion in the text at n 810 supra).   
825  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24. 
826  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24.  
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servanda and lead to commercial uncertainty.827 The court stressed the fact that 
“public policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract”.828  
 
Although the court accepted that the Constitution requires that the law should be 
developed in line with constitutional values, it held that the court cannot shelter in 
the shadow of the Constitution to attack the underlying principles of the common 
law of contract.829 It also argued that a “free judicial discretion” is not one of the 
values of the Constitution.830 Finally, it held that the principles set out in Sasfin v 
Beukes cannot be used to prevent the enforcement of contractual terms that are 
not in themselves contrary to public policy.831 It stated that even if the principles in 
Sasfin v Beukes could be extended to the enforcement of terms based on 
unfairness, it should only be applied in exceptional cases.832 
 
The court’s decision meant that good faith was not recognised as an open norm 
because, the court argued, it would result in too much legal uncertainty.833 
However, as pointed out by Barnard-Naudé and Hawthorne, the court had no 
reservation to rely on public policy to deal with contractual unfairness which is also 
an open-ended concept.834 Furthermore, the court’s decision was met with 
criticism because it favoured freedom and sanctity of contract and legal certainty 
over principles of equity835 and followed a positivistic and formalistic approach to 
                                            
827  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24. 
828  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 31 quoting Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 
(A) 9 (cf the discussion in the text at n 768 supra). 
829  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24. 
830  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24. 
831  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 31. 
832  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 31. 
833  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 397. See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 873. 
834  Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 195; Barnard 2006 Law and Critique 155; 
Hawthorne 2003 SA Merc LJ 277. 
835  Barnard 2006 Law and Critique 155; Hawthorne 2003 SA Merc LJ 276; Pretorius 2003 THRHR 
644. 
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law.836 Hawthorne also argued that the court’s approach ignored the new 
constitutional model informed by the ideas of transformative constitutionalism.837  
 
Soon thereafter, the enforceability of an exemption clause that excluded a private 
hospital’s liability for the negligent conduct of its nursing staff was considered in 
Afrox Healthcare v Strydom. With reference to Sasfin v Beukes the court accepted 
that a contract term which is so unfair as to be against public policy would be 
unenforceable but cautioned that the power to declare contracts contrary to public 
policy should be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases to prevent 
the decision being based on the judge’s own subjective perception of fairness.838  
 
The court confirmed that public policy is now rooted in the Constitution and its 
founding values, namely dignity, equality and freedom.839 According to the court, 
these values require the courts to show restraint when striking down contracts 
because contractual autonomy is part of the constitutional value of freedom and 
also informs the constitutional value of dignity.840 The court also made the 
following interesting statement: 
 
The constitutional value of contractual freedom includes, in turn, again 
the principle which finds expression in the maxim pacta sunt servanda.841 
 
                                            
836  Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 77-78; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 397-398, 407-409; Pretorius 2003 
THRHR 644-645; Hawthorne 2003 Merc LJ 276. However, Lewis 2003 SALJ 337 argues that 
the court’s reference to constitutional values indicate a departure from the blind positivism 
characteristic of previous decisions.  
837  Hawthorne 2003 SA Merc LJ 276-277. See also Barnard 2006 Law and Critique 155-156. Cf 
para  1 8 2 3 supra dealing with transformative constitutionalism. 
838  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 8. 
839  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 18. 
840  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 22 quoting the minority judgment of 
appeal judge Cameron in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 94. 
841  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 23 (my emphasis). Translated from 
the Afrikaans which reads as follows: Die grondwetlike waarde van kontrakteersvryheid omvat, 
op sy beurt, weer die beginsel wat in die stelreël pacta sunt servanda uitdrukking vind”. 
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It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal elevated contractual freedom as 
well as sanctity of contract to constitutional values without motivation and 
justification.  
 
Furthermore, although the court recognised that the unequal bargaining position of 
the parties is a relevant factor in deciding whether a contract term is contrary to 
public policy, it argued that its presence alone will not result in the contract term 
being contrary to public policy.842 Hence, the court held that the exemption clause 
was not against public policy.843 In respect of the respondent’s alternative 
argument based on good faith, the court confirmed the position set out in Brisley v 
Drotsky that good faith is an abstract value underlying the substantive common 
law of contract and not an independent substantive rule that can be used to strike 
down a contract that would otherwise be enforceable.844   
 
The approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom is 
similar to its approach in Brisley v Drotsky.845 The court emphasised the 
importance of freedom and sanctity of contract and legal certainty as informed by 
the ideas of individualism, capitalism, legal positivism and legal formalism.846 
Although the court accepted that public policy is now rooted in the Constitution, it 
did not use the Constitution to inform the concept of public policy but rather used 
the existing ideas of public policy to inform constitutional values. This can be 
deduced from the court’s remarks that contractual autonomy is part of the 
constitutional value of freedom and also informs the constitutional value of human 
dignity. More strikingly, the court expressly elevated freedom of contract into a 
                                            
842  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 12. 
843  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 24. 
844  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 32. See also South African Forestry 
Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) paras 26-31. 
845  Pretorius 2003 THRHR 644. 
846  Lewis 2013 THRHR 82; Botha 2009 Stell LR 212; Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court 
Review 185; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 79-80; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 865; Pretorius 
2003 THRHR 644. 
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constitutional value.847 This approach enabled the court to grant constitutional 
endorsement to the classical liberal conception of contractual autonomy.848 
Accordingly, the court’s approach is more in line with the conservative legal culture 
that existed prior to the enactment of the Constitution and does not follow an 
approach in line with the ideas of transformative constitutionalism. As lamented by 
Hawthorne: 
 
Despite rhetorical support for good faith, fairness and reasonableness, 
however, the post-constitutional pattern in our case law remains a 
succession of victories for the free marketeers. It would appear that the 
heritage of positivism and formalism has effectively jeopardised 
development of the law of contract by means of constitutional 
interpretation.849 
 
The court’s expression of the value of human dignity as being informed by 
contractual autonomy (and as an expression of the constitutional value of 
freedom) is a conception of human dignity that is informed by the classical law of 
contract as based on freedom and sanctity of contract.850 Furthermore, it is a 
departure from the conception of human dignity expressed in Mort v Henry 
Shields-Chiat. In that case, the court held that the principles of equality and dignity 
support the idea that contracting parties “must adhere to a minimum threshold of 
mutual respect in which ‘the unreasonable and one-sided promotion of one’s own 
                                            
847  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 9.275; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 877-878; Lubbe 
2004 SALJ 415. See also Liebenberg 2008 TSAR 476. 
848  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 473-474; Botha 2009 Stell LR 212; Davis 2008 SAJHR 325; Bhana 
& Pieterse 2005 SALJ 882. See again the description of the classical model of contract law in 
para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
849  Remarks by Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 84 in response to the decisions of Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) and Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). See also Bhana 
& Pieterse 2005 SALJ 865 where they remarked that these two decisions “indicated a 
reversion of contract law to its classical libertarian roots and a concomitant hostility, not only to 
constitutional values, but also to broader concerns of equity and fairness that had previously 
been allowed to infiltrate the application of its rules”.  See further Liebenberg 2008 TSAR 475 
who argues that the court’s approach is excessively formalistic and based on a literal 
interpretation of the rights contained in the Constitution. 
850  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421. 
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interest at the expense of the other infringes the principle of good faith to such a 
degree as to outweigh the public interest in the sanctity of contracts’”.851  
 
Accordingly, the court’s approach is a giant step backwards from the principles 
laid down in Sasfin v Beukes.852 In Sasfin v Beukes the court accepted that the 
principles of freedom and sanctity of contract were not absolute and that public 
policy required that a balance should be found between freedom and sanctity of 
contract on the one hand and fairness or equity on the other.853 The court’s 
approach in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom leaves little possibility for such a 
balancing act because contractual autonomy is now enshrined as a constitutional 
value itself and informs the constitutional value of human dignity.854 Furthermore, 
the constitutional value of equality cannot on its own justify a conclusion that a 
contract term is unfair. Finally, any consideration of fairness is not allowed as it 
would defeat the rule of law because it would result in arbitrary decisions that 
would lead to legal and commercial uncertainty. Therefore, the classical model of 
contract law pervades and tempers all these constitutional values and 
consequently the transformative aims of the Constitution are subverted. As 
remarked by Klare and Davis: 
 
These judgments share a reluctance to interrogate common law verities 
in light of Bill of Rights values, a minimalist attitude toward social 
transformation, a surprising readiness to place a neo-liberal gloss on the 
Constitution, and an uncritical acceptance of traditional legal 
methodology.855 
 
As it became clear that the Supreme Court of Appeal was taking a conservative 
stance in respect of fairness in contracts and the constitutional development of the 
                                            
851  Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 475 (also quoted in the text at n 813 supra). 
852  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 481. 
853  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9 as discussed in para  2 2 4 3 supra.  
854  Botha 2009 Stell LR 212. 
855  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 468. See also Botha 2009 Stell LR 212. 
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common law of contract, the question arose as to whether the Constitutional Court 
would follow a similar approach.856  
 
2 3 2 3 The Constitutional Court enters the battlefield 
This issue arrived in the Constitutional Court in the case of Barkhuizen v 
Napier.857 The case involved the enforcement of a time-limitation clause in a short-
term insurance contract which stated that the insurer would be released from 
liability unless the insured instituted legal proceedings within 90 days after the 
insurer rejected a claim.858 The insured attacked the clause on two grounds. First, 
that the clause was unconstitutional because it constituted an unreasonable and 
unjustified limitation of the insured’s right to judicial redress in terms of section 34 
of the Constitution. Secondly, that the clause was contrary to public policy.859 
 
The court was not convinced that the constitutionality of a contractual term should 
be tested directly against a provision in the Bill of Rights and argued that indirect 
horizontal application of the Constitution would be better suited to the task.860 It 
held that constitutional challenges to contractual terms must be determined by 
testing the terms against public policy which it defined as “the legal convictions of 
the community” and “those values that are held most dear by the society”.861 The 
court stated that public policy must now be determined with reference to the 
Constitution and its founding values (namely freedom, dignity, equality and the 
                                            
856  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 30. 
857  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
858  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 3-5. 
859  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 19-20. 
860  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 23-30. See also Bradfield Christie’s law of 
contract (2016) 406; Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 61-62; Hutchison “The 
nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 37; Floyd 
“Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 178. 
861  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 28. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of rights 
handbook (2014) 61-62; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius 
(eds) Contract (2012) 30. 
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rule of law) and that a contract term that is contrary to such values is contrary to 
public policy and therefore unenforceable.862  
 
The court maintained that such an approach would allow “the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda to operate” but also give a court the necessary power to refuse the 
enforcement of a contract term which conflicts with constitutional values despite 
the fact that the parties agreed to the inclusion of the term.863 Consequently, the 
court held that public policy recognises the need to do simple justice between man 
and man864 and implicates notions of fairness, justice, equity and 
reasonableness.865 Specifically, the court referred to the appeal court’s test laid 
down in Sasfin v Beukes866 which entails a balancing act between the policy 
considerations of freedom and sanctity of contract on the one hand and simple 
justice between individuals on the other.867 As submitted previously, the balancing 
act will always be between policy considerations that support the enforcement of 
the contract on the one hand and policy considerations that support the non-
enforcement of the contract on the other.868 Accordingly, the Constitutional Court 
accepted that freedom and sanctity of contract are important policy considerations 
and should not be interfered with lightly, but also recognised the need to do simple 
justice between the contracting parties.869 In this respect, the Constitutional Court 
referred with approval to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s statement that “the 
Constitution requires us to employ its values to achieve a balance that strikes 
                                            
862  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 29. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract 
(2016) para 1.55; Floyd “Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 178. 
863  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 30. 
864  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 51 & 70. 
865  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 51 & 73. See also Hutchison “The nature and 
basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 30; Floyd “Legality” in 
Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 185. 
866  Cf the discussion of  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) in the text at n 769 supra.  
867  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 50 n 33 referring to Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 
1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9.  
868  Cf the discussion in the text at n 779 supra. See also Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé & Eiselen 
(eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 2016) para 34. 
869  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 70.   
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down the unacceptable excesses of ‘freedom of contract’, while seeking to permit 
individuals the dignity and autonomy of regulating their own lives”.870 However, the 
Constitutional Court expressly rejected the Supreme Court of Appeal’s contention 
that the fact that a contract term is unfair or might operate harshly cannot lead to 
the conclusion that the term is contrary to constitutional values and principles.871  
 
The court stated that when determining fairness, two questions should be asked: 
 
The first is whether the clause itself is unreasonable. Secondly, if the 
clause is reasonable, whether it should be enforced in the light of the 
circumstances which prevented compliance with the time-limitation 
clause.872 
 
 
As seen above, the first part of the test for fairness asks whether the clause itself 
is reasonable or not.873 This step requires a balancing act between the policy 
considerations of freedom and sanctity of contract which gives effect to the 
constitutional values of freedom and human dignity on the one hand, and another 
policy consideration as reflected in a constitutional right or value (in casu the right 
to access to justice)874 in support of the non-enforcement of the contract on the 
other.875 This balancing act between the different policy considerations as 
                                            
870  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 70 referring to Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 
1 (SCA) para 13. 
871  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 72. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract 
(2016) para 7.24; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) 
Contract (2012) 30-31. 
872  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 56. See also Bradfield Christie’s law of contract 
(2016) 19; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) 
Contract (2012) 31. 
873  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57. 
874  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 33 where the court stated that the right to 
judicial redress protected in s 34 of the Constitution “not only reflects the foundational values 
that underlie our constitutional order, it also constitutes public policy”. See also Floyd “Legality” 
in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 186. 
875  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57. See also Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 
SALJ 507; Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 351 n 34; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in 
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expressions of constitutional rights and values is objective in nature as it deals 
with these values on an abstract level as reflected in the terms of the contract 
itself.876 In considering sanctity of contract the court reiterated that contracts freely 
and voluntarily entered into must generally be enforced. This is, the court 
reasoned, because the ability to regulate your own affairs – even to your own 
detriment – comprises the constitutional values of freedom and dignity.877 The 
court then stated that if the objective terms do not violate public policy,878 the 
further question that arises is “whether the terms are contrary to public policy in 
the light of the relative situation of the contracting parties”.879 The latter 
determination is subjective in nature.880 Specifically, the court held that an unequal 
bargaining relationship is a relevant factor in determining whether a contractual 
term is contrary to public policy because South Africa comprises such an unequal 
society.881  
                                                                                                                                    
Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 31; Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 398; Brand 2009 
SALJ 84-85; Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 198; Bhana 2008 SAJHR 314. 
876  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59 where the court refers to the “objective 
terms” of the contract. See also Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 398; Botha 2009 Stell LR 212.  
877  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57. See also Floyd “Legality” in Hutchison & 
Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 178-179. 
878  As pointed out by Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 398-399 most clauses dealing with exclusion of 
liability, time limitations and enforcement of unilateral rights will probably be considered 
objectively fair. 
879  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. There is some uncertainty whether this 
specific question forms part of the first or the second part of the test for fairness. Sutherland 
2009 Stell LR 55 argues that it forms part of the first part of the test for fairness. This view 
seems to be supported by Wallis 2016 SALJ 552-553; Hutchison “The nature and basis of 
contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 31; Bhana 2008 SAJHR 315. 
Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 398 is of the view that it forms part of the second part of the test. It is 
submitted that the interpretation depends on whether the test for fairness is seen as being 
divided according to the fairness of the terms itself vs the enforcement of the terms or whether 
the different parts of the test is interpreted as differentiating between an objective vs subject 
approach to fairness. It is submitted that the court’s decision is open to both interpretations 
(see also Sutherland 2009 Stell LR 56).  
880  Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 398. See also Wallis 2016 SALJ 552-553.  
881  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. See also Floyd “Legality” in Hutchison & 
Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 179. 
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The second part of the test states that if the clause itself is reasonable and does 
not violate public policy, it should be determined whether the clause should be 
enforced in light of the circumstances which prevented compliance with the 
clause.882 In other words, it should be determined whether the enforcement of the 
clause is unfair or unreasonable.883 This part of the test is subjective in nature and 
requires an investigation into the circumstances of the case.884  
 
The court found that the time-limitation clause was objectively reasonable.885 In 
the absence of any evidence regarding the inequality of the bargaining positions of 
the contracting parties and Barkhuizen’s failure to provide reasons why he failed to 
comply with the time-bar clause, the court could not apply the subjective parts of 
the test for fairness.886 Therefore, the court held that the time-limitation clause was 
valid and enforceable.887 
 
The court also dealt with the principle of good faith. It reiterated that the principle 
of good faith refers to “justice, reasonableness and fairness”.888 It noted that good 
faith is not an independent rule that can be used to strike down a contract due to 
unfairness but operates as an underlying principle that finds expression through 
existing doctrines and rules in the common law of contract.889 Obiter the court 
questioned whether this restricted role of good faith is appropriate under the 
Constitution, but it did not take this line of argument any further.890  
 
                                            
882  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56 & 58.  
883  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 58 & 70. 
884  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. See also Wallis 2016 SALJ 552-553; Bhana 
& Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 504; Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 351 n 35; Bhana 2014 SAPL 509.  
885  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 63. 
886  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 66 & 84. 
887  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 67 & 86. 
888  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 80. 
889  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82. 
890  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82. 
165 
 
The decision in Barkhuizen v Napier established public policy as the “doctrinal 
gateway” through which constitutional values could inform the common law of 
contract.891 It also confirmed that public policy is an open norm in the common law 
of contract and could function as a general clause.892 Furthermore, the test for 
fairness formulated by the court made provision for setting aside unfair contract 
terms and the unfair enforcement of contract terms.893 It is also important to note 
that the subjective test is relevant in determining the fairness of the clause itself 
and the enforcement of the clause.894 As illustrated by Hawthorne, the subjective 
test leads to the conclusion that the court recognised substantive equality in the 
common law of contract because the surrounding circumstances of the transaction 
must be taken into account in determining whether the contract term or its 
enforcement is fair.895 As will be seen below, it has been argued that the 
subjective part of the test for fairness is based upon ubuntu.896 
 
Nevertheless, the court’s view that the ability to regulate your own affairs (even to 
your own detriment) gives effect to the constitutional values of freedom and dignity 
was criticised as another attempt to give constitutional entrenchment to the 
classical liberal conception of freedom and sanctity of contract rather than 
determining how the Constitution and its values should inform these principles as 
part of the greater transformative constitutional project.897  
 
                                            
891  Brand 2009 SALJ 84. See also Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2827-2828. 
892  Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 395. See also Du Bois 2015 Acta Juridica 282. 
893  Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 400. 
894  Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 400. See also Wallis 2016 SALJ 552-553. 
895  Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2829; Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 399; Bhana 2008 SAJHR 316. See also 
Wallis 2016 SALJ 553 who argues that the second part of the test for fairness may result in 
legal uncertainty and arbitrary decisions. 
896  Cf the discussion in para  2 3 3 2 infra.  
897  Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2822; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 347; Davis 2011 Stell LR 854; Davis & 
Klare 2010 SAJHR 478; Davis 2010 SAJHR 93; Brand 2009 SALJ 85-86; Bhana 2008 
SAJHR 315; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420-421. 
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2 3 2 4 The Supreme Court of Appeal strikes back 
The Supreme Court of Appeal struck back in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of 
South Africa which dealt with the exercise of a contractual right that entitled the 
bank to close a client’s bank accounts on reasonable notice and for any reason.898 
Relying on the principles of fairness laid down in Barkhuizen v Napier, the client 
argued that the bank was required to exercise this right fairly and for good 
cause.899 In other words, the client relied on the second part of the test for fairness 
as laid down in Barkhuizen v Napier.900  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal referred to the test laid down in Sasfin v Beukes 
which requires a balancing act between competing values.901 As submitted 
previously, the balancing act will always be between policy considerations that 
support the enforcement of the contract on the one hand and policy considerations 
that support the non-enforcement of the contract on the other.902 The court held 
that public policy considerations are not static and their weight may change as 
circumstances change.903 It reiterated that sanctity of contract is an important but 
not the only policy consideration when determining whether a contract is contrary 
to public policy.904 The court accepted that public policy is now rooted in the 
Constitution and its underlying values but stated that this does not mean that 
public policy values cannot be found elsewhere.905  
 
Importantly, the court stated that the judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier did not hold 
that the enforcement of a valid contractual clause must be fair and reasonable 
                                            
898  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 6. 
899  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 1, 
25-26. 
900  Cf the discussion in the text at n 882 supra. 
901  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 38. Cf 
the discussion of  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) in the text at n 769 supra. 
902  Cf the discussion in the text at n 779 supra. 
903  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 38. 
904  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 36-
38. 
905  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 39.  
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where no public policy consideration in the Constitution or elsewhere is 
implicated.906 Therefore, fairness and reasonableness becomes relevant only 
when a specific constitutional value or right is implicated and it must be 
determined whether the clause or its enforcement is contrary to public policy.907 
As indicated by the court in Barkhuizen v Napier,908  this balancing act will be 
between freedom and sanctity of contract which gives effect to the constitutional 
values of freedom and human dignity on the one hand, and another policy 
consideration as reflected in a constitutional right or value in support of the non-
enforcement of the contract on the other. As mentioned before, this balancing act 
is objective in nature.909 This means that a court must identify the relevant policy 
considerations that are limited in terms of the contract or its enforcement as 
reflected in specific constitutional values and/or rights before it may apply the 
second part of the test for fairness which deals with the enforcement of a clause 
and is subjective in nature.910 Thus, the court explained the judgment in 
Barkhuizen v Napier as follows: 
 
This all means that, as I understand the judgment, if a contract is prima 
facie contrary to constitutional values, questions of enforcement would 
not arise. However, enforcement of a prima facie innocent contract may 
implicate an identified constitutional value. If the value is unjustifiably 
affected, the term will not be enforced. An example would be where a 
lease provides for the right to sublease with the consent of the landlord. 
Such a term is prima facie innocent. Should the landlord attempt to use it 
                                            
906  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 50. 
See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 9.269; Bradfield Christie’s law of contract 
(2016) 20. 
907  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 43-
44. See also Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) 
Contract (2012) 32. 
908  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57 as discussed in the text at n 875 supra. 
909  Cf the discussion in the text at n 876 supra. 
910  The second part of the test states that if the clause itself is reasonable and does not violate 
public policy, it should be determined whether the clause should be enforced in light of the 
circumstances which prevented compliance with the clause (cf the discussion in the text at 
n 882 supra). 
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to prevent the property being sublet in circumstances amounting to 
discrimination under the equality clause, the term will not be enforced.911 
 
Therefore, the court rejected the idea that fairness is an overarching requirement 
in the common law of contract.912 Specifically, the court expressly rejected the 
idea of an equitable discretion because it would defeat the principle of the rule of 
law entrenched as a founding value of the Constitution:913 
 
A constitutional principle that tends to be overlooked, when generalised 
resort to constitutional values is made, is the principle of legality. Making 
rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments may be 
destructive of the rule of law.914  
 
The court’s reasoning is open to criticism. Again, the court merely granted 
constitutional endorsement to the classical liberal conception of contractual 
autonomy and formal equality, and did not follow a transformative constitutional 
approach.915 In addition, the court’s conception of the constitutional value of the 
rule of law is based on a classical conception of the rule of law based on formal 
equality.916 Finally, it is difficult to reconcile the views of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal on the role of fairness in the common law of contract with that of the 
Constitutional Court.917 As mentioned before,918 the Constitutional Court in 
                                            
911  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 47. 
See also Bhana 2014 SAPL 521; Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & 
Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 31. 
912  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 50-
53. 
913  S 1(c) of the Constitution (quoted in para  1 8 1 supra). 
914  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 39. Cf 
s 1(c) of the Constitution (quoted in para 1 8 1 supra).  
915  Bhana 2014 SAPL 515. 
916  See the description of the classical rule of law which arrived in South African with the British 
during the nineteenth century (para  1 5 2 3 supra). As shown previously, the classical 
conception of the rule of law was retained during the Union years (see para  1 6 1 supra) and 
an even more conservative conception was used during apartheid (see para  1 7 2 supra). See 
further Bhana 2014 SAPL 519. 
917  Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 407. 
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Barkhuizen v Napier expressly rejected the view that a contract term that is unfair 
or might operate harshly cannot lead to the conclusion that the term is contrary to 
constitutional values and principles. The apparent tension between these two 
decisions can be seen in Absa Bank v Coe Family Trust where Judge Davis for 
the Western Cape High Court attempted to reconcile the two judgments: 
 
To the extent that the dictum of … [the Supreme Court of Appeal] 
suggests that fairness is not to be considered in an enquiry into the 
enforceability of a contract, that reading would be in direct conflict with 
Barkhuizen … By contrast, if the … [Supreme Court of Appeal] is 
suggesting that any enquiry into fairness can only take place through the 
prism of public policy as mediated by the values of the Constitution, then 
nothing is added to the existing state of law …919 
 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal soon had the opportunity to reiterate its 
position in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa. In African Dawn 
Property Finance 2 v Dreams Travel and Tours it stated as follows: 
 
It bears restating that our Constitution and its value system do not confer 
on judges a general jurisdiction to declare contracts invalid on the basis 
of their subjective perceptions of fairness or on grounds of imprecise 
notion of good faith. Nor does the fact that a term is unfair, or that it may 
operate harshly, of itself lead to the conclusion that it offends against 
constitutional principles.920 
  
In Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties and Potgieter v Potgieter the Supreme 
Court of Appeal also restated that good faith and fairness are not freestanding 
requirements for the exercise of a contractual right and that good faith is an 
underlying value that is given expression through existing rules of law.921 In both 
                                                                                                                                    
918  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 72 as discussed in the text at n 871 supra. 
919  ABSA Bank v Coe Family Trust and others 2012 3 SA 184 (WCC) 190. See also the criticism 
of this case by Wallis 2016 SALJ 554 n 40. 
920  African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours CC and others 2011 3 
SA 511 (SCA) para 28. 
921  Maphango and others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) paras 23-
24; Potgieter and another v Potgieter NO and others 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) paras 32-33.  
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cases the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated that this is the position in law 
“[u]nless and until the Constitutional Court holds otherwise”.922 
 
 
2 3 2 5 The Constitutional Court refers to and relies on good faith 
Although one of these cases did find its way to the Constitutional Court, it was 
decided with reference to the provisions in the Rental Housing Act.923 However, 
Justice Froneman’s statement in his concurring but separate judgment that 
“[d]etermining the true ambit of Barkhuizen must wait for another day” indicated 
that the Constitutional Court would not merely accept the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s restrictive interpretation of Barkhuizen v Napier.924  
 
This need to determine the exact role of the principle of good faith in the law of 
contract was also stressed by the Constitutional Court in Everfresh v Market 
Virginia v Shoprite Checkers as reflected in the following statement: 
 
Good faith is a matter of considerable importance in our contract law and 
the extent to which our courts enforce the good faith requirement in 
contract law is a matter of considerable public and constitutional 
importance. The question whether the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution require courts to encourage good faith in contractual 
dealings and whether our Constitution insists that good faith 
requirements are enforceable should be determined sooner rather than 
later. Many people enter into contracts daily and every contract has the 
potential not to be performed in good faith. The issue of good faith in 
contract touches the lives of many ordinary people in our country.925 
 
Recently, in Botha v Rich, the Constitutional Court had to determine whether the 
enforcement of a cancellation clause was contrary to public policy. Botha (the 
buyer) had concluded an instalment sale of immovable property with a trust (the 
                                            
922  Maphango and others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) para 25; 
Potgieter and another v Potgieter NO and others 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) para 34. 
923  Maphango and others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC). 
924  Maphango and others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 3 SA 531 (CC) para 158.  
925  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 22. 
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seller).926 The cancellation clause provided for the cancellation of the agreement 
and the forfeiture of all sums already paid by Botha in the event of a breach by 
her.927 The contract also provided that Botha may demand transfer of the property 
in terms of section 27 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 after she had paid 
at least half the purchase price.928 After Botha had paid three quarters of the 
purchase price she began to default on the payments and the trust sued for 
cancellation and eviction.929 In turn, Botha demanded transfer of the property in 
terms of section 27 of the Alienation of Land Act as provided for in the contract.930  
 
The trust was successful in the high court and the full bench of that division on 
appeal.931 In the Constitutional Court, one of Botha’s main contentions was “that 
the enforcement of the cancellation clause, where more than 50% of the purchase 
price has been paid, and in the face of a demand for a transfer pursuant to s 27, is 
contrary to public policy”.932 In this respect, Botha contended that the cancellation 
of the contract, in other words, the enforcement of the cancellation clause by the 
trustees was contrary to public policy because it violated her constitutional 
rights.933 In determining this question, the court held that public policy generally 
requires enforcement of contractual obligations freely and voluntarily undertaken 
which gives effect to the constitutional values of freedom and human dignity.934 
Thereafter the court stated as follows: 
 
All law, including the common law of contract, derives its force from the 
Constitution and is thus subject to constitutional control. It is of public 
importance to determine whether cancellation of a contract, governed by 
the Act, and the resultant forfeiture of the payments – of more than half of 
                                            
926  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 4. 
927  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 4. 
928  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 4. 
929  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) paras 5-6. 
930  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 8. 
931  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) paras 13-17. 
932  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 19. 
933  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 19. 
934  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 23. 
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the purchase price of the property – are fair and thus constitutionally 
compliant.935 
 
After considering the meaning of section 27(1) in much detail, the court held that 
Botha was entitled to demand transfer of the immovable property in terms of this 
provision.936 Subsequently, the trustees raised the exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus on account of Botha’s failure to pay the instalments and other monies 
due in terms of the agreement.937 The court accepted that Botha’s right to demand 
transfer of the property is reciprocal to her obligation to pay the instalments 
timeously.938 However, the court held that where the rigid application of the 
principle of reciprocity may lead to injustice, the principle of good faith as an 
underlying value of the common law of contract encompasses the necessary 
flexibility to ensure fairness.939 Specifically, it stated as follows: 
 
The principle of reciprocity falls squarely within this understanding of 
good faith and freedom of contract, based on one’s own dignity and 
freedom as well as respect for the dignity and freedom of others. Bilateral 
contracts are almost invariably cooperative ventures where two parties 
have reached a deal involving performances by each in order to benefit 
both. Honouring that contract cannot therefore be a matter of each side 
pursuing his or her own self-interest without regard to the other party’s 
interest. Good faith is the lens through which we come to understand 
                                            
935  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 24. 
936  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) paras 28-41. See also the 
discussions by Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 499-502 & Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 294-295. 
937  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) paras 42-43. 
938  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) paras 43-44. 
939  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 45 referring to Tuckers 
Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 651-652. Bhana & 
Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 502-503 criticise the court’s decision because they argue that the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus as a contractual defence would not be applicable in relation 
to Botha’s statutory right in terms of s 27(1) of the Alienation of Land Act. However, their 
reasoning ignores the fact that this statutory right was incorporated into the contract itself and 
therefore also constituted a contractual right (Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 
SA 124 (CC) para 4 esp n 4). 
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contracts in that way. In this case good faith is given expression through 
the principle of reciprocity and the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.940 
 
Therefore, the court held that Botha’s right to demand transfer of the property was 
conditional on her payment of the arrear amounts to avoid undue hardship to the 
trustees.941 For the same reasons, the court held that the application for 
cancellation of the contract by the trustees should also fail because enforcing the 
cancellation clause and granting forfeiture of the monies already paid “would be a 
disproportionate penalty for the breach”.942  
 
Sharrock, Bhana and Meerkotter argue that the reasoning of the court leads to the 
impression that the court impliedly held that the enforcement of the cancellation 
clause would be unfair and therefore unconstitutional.943 Sharrock argues that if 
this is the case, it would seem that the court’s decision is in conflict with the appeal 
court decisions which held that fairness is not an overarching requirement for the 
enforcement of a contract.944 In addition, Bhana and Meerkotter maintain that as 
the court did not explicitly implicate an enumerated right it would seem that it is not 
necessary to implicate a specific right or value in the Bill of Rights as envisaged by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa.945 
Nevertheless, they argue that the facts of the case could possibly have implicated 
the rights to freedom of trade, occupation and profession (section 22) 
property (section 25).946 As will be seen later, it is submitted that the court 
                                            
940  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 46.  
941  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 49. However, see the 
criticisms by Wallis 2016 SALJ 554-557. 
942  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 51. See also Bradfield 
Christie’s law of contract (2016) 22. 
943  Sharrock 2015 SA Merc LJ 179-180; Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 505. 
944  Sharrock 2015 SA Merc LJ 179-183.  
945  Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 505. See also Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 43-44 as discussed in the text at n 907. 
946  Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 505. 
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implicated the constitutional value of human dignity which it linked to the principle 
of good faith.947 
 
As the Constitutional Court did not expressly deal with the question whether good 
faith can be used as a substantive rule to set aside an unfair contract term or the 
unfair enforcement thereof the legal position in this respect remains uncertain.948 
Especially, in consideration of the conflicting views between the Constitutional 
Court in Barkhuizen v Napier and the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions starting 
with Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa.949 It would seem that the 
Constitutional Court has reinforced the view that good faith is an abstract value 
underlying the substantive law of contract which finds expression through existing 
rules and doctrines. This is because the court speaks of good faith as “the lens 
through which we come to understand” that bilateral contracts cannot be regarded 
as “a matter of each side pursuing his or her own self-interest without regard to the 
other party’s interests” which in this case is expressed through the principle of 
reciprocity and the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.950 This view would accord 
with that of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the above mentioned cases. However, 
it could be argued that the Constitutional Court also held that the Constitution 
requires that the enforcement of a contractual provision requires good faith (i.e. 
fairness) from the parties. This is reflected in the Gauteng Local Division’s 
interpretation of this decision in the case of ABSA Bank v Lekuku: 
 
The CC highlighted the fact that enforcement of stipulations in bilateral 
contracts requires good faith from both parties. Though this was part of 
our common law, it has now received constitutional approval.951 
 
                                            
947  Cf the discussion dealing the approach to human dignity in the common law of contract in para 
 3 2 7 3 infra. 
948  Hawthorne 2016 THRHR 296-297. See also Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 7.82; 
Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 22-23. 
949  Sharrock 2015 SA Merc LJ 181-184; Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 502-503.  
950  Cf the quote in the text at n 940 supra. 
951  ABSA Bank Limited v Lekuku 2015 JOL 32434 (GJ) para 72. 
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Bhana, Meerkotter and Sharrock further argue that the court failed to provide 
sufficient guidance on how to determine when a clause would be unenforceable 
due to unfairness and that this opens up the door for judges to impose their own 
ideas of contractual fairness rather than following an objective standard.952 
Accordingly, Bhana and Meerkotter argue that the Constitutional Court’s decision 
rather vindicates the Supreme Court of Appeal’s “primary concern with the ‘free 
floating’ notion of fairness”.953  
 
Despite or perhaps because of these uncertainties, there are indications that the 
Constitutional Court is of the view that ubuntu as an underlying constitutional value 
could be used to develop the role of good faith to ensure better contractual 
fairness.  
 
2 3 3 Influence of ubuntu on the common law of contract 
2 3 3 1 Introduction 
The introduction and development of the concept of ubuntu as an underlying 
constitutional value was addressed in some detail in the previous chapter. It was 
shown how ubuntu was included in and applied by the Constitutional Court under 
the interim Constitution954 and developed into an underlying value of the final 
Constitution.955 It was also illustrated how ubuntu, as an underlying value of the 
final Constitution, informs the constitutional value of human dignity, promotes the 
realisation of socio-economic rights and forms part of the legal convictions of the 
majority of the population that must now be taken into account when interpreting 
and developing existing legal rules.956 Accordingly, ubuntu has a creative role to 
play in the development of the common law in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.  
                                            
952  Sharrock 2015 SA Merc LJ 180; Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 506. See also Wallis 2016 
SALJ 557. 
953  Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 495. See also Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 22-
23. 
954  See the discussion in para  1 8 4 2 supra. 
955  See the discussion in para  1 8 4 3 supra.  
956  See the discussion in para  1 8 4 3(a) supra 
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However, the common law has not proved enthusiastic about embracing the 
concept of ubuntu.957 This is not surprising considering the fact that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has followed a conservative approach when developing the 
common law in line with constitutional values.958 Bennett further argues that the 
reason why ubuntu has not been used in the common law of contract could be 
because the common law of contract already contains principles and rules to deal 
with the type of problems ubuntu has been used for.959 He specifically refers to 
good faith and public policy read with the Bill of Rights.960 However, as the 
Supreme Court of Appeal has persistently limited the role of good faith to prevent 
unfairness in contracts,961 it would seem that ubuntu may still have a role to play 
when dealing with the question of legality. Especially, as ubuntu has an integral 
role to play in establishing a plural legal culture under the new Constitution.962 
 
2 3 3 2 Constitutional Court decisions 
The Constitutional Court discussed the role of ubuntu in the common law of 
contract in two decisions, namely Barkhuizen v Napier963 and Everfresh Market 
Virginia v Shoprite Checkers.964  
 
As discussed above,965 the court in Barkhuizen v Napier defined public policy as 
“the legal convictions of the community”.966 It held that these convictions can now 
be found in the Constitution and its founding values (freedom, dignity and equality 
                                            
957  See the discussion in para  1 8 4 3(b) supra. 
958  See the discussions in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra dealing with the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s approach to contractual fairness under the Constitution. 
959  Bennett  2011 PELJ 44. 
960  Bennett  2011 PELJ 45. 
961  See the discussion in para  2 3 2 4 supra. 
962  Cf the discussion in para  1 8 4 3(c) supra on ubuntu’s role in harmonising Western and African 
values. 
963  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
964  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC). 
965  Cf the discussion in para  2 3 2 3 supra. 
966  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 28. 
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as well as the rule of law) and that a term in a contract that is contrary to such 
values is contrary to public policy and unenforceable.967 The court then stated that 
public policy implicates notions of fairness, justice, equity and reasonableness. In 
this respect, public policy takes account of the necessity to do simple justice 
between man and man and “is informed by the concept of ubuntu”.968 It has been 
argued969 that by referring to ubuntu as an underlying value of the Constitution, 
the court was able to formulate the subjective test for fairness which requires an 
investigation into the relative situation of the contracting parties including an 
assessment of their bargaining power970 and the surrounding circumstances of the 
case.971 This is further dealt with in the next chapter.972 
 
In addition, the court later stated that good faith also refers to justice, 
reasonableness, fairness and equity973 and, as was seen above, it questioned 
whether good faith’s limited role would be appropriate under the Constitution.974 
Therefore, it would appear that the court identified the underlying constitutional 
value of ubuntu as the vehicle to inform the open norm of public policy in order to 
import constitutional values into the common law of contract (especially in view of 
the limited role that good faith plays in this respect).975 It could also be argued that 
the court is of the view that ubuntu as an underlying constitutional value should be 
used to develop the open norm of public policy to reflect the legal convictions of 
the indigenous people that make up the majority of the population in South Africa.  
 
                                            
967  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 29.  
968  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 51. 
969  Cornell and Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law 
(2012) 24; Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 400. 
970  Cf the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56-59 in the text at n 881 
supra dealing with the test for fairness of a clause itself. 
971  Cf the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56-59 in the text at n 885 
supra dealing with the test for fairness for the enforcement of a clause. 
972  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1547 infra. 
973  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 80. 
974  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82. 
975  Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2828. 
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A more explicit explanation of the role of ubuntu in the common law of contract 
can be found in the subsequent constitutional court decision of Everfresh Market 
Virginia v Shoprite Checkers. This case concerned the validity of a “right of 
renewal” clause in a lease agreement. The relevant clause stated that the lessee 
had the right to renew the lease for a further fixed period on the same terms and 
conditions as the existing lease save that there would be no further right of 
renewal and that the rentals for the renewal period shall be agreed between the 
parties. It further provided that the lessee should give notice of its intention to 
renew, and if it did give due notice and the parties failed to reach agreement then 
the right of renewal would be void.976 The lessee gave due notice to renew the 
lease and proposed a new rental to initiate negotiations but the lessor replied that 
the clause was not legally binding and enforceable and sought an order to evict 
the lessee.977 The lessee argued that the clause obliged the lessor to make a 
bona fide attempt to agree on the rental for the new period.978 The High Court 
stated that an option to renew a lease on terms to be agreed is unenforceable.979 
Eventually, the case ended up in the Constitutional Court on appeal.980 
 
In the Constitutional Court, the lessee raised its constitutional argument for the 
first time. It argued that the common law had to be developed in terms of 
section 39(2) of the Constitution, because it was contrary to the values of the 
Constitution for a court to sanction a party’s non-compliance with a clause that it 
agreed to. In other words, the lessor was obliged to negotiate in good faith with the 
view to agree on a new rental.981 The majority of the court dismissed the appeal 
because the constitutional argument was raised in the Constitutional Court as a 
                                            
976  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 3. 
977  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) paras 5 
& 7. 
978  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 9. 
979  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 10. 
980  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 12. 
981  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 13. 
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court of first instance.982 However, the court did stress that the common law of 
contract, and especially the concept of good faith, must be infused with 
constitutional values including the underlying value of ubuntu.983 The court stated 
that ubuntu highlights the communal nature of society, the ideas of humaneness, 
social justice and fairness and incorporates the values of group solidarity, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective 
unity.984 The court also seemed to lean towards the argument proffered by the 
lessee:  
 
Were a court to entertain Everfresh’s [the lessee’s] argument, the 
underlying notion of good faith in contract law, the maxim of contractual 
doctrine that agreements seriously entered into should be enforced, and 
the value of ubuntu, which inspires much of our constitutional compact, 
may tilt the argument in its favour. Contracting parties certainly need to 
relate to each other in good faith. Where there is a contractual obligation 
to negotiate, it would be hardly imaginable that our constitutional values 
would not require that the negotiation must be done reasonably, with a 
view to reaching an agreement and in good faith.985  
 
The minority judgment also stressed the importance of good faith in the common 
law of contract and the urgency and importance of determining the role of good 
faith within a constitutional framework: 
 
Good faith is a matter of considerable importance in our contract law and 
the extent to which our courts enforce the good faith requirement in 
contract law is a matter of considerable public and constitutional 
importance. The question whether the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution require courts to encourage good faith in contractual 
                                            
982  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) 
paras 73-74. See Bhana & Broeders 2014 THRHR 168-173 for a critique of the majority’s 
refusal to make a decision on the constitutional arguments. 
983  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 71. 
As pointed out by Bhana & Broeders 2014 THRHR 164, these remarks were obiter but remain 
important because they were made unanimously.  
984  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 71. 
985  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 72. 
180 
 
dealings and whether our Constitution insists that good faith 
requirements are enforceable should be determined sooner rather than 
later. Many people enter into contracts daily and every contract has the 
potential not to be performed in good faith. The issue of good faith in 
contract touches the lives of many ordinary people in our country. 986  
 
Thereafter Justice Yacoob made the following remark which led to the research 
topic of this thesis: 
 
The values embraced by an appropriate appreciation of ubuntu are also 
relevant in the process of determining the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Constitution. The development of our economy and contract law has 
thus far predominantly been shaped by colonial legal tradition 
represented by English law, Roman law and Roman Dutch law. The 
common law of contract regulates the environment within which trade 
and commerce takes place. Its development should take cognisance of 
the values of the vast majority of people who are now able to take part 
without hindrance in trade and commerce. And it may well be that the 
approach of the majority of people in our country place a higher value on 
negotiating in good faith than would otherwise have been the case. 
Contract law cannot confine itself to colonial legal tradition alone. 987 
 
Consequently, the minority held that the case had to be remitted back to the High 
Court for reconsideration in view of the above considerations.988  
 
In view of the previous discussions in chapter one and this chapter, I read these 
remarks to mean the following: The limited role of good faith as determined by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal is an expression of the underlying values of the common 
law of contract which are informed by legal convictions rooted in the colonial 
tradition. When determining whether the current role of good faith should be 
developed in line with the values of the Constitution, the underlying constitutional 
                                            
986  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 22. 
987  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 23 
(also quoted in para  1 1 supra). 
988  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 42. 
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value of ubuntu should be considered.989 This is important in order to establish a 
plural legal culture because it takes account of the legal convictions of the 
indigenous communities that were ignored prior to the constitutional era.990 This 
would require a proper appreciation of ubuntu which should go further than merely 
assuming that fairness in terms of good faith (as a product of the colonial common 
law tradition) can be equated to fairness in terms of ubuntu. Therefore, it seems to 
me that the court is questioning whether the current role of good faith is in line with 
the values of the Constitution, especially the underlying value of ubuntu. 
Therefore, ubuntu as an underlying value of the Constitution should be used to 
critique and expand the current role of good faith because its current role is an 
expression of values rooted predominantly in the colonial common law tradition 
and do not reflect the underlying values of the Constitution. Therefore, it is 
submitted that the court is of the view that the current underlying value system of 
the common law of contract should be adapted in accordance with the underlying 
constitutional value of ubuntu.991 This is addressed in the next chapter. 
 
As this thesis does not deal with the development of the rules governing 
agreements to agree specifically, this discussion does not include a critical 
assessment of the court’s remarks in this regard.992  
 
                                            
989  Harms 2014 SALJ 6 criticises the court for not identifying the relevant founding constitutional 
value and merely referring to ubuntu. This criticism has some merit because ubuntu, as an 
underlying constitutional value, should inform how the founding constitutional values are 
expressed in the law of contract. How ubuntu should inform the founding constitutional values’ 
expression in the law of contract is addressed in the next chapter. 
990  Contra Harms 2014 SALJ 6 who states that “the snide reference by Yacoob J to ‘colonial’ laws, 
as if there are some pre- or non-colonial laws that can change the meaning of words, was 
accordingly uncalled for”.  
991  Contra Wallis 2016 SALJ 559 who is of the opinion that Justice Yacoob’s remarks do not 
implicate great changes in respect of the existing principles of the law of contract. 
992  For more detailed analyses of the decision in this respect see Harms 2014 SALJ 4-7; Bhana & 
Broeders 2014 THRHR 173-176; Lewis 2013 THRHR 85-87, 89, 92. 
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2 3 3 3 Western Cape Division decisions 
The first case applying the remarks in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite 
Checkers is Combined Developers v Arun Holdings.993 This case dealt with the 
legality of an acceleration clause in a loan agreement which provided that the 
lender would be entitled to claim payment of the whole debt if the borrower 
defaulted and failed to correct the default within four days of receiving written 
notice from the lender.994 After failing to pay a due instalment of R 42 133.15 the 
lender notified the borrower of the default by email.995 The borrower made the 
payment in the time period allowed but did not pay the default interest which 
totalled R 87.57.996 Due to a dispute unrelated to the payment default, the lender 
decided to treat the non-payment of the default interest as an event of default in 
terms of the acceleration clause and claimed payment of the whole debt  
(R7 665 040.14 together with interest).997 
 
Judge Davis held that there was nothing unconstitutional about the inclusion of the 
acceleration clause in the contract.998 Rather, the question is whether the lender’s 
interpretation of the clause is against public policy.999 He also argued that 
although a clause in a contract may not be contrary to public policy in itself, its 
enforcement may be so oppressive, unconscionable or immoral as to be contrary 
to public policy.1000 He confirmed that it has been a long established rule that the 
power to declare a clause unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy 
should be exercised sparingly and not with reference to the judge’s “individual 
sense of propriety and fairness”.1001 He further stated that an objective standard 
                                            
993  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC). 
994  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 2. 
995  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 3. 
996  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 4. 
997  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) paras 5 & 25. 
998  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 29. 
999  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 30. 
1000  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) paras 36 referring to 
Juglal NO and another v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise Division 2004 5 SA 248 
(SCA) paras 12-13. 
1001  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) paras 33 & 37. 
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should be used and such a standard can now be found in the normative 
framework of the Constitution.1002 This is because public policy must accord with 
the normative framework of the Constitution.1003  
 
Specifically, Judge Davis held that guidance on the normative framework of the 
Constitution can be found in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers.1004 
Referring to both the majority and minority judgments’ remarks on the role of 
ubuntu in the law of contract, he held that public policy embraces the concept of 
good faith and reasonableness.1005 Applying these principles to the facts, he 
stated as follows: 
 
The implementation of clause 7.2 [the acceleration clause] as sought by 
the applicant [the lender] is so draconian and startlingly unfair that this 
particular construction of the clause must be in breach of public policy. 
Some form of communication to pay a measly sum of R86.57 
immediately following payment of the large principal sum should surely 
have been required. In other words, it cannot be congruent with public 
policy that a demand, in an ambiguous form … can first be met with 
silence because R86.57 has not been paid, and then a week later the full 
weight of clause 7.2 be applied by the applicant to gain massive 
commercial advantage, to the significant disadvantage of the 
respondents [the borrower].1006 
 
Although it is difficult to determine the actual basis for the rejection of the claim, 
Sharrock argues that it appears that the court held that the enforcement of the 
clause (rather than the clause itself as interpreted by the lender) was so unfair as 
to be contrary to public policy.1007 Bearing in mind that this judgment was handed 
down prior to that of the Constitutional Court in Botha v Rich the further question 
which arises is how the court’s judgment can be reconciled with the appeal court 
                                            
1002  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 37. 
1003  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) paras 31 & 37. 
1004  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) paras 38-39. 
1005  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) paras 38-40. 
1006  Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) para 42.  
1007  Sharrock 2015 SA Merc LJ 189-190. 
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decisions that reject the idea that an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement 
of a contract term on its own could lead to the conclusion that it offends 
constitutional values?  
 
First, it must be noted that Judge Davis fails to make any mention of these 
decisions in his judgment. However, it could possibly be argued that he is 
following his own interpretation of these cases as set out in Absa Bank v Coe 
Family Trust. There he suggested that the remarks in Bredenkamp v Standard 
Bank of South Africa should be interpreted to mean that “any enquiry into fairness 
can only take place through the prism of public policy as mediated by the values of 
the Constitution” and does not mean “that fairness is not to be considered in an 
enquiry into the enforceability of a contract”.1008 Secondly, and more likely, it 
would seem that Judge Davis, relying on the Constitutional Court’s remarks on the 
role of ubuntu in the law of contract in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite 
Checkers, held that a proper appreciation of the values embraced by ubuntu 
requires that greater weight should be given to the principle of good faith and 
reasonableness in determining whether the enforcement of a contractual term is 
contrary to public policy or not. If this is the case, the problem is that the court did 
not explain how a proper appreciation of ubuntu would lead to such a conclusion. 
It is not clear from his judgment how the notions of “humaneness, social justice 
and fairness” and “group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, 
conformity to basic norms and collective unity” translate into a more prominent role 
for the principle of good faith when determining whether a clause or its 
enforcement is contrary to public policy.1009 Especially in view of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s persistent view that the limited role of good faith is in line with 
the constitutional values of human dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of law.  
 
It is submitted that a proper appreciation of ubuntu requires an investigation into 
how ubuntu as an underlying constitutional value informs the foundational 
                                            
1008 ABSA Bank v Coe Family Trust and others 2012 3 SA 184 (WCC) 190 (also quoted at n 919 
supra). 
1009  See also Wallis 2016 SALJ 560-561 for a similar criticism when dealing with the decision in 
Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers 2011 (CC). 
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constitutional values as expressed in the law of contract. Only then can it be 
determined how ubuntu can be used to develop the current expression of these 
values in the law of contract and how this can lead to a more prominent role for 
good faith when determining whether a contract or its enforcement is contrary to 
public policy. Such an investigation is undertaken in the next chapter. 
 
Recently, in Savage v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province, the 
court provided more guidance on how the principle of ubuntu could be applied in 
the common law of contract. In this case, the principle of ubuntu was invoked 
explicitly by the tenants of a church property in seeking to interdict the transfer 
thereof. The tenants feared that if the property is transferred to the new owner, he 
would evict them from the property.1010 The tenants raised various grounds in 
favour of granting the interdict. In the first place the tenants alleged that their 
tenancy was based on cessions of lifelong leases entered into between the 
Catholic Church and their forebears. They argued that the lifelong leases were 
ceded to them with the verbal consent of the first respondent who is the successor 
in title of the church property.1011 Secondly, the tenants claimed that the property 
was under the umbrella of the Catholic Church and that canon law and common-
law principles precluded the alienation of the property in the manner executed by 
the first respondent.1012 Thirdly, the tenants argued that the principle of ubuntu 
applied to the mutually beneficial relationship between themselves and the first 
respondent.1013 In this respect, the tenants argued that they had made rigorous 
efforts to engage with the first respondent regarding the transfer of the church 
property and the first respondent’s obligation to provide the tenants with security of 
                                            
1010  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) para 14. 
1011  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) para 15. 
1012  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) paras 17-21. 
1013  The relationship was mutually beneficial as the first respondent assisted the tenants as 
parishioners while in turn the first respondent derived the benefit of having devout Catholic 
families occupying the church property (Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy 
Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 SA 1 (WCC) para 16). 
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tenure in the form of written leases.1014 In response, the first respondent argued 
that it was obliged to sell the property for economic reasons as the property was a 
drain on its already deteriorating financial resources.1015 
 
In dealing with the application of ubuntu to the relationship between the tenants 
and the first respondent, the court referred to the remarks in Everfresh Market 
Virginia v Shoprite Checkers where it was stated that the common law rules 
governing the law of contract should be developed with reference to the principle 
of ubuntu and the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.1016 The court held 
that the principle of ubuntu must be taken into account when interpreting property 
rights and the relationship between owners and tenants and occupiers of 
property.1017 In applying the principle of ubuntu to the facts the court held as 
follows: 
 
In my view, the first respondent’s efforts to alienate the property and 
thereby address their financial woes cannot reasonably be regarded as 
inhumane, unreasonable and contrary to the principles of ubuntu. 
However, courts have an obligation to infuse elements of grace and 
compassion into the formal structures of the law applicable. It is 
important to encourage the evolution of property rights and thereby 
balance the interests of the first respondent with the interests of the 
applicants in a principled way, so that the quality of their lives can be 
meaningfully improved and not worsened.1018 
 
                                            
1014  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) para 16. 
1015  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) para 24. 
1016  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) para 36. 
1017  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) paras 36-37 referring to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 
SA 217 (CC) para 37 (quoted at n 542 supra). 
1018  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) para 40. 
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Therefore, the court applied the principle of ubuntu to the contractual relationship 
between a landlord and a tenant. In this respect, the court held that the application 
of ubuntu would require a balancing act between the interests of the landlord and 
the interests of the tenants. Although alienating the property due to financial 
pressures is not inhumane or unreasonable, the interests of the tenants should 
also not be worsened by such alienation. Accordingly, the court held that not 
granting the interdict would place the tenants in a worse position because allowing 
the transfer of the property would defeat the tenants’ claims in the main action.1019  
 
Although this judgment dealt more with eviction proceedings it is important for the 
law of contract because the court expressly stated that the common law of 
contract should be infused with the principle of ubuntu and did so in respect of the 
legal relationship between landlord and tenant. In doing so, the court held that the 
concept of ubuntu would require a balancing act between the interests of the 
landlord and those of the tenant with reference to the specific circumstances of the 
case. It follows that the test formulated by the court accords with the subjective 
test for fairness laid down in Barkhuizen v Napier which requires an investigation 
into the relative situation of the contracting parties1020 which was also based on 
the concept of ubuntu.1021 
 
2 3 3 4 Concluding remarks 
The references to ubuntu by the courts in the context of the common law of 
contract are commendable in establishing a plural legal culture in terms of the new 
Constitution. Unfortunately, there is still much uncertainty regarding how the 
concept of ubuntu should inform the role of good faith in ensuring better 
contractual fairness and these uncertainties are addressed in the next chapter. 
                                            
1019  Savage and others v Order of the Sisters of the Holy Cross, Cape Province and others 2015 6 
SA 1 (WCC) paras 48 & 52. 
1020  Cf the discussions of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56-59 in the text at n 881 
(dealing with the test for fairness of a clause itself) and at n 885 (dealing with the test for 
fairness for the enforcement of a clause).  
1021  The link between the subjective test for fairness and ubuntu is discussed in the text at 
n 971 supra. 
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First, however, it is necessary to discuss the open norm of fairness incorporated 
into section 48 of the CPA.  
 
2 3 4 The Consumer Protection Act (“the CPA”) 
2 3 4 1 Introduction 
Although the research problem focusses on contractual fairness in the common 
law of contract,1022 it is necessary to refer to certain provisions in the CPA dealing 
with contractual fairness in the consumer market since the interpretation and 
application of these provisions will be affected by how ubuntu as an underlying 
constitutional value informs the expression of the founding constitutional values in 
the law of contract. Accordingly, this section discusses these provisions only to the 
extent necessary to illustrate how the interpretation of these provisions would 
need to take account of the harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu in the common 
law of contract.  
 
As was seen previously, the Supreme Court of Appeal has taken a conservative 
approach to the use of open norms in the common law of contract and endorsed 
the classical model of contract law as based on freedom and sanctity of contract, 
which entails a formalistic approach to contracts.1023 It has been pointed out how 
this body of jurisprudence has been motivated by traditional interpretation of the 
rule of law and follows a liberal interpretation of the constitutional values human 
dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of law, thus ignoring the movement towards 
a modern theory of contract law.1024 However, the Constitution requires a 
normative approach aiming for social transformation and substantive equality.1025 
                                            
1022  The common law refers to the non-statutory law which consists of the rules of the Roman-
Dutch based legal system as influenced by English law and developed by the South African 
courts over time (cf the discussion in n 442 supra). 
1023  See the discussions in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
1024  See the discussion on the modern law of contract in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
1025  See in general the discussion on the constitutional value of the rule of law in para  1 8 2 3 
supra.  
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This gap resulted in the enactment of the CPA in order to ensure better 
contractual fairness within the consumer market.1026  
 
The CPA became fully operational on 31 March 20111027 but only applies to 
certain consumer contracts as set out in the Act.1028 Generally, the CPA aims to 
address unequal bargaining relationships in these consumer contracts1029 by 
protecting a number of fundamental consumer rights. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the consumer’s right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions1030 is 
relevant and discussed below.  
 
2 3 4 2 Prohibition on unfair contract terms and the unfair enforcement of contract 
terms 
Section 48(1)(a)(ii) provides that a supplier must not offer to sell, sell or enter into 
an agreement to sell, any goods or services on terms that are unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust. Section 48(1)(a)(i) provides that a supplier must not offer 
to sell, sell or enter into an agreement to sell, any goods or services at a price that 
is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Furthermore, section 48(1)(c)(i) states that a 
supplier may not require a consumer to waive any rights on terms that are unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust, or impose any such terms as a condition for entering into 
the transaction. These provisions deal with the content of the contract terms,1031 
and therefore, prohibit unfair contract terms. It has further been argued that as the 
                                            
1026  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 353; Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 396. 
1027  The CPA was supposed to come into full operation on 24 October 2010 (s 122 read with 
item 2(2) of Sched 2) but the Minister deferred the date to 31 March 2011 in terms of item 
2(3)(a) of Sched 2 (see GN 917 in GG 33581 of 23 September 2010). 
1028  For more on the scope and application of the CPA see ss 5-6 of the Act. See also Sharrock 
Business transactions law (2016) 593-595; De Stadler “Section 5” & “Section 6”  in Naudé & 
Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (OS, 2014); Du Plessis 2013 
THRHR 228-231; Van Eeden Consumer Protection law (2013) ch 3; Naudé & De Stadler “The 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 435-438; 
Jacobs et al 2010 PER 309-318; Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 299-305. 
1029  Mupangavanhu 2015 De Jure 129; Hawthorne 2011 SAPL 435; Woker 2010 Obiter 230.  
1030  Contained in Part G (ss 48-52) of the CPA. 
1031  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 361, 363.  
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meanings of “unfair”, “unreasonable” and “unjust” overlap,1032 and as all three 
terms qualify as open norms in themselves, it would have been more apt to use 
only one term, for example “unfair”. Nevertheless, there are further provisions in 
the CPA that aim to provide content or concretisation to the general requirement 
for fair, reasonable and just contract terms.  
 
Section 48(2) does not limit the generality of section 48(1)1033 and lists a number 
of examples of terms, which would be regarded as unfair, unreasonable or unjust. 
The first two subsections provide guidance on how to determine whether a 
contract term itself would be considered unfair. Section 48(2)(a) provides that a 
term is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if it is excessively one-sided in favour of any 
person other than a consumer or other person to whom goods or services are to 
be supplied. Naudé interprets this provision to mean that the parties’ interests 
must be balanced against each other1034 and it is submitted that such a balancing 
act denotes an equitable discretion by the courts.1035 This is a departure from the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s consistent rejection of an equitable discretion in the 
common law of contract,1036 albeit that the equitable discretion created in section 
48 is only applicable to contracts governed by the Act.1037 In addition, section 
48(2)(b) states that if a term of an agreement is so adverse to the consumer as to 
be inequitable, the term will be unfair. However, Naudé argues that “inequitable” 
                                            
1032  Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(RS 1, 2016) para 1; Sharrock Business transactions law (2016) 606. 
1033  Therefore, a term may be unfair even if it does not meet the criteria set out in s 48(2) (Sharrock 
Business transactions law (2016) 606; Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 308). 
1034  Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(RS 1, 2016) para 12. 
1035  Floyd “Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 187; Hawthorne 2012 
THRHR 346, 361-362. Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the 
Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 2016) para 12 accepts that s 48(2)(a) “leaves much to the 
discretion of the court” when applying this provision. 
1036  Cf the discussion on the Supreme Court of Appeals approach to fairness in the common law of 
contract in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
1037  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1028 supra. 
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and “unfair” are synonyms and as such section 48(2)(b) does not provide further 
illumination on how to determine whether a term is unfair.1038 
 
Further guidelines provided by the legislature in assessing the fairness of a term 
are found in section 52(2) of the Act.1039 This provision contains a list of factors 
that the court must consider when determining whether a term is unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust. The listed factors are the following: 
(a) the fair value of the goods or services in question; 
(b) the nature of the parties, their relationship to each other and their relative 
capacity, education, experience, sophistication and bargaining position; 
(c) the circumstances of the agreement that existed or were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time the contract was concluded; 
(d) the conduct of the parties; 
(e) whether there was any negotiation between the parties, and if so, the extent 
of that negotiation; 
(f) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the consumer 
was required to do anything that was not reasonably necessary for the 
legitimate interests of the supplier; 
(g) the extent to which any documents relating to the agreement satisfied the 
plain language requirements in section 22 of the CPA; 
(h) whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
existence and extent of any particular provision of the agreement that is 
alleged to have been unfair, unreasonable or unjust, having regard to any 
custom of trade and any previous dealings between the parties; 
(i) the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a different 
supplier; and 
                                            
1038  Naudé 2009 SALJ 516. See further Sharrock Business transactions law (2016) 606-607; 
Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 25; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 363; Naudé & De 
Stadler “The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 450; Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 308. 
1039  Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 417-418. 
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(j) in the case of supply of goods, whether the goods were manufactured, 
processed or adapted to the special order of the consumer.1040 
 
As can be seen from the above, almost all of the factors listed concern the 
surrounding circumstances of the contract and the parties rather than the actual 
contract terms themselves.1041 Therefore, the inclusion and consideration of these 
factors promote substantive equality.1042 This it to be expected bearing in mind 
that one of the main aims of the CPA is to address unfair bargaining relationships 
and it is an important step in “legitimising contextualisation of the particular 
circumstances in relation to the adjudication process.”1043 Consequently, it is 
submitted that the provisions of the CPA incorporate a subjective test for fairness 
similar to that in Barkhuizen v Napier, the latter being inspired by ubuntu.1044  
 
There are also other provisions in the CPA that provide more guidance on the 
general requirement for fair, reasonable or just terms. Section 51 contains a list of 
prohibited (so-called “blacklist” terms).1045 There are also terms that are presumed 
                                            
1040  For a more detailed discussion of these factors see e.g. Naudé “Section 52” in Naudé & 
Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 2016); Sharrock Business 
transactions law (2016) 607-608; Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 309-313; Naudé 2009 SALJ 524. 
1041  Naudé 2009 SALJ 515, 529. 
1042  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 368. 
1043  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 369. See also Davis 2011 Stell LR 861. 
1044  Cf the discussion of the test for fairness set out in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) in 
the text at n 872 supra. 
1045  These terms include the limitation or exemption of a supplier from liability for gross negligence 
(s 51(1)(c)(i)); assumption of risk or liability by the consumer (s 51(1)(c)(ii); imposition of an 
obligation on the consumer to pay for damage to or assumption of risk of handling goods 
displayed by the supplier (s 51(1)(c)(iii); agreements resulting from negative option marketing 
(s 51(1)(d) read with s 31); agreements requiring supplementary agreements (s 51(1)(e) & 
s 51(2)(a)); agreements relative to a consumer’s claim against the Guardian’s fund (s 51(1)(f)); 
false acknowledgement by a consumer (s 51(1)(g)(i) & (ii)); terms entailing forfeiture of money 
as a result of exercising a right in terms of the Act (s 51(1)(h)(i) & (ii)); terms authorising 
entrance to premises to repossess goods (s 51(1)(i)(i)); undertakings to sign documentation in 
advance (s 51(1)(i)(ii)); agreements to a predetermined enforcement costs ((s 51(1)(i)(iii)); 
terms requiring deposit of an identity document, credit or debit card, bank account or automatic 
teller machine access card or any similar identity document or device (s 51(1)(j)(i)) & 
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unfair (so-called “greylist” terms).1046 This does not mean that any other terms in a 
contract cannot be considered unfair in terms of section 48 of the CPA.1047 
Furthermore, the greylist terms are only presumed unfair and hence still subject to 
the test for fairness set out in section 48.1048  
 
Moving on to the unfair enforcement of contract terms, section 48(1)(b) provides 
that a supplier must not administer a transaction or an agreement for the supply of 
any goods or services, in a manner that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. It can be 
argued that the word “administer” refers to enforcement of a contract term.1049 The 
word “administer” can be defined as “attend to the organisation or implementation 
of”.1050 Thus, the administration of the agreement refers to the implementation of 
the agreement which denotes the actual enforcement of the contract terms. 
                                                                                                                                    
s 52(1)(b)(i)); or provision of a personal identification code or number to be used to access an 
account (s 51(1)(j)(ii) & s 52(1)(b)(ii)). For a discussion of these prohibited terms see e.g. 
Naudé “Section 51” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(RS 1, 2016); Sharrock Business transactions law (2016) 603-605; Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 
420; Hawthorne 2013 SUBB Iurisprudentia 68; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 363-366; Sharrock 
2010 SA Merc LJ 316-321; Naudé 2009 SALJ 519. 
1046  These terms are contained in reg 44(3) of the regulations made by the Minister in terms of 
section 120(1)(d) of the CPA and published in GN R293 in GG 34180 of 1 April 2011 (“the CPA 
regulations”). It should be noted that this list applies only to a term in a contract “between a 
supplier operating on a for-profit basis and acting wholly or mainly for purposes related to his 
or her business or profession and an individual consumer or individual consumers who entered 
into it for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to his or her business or profession” (reg 44(1) of 
the CPA regulations). For more detail relating to these presumed unfair terms see e.g. Naudé 
“Regulation 44” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 
2016); Sharrock Business transactions law (2016) 608-613; Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 421; 
Hawthorne 2013 SUBB Iurisprudentia 68; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 366-368; Naudé 2009 
SALJ 519-524. 
1047  Reg 44(2)(b) of the CPA regulations states that the list in reg 44(3) is non-exhaustive and that 
other terms may also be unfair for purposes of s 48 of the Act. 
1048  Reg 44(2)(a) of the CPA regulations states that the list in reg 44(3) is indicative only, and such 
terms could be fair depending on the facts of the case. 
1049  See also Bradfield Christie’s law of contract (2016) 24. 
1050  The Dictionary Unit for South African English (eds) South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 
(2007) sv administer. 
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Accordingly, it is submitted that this provision prohibits the unfair enforcement of 
contract terms and has created an equitable discretion in this respect. Although it 
would seem that section 48(2) is not applicable when dealing with the unfair 
enforcement of a contract term,1051 the court is still obliged to consider the list of 
factors in section 52(2) to determine whether the enforcement was unfair or 
not.1052 As stated above,1053 the list of factors predominantly deals with the 
circumstances surrounding the contract, and hence it promotes substantive 
equality. Therefore, the CPA’s approach to the unfair enforcement of contract 
terms accords with the approach of the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v 
Napier in which the court laid down a subjective test for fairness when determining 
whether enforcement of a contract term is unfair or not, which test was also 
inspired by ubuntu.1054 Although the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v 
Standard Bank of South Africa held that the subjective part of the test dealing with 
the unfair enforcement of a contract term becomes relevant only when a specific 
constitutional value or right is implicated as envisaged by the objective part of the 
test for fairness,1055 it has been suggested that the Constitutional Court in Botha v 
Rich applied the subjective part of the test without reference to a specific 
constitutional value or right.1056 Accordingly, some legal scholars interpreted the 
court’s decision as impliedly holding that the unfair enforcement of a contract term 
would be unconstitutional, and hence against public policy.1057  
 
                                            
1051  S 48(2) concerns “a transaction or agreement, a term or condition of a transaction or 
agreement, or a notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject”. 
1052  S 52(1) provides that in any proceedings before a court concerning the contravention of s 48, 
the court must consider the list of factors in s 52(2).  
1053  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1039 supra. 
1054  Cf the discussion of the test for fairness set out in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) in 
the text at n 872 supra. 
1055  Cf the discussion of this case in para  2 3 2 4 supra. 
1056  Cf the discussion of the case in the text at n 943 supra. 
1057  Cf the discussion of this case in para  2 3 2 5 supra. 
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In the next chapter,1058 I propose an interpretation of the court’s decision in Botha 
v Rich that supports the conclusion that the court did in fact develop the common 
law of contract to reflect an equitable discretion as informed by the proper 
appreciation of the constitutional value of human dignity. If this proposal is correct, 
the position dealing with the unfair enforcement of contract terms under the CPA is 
similar to that under common law.  
It has been argued that as section 40 which deals with “unconscionable conduct” 
provides for “any form of unfair conduct”, section 48(1)(b) is “unnecessary and 
confusing”.1059 In this respect, section 40(1)(c) provides that a supplier may not 
use “unfair tactics” in connection with the “enforcement of an agreement to supply 
any goods or services to a consumer”. However, it would seem that the test laid 
down in section 40 is more stringent than that under section 48. In the first place, 
section 1 of the Act defines “unconscionable” conduct as conduct that is “unethical 
or improper to a degree that would shock the conscience of a reasonable person.” 
Consequently, Du Plessis argues that this definition suggests “a high degree of 
impropriety, and not merely conduct which is generally felt to be unfair”.1060 
Furthermore, although the term “unfair tactics” is not defined in the Act itself, Du 
Plessis proposes that “tactics” could denote that “available means are artfully or 
skilfully used to achieve a particular ends” and that the term “unfair” suggests “that 
there is something unacceptable about the use of this means”.1061 Therefore, 
although there is an overlap between the provisions in sections 40(1)(c) and 
                                            
1058  See the discussion dealing with the Constitutional Court’s development of the common law of 
contract to incorporate an equitable discretion when dealing with the enforcement of a contract 
term in para  3 2 7 3 infra. 
1059  Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(RS 1, 2016) para 10. 
1060  Du Plessis “Section 40” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection 
Act (OS, 2014) para 2. 
1061 Du Plessis “Section 40” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection 
Act (OS, 2014) para 18. See also Sharrock Business transactions law (2016) 597 who argue 
that the meaning of the term “unfair tactics” is uncertain. 
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48(1)(b),1062 it is submitted that the latter provides a consumer with more extensive 
protection against the unfair enforcement of contract terms.  
 
From the discussion above, the conclusion can be reached that the provisions in 
section 48(1) grant the courts “an equitable jurisdiction”1063 when dealing with 
unfair contract terms and the unfair enforcement of contract terms. As pointed out 
by Hawthorne, section 48(1) qualifies as a so-called “general clause”.1064 Although 
the CPA contains a number of guidelines,1065 the development of the test for 
fairness and the concomitant process of concretising the provisions in section 48 
have been left to the courts and they will have to construct relevant rules on an 
ongoing basis.1066  
 
It is possible that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s resistance to fairness as a 
standard for the enforcement of a contract1067 may well translate into a more 
restrictive interpretation of these provisions than that submitted by an 
interpretation of the founding constitutional values, as inspired by ubuntu. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the CPA’s constitutional imperatives and 
how its provisions must be interpreted. 
 
                                            
1062  Du Plessis “Section 40” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection 
Act (OS, 2014) para 6. 
1063  Floyd “Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 187. See also Hawthorne 2012 
THRHR 346, 361-362. 
1064  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 361-362. See also Naudé “Section 48” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) 
Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 2016) para 1. As previously stated, a 
general clause is a legal rule that incorporates an open norm and which must be given content 
by the legislature and/or the courts (cf the definition of an open norm as set out in n 601 
supra). 
1065  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 369; Naudé 2009 SALJ 529. 
1066  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 362. 
1067  Cf the discussion on the Supreme Court of Appeals approach to fairness in common law 
contracts in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
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2 3 4 3 The CPA as a statute that promotes constitutional values 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution provides that the state must promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights. As was seen in the previous chapter,1068 section 9(2) of 
the Constitution provides that legislative and other measures may be taken to 
protect persons against unfair discrimination and advance persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination. Accordingly, it was argued that the Constitution is 
committed to the achievement of substantive equality, and specifically, egalitarian 
social transformation in the private sphere.1069  
 
The CPA is a good example of legislation aimed at promoting substantive equality 
in the private sphere.1070 The Preamble of the CPA recognises “[t]hat apartheid 
and discriminatory laws of the past have burdened the nation with unacceptably 
high levels of poverty, illiteracy and other forms of social and economic inequality”. 
It further recognises the necessity to “fulfil the rights of historically disadvantaged 
persons and to promote their full participation as consumers” and “to protect the 
interests of all consumers” and “ensure accessible, transparent and efficient 
redress for consumers who are subjected to abuse or exploitation in the 
marketplace”. As such, the CPA recognises the need to address economic 
inequality caused by apartheid and aims to promote better market participation by 
historically disadvantaged persons.1071 Therefore, the CPA incorporates a social 
welfarist approach to contracts because it promotes and advances social justice 
and the economic welfare of consumers.1072 Specifically, the link between equality 
and the consumer’s right to fair contract terms in section 48 of the Act has been 
emphasised.1073  
                                            
1068  See para  1 8 2 3 supra which deals with the transformative aims of the Constitution. 
1069  See also Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 408 dealing with this in the context of the common law of  
contract. 
1070  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 1.60; Mupangavanhu 2015 De Jure 129; Hawthorne 
2014 THRHR 417; Hawthorne 2011 SAPL 431.  
1071  Hawthorne 2013 SUBB Iurisprudentia 60; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 361; Hawthorne 2011 
SAPL 431. 
1072  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 361. 
1073  Naudé “Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the 
Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 2016) para 8. 
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It has also been stated that the consumer rights in the CPA promote the human 
dignity of consumers,1074 which is also the case for the consumer’s right to fair 
contract terms as set out in section 48.1075 Subsequently, the CPA promotes a 
more “person-orientated” approach to contracts because it “is concerned with how 
the physical, property, social and economic interests of consumers will be affected 
by the terms of their agreements and takes cognisance of a consumer’s ability to 
protect her interests, which demands contextualisation”.1076 Therefore, the 
constitutional aim towards substantive equality is also linked to the promotion of 
human dignity.1077 
 
2 3 4 4 Constitutional interpretation of the CPA 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, all law (including any legislation) is subject 
to the Constitution.1078 Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that when any 
legislation is interpreted by a court, forum of tribunal, its interpretation “must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”.1079 This would include 
an interpretation consistent with a transformative constitutional approach that aims 
to achieve substantive equality.1080 As stated by the court in Standard Bank of 
South Africa v Dlamini: 
 
Our Constitutional Court (“the CC”) has repeatedly endorsed the 
substantive approach to equality. Likewise, national legislation 
contemplated in the equality clause aimed at preventing or prohibiting 
                                            
1074  Eiselen & Naudé “Introduction and overview of the Consumer Protection Act” in Naudé & 
Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (OS, 2014) para 29; Hawthorne 
2011 SAPL 431-433. 
1075  Naudé “Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the 
Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 2016) para 8. 
1076  Hawthorne 2013 SUBB Iurisprudentia 66; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 361. 
1077  The connection between human dignity and substantive equality is discussed in more detail in 
paras  3 2 &  3 3 infra that deals with the constitutional values of human dignity and equality. 
1078  Cf the discussion in para  1 8 1 supra. 
1079  Cf the discussion in para  1 8 3 2 supra dealing with the development of the common and 
customary law in terms of s 39(2). 
1080  Cf the discussion in para  1 8 2 3 supra on the rule of law under the Constitution. 
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unfair discrimination must also be interpreted in ways that achieve 
substantive effect.1081 
 
More importantly, such an interpretation involves the incorporation of values or 
norms, and as was seen previously, these values are found in the “objective 
normative value system” established under the Constitution.1082 As explained by 
Liebenberg, this means that such legislation must be interpreted “to facilitate the 
development of people to their full potential and their participation as equals in all 
spheres of our society” and should not be interpreted to preserve the existing 
common law norms as far as possible.1083  
 
The CPA is a good example of this type of legislation and therefore it should be 
interpreted to achieve substantive equality which involves a normative approach 
as informed by the objective normative value system established under the 
Constitution.1084 As elucidated by Hawthorne: 
 
Promulgation of the Consumer Protection Act has been a decisive move, 
since mandatory consumer protection legislation represents a shift from 
rules based on formal reasoning to rules based on a more discretionary 
form of reasoning, characteristic of a fairness-based approach to contract 
law.1085 
 
Furthermore, in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai 
Motor Distributors the Constitutional Court held that section 39(2) obliges a judge 
“to examine the objects and purport of an Act and to read the provisions of 
                                            
1081  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 JOL 30897 (KZD) para 30.  
1082  See the discussion in para  1 8 2 supra. 
1083  Liebenberg 2008 TSAR 473 on the interpretation of legislation dealing with socio-economic 
rights. 
1084  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 JOL 30897 (KZD) para 30 read with 
para 32. The objective normative value system of the Constitution is dealt with in para  1 8 2 
supra. 
1085  Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 353. See also Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 62 where she argues that this 
development is proof “that the legitimacy of the formalistic rule of law approach has become 
questionable”. 
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legislation, so far as possible, ‘in conformity’ with the Bill of Rights”.1086 Therefore, 
the purpose of the CPA should be investigated when interpreting any of its 
provisions. Section 3 of the CPA states that the main purpose of the CPA is to 
promote and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers in South 
Africa.1087 This must be accomplished by the establishment and maintenance of a 
fair, accessible, efficient and sustainable consumer market;1088 also, by promoting 
fair business practices1089 and protecting consumers from unfair trade practices 
and conduct.1090 Specifically, the CPA aims to protect the rights of vulnerable 
persons.1091 These would include persons from low-income and remote 
communities, minors, seniors, illiterate persons or persons with a low literacy level, 
the visually impaired and persons who have limited language skills in the language 
in which the advertisement, agreement or other visual representation is 
presented.1092 Therefore, “[t]he more vulnerable the consumer is, the more 
protection is required”.1093 
 
As a final note it can also be mentioned that the CPA contains provisions dealing 
with its interpretation and the development of the common law of contract. 
Section 2(1) provides that the CPA should be interpreted to give effect to the 
purposes detailed in section 3. In addition, the CPA should not be interpreted in 
such a way as to preclude a consumer from exercising any of her common-law 
rights.1094 Furthermore, when a matter is brought before a court in terms of the 
Act, the court has the following obligations: first, the court must develop the 
                                            
1086  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd and others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v Smit NO and 
others 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 22. See also De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 339; Liebenberg 2008 TSAR 472. 
1087  S 3(1). 
1088  S 3(1)(a). 
1089  S 3(1)(c). 
1090  S 3(1)(d). 
1091  S 3(1)(b). 
1092  S 3(1)(b) 
1093  Du Preez 2009 TSAR 63. 
1094  S 2(10). 
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common law to improve the realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights 
generally and, in particular, to improve the position of the vulnerable persons 
referred to above.1095 Secondly, the court must promote the spirit and purposes of 
the CPA.1096 Finally, section 4(3) provides that if any provision in the CPA can 
have more than one meaning, the court must prefer the meaning that best 
promotes the spirit and purposes of the CPA and will best improve the realisation 
and enjoyment of consumer rights and, in particular, the position of the vulnerable 
persons mentioned above. 
 
2 3 4 5 Role of ubuntu when interpreting the CPA 
As section 39(2) of the Constitution means that the CPA should be interpreted to 
promote constitutional values, the underlying value of ubuntu will be one of the 
factors to guide this interpretation.1097 In fact, it would seem that ubuntu is 
especially relevant in the interpretation of the CPA, as, the Preamble of the CPA 
specifically recognises the social and economic inequality caused by apartheid 
and the need to address this inequality. The CPA is seen as a tool to ensure that 
previously excluded members can now become part of the community that has 
access to the market place.1098 It follows that the CPA aims to promote the 
realisation of socio-economic rights which accords with the ideas in ubuntu.1099 It 
was also illustrated how the CPA aims to promote the constitutional value of 
human dignity,1100 and as already shown, ubuntu is closely related to and informs 
the meaning of human dignity in terms of the Constitution.1101 Therefore, ubuntu 
                                            
1095  S 4(2)(a).  
1096  S 4(2)(b)(i). 
1097  Cf the discussion on the role of ubuntu in private law in para  1 8 4 3(b) supra. 
1098  Cf the discussion on the CPA as a statute that promotes constitutional values in para  2 3 4 3 
supra. 
1099  For the link between ubuntu and promotion of socio-economic rights see e.g. Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) & City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) discussed in para  1 8 4 3(a) supra. 
1100  See the discussion on how the CPA promotes human dignity in para  2 3 4 3 supra. 
1101  See the discussion of S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) in para  1 8 4 2(b) 
supra. See also the discussions of MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 
2008 1 SA 474 (CC); City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 
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will be relevant to inform the meaning of the constitutional values of human dignity 
and equality when interpreting and giving content to the provisions of the CPA.1102 
 
Finally, in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers Justice Yacoob 
emphasised the role of ubuntu in protecting vulnerable consumers: 
 
It may be said that a contract of lease between two business entities with 
limited liability does not implicate questions of ubuntu. This is, in my view, 
too narrow an approach. It is evident that contractual terms to negotiate 
are not entered into only between companies with limited liability. They 
are often entered into between individuals and often between poor, 
vulnerable people on [sic] one hand and powerful, well-resourced 
companies on the other. The idea that people or entities can undertake to 
negotiate and then not do so because this attitude becomes convenient 
for some or other commercial reason, certainly implicates ubuntu.1103 
 
Thus ubuntu has an important role to play in the interpretation and application of 
the CPA, especially when applying the court’s equitable discretion in section 48 of 
the Act. The open norm of fairness incorporated into section 48 should be 
interpreted within the context of the values and aims of the Constitution as 
informed by ubuntu.  
 
Recently, Eiselen and Naudé argued that the principle of good faith as linked to 
human dignity should inform the interpretation of these provisions: 
 
Although the CPA does not refer to the concept of good faith, this 
concept is at the heart of Chapter 2, Parts F and G, which deal with 
unconscionable conduct and the right to fair, just and reasonable terms 
and conditions. These terms are closely associated with the concept of 
good faith. In addition, good faith can arguably be linked to the 
                                                                                                                                    
78 (W); Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) as discussed in para  1 8 4 3 supra. 
1102  How ubuntu informs the constitutional value of human dignity is critically analysed in paras  3 2 
5 to  3 2 7 infra. 
1103  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 24 
(Yacoob minority judgment). 
203 
 
fundamental right to dignity. It could be argued that dignity and good faith 
in the context of consumer contracts means that the supplier must show 
a reasonable measure of concern for the interests of the consumer and 
not merely further its own interests in a one-sided manner.1104  
  
It is proposed that this argument compliments the submissions regarding ubuntu 
because the Constitutional Court envisages that the principle of good faith must be 
infused with the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu.1105 Furthermore, it was 
submitted that the harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu involves a critical 
investigation into how ubuntu should inform the expression of the founding 
constitutional values, namely human dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of law, 
in the common law of contract.1106 Therefore, it is submitted that how ubuntu 
informs the founding constitutional values in the common law of contract and how 
this interpretation could lead to a more prominent role for good faith in ensuring 
contractual fairness is relevant when interpreting the open norm of fairness 
created in section 48 of the CPA.  
 
How ubuntu informs these constitutional values and what this means for the role of 
good faith in the common law of contract is critically analysed in the next chapter.  
 
2 4 CONCLUSION 
It was shown throughout this chapter how the role of fairness in the South African 
law has developed over the years as informed by the political, economic and 
social climate prevalent at the time. Although the Roman-Dutch law of contract 
                                            
1104  Eiselen & Naudé “Introduction and overview of the Consumer Protection Act” in Naudé & 
Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (OS, 2014) para 4. See also 
Naudé 2009 SALJ 517-518 who argues that the court should consider the principle of good 
faith when assessing whether a term is unfair in terms of s 48 of the CPA (supported by Davis 
2011 Stell LR 861). 
1105  Cf the discussions of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) in the text at n 973 supra & 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) in the 
text at n 983 supra. 
1106  Cf the discussion of Combined Developers v Arun Holdings and others 2015 3 SA 215 (WCC) 
in the text at n 1009 supra. 
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that arrived in South Africa was flexible and fair, new political and economic ideas 
that arrived with the British resulted in various changes to the existing legal system 
at the Cape, including the arrival of the classical model of contract law. This model 
of contract law is based on freedom and sanctity of contract and has proved 
resistant to the idea of substantive fairness in contracts.  
 
During the apartheid era, the classical model of contract law was entrenched into 
the legal system as an absolute truth rather than the product of specific political 
and economic ideals. Although the movement towards the modern theory of 
contract and the introduction of the Constitution has brought with it changing 
political and economic ideals, the common law of contract has been particularly 
slow in embracing the new transformative constitutional approach. As was shown 
throughout this chapter, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s limitation of the role of 
good faith is an expression of the underlying values of the common law of contract 
rooted in the colonial tradition. As expounded upon by Barnard: 
 
The South African law of contract has been telling for centuries a grand 
story or narrative in which the central claim is that it is in the public 
interest (ie good) that individuals should be held to the contracts they 
have agreed to as competent legal subjects – even in circumstances 
when those contracts are deeply unfair and does not contribute to human 
well-being.1107 
 
As part of the new transformative constitutional approach, the Constitutional Court 
envisages that ubuntu could promote the development of good faith in the 
common law of contract to reflect the values enshrined in the Constitution rather 
than those rooted in the colonial legal tradition. The need for such change is 
pressing, but it was shown that there remains much uncertainty as to how the 
values of ubuntu should be translated into the common law of contract. A first 
tentative step was proposed in this chapter, namely that ubuntu as an underlying 
value of the Constitution should be used to critique and expand the current role of 
good faith as an expression of values rooted predominantly in the colonial 
common law tradition. The next chapter will investigate how ubuntu, as an 
                                            
1107  Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 6. 
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underlying constitutional value, can be used to critique and transform the current 
role of good faith in the South African common law of contract. 
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CHAPTER 3 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
FOUNDING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT  
 
Values … serve as reasons for rules; conversely, rules (if they are any 
good) serve to implement values…1108 
 
3 1 INTRODUCTION 
The founding constitutional values1109 should be viewed as principles underlying 
the Constitution.1110 In other words, they serve as the foundation of the 
constitutional provisions especially those found in the Bill of Rights. They do not 
have a stand-alone legal effect but are given expression to by the other provisions 
in the Bill of Rights. In Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime 
Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) the Constitutional Court 
stated as follows: 
 
The values enunciated in s 1 of the Constitution are of fundamental 
importance. They inform and give substance to all the provisions of the 
Constitution. They do not, however, give rise to discrete and enforceable 
rights in themselves. This is clear not only from the language of s 1 itself, 
but also from the way the Constitution is structured and in particular the 
provisions of ch 2 which contains the Bill of Rights.1111 
                                            
1108  Michelman “The rule of law, legality and the supremacy of the Constitution” in Woolman & 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 11.4(a). 
1109  In the context of this thesis the term “founding constitutional values” refer to the values of 
human dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of law as found in s 1 of the Constitution. This is 
in order to differentiate between these values and ubuntu which is referred to as an underlying 
constitutional value (cf the discussion in para  1 8 4 supra which deals with the development of 
ubuntu into an underlying value of the Constitution). 
1110  Fowkes “Founding provisions” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 13.3(b). 
1111  Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of 
Offenders (NICRO) and others 2005 3 SA 280 (CC) para 2. See also Albertyn “Values in the 
South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 324; 
Fowkes “Founding provisions” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) 
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Section 39(2) of the Constitution is the provision most commonly used to give 
expression to the founding constitutional values:1112 
 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law 
or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
 
This is also the case in the common law of contract. In Barkhuizen v Napier1113 the 
Constitutional Court stated as follows: 
 
[C]ourts have a constitutional obligation to develop common law, 
including the principles of the law of contract, so as to bring it in line with 
values that underlie our Constitution. When developing the common law 
of contract, courts are required to do so in a manner that “promotes the 
spirit, purport and objects of the bill of Rights”. Section 39(2) of the 
Constitution says so.1114   
 
As was shown in the previous chapter, the court further held that constitutional 
challenges to contractual terms must be determined by testing the contract terms 
against public policy which the court held “represents the legal convictions of the 
community” and “those values that are held most dear by the society”.1115 The 
court then stated that public policy must now be determined with reference to the 
Constitution and its founding values: 
 
                                                                                                                                    
para 13.3(b); Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 36.3(d). 
1112  Fowkes “Founding provisions” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 13.4(c)(i); Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) 
para 36.3(d). For a detailed discussion on the role of s 39(2) in developing the common law 
see para  1 8 3 2 supra.  
1113  The facts of the case, the judgment of court and the academic commentary on this decision is 
discussed in detail in para  2 3 2 3 supra.  
1114  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 35. 
1115  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 28. 
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Since the advent of our constitutional democracy, public policy is now 
deeply rooted in our Constitution and the values which underlie it. 
Indeed, the founding provisions of our Constitution make it plain: our 
constitutional democracy is founded on, among other values, the values 
of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law.1116 
 
The court then stated that a contract term that is contrary to such values is 
contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable: 
 
What public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to 
public policy must now be determined by reference to the values that 
underlie our constitutional democracy as given expression by the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that is inimical to 
the values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and 
is, therefore, unenforceable.1117 
 
Therefore, section 39(2) is the appropriate mechanism through which to give effect 
to the founding constitutional values in the common law of contract through the 
open norm1118 of public policy.1119 Along the same lines, section 39(2) also 
requires that any interpretation of the consumer’s right to fair, reasonable and just 
terms in section 481120 of the CPA should promote the founding constitutional 
values.1121  
 
                                            
1116  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 28. 
1117  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 29. 
1118  An open norm refers to a rule or standard that has no fixed or restricted meaning, can apply to 
various situations and enables value judgments (cf the discussions in paras  1 8 4 1 &  2 
1 supra). 
1119  This role of s 39(2) in the law of contract has been promoted by various academic scholars 
(see e.g. Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 140; Bhana & Pieterse 
2005 SALJ 870; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 402-403; Hawthorne 2003 THRHR 117).  
1120  S 48 of the CPA is discussed in detail in para  2 3 4 2 supra. 
1121  The constitutional interpretation of the provisions in the CPA is discussed in more detail in para 
 2 3 4 4 supra. 
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At first glance, this type of approach does not appear to be controversial. 
Nonetheless, the founding constitutional values are open-ended concepts 
themselves that are concretised by the specific political philosophy used to inform 
their content.1122 As was seen previously, with the introduction of the Constitution, 
the political and economic ideals that should inform the common law of contract 
have changed. Previously, the philosophical basis of the common law of contract 
was grounded firmly in individualism and economic liberalism.1123 Now the 
Constitution requires a normative approach based on human dignity and the 
promotion of substantive equality by addressing the social and economic injustices 
of the past.1124 Therefore, a move from a non-interventionist state to a social 
welfare state can be identified. In the common law of contract this translates into a 
paternalistic approach through state intervention in private contracts in order to 
correct injustices resulting from unequal bargaining relationships.1125 Furthermore, 
the Constitution promotes a plural legal culture that should take account of the 
legal convictions of the indigenous people in South Africa.1126 Finally, it was 
shown how ubuntu as an underlying value of the customary law has evolved into 
an underlying value of the Constitution that informs the founding constitutional 
values, especially that of human dignity.1127   
 
As was seen earlier, these constitutional aims have not been transposed into the 
common law of contract. The introduction and chronological development of the 
                                            
1122  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 323; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 876 referring to Woolman & Davis 
1996 SAJHR 361. See also Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420 where he states that the “fundamental 
rights set out in the Constitution are also formulated in general and indeterminate terms, it 
clearly being the intention to leave their detailed implications to be constructed and developed 
by courts”.  
1123  This was illustrated throughout the previous chapter (see generally para  2 2 supra).  
1124  See the discussion in para  1 8 2 3 supra. 
1125  See the discussion dealing with the modern law of contract in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
1126  See the discussion dealing with the unequal relationship between the common and customary 
law in para  1 8 3 3 supra. 
1127  For a detailed discussion on the development of ubuntu into an underlying constitutional value 
see paras  1 8 4 2(b) &  1 8 4 3(a) supra. 
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classical model of contract law in South African law was investigated in the 
previous chapter.1128 It was shown how this classical model was imported into the 
common law of contract under British rule,1129 retained during the union years1130 
and continued to play an important role during apartheid.1131 With the movement 
towards modern contract theory1132 and in the wake of the Constitution1133 there 
were promising indications that the courts would be willing to promote a greater 
emphasis on fairness in contracts. However, in Brisley v Drotsky1134 and Afrox 
Healthcare v Strydom,1135 the Supreme Court of Appeal halted developments in 
this direction by constitutionally endorsing the classical model of contract law.1136 
Despite later contrary indications by the Constitutional Court that fairness should 
play a substantive role in contracts,1137 the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
                                            
1128  See the discussions throughout the previous chapter starting at para  2 2 3 3 supra. 
1129  See the discussion of the introduction of the classical model of the law of contract during the 
nineteenth century in para  2 2 3 3 supra. 
1130  See the discussion in paras  2 2 3 5  (in the context of good faith) &  2 2 4 2 (in the context of 
public policy) supra dealing with the role of the classical model of contract law during the union 
years.  
1131  See the discussion in paras  2 2 3 6 (in the context of good faith) &  2 2 4 3  (in the context of 
public policy) supra dealing with the role of the classical model of contract law under apartheid. 
1132  See the discussion of judge of appeal Jansen’s minority judgment in Bank of Lisbon and South 
Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) in para  2 2 3 6 supra. See also the discussion of 
appeal judge Olivier’s minority judgment in Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v 
Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) as well as the discussions of Miller and another NNO v 
Dannecker 2001 1 SA 928 (C) & NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and others; 
Deeb and another v ABSA Bank Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 4 SA 928 
(SCA) in para  2 2 4 3 supra. The development and principles of the modern law of contract is 
also set out in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
1133  See the discussion in para  2 3 2 1 supra dealing with the court decisions in Janse van 
Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 2000 1 SA 315 (C) & Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 
464 (C) decided after the enactment of the Constitution.  
1134  2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
1135  2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). 
1136  Both these court decisions and the criticisms in response thereto are discussed in detail in 
para  2 3 2 2 supra. The classical model of contract law is discussed in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
1137  See the detailed discussions of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) in para  2 3 2 3 
supra; Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) in 
para  2 3 3 2 & Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) in para  2 3 2 5. 
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consistently limited the role of fairness in the common law of contract in line with 
the classical approach.1138 In fact, it was shown how the appeal court granted 
constitutional endorsement to the classical model of contract law and the classical 
conception of the rule of law by equating their values to those found in the 
Constitution. In other words, the appeal court has interpreted the founding 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of law with 
reference to political and economic philosophies grounded in individualism and 
economic liberalism.1139 It was also shown that there is concern that the court may 
follow a similarly conservative approach when interpreting and applying the 
consumer’s right to fair, reasonable and just terms in section 48 of the CPA.1140  
 
Although ubuntu, as an underlying constitutional value, has featured in a number 
of contract law judgments, it was shown how these references consist mainly of 
general remarks which merely indicate that ubuntu would require a more direct 
role for fairness in the common law of contract to prevent unfair contract terms and 
the unfair enforcement of contract terms. Where ubuntu was applied with the 
result that more emphasis was placed on fairness between contracting parties, 
this has also been done in vague and general terms, without a detailed 
explanation of how the values encompassed in ubuntu would result in the 
requirement for more contractual fairness. Consequently, these approaches to 
ubuntu were criticised.1141 Therefore, there is a need to investigate and explore 
what values are embraced by ubuntu, as an underlying constitutional value. This is 
the aim of this chapter and this investigation is undertaken in the following 
manner. The current expression of the founding constitutional values (human 
dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of law) in the common law of contract is 
                                            
1138  See the discussions of Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 
SA 468 (SCA), African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours CC and 
others 2011 3 SA 511 (SCA), Maphango and others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 
2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) & Potgieter and another v Potgieter NO and others 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) 
in para  2 3 2 4 supra. 
1139  This was illustrated in the previous chapter (see esp the discussions in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 
supra). 
1140  This concern was covered in more detail in para  2 3 4 2 supra. 
1141  These cases were critically discussed in para  2 3 3 supra. 
212 
 
discussed in a critical manner by comparing the expression of these values with 
those encapsulated by ubuntu. This includes the identification and discussion of 
the existing problems surrounding the current expression of these values in the 
common law of contract, especially the limited role of good faith, and how ubuntu, 
as an underlying constitutional value, should be used to develop the role of good 
faith in the common law of contract to promote greater contractual fairness. 
 
3 2 HUMAN DIGNITY 
3 2 1 Importance of human dignity 
As previously mentioned, human dignity is regarded as the core value of the 
Constitution and the most important human right from which all the other human 
rights derive.1142 Therefore, as pointed out by Barnard,1143 the content given to the 
constitutional value of human dignity in the common law of contract is of particular 
importance. Especially, as the content given to this value effects how the other 
founding constitutional values of equality, freedom and the rule of law are 
concretised.1144  
 
Although human dignity is also an enforceable right,1145 the focus in this thesis is 
on the role of human dignity as a foundational constitutional value. In the first 
place, the Constitutional Court held that this is the approach that must be followed 
when dealing with constitutional challenges to contractual terms,1146 and secondly, 
                                            
1142  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity as a constitutional value in para  1 8 2 1 supra.  
1143  Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 230. 
1144  Ackermann 2004 New Zealand Law Review 648. See also Barnard Critical legal argument for 
contractual justice (2005) 229 who argues that the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom should be investigated together in the law of contract when dealing with issues of 
fairness. See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 876ff for a detailed investigation on the 
interaction between the constitutional values of freedom, equality and human dignity in the 
South African law of contract. 
1145  S 10 of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have 
their dignity respected and protected”.  
1146  Cf the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) in the text at n 1114 supra. 
213 
 
human dignity is rarely invoked as a right itself.1147 However, as the Constitutional 
Court has provided content to the founding constitutional value of human dignity 
with reference to the wording in section 10, reference will be made to this 
provision where necessary to illuminate the court’s approach to the constitutional 
value of human dignity.1148  
 
3 2 2 Difficulty in defining human dignity 
The fact that human dignity is an open ended concept means that determining its 
meaning is not an easy matter.1149 As explained by Feldman, its meaning is 
dependent on the specific political and/or moral philosophy used to inform its 
content: 
 
[I]deas about descriptions of dignity are linked to beliefs about what is 
involved in living a good life, and to ideas of the Good more generally… 
[and] such ideas are culturally specific, and consensus in relation to them 
is difficult to maintain in a pluralist society.1150 
                                            
1147  De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 458-461; Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law (2014) para 36.3. 
1148  See the discussions dealing with the approach to human dignity in the Constitution (para  3 2 7 
1) and by the Constitutional Court (para  3 2 7 2) infra. 
1149  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and another 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 52; National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality and another v Minister of Justice and others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 28. See 
also De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South 
African constitutional law (2014) 418; Cameron “Dignity and disgrace: moral citizenship and 
constitutional protection” in McCrudden (ed) Understanding human dignity (2013) 480; 
Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 1; Brand 2009 SALJ 86; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421; 
Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 191. 
1150  Feldman 1999 Public Law 686. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in 
Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 323; Hawthorne 2011 SUBB 
Iurisprudentia para 4 1; Foster Human dignity in bioethics and law (2011) 44-45; Brownsword 
“Genetic engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger 
& Cottier (eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 292; Brownsword 
“Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) 
214 
 
 
Specifically, Feldman observes that the difficulty in defining human dignity is that it 
is generally viewed as either serving individual or collective interests: 
 
[W]e must not assume that the idea of dignity is inextricably linked to a 
liberal-individualist view of human beings as people whose life-choices 
deserve respect. If the state takes a particular view on what is required 
for people to live dignified lives, it may introduce regulations to restrict the 
freedom which people have to make choices which, in the state’s view, 
interfere with the dignity of the individual, a social group or the human 
race as a whole… The quest for human dignity may subvert rather than 
enhance choice, and in some circumstances may limit rather than extend 
the scope of traditional “first generation” human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Once it becomes a tool in the hands of lawmakers and judges, 
the concept of human dignity is a two-edged sword.1151 
 
As pointed out by a number of contract law scholars, the same problem is faced 
when attempting to define the constitutional value of human dignity in the common 
law of contract.1152 However, before investigating the meaning of human dignity in 
the South African common law of contract, it is necessary to discuss how the 
dualistic approach to human dignity is understood in the law of contract.1153 This is 
                                                                                                                                    
Human rights in private law (2001) 191. In the context of the law of contract, see Barnard 
Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 231 where he talks about the clash 
between freedom of contract (derived from the constitutional value of freedom) and good faith 
(which he argues is derived from the constitutional value of human dignity) and states that 
“people do not share the same ideas about the extent of freedom of contract and the extend of 
good faith, primarily because most of the time they do not share the same morality”. 
1151  Feldman 1999 Public law 685. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in 
Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 326; Brownsword “Human dignity 
from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge handbook of human dignity (2014) 1; 
Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 1; Foster Human dignity in bioethics and law 
(2011) 14; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann 
& Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 191. 
1152  Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 1; Brand 2009 SALJ 86; Bhana 2007 SALJ 274; 
Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 231-232; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420-
421; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880. 
1153  See the discussion in para  3 2 3 infra. 
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followed by a critical discussion of the philosophical origins of this approach.1154 
Thereafter, in view of these discussions, the approach to human dignity in the 
Constitution, by the Constitutional Court generally, and as applied in the South 
African common law of contract is analysed in a critical manner.1155 
 
3 2 3 Dualistic approach to human dignity in the law of contract 
3 2 3 1 Introduction 
It is not my intention nor is it possible to make an original contribution to the 
interpretation and understanding of human dignity. Thus, for the application of 
human dignity to the law of contract the seminal work of Brownsword including the 
work he produced in collaboration with Beyleveld will be relied upon.1156  
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword (relying on Feldman)1157 distinguish between two 
concepts of human dignity, namely human dignity as empowerment and human 
dignity as constraint.1158 Human dignity as empowerment refers to the case where 
human dignity promotes individual interests in the law of contract, while human 
dignity as constraint refers to instances where communitarian interests are 
                                            
1154  See the discussion in para  3 2 4 infra. 
1155  See the discussion in para  3 2 7 infra. 
1156  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 181-199. See also Brownsword “Genetic 
engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger & Cottier 
(eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008); Beyleveld & Brownsword 
Human dignity in bioethics (2004); Beyleveld & Brownsword 1998 Modern Law Review 661-
680. 
1157  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 26; Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 191. 
1158 Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 11. See also Brownsword “Genetic 
engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger & Cottier 
(eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 292;  Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 191. 
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promoted.1159 As the idea of human dignity as empowerment can be linked to the 
earlier classical law of contract it will be discussed first,1160 followed by the concept 
of human dignity as constraint which aligns more closely with the theories 
underpinning modern law of contract.1161 
 
3 2 3 2 Human dignity as empowerment 
These eminent authors explain that the idea of human dignity as empowerment is 
embedded in the development of the modern culture of human rights after the 
Second World War.1162 Referring to a number of post-Second World War 
international human rights instruments,1163 they explain that the role of human 
dignity in human rights is based on the following premises: 
 
[T]hat each and every human being has inherent dignity; that it is this 
inherent dignity that grounds (or accounts for) the possession of human 
rights (it is from such inherent dignity that such rights are derived); that 
these are inalienable rights, and that, because all humans have dignity, 
they hold these rights equally.1164 
 
Accordingly, they argue that human dignity acts as background justification for 
human rights and “the practical business of pressing one’s interest against others 
                                            
1159  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 191. See also Beyleveld & Brownsword Human 
dignity in bioethics (2004) 11. 
1160  Cf the discussion dealing the classical law of contract in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
1161  Cf the discussion dealing with the development of the modern law of contract in para  2 2 3 6 
supra. 
1162  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 11ff. See also Brownsword 
“Genetic engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger 
& Cottier (eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 293-294. 
1163  Specifically, they refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (GA Res 217A (III)), 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (GA Res 2200A 
(XXI)) & the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (GA res 2200A (XXI)). Cf 
the discussion dealing with the introduction of apartheid in South Africa in para  1 7 1 supra as 
contrasted with the international human rights movement.  
1164  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 13. See also Botha 2009 
Stell LR 174. 
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(particularly against powerful States) will be conducted in terms of claimed human 
rights”.1165  
 
The authors argue that if these are the accepted premises about the role of human 
dignity in the field of human rights, the question then arises why humans have 
inherent dignity? In other words, what distinctive characteristic of being human 
gives a person inherent dignity?1166 According to these authors, the predominant 
view states that humans have inherent dignity because they have the capacity to 
act autonomously (i.e. “the capacity to control one’s actions by reference to the 
choices one has made”).1167 The further rely on the following explanation by Raz: 
 
Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of 
planning and plotting their future. Thus, respecting people’s dignity 
includes respecting their autonomy, their right to control their future.1168 
 
Brownsword and Beyleveld thus argue that human dignity requires that people 
should be treated as autonomous beings who can make their own decisions and 
must never be treated as mere things or instruments.1169 Relying on Clapham,1170 
Brownsword argues that the protection of human dignity may comprise two 
aspects. First, it can involve respect for everyone’s human dignity which involves 
direct attacks like “killing, torture, slavery, trafficking in persons, coercion, verbal 
                                            
1165 The authors recognise that human dignity may also have a more prominent role where it is 
formulated as a specific human right. For example, section 10 of the Constitution which 
provides that “everyone has inherent dignity” (i.e. background role) and “the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected (i.e. foreground idea) (Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity 
in bioethics (2004) 13). 
1166  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 15. 
1167  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 15-16. See also Brownsword 
“Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge handbook of human 
dignity (2014) 3. 
1168  Raz Authority of law (1979) 221 as quoted by Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in 
bioethics (2004) 15-16. See also Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in 
Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge handbook of human dignity (2014) 3. 
1169  Beyleveld & Brownsword 1998 Modern Law Review 666. 
1170  Clapham Human rights in the private sphere (1993) 148-149. 
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abuse, discrimination, maltreatment” and so forth.1171  Secondly, it can also 
denote the creation of the necessary conditions for the realisation of human dignity 
which Brownsword describes as “the creation and protection of ‘the conditions for 
everyone’s self-fulfilment (or autonomy or self-realization)’”.1172 For Beyleveld and 
Brownsword the second aspect denotes a negative “right against unwilled 
interventions by others that are damaging to the circumstances or conditions that 
are essential if one is to flourish as a human” and a positive “right to support and 
assistance to secure circumstances or conditions that are essential if one is to 
flourish as a human”.1173 Accordingly, the second aspect of human dignity involves 
indirect attacks that deny the opportunity for self-fulfilment and includes the rights 
to associate, take part in social life, express intellectual, artistic or cultural ideas 
and enjoy a decent standard of living and health care.1174 In this respect, human 
dignity also grounds and promotes socio-economic rights.1175 An oft-quoted 
example1176 of this approach to human dignity is article 22 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 19481177 which provides as follows: 
 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is 
entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each 
State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality. 
                                            
1171  Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 4 referring to Clapham Human rights in the private sphere 
(1993) 149. 
1172  Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 4 referring to Clapham Human rights in the private sphere 
(1993) 148. 
1173  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 15. 
1174  Clapham Human rights in the private sphere (1993) 149 as referred to with approval by 
Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 4. 
1175  Botha 2009 Stell LR 174.  
1176  See e.g. Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 4; Botha 2009 Stell LR 174; Clapham Human rights in the 
private sphere (1993) 148. 
1177  GA Res 217A (III). 
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Therefore, they propose that the connection between human dignity and human 
rights can be summarised as follows:  
 
1.  The dignity of humans (the reason for their value or worth) resides in 
their capacity for autonomous action. 
2.  Humans express their value (dignity) when they act autonomously. 
3.  It follows that a setting in which humans are able to act autonomously 
is to be preferred to one in which they are not able to do so. 
4.  Thus, an autonomously-supporting regime of human rights not only 
signals respect for human dignity but assists in creating a context in 
which such dignity can be realized in practice.1178 
 
This is referred to as human dignity as empowerment, because according to this 
conceptualisation respect for human dignity entails the empowerment of a person 
to live an autonomous life by making her own decisions and taking responsibility 
for those decisions.1179 Consequently, Brownsword provides the following 
description of human dignity as empowerment: 
 
[I]t is because humans have a distinctive value (their intrinsic dignity) that 
they have rights qua humans. Commonly, it is the capacity for 
autonomous action that is equated with human dignity and this, in turn, 
generates a regime of human rights organised around the protection of 
individual autonomy. In this way, respect for human dignity empowers 
individuals by protecting their choices against the unwilled interferences 
of others.1180 
                                            
1178  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 23. 
1179  Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 2; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880-881; Lubbe 
2004 SALJ 421; Feldman 1999 Public Law 685.  
1180  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 183. See also the description by Feldman 1999 
Public Law 685: “[A] readiness to confront the realities of one’s circumstances, including 
talents and physical and mental limitations, and make the best of them without losing hope and 
a sense that one’s life is worthwhile, to live according to a set of normative standards, whether 
accepted from outside or imposed from within, accepting both burdens and benefits in full 
measure; and readiness to accept responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions and 
decisions”.  
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In other words, because a person has the capacity for autonomous action, and 
therefore human dignity, her choices must be respected by others. Therefore, both 
authors maintain that human dignity as empowerment is rights-driven because it 
grounds “a set of rights claims against others” and reinforces “claims to self-
determination” rather than providing justification for the limitation of free choice 
and “social or collective constraint”.1181 As pointed out by Brownsword, a rights-
driven approach to human dignity places great importance on individual autonomy 
in that “individual freedom is to be maximised and cut back only for the sake of 
other rights-holders (or for some less direct rights-related reason)”.1182 
Accordingly, the idea of human dignity as empowerment is based on the political 
philosophies of individualism and economic liberalism which limits state 
interference in private transactions.1183 
 
Applying the notion of human dignity as empowerment in a contract law setting, 
Brownsword explains that contracting parties are free to conclude contracts (as an 
expression of their autonomy) and that contracts freely entered into must be 
respected, failing which, there is an affront to the human dignity of the contracting 
parties.1184 Brownsword further elucidates as follows: 
 
[T]here is a relatively familiar and widely accepted chain of thinking, 
linking human dignity with a right to individual autonomy that, in turn, 
expresses itself through the exercise of contractual freedom. Indeed, we 
                                            
1181  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 27-28. 
1182  Brownsword “Genetic engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local 
ethics” in Wüger & Cottier (eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 297-
298. 
1183  Brownsword “Genetic engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local 
ethics” in Wüger & Cottier (eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 298; 
Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 189. 
1184  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 193-194. See also Hawthorne 2011 SUBB 
Iurisprudentia para 4 2; Bhana 2007 SALJ 274; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881; Barnard 
Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 231-232; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421. 
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can trace this idea in nineteenth-century America where the proponents 
of the “free labour” ideology in the northern states where fond of 
contrasting “the dignity and vitality of the free white workers” with “the 
labouring man’s poverty, degradation, and lack of opportunity for 
advancement in the South”. On this view, respect for human dignity and 
freedom of contract forms a virtuous circle: without at least the right to 
make our own contracts, we lack dignity (being reduced to a mere 
status); with such a right, we recover our human dignity.1185 
 
Hence this notion of human dignity finds expression in the classical law of contract 
which can also be linked to the political philosophies of individualism and 
economic liberalism.1186  
 
3 2 3 3 Human dignity as constraint 
While human dignity as empowerment enforces and promotes individual 
autonomy, human dignity as constraint refers to the limitation of individual 
autonomy where the protection and promotion of human dignity requires such 
limitation.1187 Beyleveld and Brownsword expound on this idea as follows: 
 
[I]f we think of respect for human dignity as one of the constitutive values 
of our society (whether as an element of the public interest, or of ordre 
public, or as one of the fundamental values of our community), then 
those individual preferences and choices that are out of line with respect 
for human dignity are simply off limits.1188 
 
                                            
1185  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 188-189. 
1186  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 184-185; Brownsword “Genetic engineering, free 
trade and human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger & Cottier (eds) Genetic 
engineering and the world trade system (2008) 298. See also Hawthorne 2011 SUBB 
Iurisprudentia para 4 2; Bhana 2007 SALJ 274; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881; Barnard 
Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 232; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421. Cf the 
discussion dealing with the classical law of contract in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
1187  Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 1. 
1188  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 29. 
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Beyleveld and Brownsword explain that while human dignity as empowerment 
aligns with a rights-driven theory of human rights, the idea of human dignity as 
constraint expresses a more duty-driven approach to human rights.1189 On a 
fundamental level, it refers to the correlating duty to respect the human dignity of 
others: 
 
[These] are the duties that we (including officials of the State) owe to 
others (and, correlatively, the human rights that others have against us 
and that we have against others). Such duties are designed to articulate 
respect for the dignity-related interests of others; and if a duty-driven 
theory of human rights stopped here, it would be very close to a rights-
driven theory.1190  
 
In other words, this approach to human dignity denotes the duty to respect 
another’s human dignity as given effect to by her specific human rights. As 
reflected in section 10 of the Constitution, this could include the explicit duty to 
respect another’s human dignity as a specified human right.  
 
In addition, the authors argue that human dignity as constraint may also recognise 
a further duty to one’s community which would entail not only a direct duty to 
respect the human dignity of others but also an indirect duty “to respect their vision 
of human dignity”.1191 They state that this duty may arise “where there is a 
background ethic of care and concern for others (and, concomitantly, a sense of 
solidarity with and responsibility for others)” which results in “a regime of values 
that reflects not only a degree of control over one’s own flourishing but also a 
measure of commitment to the flourishing of others”.1192 Accordingly, it could be 
argued that such a duty could denote an obligation on private individuals to assist 
in the creation of the necessary conditions for the realisation of others’ human 
                                            
1189  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 36. 
1190  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 37. See also Brownsword “Genetic 
engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger & Cottier 
(eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 295; Beyleveld & Brownsword 
1998 Modern Law Review 667-668 on the duty not to compromise the dignity of others. 
1191  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 37. 
1192  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 41-42. 
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dignity.1193 Consequently, in this way human dignity as constraint may be used to 
promote socio-economic rights and substantive equality in the private sphere.1194  
 
As was seen above,1195 human dignity as empowerment promotes a rights-driven 
approach to human rights which results in the maximisation of individual freedom 
and limits state intervention in the private sphere. In contrast, human dignity as 
constraint involves a more duty-driven approach to human rights which allows for 
a greater limitation of individual freedom: 
 
[T]here is no pressure to maximise individual freedom. The first priority is 
to ensure that duty is done; there is no sense of loss as freedom is 
reduced for the sake of dignitarian duty; in the latter, freedom is simply 
what is left over to the individual when his or her duties have been fully 
itemised.1196 
 
Consequently, human dignity as constraint envisages a paternalistic society1197 
where the exercise of individual autonomy may be tempered where such actions 
are incompatible with the human dignity of others or in order to create the 
necessary conditions for the realisation thereof. As a result, it can be argued that 
human dignity as constraint envisages a society where not only the State but also 
private individuals are obliged to promote the realisation of the human dignity of 
others. In other words, the individual’s autonomy may be limited where necessary 
to respect the human dignity of others and in order to promote the socio-economic 
rights and substantive equality of others which they need for the realisation of their 
human dignity. 
                                            
1193  Clapham Human rights in the private sphere (1993) 148. See also Brownsword “Human dignity 
from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge handbook of human dignity (2014) 4.  
1194  See also Botha 2009 Stell LR 174. 
1195  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1181 supra. 
1196  Brownsword “Genetic engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local 
ethics” in Wüger & Cottier (eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 297-
298. 
1197  See also Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 11 & 31 esp n 4. See 
also Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & 
Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 194-195; Feldman 1999 Public Law 700. 
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Finally, Brownsword draws the inevitable conclusion that in a contract law setting, 
this notion of human dignity requires that even freely concluded contracts must be 
tested for conformity to human dignity.1198 Thus, this conception of human dignity 
is in line with the socialist values expressed in modern law of contract which make 
place for state intervention in contracts.1199  
 
3 2 3 4 Tension resulting from the dualistic approach to human dignity 
Thus in the paradigm as postulated by Beyleveld and Brownsword, the two 
notions of human dignity are in tension with each other as they pull in opposite 
directions.1200 As was seen above, these authors argue that human dignity as 
empowerment supports contractual autonomy while human dignity as constraint 
results in the limitation of contractual autonomy.  
 
As a practical example of the tension between human dignity as empowerment 
and constraint, Beyleveld and Brownsword refer to the famous French dwarf-
throwing case.1201 This case concerned the banning of a dwarf-throwing attraction 
                                            
1198  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 194. See also Hawthorne 2011 SUBB 
Iurisprudentia para 4 2; Bhana 2007 SALJ 274; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881; Barnard 
Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 231-232; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421.  
1199  See Feldman 1999 Public Law 699 who maintains that this conception of human dignity has 
been used to promote social justice & Brownsword “Genetic engineering, free trade and 
human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger & Cottier (eds) Genetic engineering 
and the world trade system (2008) 298 who states that this conception of human dignity can be 
used to limit free trade. See also Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 2; Bhana & 
Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 422. See the discussion on the modern law of 
contract in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
1200  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 194. See also Brownsword “Genetic 
engineering, free trade and human rights: global standards and local ethics” in Wüger & Cottier 
(eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system (2008) 296. 
1201  Conseil d’Etat (27 Oct 1995) req nos 136-727 (Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge) and 143-578 
(Ville d’Ais-ex-Provence). See the references to this case in Beyleveld & Brownsword Human 
dignity in bioethics (2004) 25-27; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human 
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in local clubs and the power of the local police to prevent activities that would 
contravene the ban. It was held that such action was lawful in order to secure the 
respect for human dignity and ordre public. However, one of the dwarfs 
(Wackenheim) challenged the legality of the bans and argued that he willingly and 
freely took part in these activities, that it provided him with an income and that if 
dwarf-throwing was banned he would be without employment. The council 
responded that in allowing himself to be used as a projectile (a mere thing), 
Wackenheim was compromising his own human dignity which could not be 
allowed. Hence, the ban was legal and the exercise of the power to prevent such 
activities lawful.1202  
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword maintain that Wackenheim’s arguments were based 
on the concept of human dignity as empowerment. For Wackenheim, the ban 
infringed upon his human dignity because the ban prevented him from making the 
free choice to take part in the activities. In other words, the ban limited his 
autonomy. He further argued that he was not treated as a mere thing because 
others were not disregarding his ability to control the situation. Also, by banning 
the activities he was deprived of employment which was a condition for him to 
experience a sense of dignity.1203 They further state that the council found support 
for their position in the concept of human dignity as constraint as expressed in the 
duty not to compromise one’s own dignity and/or the dignity of others as fellow 
human beings in the community. Therefore, even though the dwarfs freely took 
                                                                                                                                    
dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 192-193; 
Beyleveld & Brownsword 1998 Modern Law Review 662. Mr Wackenheim unsuccessfully 
brought his case before the UN Human Rights Committee in 2002 on the basis of the right to 
non-discrimination in art 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (GA 
res 2200A (XXI)) (Manuel Wackenheim v France, Communication No 854/1999, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002)).  
1202  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 26-27; Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 192-193. 
1203  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 26; Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 192-193. 
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part in the activities, their actions were not allowed because it would run counter to 
their own and others’ human dignity.1204 Addressing how the counsel’s reasoning 
can be reconciled with Wackenheim’s argument that taking part in dwarf throwing 
activities provided him with a sense of dignity, Beyleveld and Brownsword propose 
that “presumably the Conseil judged that this must be a case of false 
consciousness; for surely, no genuine sense of self-esteem could be derived from 
participation in dwarf-throwing when … such an undignified activity could not stand 
alongside respect for human dignity”.1205 
 
A better illustration for the purposes of the research topic1206 is the Supreme Court 
of Israel decision in Jerusalem Community Burial Society v Kestenbaum1207 as 
analysed by Brownsword in his work dealing with the dualistic approach to human 
dignity in the law of contract.1208 In this case, the respondent (Mr Kestenbaum) 
entered into a contract with the appellant (the burial society) for his wife’s funeral 
arrangements. One of the terms in the standard form of contract signed by Mr 
Kestenbaum’s brother (on his behalf) provided that the burial society would only 
engrave their tombstones in characters from the Hebrew alphabet. The 
respondent, in accordance with his wife’s wishes, requested the appellant to 
engrave the tombstone with his wife’s name and Gregorian dates of birth and 
death in Latin characters, which the burial society refused by relying on the above 
                                            
1204  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 27; Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 193. 
1205  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 27; Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 193. 
1206  Brownsword’s approach to the case is critically investigated in the text at n 1242 infra.  
1207  Jerusalem Community Burial Society v Kestenbaum CA 294/91, [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 464 
(Hebrew). I rely on a translation of this case by Yuval Abrams as available at 
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/israeli/case.php?id=1391 (Date of 
use: 8 April 2017). 
1208  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 182, 194-195. See also his discussion of this 
case in Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 11. 
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contract term.1209 The majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal annulled the 
contract term because it held that the term, among other things, infringed upon the 
respondent’s freedom of expression, conscience and his human dignity.1210 In the 
dissenting judgment, it was held that respect for the free will of the parties to a 
contract is an essential principle of public policy and should not be departed from 
except in rare and exceptional cases. As the burial society’s decision to engrave 
all its tombstones with Hebrew characters promoted the dignity of the cemetery 
and took account of the feelings of the community members that used it, the 
dissenting court argued that the term did not negate public policy.1211 Therefore, 
human dignity was used to argue both for the enforcement and annulment of the 
contract term. In view of the above example, Brownsword concludes that there is a 
clear tension between the two concepts of human dignity.1212   
 
3 2 4 Philosophical origins of the dualistic approach to human dignity in 
the law of contract 
Beyleveld and Brownsword accept that both notions of human dignity can be 
derived from the work of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant.1213 The citation 
                                            
1209  See the summary of the facts of the case in the translation & Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 182. 
1210  Per Shamgar P (opinion of the court) as found in the translation of the case & Brownsword 
“Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) 
Human rights in private law (2001) 182. In his concurring judgment, Justice Barak held that the 
contract term violated both the human dignity of the deceased and that of her family if neither 
the deceased (during her lifetime) nor her family is allowed to determine the inscription on the 
tombstone (Barak J (concurring judgment) para 28 as found in the translation of the case). 
1211  Per Elon DP (in dissent) as found in the translation of the case. See also Brownsword 
“Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) 
Human rights in private law (2001) 182. 
1212  Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 11; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and 
human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 194. 
1213  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 52-53; Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 191. See also Bhana Constitutionalising contract law (2013) 112; Hawthorne 
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of Kant’s work is not surprising as his work on the inherent dignity of human 
beings is regarded as the most substantial analysis of human dignity in Western 
philosophy, especially when dealing with human rights.1214  
 
As Foster verbalises, Kant’s work is opaque and subject to different 
interpretations: 
 
Many discussions of Kant’s view of dignity proceed on the basis of a 
pastiche of his views. His writing is so difficult, at least to me, that it is 
unsurprising that most of us use executive summaries prepared by 
others.1215 
 
When dealing with the Kantian origins of the concept of human dignity in the law of 
contract, most South African legal scholars cite the work of Brownsword, and in 
some instances, also the work he produced in collaboration with Beyleveld.1216 In 
                                                                                                                                    
2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 2; Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice 
(2005) 233; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421; Feldman 1999 Public Law 685. 
1214  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 51-52. See also Cornell 2010 
SAPL 384; Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 48. 
1215  Foster Human dignity in bioethics and law (2011) 34. I am not a Kantian scholar, and therefore, 
I make no claims as to the best interpretation of Kant’s work. Rather, my aim is to compare 
different interpretations of Kant in a way that illuminates how ubuntu can be used to harmonise 
good faith and ubuntu in the South African common law of contract. The South African 
common law of contract is influenced by the Anglo-analytical interpretation of Kant, in 
consequence this is my premise. Furthermore, because South African common law of 
contract’s starting point is the Anglo-analytical interpretation it is not apposite to deal with 
Kant’s role as the father of German idealism. As pointed out by Cornell and Fuller, “a Kantian 
informed understanding of freedom may help us think through the role of dignity in the 
competing rights situation that inevitable arises” (Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al 
(eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013) 16-17). For my purposes I rely on 
the work of Cornell and Wood as discussed in para  3 2 4 2 infra. For a proposed idealist 
reading of Kant resisting the dualistic readings of the classical law of contract, see Barnard-
Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 155-208 & Barnard Critical legal argument for 
contractual justice (2005). 
1216  For examples see Bhana Constitutionalising contract law (2013) 112; Hawthorne 2011 SUBB 
Iurisprudentia para 4 2; Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 233; 
Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881. 
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their writings, these authors show how Kantian dignity can be used to support both 
conceptions of human dignity.1217 Thus, this specific section does not constitute a 
critical discussion of Kant’s work itself, but rather sets out how Brownsword and 
Beyleveld have linked Kant’s work to both conceptions of human dignity and how 
this results in a tension between human dignity as empowerment and human 
dignity as constraint. As will become clear, this tension results from an 
individualistic interpretation of Kantian dignity. This section is then followed by a 
critical discussion of Brownsword and Beyleveld’s approach by drawing on the 
work of Cornell, and to some extent also that of Wood, as they both promote a 
more communitarian understanding of Kantian dignity.  
 
3 2 4 1 Brownsword and Beyleveld: individualistic interpretation of Kantian dignity 
As mentioned earlier, Beyleveld and Brownswords’ conception of human dignity 
as empowerment is based on the premise that it is the inherent dignity of human 
beings that grounds human rights.1218 Brownsword points out that the idea that 
human beings have intrinsic value (dignity) finds support in Kantian thinking.1219 In 
Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals, Kant argues that everything either has a 
price or a dignity.1220 If something has a price then that means “something else 
can be put in its place as an equivalent” which means it has a relative value.1221 In 
contrast, if it has a dignity, Kant maintains that “it is exalted above all price and so 
admits of no equivalent”.1222 In other words, if something is beyond price it has an 
                                            
1217  In particular the following three sources: Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics 
(2004); Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & 
Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 181-199 & Beyleveld & Brownsword 1998 
Modern Law Review 661-680.  
1218  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1164 supra. 
1219  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 191. 
1220  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 96. Throughout this thesis, I use and refer to 
this translation of Kant’s Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals. 
1221  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 96. 
1222  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 96. 
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intrinsic value.1223 Therefore, something has dignity because it has intrinsic value 
and is of inestimable worth.1224  
 
So what gives humans intrinsic value and therefore dignity? Kant states as 
follows: 
 
Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an 
end in himself; for only through this is it possible to be a law-making 
member in a kingdom of ends. Therefore morality, and humanity so far 
as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity.1225 
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword interpret this to mean that it is the capacity of rational 
beings to make moral laws and then abide by those laws that gives them 
dignity.1226 As pointed out by Beyleveld and Brownsword (and quoting Kant), “the 
dignity of man consists precisely in his capacity to make universal law, although 
only on condition of being himself also subject to the law he makes”.1227 Relying 
on this passage, they state that Kantian dignity can be used to explain why human 
beings have dignity (intrinsic worth).1228 In this way, Kantian dignity is used in 
support of the premise that it is the inherent dignity of human beings that grounds 
human rights. Accordingly, as Kantian dignity is used to promote this premise, it 
                                            
1223  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 96. 
1224  See the references to this passage in Kant’s work in Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity 
in bioethics (2004) 52; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in 
Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 191; Beyleveld & 
Brownsword 1998 Modern Law Review 666.  
1225  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 96-97. 
1226  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 53. See also Beyleveld & 
Brownsword 1998 Modern Law Review 666. 
1227  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 52 & Beyleveld & Brownsword 
1998 Modern Law Review 666 (both referring to Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork 
(1978) 101).  
1228  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 53-54. 
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ultimately supports the concept of human dignity as empowerment which is based 
on this premise.1229  
 
Furthermore, as was seen above, human dignity as empowerment requires that 
human beings should be treated as autonomous beings who can make their own 
decisions and should never be treated as mere things or instruments.1230 
According to the authors, this view is reflected in Kant’s second formulation of the 
categorical imperative1231 (also referred to as the “Formula of the End in Itself”): 
 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end.1232 
 
They state that this passage can be used to argue “that it is wrong to treat persons 
as mere things rather than as autonomous ends”.1233 In this way, Kantian thinking 
can be used to support the idea that “human dignity empowers individuals by 
protecting their choices against the unwilled interferences of others”.1234  
 
                                            
1229  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 53 & Beyleveld & Brownsword 
1998 Modern Law Review 666. See also Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice 
(2005) 233.  
1230  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1169 supra. 
1231  The term “categorical imperative” refers to the moral law. For Kant, an imperative is a 
command that tells us what we must do (i.e. it is expressed by an “ought to”). A categorical 
imperative is a command that applies unconditionally or by virtue of our rationality without 
reference to our own specific goals and desires. In other words, the moral law tells us what to 
do irrespective of our goals and desires (see Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 
76-80). See further Johnson, Robert & Creton, Adam “Kant’s moral philosophy” in Zalta (ed) 
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (2017) para 4. 
1232  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 91 as quoted by Beyleveld & Brownsword 
1998 Modern Law Review 666. 
1233  Beyleveld & Brownsword 1998 Modern Law Review 666. See also Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421. 
1234  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 183. 
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Discussing how Kantian dignity is reflected in the idea of human dignity as 
constraint, Beyleveld and Brownsword1235 refer to the following passage from 
Kant’s The metaphysics of morals1236 which was published more than a decade 
after the Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals: 
 
Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow 
human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself 
is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any 
human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be 
used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity 
(personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings 
in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over 
all things. But just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this 
would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary 
to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, 
he is under obligation to acknowledge in a practical way, the dignity of 
humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on him a duty 
regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human 
being.1237 
 
The authors find support in this passage for the notion of human dignity as 
constraint, specifically the duty to respect one’s own dignity as reflected in Kant’s 
statement that “he cannot give himself away for any price” because “this would 
conflict with his duty of self-esteem”.1238 This passage has also been used to 
support human dignity as constraint expressed in the duty to respect the human 
dignity of others.1239 This is because Kant speaks of the duty not to “act contrary 
                                            
1235  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 52-53. See also Brownsword 
“Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) 
Human rights in private law (2001) 191-192. 
1236  Throughout this thesis, I use and refer to Gregor’s translation of this work (Gregor (ed) Kant’s 
metaphysics of morals (1996)). 
1237  Gregor (ed) Kant’s metaphysics of morals (1996) 209. 
1238  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 55; Brownsword “Freedom of 
contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in 
private law (2001) 191-192. See also Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421 n 190. 
1239  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421-422. See also Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 206. 
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to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as human beings” and the 
“obligation to acknowledge in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every 
other human being”.  
 
In view of the above discussion it is argued that the interpretation of Kantian 
dignity to support the empowerment based conception of human dignity is based 
on the rationalism resulting from the Enlightenment. The latter gave birth to 
individualism and liberalism which accentuate autonomy. In basic terms, human 
dignity is defined with reference to autonomy, which in turn, denotes the freedom 
to make your own decisions without interference from others.1240 As was seen 
above, human dignity as empowerment is based on the idea that human beings 
express their dignity when they act autonomously and make their own 
decisions.1241  
 
The concept of human dignity as empowerment seems to be an elegant solution in 
protecting the free choices of persons against the unwilled interferences by others. 
However, the problem with such an interpretation of human dignity can be 
illustrated where the concept of human dignity as constraint comes into play. This 
was illustrated by the discussion of the Supreme Court of Israel decision in 
Jerusalem Community Burial Society v Kestenbaum above.1242 On an 
understanding of human dignity that denotes the freedom to make your own 
decisions without the interference of others, this means that your freedom 
(i.e. your dignity) is constrained to protect the dignity (i.e. freedom) of another. But 
surely, it doesn’t make sense to constrain your own freedom (i.e. your own dignity) 
to protect the dignity (i.e. freedom) of another?1243 Brownsword articulates this 
problem as follows: 
                                            
1240  See also Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court (2013) 8. 
1241  See the discussion in the text at n 1178 supra. 
1242  Cf the discussion on the tension between human dignity as empowerment and constraint in 
para  3 2 3 4 supra. 
1243  Using the dwarf-throwing case as illustration (also discussed in para  3 2 3 4 supra), the 
question can be framed as follows: How can your own freedom (i.e. dignity) be constrained to 
protect your own dignity (i.e. freedom)?   
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[T]he majority clearly relies on human dignity to prioritise freedom of 
choice over the cultural context (or, possibly, to redefine that context so 
as to privilege individual choice on this matter). Thus, had the contractors 
agreed that the tombstone should be engraved in accordance with the 
wishes of the deceased, it seems clear that the majority would have 
supported that agreement, the dignity of the cemetery notwithstanding. In 
the absence of such agreement, however, what remains to be explained 
is why, in the name of human dignity, the respondent should be 
empowered at the expense of the appellant.1244 
 
It is submitted that the problem of explaining why the respondent should be 
empowered at the expense of the appellant results from how human dignity (in 
particular its empowerment conception) is defined to denote unconstrained 
freedom. On the one hand, there is the dignity of the respondent, as relied upon 
by the majority, and which includes his freedom to determine how the gravestone 
of his wife should be engraved without interference from others. As stated by the 
majority, “every person has the right to properly respect his deceased loved ones 
… in accordance with his lifestyle and tradition”.1245 On the other hand, as relied 
upon by the minority, there is the dignity of the cemetery, which could be seen as 
the dignity of the community as represented by the appellant and denotes the 
community’s freedom to prescribe how the tombstones in the cemetery should be 
engraved without interference from others. As stated in the concurring judgment: 
 
The exclusive use of the Hebrew language promotes the dignity of those 
who see that language as an expression of their personality.1246 
 
According to the conception of human dignity as empowerment, both parties’ 
dignity is defined as unconstrained freedom. Defining human dignity in this way 
results in the following difficulty: Why should the freedom (i.e. dignity) of the 
appellant be constrained to protect the dignity (i.e. freedom) of the respondent? In 
                                            
1244  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 194-195. 
1245  Per Shamgar P (opinion of the court) as found in the translation of the case. 
1246  Per Barak J (concurring judgment) para 12 as found in the translation of the case. 
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other words, why should the dignity (read unconstrained freedom) of the 
respondent be protected rather than that of the appellant? Or as articulated by 
Brownsword: “Why, in the name of dignity, [should] the respondent … be 
empowered at the expense of the appellant[?]”1247 In other words, defining human 
dignity in this way always results in one of the parties’ dignity being protected 
while the dignity of the other party is compromised.  
 
Therefore, due to the individualist meaning ascribed to human dignity as 
empowerment, there will always be a tension between human dignity as 
empowerment and human dignity as constraint. By giving a strong individualist 
interpretation to Kant, there is nowhere else to arrive at but the middle of a tightly 
pulled rope where human dignity pulls in opposite directions, either respecting and 
promoting freedom or limiting it. The question which arises now is whether there is 
another way to see freedom and/or human dignity that could possibly reconcile 
this tension between human dignity as empowerment and human dignity as 
constraint? 
 
3 2 4 2 Cornell and Wood: communitarian interpretation of Kantian dignity 
In order to address the problem identified with a strong individualistic reading of 
Kant, I will consider an alternative interpretation of Kant that provides a more 
communitarian understanding of human dignity. This is found in the work of 
Cornell which includes writings she produced with Fuller and Van Marle1248 and 
also the writings of Wood.1249 The above authors have interpreted Kantian dignity 
in such a manner that a comparison with ubuntu comes to the fore.1250  
 
                                            
1247  Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-
Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 195. 
1248  This section specifically draws from the following sources: Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in 
Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013) 3-20; Cornell 2010 
SAPL 382-399; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 18-46; Cornell & Van Marle 2005 AHRLJ 195-220; 
Cornell 2004 SAPL 666-675. 
1249  This section specifically draws from the following source: Wood A “Human dignity, right and the 
realm of ends” 2008 Acta Juridica 47-65. 
1250  The relationship between Kantian dignity and ubuntu is explored in para  3 2 6 infra. 
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The first point to be highlighted is that Kant was not an individualist. As explained 
by Wood: 
 
For various reasons, Kantian ethics is often characterised as 
“individualistic”. Among the valid reasons for this thought is Kant’s 
emphasis on individual rights, dignity and responsibility. At the same 
time, I think the use of this term also reflects an all too common tendency 
to read Kant through the lens of certain ideas about Western morality and 
a moralistic attitude toward the world, of which Kant is assumed to be the 
paradigm representative. On many subjects, this leads people to ignore 
important themes in Kantian ethics, and to misread others.1251 
 
In consequence, the interpretation of Kantian dignity as set out by Beyleveld and 
Brownsword above is critically analysed on the basis of a more communitarian 
understanding of Kant as proposed by Cornell and Wood.  
 
First, it has been shown that Kant distinguished between something that has a 
price (i.e. a relative value, and therefore, is replaceable) and something that has 
dignity (i.e. an inherent value, and as such, is irreplaceable). Kant argued that 
human beings have inherent worth, and therefore, dignity.1252 Both Cornell1253 and 
Wood1254 follow this interpretation of Kant and the idea that human dignity denotes 
the inherent worth of all persons is reflected in the Constitution and has been 
incorporated into South African constitutional jurisprudence.1255  
 
Beyleveld and Brownsword then stated that the following passage from Kant is 
used in support of the idea of human dignity as empowerment as it explains why 
human beings have inherent dignity, and therefore, are bearers of human rights: 
                                            
1251  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 60. See also Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 30 where she argues that 
“Kant is often mischaracterised as an individualist”. 
1252  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1220 supra. 
1253  Cornell 2004 SAPL 667; Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013) 12. 
1254 Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 49. 
1255  The approach to the constitutional value of human dignity in the Constitution and by the 
Constitutional Court is discussed in paras  3 2 7 1 &   3 2 7 2 infra. 
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Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an 
end in himself; for only through this is it possible to be a law-making 
member in a kingdom of ends. Therefore morality, and humanity so far 
as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity.1256 
 
It is here that divergent interpretations arise since, as will be illustrated by drawing 
on the work of Cornell and Wood, this passage has to be interpreted within the 
greater matrix of Kant’s philosophy. At the source of the argument is the 
contention by both Cornell and Wood that Kant was not an individualist. Cornell 
points out that in order to understand Kantian dignity, it is necessary to understand 
Kant’s conceptualisation of freedom and autonomy.1257 According to Kant, 
freedom is a special type of causality that is a characteristic of human beings to 
the extent that they are rational.1258 Kant then distinguishes between “negative” 
and “positive” freedom.1259 In the Groundwork for the metaphysic of morals, Kant 
first explains his concept of negative freedom: 
 
Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to 
work independently of determination by alien causes; just as natural 
necessity is a property characterising the causality of all non-rational 
beings – the property of being determined to activity by the influence of 
alien causes.1260 
 
Cornell explains that, for Kant, human beings (like animals) live their lives 
according to their needs and desires, but human beings (unlike animals) have the 
possible capacity to resist those needs and desires because they are capable of 
                                            
1256  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 96-97 as quoted in the text at n 1225 supra.  
1257  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 24-26. 
1258  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107 where Kant states that “[w]ill is a kind of 
causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational”. See also Johnson, Robert & 
Creton, Adam “Kant’s moral philosophy” in Zalta (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 
(2017) para 10; Wood Kant’s ethical thought (1999) 172. 
1259  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107. See also Johnson, Robert & Creton, 
Adam “Kant’s moral philosophy” in Zalta (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 
(2017) para 10. 
1260  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107. 
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rationality.1261 She notes that in conceptualising freedom in this way, Kant is not 
saying that human beings actually resist external influences or their own primal 
needs and desires.1262 Kant is also not arguing that human beings exercise their 
own freedom on a daily basis because it is impossible to determine whether or not 
this is actually the case.1263 For Kant, it is the possibility of this capacity that forms 
the basis of our freedom.1264 Therefore, negative freedom is the ability to resist 
outside influences and our own immediate natural impulses and desires (i.e. 
natural laws) that are in conflict with our own ends.1265 Cornell provides the 
following explanation: 
 
[Kant] is suggesting that human life is purposive and that when we take 
our humanity seriously as a being who can set ends for itself and can 
coordinate those ends as a direction for a life, then we are able to 
exercise a kind of freedom precisely in coordination with those ends so 
that we rationally guide who we seek to become.1266 
 
As a practical illustration, Cornell and Fuller use the example of a law student who 
has to study for his law examinations but also wants to go surfing. The student has 
to weigh up his short term desire to go surfing with his long term goal of becoming 
a lawyer (which could also include surfing) and must then decide which of the two 
is in the interests of his well-being at that moment. When he decides to study that 
morning rather than go surfing, he is exercising his negative freedom to achieve 
his long term goal of becoming a lawyer.1267 Therefore, Kant is not proposing that 
freedom is equated merely to doing what you want and protecting your choices 
                                            
1261  Cornell 2010 SAPL 384. See also Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53. 
1262  Cornell 2010 SAPL 384. 
1263  Cornell 2010 SAPL 384. See also Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013) 8. 
1264  Cornell 2010 SAPL 384. 
1265  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 24. See also Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) 
Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013) 8. 
1266  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 24-25. 
1267  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 8. 
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against unwilled interferences.1268 Rather, freedom (in the negative sense) means 
resisting outside influences and your own immediate natural impulses and desires 
in order to act towards your own ends for your own long term well-being through 
practical reason.1269  
  
The other dimension of freedom is “positive freedom”.1270 Positive freedom flows 
from the idea of negative freedom. If negative freedom refers to the idea of being 
able to make rational decisions by resisting outside influences and our own 
immediate natural impulses and desires (i.e. natural laws), then freedom in the 
positive sense can only refer to the idea that a free will is the ability to act in 
accordance with its own laws. This must be the case if freedom is seen as a type 
of causality that operates according to a law (i.e. it cannot be lawless).1271 
Accordingly, freedom in the positive sense refers to the ability to make decisions in 
accordance with self-imposed laws. As explained by Kant: 
 
Hence freedom of will, although it is not the property of conforming to 
laws of nature, is not for this reason lawless: it must rather be a causality 
conforming to immutable laws, though of a special kind; for otherwise a 
free will would be self-contradictory.1272 
 
                                            
1268  Cornell 2010 SAPL 385; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 25. Contra the conception of autonomy 
from an individualistic perspective as discussed in para  3 2 4 1 supra). 
1269  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 25.  
1270  In Kant’s words: “The above definition of freedom is negative and consequently unfruitful as a 
way of grasping its essence; but there springs from it a positive concept, which, as positive, is 
richer and more fruitful” (Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107). See also 
Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 25.  
1271  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 9 where they state that Kantian freedom “must be law like”. See also Kant (Paton 
(ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107): “The concept of causality carries with it that of 
laws (Gesetze) in accordance with which, because of something we call cause, something else 
– namely, its effect – must be posited (gesetzt)”. 
1272  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107. 
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Therefore, for Kant, freedom is autonomy which he defines as “the property which 
will has of being a law to itself”.1273   
 
This leads Kant back to one of his earlier formulations of the categorical 
imperative, the Formula of Autonomy, which refers to “the Idea of the will of every 
rational being as a will which makes universal law” and can be described as an 
imperative in the following terms: 
 
Act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal 
laws.1274 
 
For Kant, autonomy does not refer to the idea that human beings can do what they 
want without interference from others, but rather, that they are bound only to those 
laws that they, as rational beings, could lay down unto themselves, provided such 
laws meet the standard of a universal law. For Kant, a universal law refers to “an 
objective principle valid for every rational being; and it is a principle on which he 
ought to act – that is, an imperative”.1275 In other words, it must qualify as a moral 
law. 
 
This formulation of the categorical imperative is for Kant the supreme principle of 
morality: 
 
We need not now wonder, when we look back upon all the previous 
efforts that have been made to discover the principle of morality, why 
they have one and all been bound to fail. Their authors saw man as tied 
to laws by his duty, but it never occurred to them that he is subject only to 
laws which are made by himself and yet are universal, and that he is 
                                            
1273  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107. See also Johnson, Robert & Creton, 
Adam “Kant’s moral philosophy” in Zalta (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 
(2017) para 10; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 25; Wood Kant’s ethical thought (1999) 172. 
1274  Johnson, Robert & Creton, Adam “Kant’s moral philosophy” in Zalta (ed) Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy (2017) para 7. Paton’s version reads as follows: “[A]ct that your will 
can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim” (Paton (ed) 
Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 33).  
1275  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 84. 
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bound only to act in conformity with a will which is his own but has as 
nature’s purpose for it the function of making universal law.1276  
 
As freedom is equated to autonomy and autonomy is the principle of morality, 
Kant argues that a free will is a will under moral law: 
 
The proposition “Will is in all its actions a law to itself” expresses, 
however, only the principle of acting on no maxim other than the one 
which can have for its object itself as at the same time a universal law. 
This is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and the 
principle of morality. Thus a free will and a will under moral laws are one 
and the same. 1277 
 
Thus, Cornell’s interpretation of Kant is that freedom can be found only in the 
realm of morality which means there is no tension between a person’s freedom 
and subjecting herself to the moral law.1278 This is because a human being, as a 
rational being, has the capacity to be a legislator of the moral law.1279 Accordingly, 
she contends that positive freedom can be seen as “causality through norms”: 
 
For Kant, when we act as moral agents we lay down a law for ourselves: 
a law that allows us to act at least as if we were free from the constraints 
of the real world around us and had the power to determine ourselves in 
accordance with what “ought to be” and what we “ought to do” in such a 
world. It is a normative law, not a natural law. By acting under the law of 
the categorical imperative … we can represent ourselves as acting as if 
we were able to actualise the power to determine ourselves in 
accordance with a law that we lay down to ourselves…1280 
                                            
1276  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 94. 
1277  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 107-108. 
1278  Cornell 2004 SAPL 666 (referred to with approval by Barnard Critical legal argument for 
contractual justice (2005) 235-236 & Barnard 2005 SAJHR 288-289). 
1279  As Kant explains: “The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that it 
must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all 
subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author” (Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s 
Groundwork (1978) 93). 
1280  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 25. See also Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) 
Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013) 9. 
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Therefore, Kantian freedom cannot be equated to doing what you want without 
interference from others. Rather, Kantian freedom is the capacity to lay down 
moral laws for yourself and being bound by those laws. Furthermore, it is precisely 
this possibility of positive freedom (i.e. the capacity to make moral law as a 
rational being and being subject to such laws) that gives human beings their 
infinite worth, in other words their dignity, and which results in the idea that they 
must be regarded as ends in themselves.1281 In other words, human dignity is 
grounded on this capacity of all human beings and does not depend on whether or 
not they actually exercise this capacity.1282  
 
Returning to Beyleveld and Brownsword’s interpretation of Kant, it can be argued 
that Kantian dignity does not support the conception of human dignity as 
empowerment which denotes unconstrained freedom. Kantian dignity can explain 
why human beings have inherent worth, and therefore, dignity, but it does not 
equate this dignity to unconstrained freedom.1283 In accordance with Cornell’s 
interpretation, freedom in Kant denotes moral freedom. Therefore, Kantian dignity 
does not deny that human beings are autonomous beings who plot their own 
futures and make their own decisions. However, the freedom to set one’s own 
ends is a moral freedom. Furthermore, although it would seem that Beyleveld and 
Brownsword’s conception of human dignity as constraint is based on Kantian 
dignity it does not reflect that the constraint is self-imposed. The authors see such 
constraint as external and in tension with the freedom of the person being 
constrained: 
 
In this version of what we have called ‘human dignity as constraint’, and 
in line with the Kantian scheme, we find ‘free’ action (as it would be 
characterized under human dignity as empowerment) distinctively 
limited.1284  
                                            
1281  Cornell 2010 SAPL 384; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 25; Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 54. 
1282 Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 8; Cornell 2010 SAPL 385-386. 
1283  Cf the discussion of Kantian dignity by Beyleveld and Brownsword in the text at n 1228 supra. 
1284  Beyleveld & Brownsword Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 65. 
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As explained by Cornell, Kantian dignity is based on constraint, but this constraint 
is internal because it is self-imposed.  
 
It was then shown that Beyleveld and Brownsword find support for the idea of 
human dignity as empowerment in Kant’s second formulation of the categorical 
imperative (the Formula of the End in Itself): 
 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end.1285 
 
According to their interpretation, this imperative requires that human beings should 
be treated as autonomous beings in that their choices should be protected against 
the unwilled interferences of others.1286 First, the concept of “an end in itself” must 
be dealt with. As treating someone as an end in itself can be interpreted in 
different ways,1287 it should be questioned what Kant means when he talks of “an 
end in itself”. Wood explains that “an end” is “anything we act for the sake of”.1288 
Kant distinguishes between “ends in themselves” and “ends to be produced”.1289 
Wood explains that “ends to be produced” are “objects, results or states of affairs 
we pursue in our actions”, and therefore, they are ends because “we act for the 
sake of bringing them about”.1290 This is in contrast to an “end in itself” where we 
act for its own sake. Consequently, human beings are ends in themselves 
“because we act for their sake”.1291 As explained by Wood: 
 
                                            
1285  As quoted in the text at n 1232 supra. 
1286  Cf Beyleveld and Brownsword’s interpretation of this formulation of the categorical imperative 
discussed in the text at n 1233 supra. 
1287  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53. 
1288  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53. 
1289  Kant (Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 99. 
1290  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53. 
1291  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53. 
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A person, or humanity in a person, when regarded as an end in itself, is 
not a result to be produced but something already existing, for whose 
sake we value any result to be produced.1292 
 
Thus Wood interprets “as an end” as being related to humanity. Moving on to the 
term “humanity”, Wood points out that, for Kant, it has a technical meaning:  
 
[It] refers to our rational nature, and specifically to the capacity to set 
ends for oneself, devise means to them, combine them into more 
comprehensive ends, setting priorities among them. Humanity for Kant 
develops in the social condition, and with it comes the freedom to set 
ends.1293 
 
Thus, respect for a person’s humanity as an end in itself would denote respect for 
a person’s capacity to set ends for herself and choose ways to achieve them in 
order to lead a purposive life through her practical reason.1294 In other words, 
human dignity requires respect for the unique set of ends that an individual 
pursues. Accordingly, Wood arrives at the following understanding of what it 
entails to treat humanity in a person as an end in itself: 
 
I think a more immediate conclusion from the fact that humanity is an end 
in itself is that human beings should never be treated in a manner that 
degrades or humiliates them, should not be treated as inferior in status to 
others, or made subject to the arbitrary will of others, or be deprived of 
control over their own lives, or excluded from participation in the 
collective life of the human society to which they belong.1295  
 
At first glance, Wood’s interpretation of Kant’s second categorical imperative 
seems to accord with that of Beyleveld and Brownsword because respect for a 
                                            
1292  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53. 
1293  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53.  
1294  As explained by Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 53: “It is humanity – our capacity to set ends, 
choose means to them and combine them into an idea of happiness – that is an end in itself 
and that the Formula of Humanity [the Formula of the End in Itself] declares that we must 
always treat as an end, never merely as a means.” 
1295  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 52.  
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person’s unique set of ends entails respect for a person’s freedom to make 
choices without the interference of others.1296 Therefore, the question arises how 
this interpretation ties in with the idea of Kant’s moral freedom as espoused by 
Cornell?1297 Woolman provides the following explanation: 
 
While Kant certainly contends that the defining feature of humanity is our 
capacity to overcome our instincts and that we are only truly free when 
we are moral, he maintains that we define ourselves – and our humanity 
– through the rational choice of all our ends and not just those that are 
explicitly moral. … An individual’s capacity to create meaning generates 
an entitlement to respect for the unique set of ends that the individual 
pursues.1298  
 
From Woolman’s explanation it can be deduced that an individual’s choices should 
be respected and not be interfered with provided such choices are not immoral. In 
other words, the freedom to set and pursue ends is still a moral freedom that 
should not violate the human dignity of others. This means that in pursuit of her 
own ends, an individual may not treat other human beings as merely a means to 
her own ends but must always also treat them as ends in themselves. Thus, 
Kant’s second categorical imperative does not support the idea of unconstrained 
freedom as reflected in Beyleveld and Brownsword’s idea of human dignity as 
empowerment. It is a moral freedom subject to the self-imposed constraint not to 
violate the human dignity of others in setting and pursuing one’s own set of ends.  
 
This leads the discussion to another formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, 
namely the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends. Cornell and Wood continue to 
integrate Kant’s “kingdom of ends” in their interpretation of human dignity, 
introducing the social ideals of Kantian ethics.1299 Kant’s hypothetical “kingdom of 
ends” also referred to as the “realm of ends” is a formulation of the categorical 
                                            
1296  Cf the discussion dealing with Beyleveld & Brownsword’s interpretation of Kant’s second 
categorical imperative in the text at n 1231 supra. 
1297  Cf the discussion on Cornell’s interpretation of Kantian dignity and freedom in the text at 
n 1257 supra. 
1298  Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 36.2(c). 
1299  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 60; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 30. 
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imperative which flows directly from the Formula of Autonomy1300 and provides as 
follows: 
 
Act on the maxims of a member who makes universal laws for a merely 
possible kingdom of ends.1301 
 
What is this hypothetical “kingdom of ends”? Kant states that it refers to “a 
systematic union of different rational beings under common laws”.1302 Wood 
provides the following description based on his interpretation of the relevant 
passage1303 in Kant’s Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals: 
 
The term “realm of ends” refers to an ideal community with all rational 
beings as its members, one involving a systematic harmony among the 
ends of all members of the community. The terms Kant uses most often 
to express the relationship between the rational beings that are members 
of a realm of ends are “system” (System) and “combination” 
(Verbindung). A collection of ends constitutes a “realm” if these ends are 
not in conflict or competition with one another, but are combined into a 
mutually supporting system. The laws of a realm of ends are those 
which, if followed, would combine all the rational beings, as ends in 
                                            
1300  Kant (Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 95) states as follows:  
The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as making 
universal law by all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and his 
actions from this point of view, leads to a closely connected an very fruitful concept – 
namely, that of a kingdom of ends. 
 The Formula of the Autonomy is discussed in the text at n 1274 supra. 
1301  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 100. 
1302  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 95. 
1303  Kant (Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 95):  
I understand by a “kingdom” a systematic union of different rational beings under 
common laws. Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we 
shall be able – if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, 
and also from all the content of their private ends – to conceive a whole of all ends in 
systematic conjunction (a whole of both rational beings as ends in themselves and 
also of the personal ends which each may set before himself); that is, we shall be able 
to conceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above 
principles. 
247 
 
themselves, and all the ends they set, into a mutually supporting system 
of shared collective ends. Kant’s Formula of the Realm of Ends 
commands us to follow maxims involving ends that belong to this system, 
and it forbids us to adopt ends that would stand in the way of rational 
beings sharing a system of ends. Ends that are neither required for nor 
incompatible with the system are permissible.1304 
 
Cornell reasons that Kant’s hypothetical kingdom of ends is based on the idea 
that, as rational beings, we not only have the possibility of aligning our own actions 
with our own ends, but also with the ends of other rational beings.1305 She argues 
that when we harmonise our own ends with the ends of others, we are aspiring to 
the Kantian ideal of a kingdom of ends.1306 According to Kant, the Formula of the 
Kingdom of Ends is also derived from the Formula of the End in Itself:1307 
 
For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat 
himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end in himself. But by so doing there arises a systematic 
union of rational beings under common objective laws – that is, a 
kingdom. Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such 
beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a 
kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only an Ideal).1308 
 
Kant then states that as members of the kingdom of ends, we are at the same 
time legislators and subjects of the moral law: 
 
A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, 
although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these 
laws.1309 
 
                                            
1304  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 58. 
1305  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 384. 
1306  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 384. 
1307  The Formula of the End in Itself is discussed in the text at n 1232 supra. 
1308  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 95.  
1309  Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 95. 
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According to Cornell and Fuller, being a member of the kingdom of ends is directly 
derived from the possibility of our positive freedom i.e. our capacity to lay down 
self-imposed moral laws and being bound by such laws.1310 As pointed out by 
Cornell, this capacity for self-legislation also has a social dimension because we 
should attempt to harmonise our own ends with the ends of others: 
 
In the kingdom of ends, we not only legislate for ourselves what is the 
right thing to do by rationally reflecting on the demands of the categorical 
imperative, but also, as members and as legislators in the kingdom of 
ends, we seek to harmonise our ends with one another so that we can 
aspire to live up to the ideal of justice, even if as an ideal it always 
remains beyond any actual existing legal system. Indeed, it is through the 
appeal to the kingdom of ends and from the imagined ideal standpoint of 
that kingdom that human beings have infinite worth precisely because 
they are each viewed as a persona; being such a persona allows them to 
subject themselves to moral, practical reason and aspire to a world of 
justice which demands nothing less than that each one of us tries to live 
up to the harmonisation of our ends with one another.1311  
 
In the above context, the passage1312 interpreted by Beyleveld and Brownsword in 
support of the conception of human dignity as empowerment, becomes apt to a 
new meaning. The idea of human dignity as empowerment which denotes 
unconstrained freedom does not find support in Kantian ethics. In Kantian ethics, 
freedom always denotes moral freedom and the categorical imperative requires 
human beings to harmonise their ends with the ends of others in a rational and 
moral manner. 
 
                                            
1310  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 9. 
1311  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 30. 
1312 Paton (ed) Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork (1978) 96-97 (as also quoted in the text at n 1225 
supra). 
 Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in himself; 
for only through this is it possible to be a law-making member in a kingdom of ends. 
Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which 
has dignity.  
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The internal realm of freedom within Kantian ethics is to be distinguished from the 
realm of external (legal) freedom which forms part of what Kant refers to as right 
(Recht).1313 In The Metaphysics of morals, Kant provides the following universal 
principle of right: 
 
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance 
with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can 
coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.1314 
 
Kant then proceeds to explain how duties of rights and ethics differ from each 
other: 
It ... cannot be required that this principle of all maxims be itself in turn 
my maxim, that is, it cannot be required that I make it the maxim of my 
action; for anyone can be free so long as I do not impair his freedom by 
my external action, even though I am quite indifferent to his freedom or 
would like in my heart to infringe upon it. That I make it my maxim to act 
rightly is a demand that ethics makes on me.1315 
 
As emphasised by Wood, duties of right are normally enforced through the laws of 
the State, and hence, they are usually enforceable by coercion.1316 This is in 
contrast with ethical duties that are an expression of the individual’s capacity to lay 
down self-imposed moral laws.1317 Therefore, the exact relationship between the 
internal (moral) and external (legal) realm of freedom is uncertain and the subject 
of much scholarly debate.1318 An argument in favour of the idea that both are 
based on a unified principle is that Kant grounds the right to freedom on the 
                                            
1313 Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 54-55 explains that right (Recht) refers to “an entire system of 
legislation, and also to the natural or rational basis of any such system” and, that for Kant, it 
denotes “that part of moral legislation that protects the external freedom of rational beings”. 
See also Cornell 2010 SAPL 387; Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (2013) 15.  
1314  Gregor (ed) Kant’s metaphysics of morals (1996) 24. See also Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 55. 
1315  Gregor (ed) Kant’s metaphysics of morals (1996) 24. 
1316  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 55. 
1317  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 55.  
1318  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 56; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 21. For a more detailed discussion on 
the distinction between Kantian ethics and rights see Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 54-58. 
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humanity of human beings, and therefore, on the Formula of the End in Itself (the 
second formulation of the categorical imperative): 
 
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), 
insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance 
with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by 
virtue of his humanity.1319 
 
If it is accepted that the two realms are connected, how then is the internal (moral) 
realm of freedom represented in the external (legal) realm of freedom? Cornell 
answers this question as follows: 
 
Kant’s hypothetical experiment in the imagination, in which we configure 
the conditions in which human beings could aspire to the great ideal of 
the Kingdom of Ends, turns on the possibility that as creatures of 
practical reason we can harmonise our interests. For Kant, we represent 
the realm of external freedom through a hypothetical experiment of the 
imagination in which we configure the conditions of a social contract 
rooted in the respect for all other human beings. Under this experiment in 
the imagination, we imagine the conditions in which individuals are given 
the greatest possible space for freedom, as long as it can be harmonised 
with the freedom of all others. The social contract imagines us as moral 
beings that can exercise their practical reason and potentially guide their 
actions in accordance with its mandates.1320 
 
In this interpretation, the ideal of the kingdom of ends is utilised as a regulative 
ideal based on a moral social contract.1321 She states that when we harmonise our 
own ends with the ends of others as law-making members in the hypothetical 
kingdom of ends, we are in fact, reconciling our own freedom with the freedom of 
                                            
1319  Gregor (ed) Kant’s metaphysics of morals (1996) 30. 
1320  Cornell 2010 SAPL 387. 
1321  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 15. Although Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 57 argues that the Kantian realms of right 
and ethics are distinct systems with their own rational basis, he later argues that right can be 
used to further and promote the moral ideal of the kingdom of ends (at 61).  
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others.1322 This is because, as known, Kantian freedom is internally self-limiting 
because freedom is equated to autonomy which involves laying down self-
imposed moral laws.1323 Therefore, when freedom is viewed in this way, it results 
in the resolution of the tension between human dignity as empowerment and 
human dignity as constraint because respecting the dignity of others is 
represented as a moral law we have imposed on ourselves as law-making 
members in the imagined kingdom of ends.1324 Consequently, when we disrespect 
the dignity of others i.e. their inherent worth as reflected in the fact that they are 
ends in themselves, we are actually failing to respect our own dignity as law-
making members in the hypothetical kingdom of ends.1325 This is because we are 
not legislating together in a community that aspires to the kingdom of ends, in 
other words a community where our ends are harmonised with the ends of others, 
and consequently, we are not free in the individual or collective sense.1326 As 
previously argued, the duty to respect the dignity of others should not be seen as 
an external constraint on our freedom as proposed by Beyleveld and 
Brownsword’s conception of human dignity as constraint. It should rather be 
represented as a self-imposed constraint which we are able to exercise as part of 
our positive freedom i.e. our capacity to make moral laws as a rational being, and 
ultimately, it is this capacity for positive freedom that gives us our dignity and our 
inherent worth.1327 Thus, when we disrespect the dignity of another, we are, in 
fact, disrespecting our own dignity.1328  
                                            
1322  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 15; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 26. 
1323 Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 14-15.  
1324  As succinctly explained by Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 28: “Understanding freedom as integrally 
limited by the conditions of its exercise, the seeming paradox of unlimited freedom can be 
resolved internally”. See also Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 235. 
1325  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 15; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 26. 
1326  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 15. 
1327  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1284 supra. 
1328  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 26.  
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Therefore, Cornell and Wood’s interpretations of Kant’s work results in a Kantian 
dignity which takes account of Kant’s specific conception of freedom, humanity 
and the ideal of the kingdom of ends. This interpretation leads to a more 
communitarian concept of human dignity which results in an understanding of 
human dignity which is not based on unconstrained freedom but rather a moral 
freedom where an individual exercises her freedom to further her own ends in a 
manner that harmonises with the ends of others.1329  
 
3 2 4 3 Is the communitarian interpretation of Kantian dignity enough? 
Although Cornell and Wood’s more communitarian interpretation of Kantian dignity 
provides a way to resolve the tension created by Beyleveld and Brownsword’s 
conceptions of human dignity as empowerment and constraint, there are still a 
number of problems with Kantian dignity that must be addressed.1330 Cornell 
mentions four points of criticism against Kantian dignity in order to compare 
Kantian dignity with ubuntu.1331  
 
First, the author argues that Kantian dignity is a Western conception of dignity and 
does not take into account how indigenous communities view human dignity. In 
other words, basing the constitutional value of human dignity on purely Western 
philosophy undermines proper legal pluralism as envisioned by the 
Constitution.1332  
 
Secondly, she states that Kantian dignity does not take account of human beings 
who do not have the ability to act rationally – whether they were never born with 
the ability due to a birth defect or lost it later on in life due to old age or illness for 
                                            
1329  See also Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 236. 
1330  Cornell 2010 SAPL 388. 
1331  Cornell 2010 SAPL 388. 
1332  Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 19. See also Mokgoro & Woolman 2010 SAPL 402; Wood 2008 
Acta Juridica 60-61. Cf the discussion on the unequal relationship between the common and 
customary law in para  1 8 3 3 supra. 
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instance. Hence, Kantian dignity does not affirm the human dignity of all human 
beings.1333  
 
Thirdly, she points out that Kantian dignity is generally criticised because it is 
based on human beings’ capacity for rationality and following their practical 
reason, while in reality human beings do not always use this potential. Thus she 
argues that Kantian dignity does not really appreciate or take account of the 
realities of human nature.1334  
 
Fourthly, Kantian dignity is generally criticised as being too individualistic. As was 
shown above, such criticisms may ignore or misunderstand the more social or 
communitarian ideas in Kantian ethics. However, as acknowledged by Cornell, 
Kantian dignity is based on the individual’s capacity for reason. Therefore, Kant’s 
hypothetical moral social contract envisaged through the ideal of the kingdom of 
ends begins with imagined, already individuated, individuals who, as free persons, 
contract with each other for their own constraint in order to respect each other’s 
dignity.1335 As was seen above, this moral social contract ultimately results in the 
maximisation of everyone’s unconstrained freedom in the external realm of 
right.1336 Consequently, as pointed out by Cornell and Van Marle, this results in 
individual correlating rights and duties: 
 
My rights are also my duties to you, but my duties to you, since they are 
limited by the very rights they entail, will never go beyond this one-to-one 
correspondence between rights and duties.1337 
 
On account of the above criticisms, Cornell and Van Marle contend that it is 
difficult to use the Kantian imagined social contract to justify socio-economic rights 
                                            
1333  Cornell 2010 SAPL 388. See also Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 54; Beyleveld & Brownsword 
Human dignity in bioethics (2004) 54. 
1334  Cornell 2010 SAPL 388. 
1335  Cornell 2010 SAPL 388-389; Cornell & Van Marle 2005 AHRLJ 211; Cornell 2004 SAPL 668. 
1336  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1319 supra. See also Cornell 2010 SAPL 388-389; Cornell & 
Van Marle 2005 AHRLJ 211; Cornell 2004 SAPL 668.  
1337  Cornell & Van Marle 2005 AHRLJ 211. 
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and the idea of substantive equality.1338 The reason being that substantive 
equality involves a greater constraint on the freedom of certain members of the 
community in order to ensure and promote social and economic equality for all 
members of the community, especially those in social and economic 
disadvantaged positions.1339 Hence, substantive equality goes further than mere 
individual correlation of rights and duties and is incompatible with the maximisation 
of unconstrained freedom of everyone. In addition, substantive equality requires 
an understanding of the existing social and economic differences within a society 
which involves taking account of the actual lived social and economic conditions of 
the community members.1340 This is different from Kantian dignity which is based 
on human beings’ capacity for practical reason whether they actually use this 
capacity or not. Accordingly, Kantian dignity is based on an ideal and does not 
take account of the actual lived circumstances of human beings.1341  
 
Although Wood concedes that Kantian dignity does not automatically implicate 
measures to address social inequality, he argues that it may have a role to play in 
addressing existing institutionally accepted inequalities: 
 
An egalitarianism of the equal worth of persons does not, however, 
immediately entail any egalitarian rules of right for the distribution of any 
of the many things human beings want, such as welfare or happiness, or 
any of the things for which they compete – such [sic] wealth, income 
power, honour or even social opportunities or capabilities. …  
 
Nevertheless, I do think that social, political or legal conceptions based 
on the idea of human dignity do inevitably take on egalitarian implications 
in regard to the distribution of goods. This happens mainly on account of 
the ways in which inequalities, especially large and systematic ones, that 
are known to all and have come to be institutionally accepted, can 
                                            
1338 Cornell & Van Marle 2005 AHRLJ 211; Cornell 2004 SAPL 667-668. See also Kamchedzera & 
Banda 2009 SAJHR 78 citing this criticism against Kantian dignity in the Malawian context. 
1339  Cf the discussion dealing with substantive equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra. 
1340  Cf the discussion dealing with substantive equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra. 
1341  Cornell 2004 SAPL 667.  
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contradict, belie or undermine the value of equal human worth, and 
hence of human dignity.1342 
 
Consequently, Wood argues that the Kantian ideal of the kingdom of ends can be 
used as a critique against the ideologies underlying the free market economy.1343 
This is because the free market economy portrays human dignity as 
unconstrained freedom while in reality the weaker contracting party in an unequal 
bargaining relationship cannot be regarded as free or equal: 
 
In the real world, markets are above all a way for agents to make 
unrestrained use of all sorts of bargaining advantages they may have 
over others. In this way, the workings of the market are systematically 
destructive of the human dignity of many human beings, because market 
agents are never free or equal when there are great inequalities between 
them in information, wealth or other resources.1344 
 
Finally, it is important to note that, in contrast to Cornell and Van Marle’s view, 
Beyleveld and Brownsword’s conception of human dignity as empowerment and 
constraint takes account of socio-economic rights.1345  
 
3 2 5 Human dignity through ubuntu  
It is not my intention nor is it possible to make an original contribution to the 
interpretation and understanding of ubuntu in African philosophy. In this section, 
the focus remains on the judicial descriptions of ubuntu as found in South African 
law.1346 In this respect, I predominantly draw on the important work of Cornell 
including writings she produced in collaboration with Muvangua.1347 In these 
works, the authors rely on prominent scholars in African philosophy and African 
                                            
1342  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 61. 
1343  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 62-64. 
1344  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 63. 
1345  Cf the discussion on human dignity as constraint in para  3 2 3 3 supra. 
1346  The reasons for this approach was explained in para  1 8 4 1 supra. 
1347  Specifically, the following two sources: Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & 
Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) & Cornell 2010 SAPL 382-399. 
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jurisprudence to elucidate the role and meaning of ubuntu in the law and bring a 
comparison between Kantian dignity and ubuntu to the fore. 
 
In chapter one, it was shown how ubuntu has been linked to the moral theory of 
humanism and the political and economic theory of socialism.1348 These 
connections are also noticeable in judicial descriptions of ubuntu. From its 
inception as a legal concept, the Constitutional Court has associated ubuntu with 
human dignity. As was seen previously, in S v Makwanyane, it was held that 
ubuntu’s “spirit emphasises respect for human dignity”,1349 and that “[r]espect for 
the dignity of every person” is an integral aspect thereof.1350 Since then, the 
Constitutional Court has reiterated this link between ubuntu and human dignity on 
a number of occasions1351 and in Hoffmann v South African Airways the 
Constitutional Court stated that “[u]buntu is the recognition of human worth and 
respect for the dignity of every person”.1352 In S v Makwanyane, ubuntu was also 
linked to the ideal of social justice1353 and in a number of cases thereafter it was 
used to promote the realisation of socio-economic rights.1354 
 
While it can be deduced that ubuntu emphasises respect for human dignity and 
the promotion of social justice, it is necessary to establish how these ideas are 
                                            
1348  Cf the discussion dealing with the underlying values of the customary law in para  1 3 2 2 
supra. 
1349  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308 (Justice Mokgoro). See the 
detailed discussion of this case in para  1 8 4 2(b) supra. 
1350  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225 (Justice Langa). 
1351 For example, MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC); City 
of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W); Dikoko v Mokhatla 
2006 6 SA 235 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) as 
discussed in para  1 8 4 3 supra. 
1352  Hoffmann v South African Airways 2011 1 SA 1 (CC) para 38 n 31. See also Ackermann 
Human dignity (2013) 113. 
1353  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 237 (Justice Madala). 
1354  For example, Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) & City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) discussed in para  1 8 
4 3(a) supra.  
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understood in African thinking. Justice Mokgoro’s definition of ubuntu in S v 
Makwanyane provides a good basis for such a discussion: 
 
Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental 
sense, it translates as personhood and morality. Metaphorically, it 
expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the 
significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the 
survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of group 
solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms 
and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and 
morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift 
from confrontation to conciliation.1355 
 
In the first place, Justice Mokgoro defines ubuntu as humaneness which she 
translates as “personhood” and “morality”. To understand what she means with 
the terms “personhood” and “morality”, Cornell argues that it is necessary to 
understand how ubuntu denotes the moral development of the individual and the 
African social bond.1356 In this respect, she relies1357 on the following explanation 
by Menkiti: 
 
In the stated journey of the individual toward personhood, let it therefore 
be noted that the community plays a vital role both as catalyst and as 
prescriber of norms. The idea is that in order to transform what was 
initially biologically given into full personhood, the community, of 
necessity, has to step in, since the individual, himself or herself, cannot 
carry through the transformation unassisted. But then what are the 
implications of this idea of a biologically given organism having first to go 
through a process of social and ritual transformation, so as to attain the 
full complement of excellences seen as definitive of the person? 
 
One conclusion appears inevitable, and it is to the effect that personhood 
is the sort of thing which has to be achieved, the sort of thing at which 
                                            
1355  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
1356  Cornell 2010 SAPL 392. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 3. 
1357  Cornell 2010 SAPL 392. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 3-4. 
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individuals could fail. I suppose that another way of putting the matter is 
to say that the approach to persons in traditional thought is generally 
speaking a maximal, or more exacting, approach, insofar as it reaches 
for something beyond such minimalist requirements as the presence of 
consciousness, memory, will, soul, rationality, or mental function. The 
project of being or becoming persons, it is believed, is a truly serious 
project that stretches beyond the raw capacities of the isolated individual, 
and it is a project which is laden with the possibility of triumph, but also of 
failure.1358 
 
Relying on Menkiti’s remarks, the author draws the conclusion that a human being 
is intertwined in ethical relations with other community members and that her 
humaneness is embedded in the community from birth.1359 She emphasises that 
this social bond is a social fact and not an imagined social contract as found in 
Kantian dignity.1360 She further cautions that this social bond should not be seen 
as simple communitarianism which denies individual interests.1361 As further 
explained by Murungi: 
 
African jurisprudence takes human beings in their social setting. Contrary 
to the claims of Western modernity, such a setting is not a social 
construction. Human beings are not social beings because they socialize 
with one another. They socialize with one another because they are 
social beings. The claim that human beings are social beings is not to be 
taken as denying individuality. That is, it is not to be taken as denying 
individual rights or individual autonomy. Individual rights or individual 
autonomy in a social vacuum are theoretical constructions that are 
                                            
1358  Menkiti “On the normative conception of a person” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to African 
philosophy (2004) 326.  
1359  Cornell 2010 SAPL 392. See also Cornell & Van Marle 2015 Verbum et Ecclesia 2; Cornell & 
Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 3; Murungi 
“The question of an African jurisprudence: some hermeneutic reflections” in Wiredu (ed) 
Companion to African philosophy (2004) 522. 
1360 Cornell 2010 SAPL 392. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 3. Cf the discussion on the social contract as imagined by 
Kant through the ideal of the kingdom of ends in para  3 2 4 2 supra. 
1361  Cornell 2010 SAPL 392. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 3; Bohler-Muller 2007 Obiter 592-593. 
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removed from human reality. In Africa, legality is not a social 
construction. It is a natural social setting in which the African has her or 
his being.1362 
 
Therefore, it is only through actual ethical relations and engagement with 
community members and with their support that a person can and must develop 
towards becoming an individuated moral being.1363 Accordingly, Cornell and 
Muvangua state that the reason why Justice Mokgoro links the term 
“humaneness” to personhood and morality is to denote how a person’s 
development into a unique being (his personhood) is inseparable from her moral 
development.1364 Ultimately, this leads Cornell to argue that a person’s dignity is 
rooted in her personhood (uniqueness) and her embeddedness in the community 
which is in contrast to Kantian dignity which is based on the capacity for 
rationality.1365 As the community must respect and support the moral development 
of the individual into a unique being, the community has a duty to respect the 
human dignity of the individual. In the same way, the individual has a duty to 
respect the human dignity of the other community members. As reflected in the 
remarks of Justice Langa in S v Makwanyane: 
 
It is a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community. It recognises a 
person’s status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community such 
person happens to be part of. It also entails the converse however. The 
                                            
1362  Murungi “The question of an African jurisprudence: some hermeneutic reflections” in Wiredu 
(ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 523. See also  Masolo “Western and African 
communitarianism: a comparison” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 493. 
1363  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 3; 
Cornell 2010 SAPL 392; Masolo “Western and African communitarianism: a comparison” in 
Wiredu (ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 493. 
1364  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 8. 
Cf the definition of ubuntu by Justice Mokgoro in S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 
(CC) para 308 (quoted in n 1355 supra).  
1365  Cornell 2010 SAPL 298. See also the remark by Justice Mokgoro in S v Makwanyane and 
another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 309 where she links the inherent dignity of every person to 
ubuntu (cf the discussion in the text at n 511 supra). 
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person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value 
and acceptance to each member of that community.1366 
 
Therefore, like Kantian dignity, ubuntu emphasises the link between morality and 
freedom as the development of a person’s personhood and her unique destiny is 
inseparable from her moral development.1367 Also, ubuntu accords with the idea of 
human dignity as constraint as reflected in the correlating duty to respect the 
human dignity of others.1368 
 
Cornell further asserts that when the community supports the individuation and 
unique destiny of each community member, then each community member is in 
turn obligated to support and promote the community that supports her.1369 
Masolo calls this the ethics of participatory difference that acknowledges that each 
person is different but places a demand on each person to make a difference and 
share in the responsibility of bringing about an ethical, and therefore, humane 
world.1370 According to Masolo (relying on Wiredu) the ethics of participatory 
difference results in “a thick system of rights and obligations”.1371 Accordingly, 
Cornell maintains that the ethical ideal of participatory difference entails more than 
an individual duty that correlates with a specific individual right.1372 In other words, 
it goes further than the harmonisation of individual freedoms to maximise the 
unconstrained freedom of everyone as reflected in the Kantian right to 
                                            
1366  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224 as also quoted in the text at 
n 502 supra.  
1367  Cornell 2010 SAPL 397. 
1368  Cf the discussion on human dignity as constraint in the text at n 1190 supra. 
1369  Cornell 2010 SAPL 393. See also Cornell & Van Marle 2015 Verbum et Ecclesia 2; Cornell & 
Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 4. 
1370  Masolo “Western and African communitarianism: a comparison” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to 
African philosophy (2004) 495. 
1371  Masolo “Western and African communitarianism: a comparison” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to 
African philosophy (2004) 495 relying on Wiredu Cultural universals and particulars (1996) 159 
where Wiredu speaks of “a wider set of rights and obligations”.  
1372  Cornell 2010 SAPL 393. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 3. 
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freedom.1373 As further elucidated by the Constitutional Court in Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha: 
 
A sense of community prevailed from which developed an elaborate 
system of reciprocal duties and obligations among the family members.  
This is manifest in the concept of ubuntu — umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu 
– a dominant value in African traditional culture.  This concept 
encapsulates communality and the inter-dependence of the members of 
a community.  As Langa DCJ put it, it is a culture which “regulates the 
exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility 
and the mutual enjoyment of rights”. It is this system of reciprocal duties 
and obligations that ensured that every family member had access to 
basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter and healthcare.1374 
 
For Cornell, there is an inherent activism in the ethics of participatory difference 
because it denotes an ethical demand to bring about a humane world.1375 She 
contends that ubuntu “has an aspirational and ideal edge” because bringing about 
a humane world and becoming a moral person in that world is a never-ending 
task.1376 In S v Makwanyane Justice Langa emphasised that ubuntu is always 
“mentioned in the context of it being something to be desired, a commendable 
attribute which the nation should strive for”.1377 However, unlike the Kantian ideal 
of the kingdom of ends that is a regulative ideal,1378 ubuntu is embedded in the 
social reality and materialises in the ethical actions between community 
                                            
1373  Cf the discussion on Kant’s right to freedom in para  3 2 4 2 and the criticisms against Kantian 
dignity as discussed in para  3 2 4 3 supra. 
1374  Bhe and others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and others (Commission for Gender Equality as 
amicus curiae); Shibi v Sithole and others; South African Human Rights Commission and 
another v President of the Republic of South Africa and another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 163 
referring to S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224 as quoted in the text 
at n 502 supra. 
1375  Cornell 2010 SAPL 396. See also Cornell & Van Marle 2015 Verbum et Ecclesia 2; Cornell & 
Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 6. 
1376  Cornell 2010 SAPL 396. See also Cornell & Van Marle 2015 Verbum et Ecclesia 2; Cornell & 
Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 6. 
1377  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 227. 
1378  Cf the discussion on Kant’s kingdom of ends in para  3 2 4 2 supra. 
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members.1379 It is especially concerned with the well-being and welfare of 
community members because it recognises that the identity and dignity of a 
human being is embedded in the community.1380 Hence, it takes account of the 
actual social and economic circumstances of community members. This is also 
reflected in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, for example in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers where Justice Sachs insisted that the particular 
circumstances of each case must be taken into account: 
 
The combination of circumstances may be extremely intricate, requiring a 
nuanced appreciation of the specific situation in each case. … Each case 
accordingly has to be decided not on generalities but in the light of its 
own particular circumstances. Every situation has its own history, its own 
dynamics, its own intractable elements that have to be lived with (at least 
for the time being), and its own creative possibilities that have to be 
explored as far as reasonably possible.1381  
 
In view of the above, Cornell concludes that ubuntu demands the “moralisation of 
social relationships” which entails constant and never-ending social 
transformation.1382 In other words, ubuntu is a moral demand for social justice and 
harmony, and therefore, it promotes the realisation of socio-economic rights.1383 
Cornell and Muvangua argue that this obligation is reflected in Justice Mokgoro’s 
description of ubuntu where she states that the phrase umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu refers to “the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so 
                                            
1379  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 6; 
Cornell 2010 SAPL 396.  
1380  More “Philosophy in South Africa under and after apartheid” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to 
African philosophy (2004) 157. 
1381  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 31 as quoted in the 
text at n 536 supra. 
1382  Cornell 2010 SAPL 396. See also Cornell & Van Marle 2015 Verbum et Ecclesia 2; Cornell & 
Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 6. 
1383  Cornell 2010 SAPL 396-397. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & 
Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 6 & 10. 
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central to the survival of communities”.1384 For Cornell and Muvangua this means 
that ubuntu emphasises that “survival is dependent on mutual support” which they 
link to Murungi’s succinct statement that “[w]hat is essential to [African] law is what 
secures human beings in their being”.1385 Accordingly, ubuntu can be linked to the 
idea of human dignity as constraint as reflected in a duty on the individual to 
realise the human dignity of other persons through the promotion of socio-
economic rights and substantive equality.1386 As further elucidated by Bohler-
Muller: 
 
[A]dherence to the value of ubuntu, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
demands that we deal with individuals in the context of their historical 
and current disadvantage and that equality issues must address the 
actual conditions of human life.1387 
 
Thus ubuntu resonates with the ideas of transformative constitutionalism1388 which 
are further elaborated upon below.1389 
 
Cornell and Muvangua1390 also extend Masolo’s idea of participatory difference to 
Wiredu’s principle of sympathetic impartiality which is defined as “the ability to 
                                            
1384  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 8 
referring to S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308 (quoted in n 1355 
supra). 
1385  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 8 
referring to Murungi “The question of an African jurisprudence: some hermeneutic reflections” 
in Wiredu (ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 525. 
1386  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity as constraint in the text at n 1193 supra. 
1387  Bohler-Muller 2007 Obiter 595. 
1388  Cornell 2010 SAPL 396 who describes ubuntu as “a transformative ethic at its core”. See also 
Himonga et al 2013 PELJ 370; Himonga “Exploring the concept of ubuntu in the South African 
legal system” in Kischel & Kirchner (eds) Ideologie und Weltanschauung im Recht (2012) 14; 
Keep & Midgley “The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African 
legal culture” in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds) Recht der werkelijkheid (2007) 37. Cf the discussion 
dealing with transformative constitutionalism in para  1 8 2 3 supra.  
1389  See the discussion on how ubuntu informs the constitutional value of the rule of law in para  3 5 
infra. 
1390  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 4. 
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imagine ourselves empathetically in the shoes of others” and “not to desire for 
others what we would not desire for ourselves”.1391 Wiredu argues that this ability 
is developed through ethical engagement with others and part of a person’s moral 
development into personhood.1392 Accordingly, both authors argue that we 
develop this empathy for others because we are intertwined in ethical relations 
with them and they are, in a sense, a part of ourselves.1393 It is in this sense that 
the expression “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (“a person is a person through other 
persons”) should be understood.1394 As expounded upon by More: 
 
Fundamental to African political philosophy and ontology is the view that 
an individual is not a human being except as he or she constitutes part of 
a social order. That is a conception of self as intrinsically linked to, and 
forming a part of, the community. In this communal orientation the self is 
dependent on other selves and is defined through its relationships to 
other selves.1395 
 
For Cornell and Muvangua, this is further elucidated by the Constitutional Court’s 
remarks in MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay. As was seen in chapter 
one,1396 Justice Langa stated that the phrase umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu 
emphasised that “every individual is an extension of others” and referred to 
Gyekye who argued that “an individual human person cannot develop and achieve 
                                            
1391  Masolo “Western and African communitarianism: a comparison” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to 
African philosophy (2004) 496 referring to Wiredu “Morality and religion in Akan thought” Oruka 
& Masolo (eds) Philosophy and cultures (1983) 6-13. 
1392  Masolo “Western and African communitarianism: a comparison” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to 
African philosophy (2004) 496 referring to Wiredu “Morality and religion in Akan thought” Oruka 
& Masolo (eds) Philosophy and cultures (1983) 6-13. See also Cornell & Muvangua 
“Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 4. 
1393  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 4. 
1394  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 5. 
Cf the definition of ubuntu by Justice Mokgoro in S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 
(CC) para 308 (quoted in n 1355 supra). 
1395  More “Philosophy in South Africa under and after apartheid” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to 
African philosophy (2004) 157 (also quoted in the text at n 64 supra). 
1396  Cf the discussion of this case in para  1 8 4 3(a) supra. 
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the fullness of his/her potential without the concrete act of relating to other 
individual persons”.1397 According to Justice Langa: 
 
This thinking emphasises the importance of community to individual 
identity and hence to human dignity. Dignity and identity are inseparably 
linked as one’s sense of self-worth is defined by one’s identity. Cultural 
identity is one of the most important parts of a person’s identity precisely 
because it flows from belonging to a community and not from personal 
choice or achievement. And belonging involves more than simple 
association; it includes participation and expression of the community’s 
practices and traditions.1398 
 
Therefore, a person’s identity, and therefore her human dignity, is embedded in 
the community and the community members are, in a sense, a part of her, 
because her moral development into personhood happens through her 
engagement with other community members and her participation in the 
community’s practices and traditions.1399 Ultimately, Cornell emphasises that the 
individual’s embeddedness in the community results in two obligations: first, the 
obligation on each person in the community to become her own person through 
her ethical engagement with others, and secondly, the obligation to recognise and 
support this ethical humanness in others.1400  
 
Coming back to Justice Mokgoro’s definition of ubuntu, it should be noted that the 
obligation to respect and promote the ethical humaneness of the other community 
members is not more important than the obligation to become an ethical being 
within the community. This is because she emphasises that although ubuntu 
refers to “the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the 
survival of communities” and embraces values like “group solidarity, compassion, 
                                            
1397  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53. 
1398  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 53. 
1399  Cornell 2010 SAPL 393. See also Muvangua & Cornell “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 4; Masolo “Western and African communitarianism: a 
comparison” in Wiredu (ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 493. 
1400  Cornell 2010 SAPL 393. See also See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & 
Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 5. 
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respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity”, she then 
proceeds to stress that ubuntu “in its fundamental sense” refers to “humanity and 
morality”.1401 Accordingly, Cornell argues that group solidarity is always tempered 
by the idea of humanity which is inseparable from morality: 
 
Although others support me, and an ethical action is by definition ethical 
because it is an action in relationship to another human being, it is still up 
to me to realise my own personal destiny and to become a person in the 
ethical and moral sense of the word. Thus, it is humanity, as Justice 
Mokgoro emphasises in her own definition of Ubuntu, and not just my 
community that is at stake in my actions. … The concept of uBuntu is an 
ethical concept. A self-regarding or self-interested human being is one 
that has not only fallen away from her sociality with others; she has lost 
touch with her humanity.1402 
 
In this respect, she1403 also draws on the work of Murungi: 
 
Certainly, in Africa, but not only in Africa, personhood is social. African 
jurisprudence is a part of African social anthropology. Social cohesion is 
an essential element of African jurisprudence. Areas of jurisprudence 
such as criminology and penology, law of inheritance, and land law, for 
example, focus on the preservation and promotion of social cohesion. 
This cohesion is a cohesion that is tempered by justice. Justice defines a 
human being as a human being. Thus, injustice in Africa is not simply a 
matter of an individual breaking a law that is imposed on him or her by 
other individuals, or by a collection of individuals who act in the name of 
the state. It is a violation of the individual’s duty to him or herself, a 
violation of the duty of the individual to be him or herself – the duty to be 
a social being.1404 
 
                                            
1401  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308 (quoted in n 1355 supra). 
1402  Cornell 2010 SAPL 393. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 5. 
1403  Cornell 2010 SAPL 393. See also Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua 
(eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 5. 
1404  Murungi “The question of an African jurisprudence: some hermeneutic reflections” in Wiredu 
(ed) Companion to African philosophy (2004) 522-523. 
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Finally, the idea that the well-being and human dignity of the individual is tied up 
with the well-being and human dignity of the other community members can also 
be identified in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and is sometimes 
referred to as human dignity as a collective responsibility or concern.1405 As can 
be expected in view of the above discussions, it has been utilised by the 
Constitutional Court to promote the realisation of socio-economic rights. Although 
Justice Mokgoro did not explicitly refer to ubuntu in Khosa v The Minister of Social 
Development, dealing with the State’s refusal to provide social welfare benefits to 
permanent residents, it has been argued1406 that her following remark is based on 
ubuntu: 
 
Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty 
equally as a community represents the extent to which wealthier 
members of the community view the minimal well-being of the poor as 
connected with their personal well-being and the well-being of the 
community as a whole.1407 
 
It can also be identified in the following extract from Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers in which Justice Sachs explicitly relied upon ubuntu: 
 
It is not only the dignity of the poor that is assailed when homeless 
people are driven from pillar to post in a desperate quest for a place 
where they and their families can rest their heads. Our society as a whole 
is demeaned when state action intensifies rather than mitigates their 
marginalisation.1408  
                                            
1405 See e.g. Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the 
existence of global values (2015) 344 & Mokgoro & Woolman 2010 SAPL 403 n 10. 
1406  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 344; Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) 
uBuntu and the law (2012) 20; Mokgoro & Woolman 2010 SAPL 403; Cornell & Van Marle 
2005 AHRLJ 213ff. 
1407  Khosa and others v The Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and others v 
Minister of social Development and others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 74.  
1408 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 18 (also quoted in 
the text at n 546 supra). See also City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 
2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 63 as discussed in text at n 551 supra. 
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3 2 6 Harmonisation of Kantian dignity and ubuntu 
3 2 6 1 Similarities between Kantian dignity and ubuntu 
In view of the analysis above, Cornell identifies two similarities between Kantian 
dignity and ubuntu.1409 First, both emphasise the link between freedom and 
morality. In Kantian dignity, a person can only be free and set ends for herself 
within the moral realm.1410 In ubuntu, the development of a person’s personhood 
and her unique destiny is inseparable from her moral development.1411 Secondly, 
both concepts promote human dignity in that they both emphasise the 
inseparableness of personhood and morality.1412  
 
3 2 6 2 Differences between Kantian dignity and ubuntu 
Cornell identifies two important differences between Kantian dignity and 
ubuntu.1413 First, where Kantian dignity is based on the rational capacity of human 
beings,1414 dignity through ubuntu is based on the uniqueness of human beings 
and their embeddedness in the community.1415 As was seen above, the fact that 
Kantian dignity is based on human beings’ capacity for rationality has been 
criticised because it does not take account of human beings who do not have this 
capacity.1416 This problem does not arise with ubuntu because a person’s dignity 
is based on the fact that she is a unique member of the community and not 
                                            
1409  Cornell 2010 SAPL 397. 
1410  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 4 2 supra. 
1411  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 5 supra. 
1412  Cornell 2010 SAPL 398. See also Silungwe “On ‘African’ legal theory: A possibility, an 
impossibility or mere conundrum?” in Onazi (ed) African legal theory and contemporary 
problems (2014) 28 who are of the view that ubuntu and Kantian dignity both define human 
being-ness and acknowledge the inherent worth of every human being. 
1413  Cornell 2010 SAPL 398-399. 
1414  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 4 2 supra. 
1415  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 5 supra. 
1416  Cf the discussion dealing with the criticisms against Kantian dignity in para  3 2 4 3 supra. 
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dependent on a specific characteristic or capacity.1417 Therefore, ubuntu 
recognises the inherent dignity of all human beings. 
 
Secondly, the social bond is construed differently in African thinking than that 
envisaged by Kantian dignity.1418 The Kantian ideal of the kingdom of ends begins 
with imagined, already individuated individuals, who enter into a moral social 
contract which ultimately results in the maximisation of everyone’s unconstrained 
freedom in the external realm of right.1419 As was explained above,1420 Cornell 
argues that this construct of the moral social contract makes it difficult to justify 
socio-economic rights and substantive equality through Kantian dignity. In 
contrast, ubuntu is not based on a hypothetical social contract but relies on a 
social bond that is a social fact. Each person is born into the community and as 
part of the community she is obliged to recognise and support the ethical 
humanness of others and share in the responsibility of bringing about an ethical 
humane world.1421 Therefore, ubuntu does promote the realisation of socio-
economic rights, and therefore, substantive equality.1422  
 
As was also mentioned above,1423 Wood proposed that the ideal of the kingdom of 
ends could assist in attacking the ideologies underlying the free market economy 
because in reality these ideologies are used in a way to undermine the human 
dignity of persons. For Wood, the Kantian ideal of the kingdom of ends resonates 
with the concept of ubuntu, specifically the idea that a human person becomes a 
person through other human beings.1424 As was seen above,1425 this notion forms 
                                            
1417  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 5 supra. 
1418  Cornell 2010 SAPL 399. 
1419  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 4 2 supra. 
1420  Cf the discussion dealing with the criticisms against Kantian dignity in para  3 2 4 3 supra. 
1421  As stated by Cornell & Van Marle 2015 Verbum et Ecclesia 3: “For ubuntu, the very notion of 
the social contract misses the idea that human beings are born into an affective network that is 
constantly being transformed by the participants themselves.” 
1422  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 5 supra. 
1423  Cf the discussion dealing with the criticisms against Kantian dignity in para  3 2 4 3 supra. 
1424  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 60. 
1425  Cf the discussion in para  3 2 5 supra.  
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the basis of the African social bond that is based on a social fact and takes 
account of the social and economic realities of persons. Wood argued that “there 
is much promise in the aim of relating the Kantian conception of the realm of ends 
to ubuntu as a way of interpreting the South African Constitution’s commitment to 
the inherent dignity of every human being”.1426 It is perhaps in this light that 
Wood’s proposal, that Kant’s kingdom of ends could be used to critique the 
individualistic notion of human dignity which informs the ideologies of individualism 
and free trade can be seen. Hence, it can be argued that it is through ubuntu that 
the Kantian ideal of the kingdom of ends can be developed to take account of and 
promote socio-economic rights and substantive equality. As will be seen 
below,1427 the Constitutional Court also relied on Kant’s kingdom of ends in 
promoting socio-economic rights and substantive equality within a larger 
understanding of human dignity as informed by ubuntu.  
 
3 2 7 Human dignity as interpreted in the legal sphere 
This section critically investigates the approach to the constitutional value of 
human dignity in the South African common law of contract. This is done in three 
parts, namely (1) the approach to human dignity in the Constitution, (2) the 
approach to human dignity by the Constitutional Court generally and (3) the 
approach to human dignity in the common law of contract.  
 
3 2 7 1 The approach to human dignity in the Constitution  
As already mentioned, human dignity is regarded as the core value of the 
Constitution and the most important human right from which all the other human 
rights derive.1428 Ackermann explains that the importance of human dignity in the 
Constitution becomes clear in view of South Africa’s history of apartheid during 
which the human dignity of the majority of the population was denied: 
 
                                            
1426  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 60-61. 
1427  Cf the discussion of South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) 
in para  3 2 7 2 infra. 
1428  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity as a constitutional value in para  1 8 2 1 supra.  
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The state did its best to deny to blacks that which is definitional to being 
human, namely the ability to understand or at least define oneself 
through ones (sic) own powers and to act freely as a moral agent 
pursuant to such understanding or self-definition. Blacks were treated as 
means to and (sic) end and hardly ever as an end in themselves; an 
almost complete reversal of the Kantian imperative and concept of 
priceless inner worth and dignity.1429 
 
Consequently, section 10 of the Constitution now confirms that everyone “has 
inherent dignity”, and in this sense, the Constitution now legally recognises the 
inherent human dignity of everyone.1430 Furthermore, human dignity cannot be 
limited in terms of section 36 of Constitution or suspended in a state of emergency 
(section 37(5)(c) of the Constitution).1431 Therefore, it has been argued that the 
Kantian conception of dignity which recognises the intrinsic worth of human beings 
is reflected in the constitutional provisions.1432 It is submitted that the fact that 
                                            
1429  Ackermann 2000 HJIL 540. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in 
Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 326; Woolman “Dignity” in 
Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 36.2; Cameron “Dignity and disgrace: 
moral citizenship and constitutional protection” in McCrudden (ed) Understanding human 
dignity (2013) 468; Botha 2009 Stell LR 201.  
1430  De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 418; Cameron “Dignity and disgrace: moral citizenship and 
constitutional protection” in McCrudden (ed) Understanding human dignity (2013) 476. See 
also Botha 2009 Stell LR 197 who makes the point that this wording indicates that human 
dignity is not dependent on a specific characteristic or attribute. 
1431  See also Cameron “Dignity and disgrace: moral citizenship and constitutional protection” in 
McCrudden (ed) Understanding human dignity (2013) 474; Hawthorne 2011 SUBB 
Iurisprudentia para 3; Hawthorne 2011 SAPL 432; Botha 2009 Stell LR 198; Ackermann 2004 
New Zealand Law Review 653-654; Ackermann 2000 HJIL 543-544. 
1432  Ackermann 2000 HJIL 541 who states that human dignity in the Constitution refers to “innate, 
priceless and indefeasible human worth”. In a later article, he refers specifically to Kant’s 
differentiation between dignity and price when dealing with the concept of human dignity in the 
Constitution (Ackermann 2004 New Zealand Law Review 649). See also Albertyn “Values in 
the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 
326-327; Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 
36.2(a); Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 3.  
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section 10 applies to everyone without the requirement of rationality is a reflection 
of ubuntu.1433 
 
As section 10 recognises the inherent dignity of everyone and their right to have 
their dignity respected and protected, it can be argued that the right to human 
dignity in section 10 grounds “a set of rights claims against others” and “reinforce 
claims to self-determination” as envisaged by the concept of human dignity as 
empowerment.1434 However, Ackermann argues that section 10 must be read with 
section 7(2) of the Constitution which provides that the State must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil all the rights in the Bill of Rights, including the right to 
human dignity.1435 Viewed in light of the Constitution’s commitment to substantive 
equality and the promotion of socio-economic rights,1436 the Constitution follows 
an approach which recognises the State’s duty to realise and promote the human 
dignity of everyone through the realisation and promotion of socio-economic rights 
and substantive equality.1437 This includes the duty of the courts to promote and 
realise the human dignity of everyone when interpreting and/or developing 
legislation, the common law and the customary law in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. Thus, the courts have a duty to ensure the protection and realisation 
of human dignity in the private sphere. In other words, the courts have a duty to 
ensure the protection and realisation of the human dignity of contracting parties 
when developing the common law of contract and when interpreting and applying 
the provisions of the CPA. In other words, in the field of contract law, the courts 
should follow a more duty-driven approach to human dignity as conceptualised 
through the concept of human dignity as constraint which could entail the limitation 
                                            
1433  Cf the discussion dealing with the differences between Kantian dignity and ubuntu in para  3 2 6 
2 supra. 
1434  Cf Beyleveld and Brownsword’s discussion of human dignity as empowerment in the text at 
n 1181 supra. 
1435  Ackermann Human dignity (2013) 95. See also Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 3.  
1436  Cf the discussion dealing with the constitutional value of equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra. 
1437  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity as constraint in the text at n 1193 supra. 
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of a party’s contractual autonomy to ensure the respect and promotion of the other 
party’s human dignity.1438 
 
Ackermann further views the connection between human dignity in the 
Constitution and Kantian dignity as follows: 
 
It is significant that s 10 first proclaims that “everyone has inherent 
dignity” before entrenching the right of “everyone … to have their dignity 
respected and protected”. This underscores, in my view, the recognition 
by the Constitution that human dignity is not merely a protected and 
entrenched right, but that the concept of human dignity is definitional to 
what it means to be a human – that all humans have inherent dignity as 
an attribute independent of and antecedent to any constitutional 
protection thereof. It is, I would argue, accepted as a categorical 
constitutional imperative.1439 
 
In other words, Ackermann is arguing that human beings do not acquire their 
human dignity from the constitutional provisions because it is something that 
already exists in every human being.1440 Relying on Ackermann’s interpretation of 
human dignity as a categorical imperative1441 and the Kantian idea that dignity is 
priceless, irreplaceable and of inestimable worth,1442 Cornell and Fuller argue that 
human dignity should not be weighed up or balanced against the other 
constitutional values like freedom or equality but should rather inform the meaning 
of these constitutional values.1443  
 
                                            
1438  How the courts have utilised the constitutional value of human dignity in the common law of 
contract is critically investigated in para  3 2 7 3 infra. 
1439  Ackermann Human dignity (2013) 95; Ackermann 2004 New Zealand Law Review 647.  
1440  Ackermann Human dignity (2013) 95. See also Botha 2009 Stell LR 197-198. 
1441  For Kant, a categorical imperative is a command that applies unconditionally and without 
reference to our own specific goals and desires. In other words, it refers to the moral law (cf 
the explanation of a categorical imperative in n 1231 supra). 
1442  Cf the discussion of the Kantian differentiation between something that has dignity and 
something that has price in para  3 2 4 1 supra. 
1443  Cornell & Fuller “Introduction” in Cornell et al (eds) Dignity jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court (2013) 12. See also Cornell 2004 SAPL 667. 
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3 2 7 2 The approach to human dignity by the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane confirmed that human dignity refers 
to the intrinsic worth of all human beings which means that they are entitled to 
equal respect and concern and may not be treated in a degrading or 
dehumanising way.1444 Specifically, the Kantian idea that dignity is beyond price 
and of incalculable worth,1445 as well as Kant’s second formulation of the 
categorical imperative (the Formula of an End in Itself),1446 was explicitly imported 
into our constitutional jurisprudence by Justice Ackermann in S v Dodo: 
 
Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be attached; 
they are creatures with inherent and infinite worth; they ought to be 
treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to an end.1447 
 
In the constitutional court case of Khumalo v Holomisa Justice O’Regan confirmed 
that human dignity does not only refer to a person’s own self-worth but also how 
she is valued and treated by the members of the community: 
 
The value of human dignity in our Constitution is not only concerned with 
an individual’s sense of self-worth, but constitutes an affirmation of the 
worth of human beings in our society. It includes the intrinsic worth of 
human beings shared by all people as well as the individual reputation of 
each person built upon his or her own individual achievements. The 
value of human dignity in our Constitution therefore values both the 
personal sense of self-worth as well as the public’s estimation of the 
worth or value of an individual.1448  
                                            
1444  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 26 (Justice Chaskalson), 271 & 281 
(Justice Mohamed), 313-316 (Justice Mokgoro) & 328 (Justice O’Regan). See also  Albertyn 
“Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global 
values (2015) 327; Botha 2009 Stell LR 202. 
1445  Cf the discussion of the Kantian differentiation between something that has dignity and 
something that has price in para  3 2 4 1 supra. 
1446  Cf the discussion of this formulation of the categorical imperative in para  3 2 4 supra. 
1447  S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC) para 38. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African 
Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 327 n 28; Botha 
2009 Stell LR 202. 
1448  Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) para 27. 
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Therefore, the court confirmed the inherent and equal worth of all human beings 
which result in their entitlement to equal respect and concern.1449  
 
In MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay the court further explained what it 
means to treat human beings as an end in themselves.1450 In the first place, the 
court emphasised the importance of freedom in defining human dignity1451 by 
quoting from Justice Ackermann’s minority judgment in Ferreira v Levin where he 
stated as follows: 
 
Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom 
personal development and fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, 
human dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are 
inseparably linked. To deny people their freedom is to deny them their 
dignity.1452 
 
Justice Langa then continued as follows: 
 
A necessary element of freedom and of dignity of any individual is an 
‘entitlement to respect for the unique set of ends that the individual 
pursues’. One of those ends is the voluntary religious and cultural 
practices in which we participate. That we choose voluntarily rather than 
through a feeling of obligation only enhances the significance of a 
practice to our autonomy, our identity and our dignity.1453  
 
The court’s conception of what it means to treat a human being as an end in 
herself reflects Wood’s interpretation of Kant’s second categorical imperative. As 
was shown above,1454 Wood’s interpretation proposed that treating a person’s 
                                            
1449  See the discussion of this case in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 
SA 123 (CC) para 172.  
1450  The facts and decision of this case is discussed in para 1 8 7 supra. 
1451  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 63. 
1452 Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 49. 
1453  MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 64. 
1454  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1293 supra.  
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humanity as an end in itself entails respecting her capacity to set her own ends 
and choose ways to achieve them in order to lead a purposive life through her 
practical reason. In other words, it would entail respecting the unique set of ends a 
person sets for herself. For Wood, like Beyleveld and Brownsword, this means 
that the autonomy of a person must be respected by not subjecting another’s 
arbitrary will onto that person. Furthermore, Wood emphasised that this would 
include that a person should not be excluded from participating in community 
life.1455 Hence, respecting a person as an end in herself would include respect for 
a person’s participation in religious or cultural practices. In his discussion of the 
case, Botha interpreted the court’s finding to mean that respecting a person as an 
end in herself “demands the creation of a space within which individuals are free 
to forge their own autonomous identities”.1456 The court, therefore, has developed 
the constitutional value of human dignity to reflect its empowerment conception 
which denotes a right to the creation of a space in which a person’s human dignity 
can flourish.1457 In this respect, the court also confirmed the State’s duty to create 
and protect such a space for individual autonomy as reflected in the notion of 
human dignity as constraint although this duty aligns more closely with a rights-
driven approach to human rights because it promotes individual autonomy as 
reflected in the notion of human dignity as empowerment.1458 
 
In a number of recent cases, the Constitutional Court has emphasised this link 
between human dignity and autonomy. In MM v MN the Constitutional Court had 
to decide (among other things) whether the right to dignity would require a man in 
a customary marriage to obtain the consent of his existing wife before he could 
take a second wife.1459 In arriving at its decision, the court made the following 
statement: 
                                            
1455  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1295 supra.  
1456  Botha 2007 Stell LR 203-204 commenting on MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v 
Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). 
1457  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity as empowerment in para  3 2 3 2 supra. 
1458  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity as constraint in para  3 2 3 3 supra. 
1459  MM v MN and another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). However, the decision of the court has been 
criticised for not dealing with the human dignity of the second wife (Kruuse & Sloth-Nielsen 
2014 PELJ 1724).  
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[T]he right to dignity includes the right-bearer’s entitlement to make 
choices and to take decisions that affect his or her life – the more 
significant the decision, the greater the entitlement. Autonomy and 
control over one’s personal circumstances are a fundamental aspect of 
human dignity.1460 
 
In Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development the court stated that human dignity acknowledged the value of a 
person’s choices.1461 And, in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 
Justice Van der Westhuizen, in his separate but concurring judgment, confirmed 
that human dignity includes the idea that a person should be permitted to develop 
their unique talents1462 by quoting the following passage from Justice Ackermann’s 
minority judgment in Ferreira v Levin: 
 
Human dignity cannot be fully valued or respected unless individuals are 
able to develop their humanity, their “humanness” to the full extent of its 
potential. Each human being is uniquely talented. Part of the dignity of 
every human being is the fact and awareness of this uniqueness. An 
individual's human dignity cannot be fully respected or valued unless the 
individual is permitted to develop his or her unique talents optimally.1463 
 
Although the Constitutional Court sees human dignity as creating and promoting a 
space for the individual to make her own decisions and pursue her own unique set 
of ends as promoted by the idea of human dignity as empowerment, this does not 
                                            
1460  MM v MN and another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) paras 73-74.  
1461  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and another 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 56. Referred to by approval in the minority 
judgment in AB and another v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 570 (CC) para 110, 
esp n 118. 
1462  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 173. 
1463 Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 49.  
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mean that the individual is viewed “as an isolated and unencumbered being”.1464 
In dealing with the right to privacy in Bernstein v Bester, Justice Ackermann 
emphasised the correlating nature of rights and duties: 
 
The relevance of such an integrated approach to the interpretation of the 
right to privacy is that this process of creating context cannot be confined 
to any one sphere, and specifically not to an abstract individualistic 
approach. The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies 
that from the outset of interpretation each right is always already limited 
by every other right accruing to another citizen. … This implies that 
community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding 
obligation on a citizen. 1465 
 
It would seem that Justice Ackermann was influenced by Kantian ethics, 
specifically Kant’s imagined kingdom of ends as he refers to Kant’s “community of 
humanity” which “demands mutual respect as a universal moral duty towards 
persons as moral persons”.1466 Therefore, it is submitted that the Constitutional 
Court has developed both aspects of human dignity i.e. human dignity as 
empowerment1467 and human dignity as constraint, the latter constituting the 
individual’s correlating duty to respect the human dignity of others.1468  
 
The Constitutional Court has also relied on ubuntu to emphasise that “human 
beings are social beings whose humanity is expressed through their relationships 
with others”.1469 As was seen above,1470 in MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v 
                                            
1464  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 174. See also 
Bernstein and others v Bester and others NNO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) paras 65; Ackermann 
Human dignity (2013) 109-111. 
1465  Bernstein and others v Bester and others NNO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) para 67 (my emphasis). 
1466  Bernstein and others v Bester and others NNO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) para 66 (esp n 93). 
1467  Cf the discussion on human dignity as empowerment in para  3 2 3 2 supra. 
1468  Cf the discussion on human dignity as constraint in the text at n 1190 supra. 
1469  Dawood and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others; Shalabi and another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and others; Thomas and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others 2000 3 
SA 936 (CC) para 30 (esp n 42).  
1470  Cf the reference to this case when discussing how ubuntu promotes human dignity in para  3 2 
5 supra. 
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Pillay the court used ubuntu to emphasise that a person’s moral development into 
a unique human being can only happen through engagement with other 
community members, and therefore, that participating in the practices and 
traditions of the community is inseparably linked to a person’s human dignity. As 
the court also referred to Kant’s second categorical imperative to promote the idea 
that human dignity denotes respect for a person’s unique set of ends1471 this case 
illustrates how both Kantian dignity and ubuntu promote human dignity in a way 
that protects a person’s individuality and provides a space for that person to 
pursue her personhood and unique destiny (ubuntu) or her unique set of ends 
(Kantian dignity) within and through engagement with the community.1472  
 
As was seen above,1473 ubuntu’s greatest impact has been to give content to the 
constitutional value of human dignity when dealing with the socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the Constitution which accords with Cornell’s view that ubuntu is 
more appropriate than Kantian dignity in promoting the realisation of socio-
economic rights.1474 Furthermore, this means that ubuntu has been used to infuse 
the constitutional value of human dignity with a duty on the State to promote the 
realisation of socio-economic rights in order to create the necessary conditions for 
the realisation of everyone’s human dignity.1475  
 
More recently, the Constitutional Court in South African Police Service v Solidarity 
obo Barnard also embraced the construct of human dignity that reflects the duties 
to respect the human dignity of others and the creation of the necessary 
conditions for the realisation of human dignity through socio-economic rights.1476 
Specifically, Justice van der Westhuizen extended the application of this construct 
of human dignity to individuals when dealing with substantive equality. He relied 
                                            
1471  Cf the discussion of this case in the text at n 1450 supra. 
1472 See also Botha 2007 Stell LR 205. 
1473  Cf the discussion on human dignity through ubuntu in para  3 2 5 supra. 
1474  Cf the discussions in paras  3 2 4 3,  3 2 5 &  3 2 6 2 supra. 
1475  Cf the discussion on human dignity through ubuntu in para  3 2 5 supra. Cf the discussion 
dealing with human dignity as constraint in para  3 2 3 3 supra. 
1476  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) paras 174-175. 
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on both Kantian dignity1477 and ubuntu1478 as elucidated in the cases discussed 
above. Thus, the justice made the following statement: 
 
In the context of socio-economic rights, this Court has affirmed that the 
responsibility for the difficulties of poverty is shared equally as a 
community because “wealthier members of the community view the 
minimal well-being of the poor as connected with their well-being and the 
well-being of the community as a whole”. This would also hold in the 
context of substantive equality. First, the way in which individuals interact 
with social groups and society generally has a direct bearing on their 
dignity. This is true for members of both advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups. Second, this idea also gives effect to another Kantian way of 
understanding dignity – that it “asks us to lay down for ourselves a law 
that embraces every other individual in a manner that extends beyond 
the interests of our more parochial selves”.1479 
 
This statement indicates that the court is following the more communitarian 
interpretation of Kantian dignity as put forward by Cornell.1480 She argued that 
Kantian dignity should not be equated to unconstrained freedom but that it rather 
denotes the capacity to lay down moral laws for ourselves and being bound by 
                                            
1477  Specifically, Justice Van der Westhuizen referred to the following cases that incorporate 
aspects of Kantian dignity into South African law: Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 
401 (CC); S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and 
another v Minister of Justice and others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); Ferreira v Levin NO and others; 
Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC); Bernstein and others v 
Bester and others NNO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC); S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 
(CC). 
1478  Specifically, Justice Van der Westhuizen referred to the following cases that relied on ubuntu 
to develop the constitutional value of human dignity: MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and 
others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 
217 (CC); Dawood and another v Minister of Home Affairs and others; Shalabi and another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and others; Thomas and another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
others 2000 3 SA 936 (CC). 
1479  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 175 quoting 
from Khosa and others v The Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and others 
v Minister of social Development and others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 74.  
1480  See the discussion of Cornell’s interpretation of Kantian dignity in para  3 2 4 2 supra.  
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those laws. Accordingly, her interpretation of Kantian dignity is that freedom can 
be found only in the realm of morality which means there is no tension between 
our freedom and subjecting ourselves to the moral law. Relying on Kant’s concept 
of the kingdom of ends, she reached the conclusion that when we disrespect the 
dignity of others we are actually failing to respect our own dignity as law-making 
members in the hypothetical kingdom of ends. These ideas are also reflected in 
Justice van der Westhuizen’s reasoning when he makes the following statement: 
 
The dignity of all South Africans is augmented by the fact that the 
Constitution is the foundation of a society that takes seriously its duties to 
promote equality and respect for the worth of all.  Because affirmative 
substantive equality measures are one way in which these duties are 
given effect, these measures can enhance the dignity of individuals, even 
those who may be adversely affected by them.1481 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Constitutional Court is developing the 
constitutional value of human dignity to include a duty on the individual to assist in 
the creation of the necessary conditions for the realisation of the human dignity of 
other community members through the promotion of substantive equality as 
reflected in the idea of human dignity as constraint.1482 
 
Two comments must be made in respect of the Justice van der Westhuizen’s 
reliance on Kantian dignity to justify and promote substantive equality, especially 
as Cornell and Van Marle contend that Kantian dignity does not provide adequate 
justification for the promotion of substantive equality.1483 In the first place, the 
court’s reference to Kant is taken from Woolman’s work on human dignity in which 
he was relying on Rawls’ understanding of Kant.1484 Although Cornell concedes 
that Rawls applied Kantian dignity to argue for greater substantive equality, she 
remains unconvinced that any type of imagined social contract between imagined, 
already individuated, individuals can provide adequate justification for socio-
                                            
1481 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 175. 
1482  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity as constraint in para  3 2 3 3 supra. 
1483  Cf the discussion dealing with criticism levied against Kantian dignity in para  3 2 4 3 supra. 
1484  Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 36.2(e) n 43. 
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economic rights.1485 Secondly, Woolman’s reference to Kant was made in 
response to the Constitutional Court’s statement in Khosa v The Minister of Social 
Development that human dignity is a collective responsibility concerned with 
collective well-being.1486 However, as was seen above, a number of scholars 
(including Woolman himself) have linked the court’s reasoning in Khosa v The 
Minister of Social Development to ubuntu.1487  
 
3 2 7 3 The approach to human dignity in the common law of contract 
Both aspects of human dignity (empowerment and constraint) also feature 
prominently in the common law of contract.1488 As will be explained below, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal favours a rights-driven approach to human dignity as 
reflected in the empowerment-based interpretation. In contrast, it is submitted that 
the Constitutional Court follows a multi-faceted approach to human dignity which 
views human dignity both as empowerment and constraint and aligns with its 
approach as discussed in the previous section.  
 
As pointed out above,1489 the empowerment-based view of human dignity 
supports the classical model of contract law as it promotes individual liberty and 
limits state intervention in contracts. It further equates human dignity with the 
capacity for autonomous action and results in the protection of individual choices 
against the unwilled interferences of others. This is the conception of human 
dignity favoured by the Supreme Court of Appeal.1490 Quoting appeal judge 
                                            
1485  Cornell 204 SAPL 668. 
1486  Khosa and others v The Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and others v 
Minister of social Development and others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 74. This was also the 
case referred by the court in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 
123 (CC) para 175 when it invoked Kantian dignity in its reasoning.  
1487  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1406 supra. 
1488  Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 1; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881; Lubbe 2004 
SALJ 421; Brownsword “Freedom of contract, human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann 
& Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law (2001) 191. 
1489  See the discussion in para  3 2 3 2 supra dealing with human dignity as empowerment. 
1490  Cf the discussion of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach to fairness in the common law of 
contract in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
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Cameron’s minority judgment in Brisley v Drotsky,1491 the court in Afrox Healthcare 
v Strydom stated that contractual autonomy is part of the constitutional value of 
freedom and informs the constitutional value of human dignity.1492 The court 
further elevated contractual freedom into a constitutional value which demands 
respect for the sanctity of contracts.1493 Consequently, the court reduced good 
faith to an abstract value underlying the substantive common law of contract which 
means it cannot be used to set aside an unfair contract term or prevent the unfair 
enforcement of a contract term.1494  
 
The approach by the Supreme Court of Appeal is a reflection of the idea of human 
dignity as empowerment in that a person should be free to make her own 
decisions and take responsibility for those decisions.1495 Specifically, the appeal 
court equated a person’s contractual autonomy i.e. the capacity to decide whether 
to contract, with whom to contract and on what terms to contract to that persons’ 
human dignity.1496 As mentioned above,1497 the classical law of contract is 
founded on the ideologies of individualism and capitalism.1498 A striking example 
of how the court’s approach is based on an individualistic interpretation of Kant is 
reflected in Jordaan’s brief version of Kantian dignity: 
 
Kant’s reasoning can be encapsulated as follows: Since our species 
possesses the capacity to reason, every (adult) person has the capacity 
                                            
1491  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 94 as discussed in para  2 3 2 2 supra. 
1492  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 22 as discussed in para  2 3 2 2 
supra. 
1493  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 23 as quoted in the text at n 841 
supra. 
1494  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 32. See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 
4 SA 1 (SCA) para 22.  
1495  See the discussion in para  3 2 3 2 supra dealing with human dignity as empowerment. See 
also Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4.2; Brand 2009 SALJ 85; Bhana 2007 
SALJ 274; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420-421. 
1496  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 22 as discussed in para  2 3 2 2 
supra. 
1497  Cf the discussion of this case in the text at n 850 supra. 
1498  Cf the discussion of this case in the text at n 846 supra. 
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to differentiate between right and wrong and make moral judgments. 
Every person is therefore perceived as a moral agent with moral 
autonomy. Having the status of being a moral agent endows every 
human with unconditional incomparable worth, also known as dignity. 
Moral autonomy relates to every action by a moral agent, and therefore 
includes actions that relate to contracting. Infringing contractual 
autonomy thus infringes moral autonomy, which in return infringes 
dignity. To disregard contractual autonomy is to disregard dignity.1499 
 
The importance of contractual autonomy in promoting human dignity is not 
disputed.1500 As reflected in the constitutional jurisprudence discussed above,1501 
human dignity demands and promotes a space for an individual to make her own 
decisions in order to pursue her unique set of ends as based on Kantian dignity or 
her personhood and unique destiny as based on ubuntu. This would include the 
freedom to enter into contracts in pursuit of such unique ends or personhood. 
Therefore, both Kantian dignity and ubuntu as incorporated in the Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence support the idea of contractual autonomy as essential in 
respecting the human dignity of persons as reflected in the concept of human 
dignity as empowerment. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court as discussed above,1502 also recognises that an individual does not pursue 
her unique set of ends or her personhood in a social vacuum. This is especially 
                                            
1499  Jordaan 2004 De Jure 59-60 (my emphasis). See also Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional 
Court Review 164 who states that “[i]n the context of the law of contract, individualism believes 
that the parties create their own law through agreement (consensus) which is itself a 
manifestation of the individual’s autonomy”. 
1500  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 24 
who state that “freedom of contract is grounded in the respect for dignity of persons”. 
1501  Cf the discussions of MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 
(CC); Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 
SA 984 (CC); MM v MN and another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC); Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused 
Children and another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and another 2014 2 
SA 168 (CC); South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) in 
para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
1502  Cf the discussion of Bernstein and others v Bester and others NNO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC); MEC 
for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC); South African Police 
Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
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true in the sphere of contract law where such ends or personhood are always 
pursued through relationships with other persons and within a specific social 
reality.1503 Accordingly, the Constitutional Court has developed a concept of 
human dignity endorsing both aspects of human dignity viz autonomy and 
constraint. The latter as reflected in the duty to respect the human dignity of others 
which duty the court has linked to both Kantian dignity and ubuntu.1504 Moreover, 
the Constitutional Court has been inspired by ubuntu to develop socio-economic 
rights and promote substantive equality in order to create the necessary conditions 
for the realisation of human dignity.1505 Therefore, the harmonisation of Kantian 
dignity and ubuntu in the constitutional jurisprudence has led to the endorsement 
of both facets of human dignity as empowerment and constraint. The latter as 
reflected in the State and the individual’s duties to respect the human dignity of 
others and to share in the responsibility of creating the necessary conditions for 
the realisation of others’ human dignity through the promotion of socio-economic 
rights and substantive equality. 
 
In consequence, a proper appreciation of the constitutional value of human dignity 
does not follow a purely rights-driven approach as reflected in human dignity as 
empowerment.1506 The constitutional value of human dignity also includes the idea 
of human dignity as constraint as reflected in both duties referred to above. 
However, this constraint is not seen as an external constraint that results in a 
                                            
1503  Barnard 2006 Law and Critique 170. 
1504  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1468 supra. 
1505  Cf the discussions of Khosa and others v The Minister of Social Development and others; 
Mahlaule and others v Minister of social Development and others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC); Bhe 
and others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and others (Commission for Gender Equality as amicus 
curiae); Shibi v Sithole and others; South African Human Rights Commission and another v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC); Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties 
(Pty) Ltd and others 2007 1 SA 78 (W) in para  3 2 5 supra and the discussion of South African 
Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) in para  3 4 2 supra. 
1506 As pointed out above, the rights-driven approach to human dignity as empowerment results in 
the maximisation of the freedom of individuals (cf the discussions of human dignity as 
empowerment and constraint in paras  3 2 3 2 &  3 2 3 3 supra. 
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tension between the human dignity of two persons,1507 but as an internal 
constraint reflecting the idea of moral freedom which can be used to resolve the 
abovementioned tension.1508 The idea of moral freedom, also referred to as 
human dignity as a collective responsibility or concern, is the result of a 
harmonisation between Kantian dignity and ubuntu. First, it is based on the 
communitarian interpretation of Kantian dignity which has been incorporated into 
the constitutional jurisprudence.1509 According to this interpretation of Kant, 
freedom can only be found in the moral realm, and therefore, following moral laws 
should be seen as an internal constraint on a person’s freedom. In other words, a 
person can only be truly free by subjecting herself to the moral law which moral 
law demands that she respects the human dignity of others. Secondly, as also 
reflected in the constitutional jurisprudence,1510 ubuntu recognises that an 
individual, and therefore, her human dignity, is embedded in the community which 
means that the community is, in a sense, a part of her. Therefore, the well-being 
and human dignity of the individual is tied up with the well-being and human 
dignity of the other community members. Consequently, when the individual is not 
respecting the human dignity of others or supporting the realisation of the human 
dignity of the other community members she is also disrespecting her own human 
dignity. 
 
                                            
1507  Cf the discussion on human dignity as empowerment in para  3 2 3 2 supra. 
1508  Cf the discussion dealing with the communitarian interpretation of Kantian dignity in para  3 2 4 
2 supra.  
1509  Cf the discussion of South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) 
in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
1510  Cf the discussions of MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 
(CC); Bhe and others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and others (Commission for Gender Equality 
as amicus curiae); Shibi v Sithole and others; South African Human Rights Commission and 
another v President of the Republic of South Africa and another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC); Khosa 
and others v The Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and others v Minister of 
social Development and others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) in para  3 2 5 supra which deals with human dignity through 
ubuntu. See also the discussion of South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 
6 SA 123 (CC) in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
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In the law of contract, this should mean that a contracting party can only be truly 
free when she exercises her contractual freedom in a way that respects and 
supports the human dignity of the other contracting party.1511 Accordingly, when a 
contracting party fails to respect or support the human dignity of the other 
contracting party, she is not only disrespecting the human dignity of the other 
contracting party but also failing to respect her own human dignity. Accordingly, 
contractual freedom has to denote moral freedom in that a contracting party can 
only exercise her contractual freedom in a way that respects and supports the 
human dignity of the other contracting party. This view accords with that of 
Hawthorne who argues that human dignity as constraint provides justification for 
limiting contractual autonomy where contract terms freely entered into violate one 
of the party’s human dignity.1512 This is also reflected in Judge Cameron’s minority 
judgment in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision of Brisley v Drotsky where he 
stated as follows: 
 
The Constitution requires that its values be employed to achieve a 
careful balance between the unacceptable excesses of contractual 
“freedom”, and securing a framework within which the ability to contract 
enhances rather than diminishes our self-respect and dignity.1513 
 
Except for Judge Cameron’s remarks above, the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
been silent on the notion of human dignity as constraint and how it could be 
applied in the common law of contract. It is therefore necessary to look at two high 
court cases decided shortly after the enactment of the Constitution in which the 
idea of human dignity as constraint was promoted in the common law of contract.  
 
In chapter two,1514 it has been discussed how the court in Coetzee v Comitis held 
that a contract term that infringed upon one of the contracting party’s human 
                                            
1511  Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 205. 
1512  Hawthorne 2011 SUBB Iurisprudentia para 4 2. See also Brownsword “Freedom of contract, 
human rights and human dignity” in Friedmann & Barak-Erez (eds) Human rights in private law 
(2001) 194. 
1513  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 95. 
1514  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) as discussed in para  2 3 2 1 supra. 
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dignity would be considered contrary to public policy and therefore invalid and 
unenforceable.1515 Woolman has pointed out that the court’s judgment was based 
on Kant’s second categorical imperative as the court stated that the contract 
infringed upon the soccer player’s human dignity because in terms of the contract 
he was “helpless” and “treated just like an object”,1516 and hence, not treated as 
an end in himself.1517 The high court’s interpretation preceded the more recent 
judgments of the Constitutional Court that incorporate the Kantian categorical 
imperative that respect for the human dignity of a person means that she should 
be treated as end in herself and never merely as a means to an end.1518 
Specifically, the court in Coetzee v Comitis held that the NLS rules as incorporated 
into the contract “are akin to treating players as goods and chattels who are at the 
mercy of their employer once their contract has expired”.1519 Therefore, the court’s 
definition of what it means to treat a person as an end in herself accords with 
Wood’s interpretation of Kant as endorsed by the Constitutional Court in MEC for 
Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay.1520 As was seen above, Wood argued that 
treating a person as an end in herself denotes respect for the person’s unique set 
of ends which would include that a person should not be deprived of control over 
her life.1521 As the NSL rules incorporated into the contract left the player helpless 
and at the mercy of his former employer, the contract deprived him of control over 
his life which constituted an infringement on his human dignity, and consequently 
the court held that the contract was contrary to public policy. 
 
                                            
1515  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) paras 34 & 41. See also Lubbe 2004 
SALJ 422. 
1516  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 34. 
1517  Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 36.4(f). See also 
Lubbe 2004 SALJ 422. 
1518  Cf the discussion of S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC) & MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and 
others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
1519  Coetzee v Comitis and others 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) para 38. 
1520  Cf the discussion of MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 
(CC) in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
1521  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1292 supra. 
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In Mort v Henry Shields-Chiat the same court obiter linked the constitutional value 
of human dignity to the principle of good faith.1522 Specifically, the court linked the 
value of human dignity to Lubbe’s proposal that where a contract term constitutes 
an unreasonable and one-sided promotion of one party’s interests at the expense 
of the other party it may be contrary to the principles of good faith and 
consequently also against public policy.1523 Originally, Lubbe made this proposal 
in the aftermath of the court’s decision in Sasfin v Beukes which was decided 
before the enactment of the Constitution.1524 In this case, the deed of cession 
concluded between the parties placed Sasfin in complete control of Beukes’ 
earnings to the extent that the contract relegated Beukes to the position of a 
slave.1525 The court acknowledged that public policy generally favours freedom 
and sanctity of contract but held that the court is also obliged to take account of 
“doing simple justice between man and man”.1526 In balancing these policy 
considerations, the court held that the provisions of the contract were so unfair 
and unreasonable towards Beukes that the contract was contrary to public policy 
and therefore unenforceable.1527 In commenting on the case, Lubbe argued that 
the contract terms constituted an unreasonable infringement upon Beukes’ 
freedom to exercise his professional trade and therefore it was contrary to good 
faith and hence against public policy.1528 Specifically, Lubbe argued that good faith 
requires that in pursuing her own interests, a party had to show a measure of 
respect and regard for the interests of the other party.1529 After the enactment of 
the Constitution, Lubbe linked the decision in Sasfin v Beukes to the constitutional 
value of human dignity.1530 This link is highly appropriate as the facts in Sasfin v 
Beukes, like those in Coetzee v Comitis, constitute a good example of a contract 
that infringes upon the human dignity of one of the contracting parties. It could be 
                                            
1522  Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) as discussed in para  2 3 2 1 supra. 
1523  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20-21.  
1524  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) as discussed in para  2 2 4 3 supra. 
1525  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 13. 
1526  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9. 
1527  Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 18-19. 
1528  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 21. 
1529  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20. 
1530  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 422. 
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argued that as the terms of the contract deprived Beukes of control over his life to 
such an extent that it relegated him to the position of a slave, the contract treated 
Beukes merely as a means to an end and not as an end in himself, and therefore, 
infringed upon his human dignity.1531   
 
In dealing with the role of human dignity in the law of contract, Lubbe further 
emphasised that Kant’s second categorical imperative does not mean that a 
contracting party should never treat the other contracting party as a means to her 
own ends, but rather that she must never treat the other contracting party merely 
as a means, but always also as an end.1532 Accordingly, he argued that Kant’s 
second categorical imperative, like good faith, “suggests that in the pursuit of 
one’s own ends, a minimum level of regard for the interests of others is 
indicated”.1533 This is because contracts are typically bilateral co-operative 
ventures in terms of which both parties have to perform and both benefit from the 
contractual relationship in some manner. In other words, each party’s contractual 
performance contributes to the other party’s pursuit of her unique ends, while at 
the same time, each party also uses the other party as a means in pursuit of her 
own unique ends. Hence, the contract terms will always reflect two unique set of 
ends that must be harmonised with each other.1534 Ultimately, this means that 
when determining whether a contract term infringes the human dignity of one of 
the parties, a court has to balance the interests of both parties in order to 
determine whether the contract term constitutes an unfair infringement of that 
party’s interests and hence violates her human dignity.1535 This led Barnard to 
                                            
1531  See also Floyd “Legality” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract (2012) 186. 
1532  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421 n 188 referring to Beyleveld & Brownsword 1998 Modern Law 
Review 666 n 30. See also Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 36.2(b). Cf the formulation of Kant’s second categorical imperative as quoted in 
the text at n 1232 supra.  
1533  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 421 n 188.  
1534  See also Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20 who speaks of the need to harmonise conflicting individual 
interests. Cf Cornell’s interpretation of Kant’s kingdom of ends which entails the harmonisation 
of ends as discussed in the text at n 1305 supra.  
1535  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20 proposes a similar test based on good faith: “Die implikasie is egter 
dat die onredelike bevodering van eiebelang ten koste van die ander party tot die kontraktuele 
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argue that human dignity as constraint can find expression through the principle of 
good faith:  
 
Dignity as constraint “may subvert, rather than enhance choice” in 
situations where freedom is restricted by the State, because it is believed 
to interfere with the dignity of the individual, a social group or the human 
race as a whole. In contract, we might then refer to this dignity as 
constraint as dignity as good faith, because good faith is said to operate 
as constraint (or corrective) on the utmost freedom of contract.1536 
 
In view of the above analysis, it is submitted that the idea of human dignity as 
constraint would require the development of the principle of good faith into a 
substantive rule that can be used to set aside an unfair contract term because it 
infringes the human dignity of one of the contracting parties. In other words, the 
idea of human dignity as constraint supports a general equitable jurisdiction to 
declare an unfair contract term invalid. However, as was seen above, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal favours the idea of human dignity as empowerment 
which prohibited the revival of good faith in the common law of contract and 
denied any equitable jurisdiction to declare unfair contract terms invalid.1537  
 
It has been shown that the Constitutional Court is developing the constitutional 
value of human dignity as both empowerment and constraint which came about 
from the harmonisation of Kantian dignity and ubuntu.1538 In view of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s preference for the conception of human dignity as empowerment 
which continued the limited role of good faith in addressing contractual unfairness, 
it is submitted that the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier relied on 
                                                                                                                                    
verhouding strydig mag wees met die bona fides” (The implication is that the unreasonable 
promotion of self-interest at the expense of the other contracting party may be contrary to the 
bona fides). 
1536  Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 232. See also Barnard 2005 
SAJHR 289. 
1537  See the discussions dealing with the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 
2 4 supra.  
1538  Cf the discussion dealing with the Constitutional Court’s approach to human dignity in para  3 2 
7 2 supra. 
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ubuntu to import the concept of human dignity as constraint into the common law 
of contract.1539  
 
In order to place my interpretation of Barkhuizen v Napier into context it is 
necessary to summarise the communis opinio (if any) on this case. It is generally 
accepted that the Constitutional Court laid down a two-part test for fairness 
dealing with the fairness of the clause itself and the enforcement of the clause.1540 
The first part of the test requires a balancing act between the policy considerations 
of freedom and sanctity of contract which gives effect to the constitutional values 
of freedom and human dignity on the one hand, and another policy consideration 
as reflected in a constitutional right or value in support of the non-enforcement of 
the contract on the other. This examination is objective in nature. If the court finds 
that the clause objectively does not violate public policy, the court then has to 
determine whether the clause violates public policy in light of the relative situation 
of the contracting parties which would include an assessment of the bargaining 
position of the parties which determination is subjective in nature. The second part 
of the test for fairness investigates whether, in spite of the fact that the clause itself 
does not violate public policy, enforcement of the clause would be fair in light of 
the circumstances which prevented compliance therewith. The second part of the 
test is therefore subjective in nature. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa1541 interpreted the Constitutional 
Court’s decision as requiring an objective investigation in both parts of the test.  
 
As was mentioned above, the objective test for fairness requires a balancing act 
between freedom and sanctity of contract as an expression of the constitutional 
values of freedom and human dignity on the one hand and another policy 
consideration as reflected in a constitutional value or right in favour of non-
enforcement on the other. In this respect, the court in Barkhuizen v Napier stated 
that “[s]elf-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own 
                                            
1539  Cf the discussions of this case in paras  2 3 2 3 &  2 3 3 2 supra. 
1540  Cf the discussion in the text at n 873 supra.  
1541  Cf the discussion in the text at n 906 supra. 
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detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity”.1542 Therefore, 
the court recognised the importance of contractual freedom in respecting the 
human dignity of a contracting party.1543 However, the court’s view that the ability 
to regulate your own affairs (even to your own detriment) gives effect to the 
constitutional values of freedom and human dignity has been criticised as another 
attempt to give constitutional entrenchment to the classical liberal conception of 
freedom and sanctity of contract as reflected in the idea of human dignity as 
empowerment.1544 The court did not take into consideration the idea of human 
dignity as constraint as reflected in the duty to respect the human dignity of the 
other contracting party and which would provide justification for setting aside a 
freely concluded contract term or the enforcement of such a term where it violates 
one of the contracting party’s human dignity.1545 In other words, the court did not 
recognise that the constitutional value of, or right to, human dignity can also be 
invoked on the other side of the balancing scale to limit contractual freedom and 
that this would necessarily implicate the notion of fairness because it entails a 
balancing act of the different parties’ interests as reflected in the contract terms 
themselves.  
 
It is submitted that the objective test for fairness as laid down in Barkhuizen v 
Napier will always entail a weighing up between the human dignity of the 
contracting party who wants to enforce the contract term as expressed through the 
maxims of freedom and sanctity of contract and the human dignity of the other 
contracting party who avers that the contract term infringes her human dignity as 
expressed in the demand that a human being should never be treated merely as a 
means to an end, but always also as an end.1546 Nevertheless, it can be argued 
                                            
1542  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57. Cf the discussion of this case in para  2 3 2 
3 supra. 
1543  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 24. 
1544  Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2822; Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 347; Davis 2011 Stell LR 854; Davis & 
Klare 2010 SAJHR 478; Davis 2010 SAJHR 93; Brand 2009 SALJ 85-86; Bhana 2008 
SAJHR 315; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420-421. 
1545  Brand 2009 SALJ 85; Bhana 2007 SALJ 274; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420-421.  
1546  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1532 supra (dealing with Lubbe’s postulation on how human 
dignity can be conceptualised through good faith). 
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that the court did import the idea of human dignity as constraint into the subjective 
test for fairness (whether dealing with the term itself or the enforcement of the 
term) by relying on the concept of ubuntu. This interpretation is proposed by 
Cornell and Muvangua: 
 
To make the next step in the analysis, Justice Ngcobo turns to ubuntu in 
that ubuntu demands that values like justice and reasonableness must 
be taken into account when assessing any specific contract, and the 
actual relations of power between the parties.1547  
 
Although the court did not explicitly link ubuntu to the constitutional value of 
human dignity, it is submitted that the court’s formulation of the subjective test 
reflects the concept of human dignity as constraint as informed by the concept of 
ubuntu. The Constitutional Court stated that public policy takes account of the 
necessity to do simple justice between man and man which is informed by the 
concept of ubuntu.1548 As previously discussed, in the pre-constitutional appeal 
court decision of Sasfin v Beukes,1549 the policy consideration of simple justice 
between man and man was used to set aside an unfair contract where it was 
found that the terms itself were so unfair as to be considered against public policy. 
Accordingly, in Sasfin v Beukes the test was objective in nature as the court 
balanced the interests of the parties as reflected in the contract terms itself and did 
not take account of relative situation of the contracting parties at contract 
conclusion or enforcement. As submitted before,1550 it could be argued that the 
court’s decision in Sasfin v Beukes provides support for the notion of human 
dignity as constraint as reflected in the duty of a contracting party to respect the 
human dignity of the other contracting party which has been linked to the principle 
of good faith. By using ubuntu to inform the concept of public policy to take 
account of the need to do justice between the contracting parties, it is submitted 
that the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier has now recognised that a 
contracting party must respect and promote the human dignity of the other 
                                            
1547  Cornell & Muvangua “Introduction” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012) 24. 
1548  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 51. 
1549  Cf the discussion of this case in the text at n 774 supra. 
1550  Cf the discussion of this case in the text at n 1524 supra. 
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contracting party. By relying on ubuntu, the court recognised the interdependence 
of contracting parties and how they are intertwined in ethical relations with each 
other which result in an obligation on each contracting party to respect and 
promote the human dignity of the other contracting party.1551 Bhana and Broeders 
argue that in the sphere of contract law ubuntu “highlights the (increasing) reality 
of human interdependence and solidarity in parties’ dealings with each other, 
operating in the post-apartheid constitutional context”.1552 Consequently, the 
subjective part of the test for fairness obliges the court to determine the fairness of 
the contract term and its enforcement by taking into account the parties’ relative 
bargaining powers and the actual circumstances which prevented compliance with 
the contract term.1553 This implies that through the concept of ubuntu the court is 
now required to “take better account of the lived realities” of the parties.1554 
Therefore, the subjective test for fairness recognises and promotes substantive 
equality1555 in order to promote and realise the human dignity of the contracting 
parties. Phrased differently, it is submitted that the court introduced the idea of 
human dignity as constraint as reflected in one contracting party’s duties to 
respect the human dignity of the other contracting party and to promote the 
realisation of the human dignity of that contracting party in view of the surrounding 
circumstances of the contract and the bargaining position of the parties when 
determining whether the contract term or its enforcement would be unfair. 
However, as a result of the Constitutional Court’s reticence to elaborate the 
concept of human dignity as constraint, the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa interpreted the decision in 
Barkhuizen v Napier as not holding that fairness is a requirement for the 
enforcement of a contract term.1556 Instead, the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that fairness and reasonableness only become relevant when another 
                                            
1551 Cf the discussion of human dignity through ubuntu in para  3 2 5 supra.  
1552  Bhana & Broeders 2014 THRHR 175. 
1553  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. 
1554  Bhana & Broeders 2014 THRHR 175. 
1555  Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 399. See also Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2829; Bhana 2008 SAJHR 316. 
1556  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 50-
53. 
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constitutional value or right is implicated.1557 As the court relied on the decision in 
Barkhuizen v Napier to embrace the view that human dignity only supported the 
idea of freedom and sanctity of contract1558 it is safe to assume that the court did 
not envisage that this other constitutional value or right could be human dignity as 
well. 
 
In consideration of the above analysis, it can be seen why the Constitutional Court 
questioned the limited role of good faith in the common law of contract.1559 As was 
argued previously,1560 good faith can also be understood as human dignity as 
constraint reflected in the duty to respect the human dignity of the other 
contracting party. Phrased differently, theoretically good faith can be used to 
determine whether a contract term violates the human dignity of one of the 
contracting parties because it unfairly infringes upon the interests of that 
contracting party as reflected in the terms of the contract itself. Furthermore, it can 
be argued that the Constitutional Court envisaged that such development of good 
faith would be informed by ubuntu as an underlying constitutional value, in view of 
the previous decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal that reaffirmed the limited 
role of good faith after the enactment of the Constitution.1561 However, after the 
judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier, the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated that 
good faith is not a substantive rule to be used to set aside an unfair contract term 
or the unfair enforcement thereof.1562 Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court’s 
subsequent obiter but unanimous statement in Everfresh Market Virginia v 
                                            
1557  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 47. 
1558  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 50. 
1559  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82. 
1560  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1536 supra. 
1561  Cf the discussion of Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) & Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 
2002 6 SA 21 (SCA)  in para  2 3 2 2 supra. 
1562  Cf the discussion of African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours CC 
and others 2011 3 SA 511 (SCA) para 28; Maphango and others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties 
(Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) paras 23-24; Potgieter and another v Potgieter NO and others 
2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) paras 32-33 in para  2 3 2 4 supra. 
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Shoprite Checkers that the concept of good faith must be infused by ubuntu as an 
underlying constitutional value left the door open in this respect.1563  
 
It is therefore regrettable that the Constitutional Court did not rely on ubuntu in the 
subsequent case of Botha v Rich1564 although it is submitted that the court 
endorsed the idea of human dignity as constraint which in this instance was 
conceptualised through the principle of good faith. It is important to note that Botha 
contended that the cancellation of the contract, in other words, the enforcement of 
the cancellation clause by the trustees were contrary to public policy because it 
violated her constitutional rights.1565 It is not stated which constitutional rights 
Botha implicated in her application before the Constitutional Court. However, it can 
be argued that she most probably relied upon her rights to dignity and equality.1566 
It is further submitted that the court implicated the constitutional value of human 
dignity1567 when it referred to the constitutional demand that contracting parties 
must be treated with equal worth and concern.1568 Accordingly, it is submitted 
Botha and the court did implicate a policy consideration as reflected in a specific 
constitutional right or value in favour of the non-enforcement of the relevant clause 
as envisaged by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of 
South Africa.1569  
 
                                            
1563  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 71 
as discussed in the text at n 983 supra. 
1564  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) as discussed in para  2 3 2 5 
supra. 
1565  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 19. 
1566  These were the rights cited by the applicant in her appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 15).  
1567 The Constitutional Court has held that human dignity refers to the inherent and equal worth of 
human beings in a number of cases. Cf the discussion dealing with the Constitutional Court’s 
approach to human dignity in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
1568  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 40. 
1569  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 47 as 
discussed in the text at n 907 supra. 
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In Botha v Rich, the court emphasised that public policy generally requires 
freedom and sanctity of contract as an expression of the constitutional values of 
freedom and human dignity1570 which accords with the idea of human dignity as 
empowerment. It is submitted that the court then applied the idea of human dignity 
as constraint which it conceptualised through the principle of good faith: 
 
The principle of reciprocity falls squarely within this understanding of 
good faith and freedom of contract, based on one’s own dignity and 
freedom as well as respect for the dignity and freedom of others. Bilateral 
contracts are almost invariably cooperative ventures where two parties 
have reached a deal involving performances by each in order to benefit 
both. Honouring that contract cannot therefore be a matter of each side 
pursuing his or her own self-interest without regard to the other party’s 
interest. Good faith is the lens through which we come to understand 
contracts in that way.1571 
 
This statement was made in respect of the application of the exceptio non 
adimpleti contractus to the facts of the case, but later the court stated that the 
enforcement of the cancellation clause and the concomitant forfeiture of the 
purchase price already paid was unfair1572 for the same reasons because it 
constituted a disproportionate penalty in circumstances where three-quarters of 
the purchase price has already been paid.1573  
 
In the first instance, it can be argued that by referring to both parties’ human 
dignity1574 the court recognised that determining the fairness of a contract term or 
the enforcement thereof will always entail a balancing act between the human 
dignity of the contracting party who wants to enforce the contract term as 
expressed through the maxims of freedom and sanctity of contract and the human 
                                            
1570  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 23 esp n 38. 
1571  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 46.  
1572  The court specifically speaks of the “fairness of awarding cancellation” (Botha and another v 
Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 51). 
1573  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 51. 
1574  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 46 where the court speaks 
of the “reciprocal recognition of the dignity … of the respective contracting parties”.  
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dignity of the other contracting party who avers that the contract term infringes her 
human dignity as expressed in the demand that a human being should never be 
treated merely as a means to an end, but always also as an end.1575 This is further 
supported by the court’s statement that bilateral contracts typically entail 
performances by and benefits to both parties. As was seen above,1576 this means 
that the unique set of ends of both parties must be harmonised which entails that 
the court has to weigh up the interests of both parties in order to determine 
whether the contract term constitutes an unfair infringement of one of the party’s 
interests and hence violates her human dignity. It is submitted that the 
Constitutional Court relied upon human dignity as constraint as conceptualised 
through good faith and endorsed Lubbe’s proposal that good faith requires that in 
the pursuit of her own interests, a party must have regard to the interests of the 
other party. This is supported by the court’s statement that “[t]he principle of 
reciprocity falls squarely within this understanding of good faith and freedom of 
contract, based on one’s own dignity and freedom as well as respect for the 
dignity and freedom of others”.1577 
 
Consequently, it is submitted that the court impliedly invoked the concept of 
human dignity as constraint which enabled the court to apply the subjective test for 
fairness in determining whether the enforcement of the cancellation clause was 
unfair. In coming to the decision that the enforcement of the cancellation clause 
was unfair, the court took specific notice of the fact that the cancellation in the 
specific circumstances of the case would entail the forfeiture of almost three-
quarters of the purchase price that was already paid by Botha. As the court 
explicitly linked good faith to both duties as reflected in human dignity as 
constraint, namely to respect and promote the human dignity of the other 
contracting party, the decision relies by implication on ubuntu. As was argued 
                                            
1575  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1545 supra (in the context of the decision in Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC)).   
1576  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1532 supra (dealing with Lubbe’s postulation on how human 
dignity can be conceptualised through good faith). 
1577  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 46. 
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above,1578 the subjective part of the test for fairness which includes substantive 
equality is an expression of ubuntu, as it requires an investigation into the 
contracting parties’ actual social and economic conditions. Accordingly, ubuntu 
can be construed as the subtext. In terms of this interpretation further factors in 
favour of the non-enforcement of the cancellation clause would have come to the 
fore. For example, Hawthorne argued that the parties were in an unequal 
bargaining relationship: 
 
To enter into an instalment sales contract in terms of which the purchaser 
agrees to losing everything in the event of defaulting is a clear indication 
that the purchaser, Botha (and every other instalment purchaser), had 
little negotiating power in reaching this agreement. If she had been in a 
stronger position she would have qualified for a mortgage initially.1579  
 
A further possible factor is the fact that Botha used the property to operate a 
laundry service through a closed corporation of which she was the sole 
member.1580 Losing the property would probably mean that she would no longer 
be able to operate her business which provided her with a substantial part (if not 
the sole source) of her income.1581 Therefore, enforcement of the cancellation 
clause, coupled with the forfeiture of the purchase price already paid, might well 
have resulted in the deprivation of Botha’s livelihood. Whether this would actually 
have been the result of enforcement of the cancellation clause cannot be 
ascertained from the court’s decision but supports the argument that various other 
factors relating to the actual social and economic position of the parties would 
have been relevant in determining the fairness of the enforcement of the 
cancellation clause.  
 
                                            
1578  Cf the discussions in the text at n 969 & n 1547 supra. 
1579  Hawthorne 2016 THRHR 299. 
1580  Botha and another v Rich NO and others 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 3. 
1581  The relevance of these factors are evidenced by Bhana & Meerkotter’s contention that the 
facts of the case could have implicated the right to property (s 25) & the right to freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession (section 22) (see Bhana & Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 505). 
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The above analysis validates the submission that the Constitutional Court is in the 
process of developing the aspect of human dignity as constraint in the common 
law of contract which is the result of the harmonisation of Kantian dignity and 
ubuntu. In this respect, human dignity as constraint would refer to the duty to 
respect the human dignity of the other party as based on Kantian dignity and 
ubuntu, and the duty to promote the realisation of the other party’s human dignity 
through the idea of substantive equality as based on ubuntu. Therefore, ubuntu as 
an underlying value of the Constitution has provided the Constitutional Court with 
the means to develop the constitutional value of human dignity into a multifaceted 
concept of human dignity of which both aspects, empowerment and constraint, 
must find expression in the common law of contract in a way that promotes 
substantive equality. 
  
In conclusion it is submitted that recognition of human dignity as constraint in the 
common law of contract through the open norm of public policy inevitably results in 
a balancing act between human dignity as empowerment versus human dignity as 
constraint; the contracting party who wishes to enforce the contract term relies on  
freedom and sanctity of contract as opposed to the other contracting party who 
avers that the contract term infringes her human dignity, as expressed in the 
demand that a human being should never be treated merely as a means to an 
end, but always also as an end. Accordingly, the court will always have to balance 
the interests of the contracting parties in order to determine whether a contract 
term or its enforcement constitutes an unfair infringement of one of the party’s 
interests and hence violates her human dignity. Therefore, the application of 
human dignity as constraint in the common law of contract means that notions of 
fairness and reasonableness are always implicated when the court has to 
determine whether a contract term or its enforcement is contrary to public policy. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the proper appreciation of the constitutional 
value of human dignity in the common law of contract results in a general 
equitable discretion to declare unfair contract terms or the unfair enforcement of 
contract terms invalid. Furthermore, it is submitted that this would entail the 
development of good faith into a substantive rule that can be used to set aside 
unfair contract terms or the unfair enforcement of contract terms.   
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3 3 EQUALITY  
3 3 1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter one,1582 equality is enshrined in the Constitution as both 
a founding constitutional value and a substantive right. The focus in this thesis is 
on the role of equality as a foundational constitutional value as the Constitutional 
Court has followed that approach when dealing with constitutional challenges to 
contractual terms.1583 In addition, Albertyn and Goldblatt argue that in contrast to 
the right to equality, the constitutional value of equality is open to “a more 
expansive meaning” and “unencumbered by more practical considerations 
manifest in the doctrine of the separation of powers and related concerns 
regarding institutional competence”.1584 Furthermore, this section does not 
constitute a comprehensive discussion of the equality jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court but focusses on the relevant aspects needed to address the 
research problem. 
 
3 3 2 The approach to equality in the Constitution 
The importance of the constitutional value of equality is underscored by the vast 
inequalities prevalent in South African society which are a result of South Africa’s 
history of colonialism and apartheid.1585 Accordingly, the Constitution reflects not 
only a commitment to formal equality but also aims to achieve substantive 
equality.1586 As was shown in chapter one,1587 formal equality entails that 
                                            
1582  Cf the discussion dealing with the constitutional value of equality in para  1 8 2 2 supra. 
1583  Cf the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) in the text at n 1114 supra. For 
an investigation into the implications of the right to equality in the common law of contract see 
Bhana 2017 SALJ 141-161. 
1584  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(b). See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al 
Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 331. 
1585  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(a). The creation of these inequalities were also referred to throughout ch 1 
(esp para  1 4 –  1 7) supra.  
1586  Cf the discussion on the constitutional value of equality in para  1 8 2 2 supra. 
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everyone should be treated the same and prohibits any irrational or arbitrary 
differentiation in treatment. The notion of formal equality is reflected in section 9(1) 
of the Constitution which provides that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. In contrast, the idea of 
substantive equality1588 requires an understanding of the social and economic 
conditions that create and reinforce inequality within society and involves an 
investigation into the context, specifically the actual lived, social and economic 
conditions of the relevant persons or groups. The notion of substantive equality is 
supported by the Preamble,1589 sections 1(a)1590 and 9(2)1591 of the Constitution 
and the various socio-economic rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
 
Albertyn and Goldblatt note that the idea of substantive equality as reflected in the 
Constitution does not provide a clear answer to the question “equality of 
what?”1592 These authors argue that the constitutional value of equality should at 
least embrace both the ideas of “equality of opportunities” and “equality of 
outcomes” which would entail the “redistribution of power and resources and the 
elimination of material disadvantage”.1593 
 
                                                                                                                                    
1587  Cf the discussion on formal equality in para  1 8 2 2(a) supra. 
1588  Cf the discussion dealing with substantive equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra. 
1589  As reflected in the aims of the Constitution to “[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights” and  
“[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person”. 
1590  As reflected in the “achievement of equality” as a founding constitutional value. 
1591  The section provides as follows: “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken.” 
1592  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(a)-(b). See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis 
et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 333. 
1593  Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 35.1(b). See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al 
Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 333. 
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3 3 3 The approach to equality by the Constitutional Court 
The importance of the constitutional value of equality in addressing the unequal 
past of South Africa has been acknowledged by Justice Kriegler in President of 
the RSA v Hugo: 
 
The South African Constitution is primarily and emphatically an 
egalitarian Constitution. The supreme laws of comparable constitutional 
states may underscore other principles and rights. But in the light of our 
own particular history, and our vision for the future, a Constitution was 
written with equality at its centre. Equality is our Constitution’s focus and 
its organising principle.1594 
  
The Constitutional Court (per Justice Goldstone) further emphasised the link 
between human dignity and equality when it made the following statement: 
 
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition 
that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded 
equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular 
groups.1595 
 
With specific reference to Canadian law the court held that equality does not allow 
for “distinctions that treat certain people as “second-class citizens”, “demean 
them”, “treat them as less capable for no good reason” or offends “fundamental 
human dignity”.1596 The notion that all human beings have equal moral worth and 
must be treated with equal concern and respect is a reflection of Kantian 
                                            
1594  President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 74. See also Albertyn “Values in the 
South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 330. 
1595  President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41 (my emphasis). See also Albertyn 
“Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global 
values (2015) 327; De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman 
(eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 426. 
1596  President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41 referring to Egan v Canada (1995) 29 
CRR (2d) 104-105. 
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dignity.1597 If all human beings have the same inherent dignity, they are equal in 
dignity and should be treated as such. As further explained by Wood: 
 
Human dignity, however, requires that all people be treated as alike in 
dignity; however they might differ in other properties. Equality based on 
human dignity is also not like the equality of two bills or coins you might 
find in your pocket. For these are equal only in what Kant would call 
“price”. Human dignity is equal only in the sense that as a value that is 
absolute, it is a value that cannot be compared or exchanged, hence a 
value that cannot be unequal.1598 
 
The link between dignity and equality was reiterated in a number of constitutional 
court cases dealing with the right to equality.1599 Specifically, Albertyn points out 
that the Kantian conception of human dignity was emphasised in the equality 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court dealing with gay and lesbian rights.1600 
Consequently, this approach was criticised for “its narrow, individualist focus on 
individual personality issues rather than a group-based understanding of material 
                                            
1597  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1444 supra. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African 
Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 326-327; De Vos 
“Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 427; Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law 
(2014) para 36.2(b); Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
law (2014) para 35.1(d)(i); Botha 2009 Stell LR 203. 
1598  Wood 2008 Acta Juridica 50. See also Ackermann Human dignity (2013) 55-56; Cornell 2010 
SAPL 385; Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 36. 
1599  See e.g. Prinsloo v Van der Linde and another 1997 3 SA 1012 (CC) paras 31-33; Harksen v 
Lane No and others 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 50. See also De Vos “Equality, human dignity 
and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 427. 
1600  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 327-328. She refers to the following cases: Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC); J v 
Director-General, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC); Du Toit v Minister for 
Welfare and Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); Satchwell v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2003 4 SA 266 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
and another v Minister of Justice and others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC). 
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disadvantage and the systemic nature of inequality”.1601 Therefore, the Kantian 
conception of dignity as incorporated into the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court has been regarded as inadequate to promote the realisation of socio-
economic rights, and hence substantive equality, as provided for in the 
Constitution.1602 However, in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 
dealing with the right to healthcare1603 Justice Chaskalson explicitly linked the 
constitutional value of human dignity with the promotion of socio-economic rights: 
 
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions 
of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is 
a high level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do 
not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. These 
conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a 
commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in 
which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart 
of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue 
to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.1604 
 
Similarly, in respect of the right to housing,1605 Justice Yacoob in Government of 
the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom stated that human dignity (together with 
freedom and equality) “are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter” 
                                            
1601  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 328. See further De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De 
Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 427-428; Albertyn & Goldblatt 
“Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 35.1(d)(i); Albertyn & 
Goldblatt 1998 SAJHR 248, 247-258. 
1602  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 328. See also De Vos “Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De 
Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 427-428; Albertyn & Goldblatt 
“Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) para 35.1(d)(i). Cf the 
discussion dealing with the criticisms levied against Kantian dignity in para  3 2 4 3 supra. 
1603  S 27 of the Constitution. 
1604  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8 (my emphasis). 
See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the 
existence of global values (2015) 328.  
1605  S 26 of the Constitution. 
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and that “[a] society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are 
provided to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and 
equality”.1606 As was shown above,1607 the Constitutional Court has relied upon 
the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu to develop an understanding of 
human dignity that promotes the realisation of the socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the Constitution. In emphasising the link between human dignity and 
equality in promoting the realisation of socio-economic rights, the Constitutional 
Court has endorsed the idea of substantive equality as denoting a concern with 
what Albertyn and Goldblatt have referred to as “equality of outcomes”,1608 
specifically in respect of people’s basic human needs.1609 In Khosa v The Minister 
of Social Development, Justice Mokgoro spoke of the need “to ensure that people 
are afforded their basic needs”.1610 Also, in Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom the court held that “[a] society must seek to ensure that the 
basic necessities of life are provided to all”.1611 
 
In Bato Star Fishing v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism1612 Justice 
Ngcobo confirmed the Constitution’s commitment to substantive equality as 
                                            
1606  Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and others 2001 1 SA 46 
(CC) paras 23 & 44. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al 
Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 328. 
1607  Cf the discussions dealing with human dignity through ubuntu in para  3 2 5 & the approach to 
human dignity by the Constitutional Court in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
1608  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1593 supra.  
1609  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 328. See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881. 
1610  Khosa and others v The Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and others v 
Minister of social Development and others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 52. 
1611  Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and others 2001 1 SA 46 
(CC) para 44. See also Hawthorne 2011 SAPL 434-435. 
1612  This case concerned the allocation of fishing quotas in the fishing industry, including the 
interpretation and application of section 18(5) of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 
which provided that when allocating fishing quotas particular regard must be given to 
“historically disadvantaged sectors of society”. 
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reflected in sections 1(a) and 9(2) of the Constitution.1613 The justice explained the 
substantive meaning of equality as follows: 
 
The achievement of equality is one of the fundamental goals that we 
have fashioned for ourselves in the Constitution. Our constitutional order 
is committed to the transformation of our society from a grossly unequal 
society to one “in which there is equality between men and women and 
people of all races”. In this fundamental way, our Constitution differs from 
other constitutions which assume that all are equal and in so doing 
simply entrench existing inequalities.1614  
 
The learned justice further acknowledged that this would entail a balancing act 
between the adverse effects of the transformation on historically privileged 
community members and the goal to promote the substantive equality of 
previously disadvantaged members of the community: 
 
There are profound difficulties that will be confronted in giving effect to 
the constitutional commitment of achieving equality. We must not 
underestimate them. The measures that bring about transformation will 
inevitably affect some members of the society adversely, particularly 
those coming from the previously advantaged communities. It may well 
be that other considerations may have to yield in favour of achieving 
the goal we fashioned for ourselves in the Constitution.1615 
 
In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden,1616 Justice Moseneke confirmed the 
Constitution’s commitment to substantive equality to promote social justice by 
                                            
1613  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 4 
SA 490 (CC) para 75. Cf the discussion dealing with substantive equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) 
supra.  
1614  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 4 
SA 490 (CC) para 74. 
1615  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 4 
SA 490 (CC) para 76. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et 
al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 332. 
1616  This case concerned the constitutionality of a scheme to subsidise the pension contributions of 
members of parliament appointed after 1994 in order to address inequality between privileged 
and disadvantaged parliament members. 
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addressing the injustices of the past1617 and held that the notion of substantive 
equality requires an investigation into the surrounding circumstances of the 
case.1618 Specifically, the court endorsed1619 the idea of restitutionary (or remedial) 
equality described by Justice Ackermann in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality and another v Minister of Justice as follows: 
 
Particularly in a country such as South Africa, persons belonging to 
certain categories have suffered considerable unfair discrimination in the 
past. It is insufficient for the Constitution merely to ensure, through its Bill 
of Rights, that statutory provisions which have caused such unfair 
discrimination in the past are eliminated. Past unfair discrimination 
frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the continuation of which 
is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are eliminated, 
and unless remedied, may continue for a substantial time and even 
indefinitely. Like justice, equality delayed is equality denied.1620 
 
In this respect, in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden the court held that 
section 9(1) which endorses the idea of formal equality must be read in 
conjunction with section 9(2) which promotes the idea of substantive equality: 
 
Equality before the law protection in s 9(1) and measures to promote 
equality in s 9(2) are both necessary and mutually reinforcing but may 
                                            
1617  Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) paras 25-26. See further 
Albertyn & Goldblatt “Equality” in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law (2014) 
para 35.4(a); Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 214; De Vos “Equality, human 
dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law (2014) 
422-423; Botha 2001 THRHR (3) 535. 
1618  Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 27. See also De Vos 
“Equality, human dignity and privacy rights” in De Vos & Freedman (eds) South African 
constitutional law (2014) 422-423. Cf the discussion on substantive equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) 
supra. 
1619  Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 30. 
1620  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another v Minister of Justice and others 
1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 60. See Currie & De Waal Bill of rights handbook (2014) 214; 
Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 26-27 where she cites various statistics to illustrate 
the continuing existence of various inequalities in South African society; Bhana & Pieterse 
2005 SALJ 880. 
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sometimes serve distinguishable purposes, which I need not discuss 
now. However, what is clear is that our Constitution and in particular s 9 
thereof, read as a whole, embraces for good reason a substantive 
conception of equality inclusive of measures to redress existing 
inequality. Absent a positive commitment progressively to eradicate 
socially constructed barriers to equality and to root out systematic or 
institutionalised underprivilege, the constitutional promise of equality 
before the law and its equal protection and benefit must, in the context of 
our country, ring hollow.1621  
 
Consequently, Albertyn argued that the court’s approach suggested that “the value 
of substantive equality can be prioritised over a more individualised version of 
dignity”.1622  
 
More recently, in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard, Justice 
Moseneke (for the majority) stressed the importance of the constitutional values of 
human dignity and equality in endorsing a substantive approach to equality.1623 
With reference to the above decisions,1624 the court emphasised that the correct 
balance must be found between the adverse effects of the transformation on 
historically privileged community members and the goal to promote the 
substantive equality of previously disadvantaged members of the community: 
 
Remedial measures must be implemented in a way that advances the 
position of people who have suffered past discrimination. Equally, they 
must not unduly invade the human dignity of those affected by them, if 
                                            
1621  Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 30. Referred to with 
approval by Justice Van der Westhuizen in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo 
Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 136. 
1622  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 333. See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 881. 
1623  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 28 (Justice 
Moseneke) & para 135 (Justice Van der Westhuizen) 
1624  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 30 referring to 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 4 
SA 490 (CC) (as discussed in the text at n 1612 supra) & Minister of Finance and another v 
Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) (as discussed in the text at n 1616 supra). 
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we are truly to achieve a non-racial, non-sexist and socially inclusive 
society.1625 
 
As previously explained,1626 in his separate judgment in South African Police 
Service v Solidarity obo Barnard, Justice van der Westhuizen developed the 
constitutional value of human dignity to include a duty on the individual to assist in 
the creation of the necessary conditions for the realisation of the human dignity of 
the other community members through the promotion of substantive equality. This 
development can be viewed as the result of the harmonisation between Kantian 
dignity and ubuntu. In this respect, Justice van der Westhuizen further held that 
such a constraint of an individual’s freedom should be viewed as enhancing the 
individual’s human dignity as well. 
 
Finally, when dealing with the idea of substantive equality in the context of the 
right to equality, it could be argued that the Constitutional Court has endorsed both 
notions of substantive equality i.e. “equality of opportunities” and “equality of 
outcomes” as promoted by Albertyn and Goldblatt above.1627 In Bato Star Fishing 
v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Justice O’Regan linked the 
constitutional value of equality to the Constitution’s aim to create a society “in 
which all people have equal access to economic opportunities”.1628 More recently, 
in South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard, it would seem that 
Justice Moseneke endorsed the idea of equality that is more concerned with the 
material outcome of the inequality. Although the court recognised that much has 
been done “to equalise opportunities for social progress”, it held that the prevalent 
inequalities require that “[r]emedial measures must be implemented in a way that 
advances the position of the people who have suffered past discrimination”.1629 
                                            
1625  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) paras 30-32. 
1626  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1476 supra. 
1627  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1593 supra. 
1628  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 4 
SA 490 (CC) para 92. See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et 
al Inquiry into the existence of global values (2015) 333. 
1629  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 29 read with 
para 32. 
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3 3 4 The approach to equality in the common law of contract 
As previously explained,1630 the classical law of contract emphasises the 
principles of freedom and sanctity of contract and is based on the political 
philosophies of individualism and economic liberalism. It assumes that the 
contracting parties are in an equal bargaining position and is based on formal 
equality, which is equality before the law. Accordingly, the classical law of contract 
is not concerned with the respective bargaining positions of the parties or the 
resulting unfairness of the bargain but views any inequality between the 
contracting parties as the result of the parties’ natural differences and capabilities. 
Where there is a conflict between the values of freedom and equality, preference 
is given to the value of freedom.1631 As explained by Hawthorne, “[f]reedom 
combined with equality results in the liberal equality of equal opportunity, which 
accepts the dominance of freedom”.1632 
 
As discussed in chapter two,1633 the Supreme Court of Appeal followed the 
classical law of contract in Brisley v Drotsky which case concerned the 
enforcement of a non-variation clause. Specifically, the court endorsed a formal 
approach to equality when it held that because the non-variation clause was the 
result of the parties’ “free choice” and provided both parties with protection, the 
potential inequality of the parties’ bargaining position was irrelevant.1634 Therefore, 
the court did not consider the social and economic realities and systematic 
inequalities to which the weaker party could possibly be exposed, especially 
where “economic survival and basic needs are at stake”.1635 Because the classical 
model of contract law ignores the reality of unequal bargaining relationships, the 
adherence to a strict doctrine of contractual autonomy does not advance 
                                            
1630  Cf the discussion on the classical law of contract in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
1631  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880. 
1632  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 159. 
1633  Cf the detailed discussion of this case in para  2 3 2 2 supra. 
1634  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 26. 
1635  Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 360. See also Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 166. 
313 
 
egalitarian ideals, but rather confirms and results in social inequalities which 
allows for possible exploitation of one party by the other.1636  
 
However, in modern contract law increasing recognition is given to the fact that the 
formal conception of equality does not prevent exploitation of a contracting party in 
a weaker bargaining position and that freedom of contract should be limited where 
it is necessary to protect more vulnerable individuals and groups against economic 
and social exploitation.1637 Therefore, modern law of contract tends to promote 
substantive equality1638 and fits perfectly with South African constitutional 
provisions1639 and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.1640 Bhana and 
Pieterse maintain that the transformative aim of the Constitution to establish a 
more egalitarian society means that the founding constitutional value of equality 
may require the limitation of individual freedom in different manners and under 
different circumstances.1641 This approach accords with the Constitutional Court’s 
view that individual freedoms may need to be limited to promote the greater 
constitutional aim of an egalitarian society.1642 Consequently, freedom will not 
always take precedence over equality as reflected in the classical law of 
contract.1643 
 
                                            
1636  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 163 & 166. See also Barnard-Naudé 2013 SAJHR 476. 
1637  Cf the discussion dealing with the modern law of contract in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
1638  Cf the discussion on substantive equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra. See also Bhana & Pieterse 
2005 SALJ 880. 
1639  Cf the discussion dealing with the approach to equality in the Constitution in para  3 3 2 supra. 
1640  Cf the discussion dealing with the approach to equality by the Constitutional Court in para  3 3 3 
supra. 
1641  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880. In this respect they refer to the provisions of the Promotion 
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 which they state “declares 
both the imposition of contractual ‘terms, conditions or practices’ that have the effect of 
perpetuating the consequences of past unfair discrimination and the unfair limiting or denial of 
contract opportunities to be practices which may amount to (prohibited) unfair discrimination”. 
1642  Cf Albertyn’s interpretation of the decision in Minister of Finance and another v Van Heerden 
2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 30 as discussed in the text at n 1622 supra. 
1643  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 880; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 159. 
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Although, in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
recognised that the unequal bargaining position of the parties is a relevant factor 
when deciding whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy, it held that 
its presence alone will not result in the contract term being contrary to public 
policy.1644 In conjunction with the appeal court’s tendency to use the constitutional 
value of human dignity in support of the policy considerations of freedom and 
sanctity of contract, this has resulted in a conservative interpretation of 
constitutional values which has been largely unsuccessful in addressing the 
effects of systematic and substantive inequality.1645 As explained by Botha: 
 
[W]hile it has been conceded that dignity and equality may have a role to 
play in trimming the excesses of contractual freedom – for instance, in 
cases of unequal bargaining power – the courts’ actual decisions show 
that the exercise of this power will be confined to such extreme cases 
that it is likely to have a minimal effect in combating inequality and 
protecting consumers.1646 
 
This has led to greater calls for the courts to take account of the social and 
economic circumstances of the contracting parties in assessing whether a contract 
term or its enforcement is against public policy.1647 In other words, it was argued 
that the appeal court’s expression of the founding constitutional value of equality in 
the common law of contract should be redefined in light of the more substantive 
conception of equality as promoted by both modern contract theory and the 
Constitution.  
 
In Barkhuizen v Napier,1648 the Constitutional Court developed the open norm of 
public policy to take account of the relevant situation of the contracting parties 
when assessing whether a contract term is contrary to public policy. Following the 
                                            
1644  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 12 as discussed in detail in para  2 3 
2 2 supra. See also Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2824; Sharrock 2014 Obiter 136. 
1645  Cf the discussion in the text at n 854 supra.  
1646  Botha 2009 Stell LR 212. 
1647  See e.g. Barnard-Naudé 2013 SAJHR 476; Liebenberg Socio-economic rights (2010) 360; 
Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 879-880; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 422. 
1648  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59 as discussed in the text at n 879 supra. 
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approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom, it held 
that an unequal bargaining relationship is a relevant factor when making such a 
determination, especially in view of South Africa’s history of inequality. It further 
held that when determining whether the enforcement of a contract term is unfair, 
the court should consider the circumstances which prevented compliance with the 
contract term.1649 Both these enquiries are subjective in nature and promote 
substantive equality because the surrounding circumstances of the contract must 
be taken into account when determining the fairness of the contract term or its 
enforcement.1650 Furthermore, it has been argued that the subjective test for 
fairness is based upon ubuntu.1651 This means that ubuntu has been used to 
transform the formal understanding of equality in the law of contract into a more 
substantive understanding of equality which takes the social and economic 
circumstances of the parties into account. Accordingly, it can be argued that the 
Constitutional Court’s decision promotes better substantive equality in the law of 
contract as informed by the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu.  
 
Nevertheless, this subjective test only becomes applicable after an objective test 
has been applied. This test requires a balancing act between the policy 
considerations of freedom and sanctity of contract which gives effect to the 
constitutional values of freedom and human dignity and another policy 
consideration as reflected in a constitutional right or value.1652 This is so whether 
dealing with the fairness of the contract term itself1653 or the enforcement 
thereof.1654 Furthermore, both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal seemed to have held that human dignity only supports the ideas of 
freedom and sanctity of contract,1655 and that an unequal bargaining relationship is 
                                            
1649  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56, 58 & 70 as discussed in the text at n 882 
supra. 
1650  Cf the discussion in the text at n 895 supra. 
1651  Cf the discussions in the text at n 969 & n 1543 supra. 
1652  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57 as discussed in the text at n 875 supra. 
1653  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59 as discussed in text at n 879 supra. 
1654  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 43-
50 as discussed in the text at n 906 supra. 
1655  Cf the discussions in the text at n 1542 & n 1556 supra. 
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merely a relevant factor that cannot on its own lead to the decision that the 
contract term or its enforcement is contrary to public policy.1656 Thus, the 
application of the subjective test for fairness is limited to cases where another 
constitutional right or value in support of non-enforcement is implicated. Therefore, 
it did not seem that the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal 
agreed with the high court’s remark in Mort v Henry-Shields Chiat that the 
constitutional values of human dignity and equality would require that a contract 
term or its enforcement must be fair.1657 However, it is submitted that an 
interpretation of the constitutional value of human dignity as based on Kantian 
individualistic dignity1658 and communitarian ubuntu1659 as well as an 
understanding of the constitutional value of equality through the lens of ubuntu1660 
should lead to the development of a general equitable discretion to declare unfair 
contract terms or the unfair enforcement of contract terms invalid.  
 
Although the Constitutional Court in Botha v Rich did not make explicit reference 
to the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu, it was argued that the court’s 
decision was based, by implication, on ubuntu and has led to the possibility of a 
general equitable discretion to be implemented by development of good faith into 
a substantive rule which could be used to set aside an unfair contract term or its 
unfair enforcement.1661 In this decision, the court endorsed a substantive 
understanding of the constitutional value of equality which accords with its general 
approach to equality as discussed above.1662 Thus, the Constitutional Court 
                                            
1656  Cf the discussions in the text at n 842 & n 879 supra. 
1657  Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 475 as discussed in the text at n 813 supra. 
1658  As was seen above, even the communitarian interpretation of Kantian dignity is still too 
individualistic as it fails to take cogniscance of the socio-economic realities of persons, and 
hence, it is difficult to use Kantian dignity to justify the promotion of socio-economic rights and 
substantive equality (cf the discussion dealing with the criticisms levied against Kantian dignity 
in para  3 2 4 3 supra.  
1659  As proposed and set out in para  3 2 7 supra. 
1660  Cf the discussion of the approach to equality in the Constitution in para  3 3 2 and by the 
Constitutional Court in para  3 3 3 supra, 
1661  Cf the discussion of this decision in the text at n1564 supra. 
1662  Cf the discussion on the Constitutional Court’s approach to equality in para  3 3 3 supra. 
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extended its general approach to the constitutional value of equality to the law of 
contract. Since it took specific notice of the fact that the enforcement of the 
cancellation clause in the circumstances of the case would lead to the forfeiture of 
almost three-quarters of the purchase price already. Therefore, it is submitted that 
the Constitutional Court is in the process of constitutionalising the common law of 
contract which process is reflected in a more substantive understanding of equality 
as informed by the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that the court’s approach to substantive equality not only promotes 
equality of opportunities, but also supports Albertyn and Goldblat’s proposition1663 
that substantive equality is concerned with equality of outcomes, because the 
financial consequences of enforcing the specific contract term was also 
considered when assessing fairness.1664   
 
3 4 FREEDOM 
3 4 1 The approach to freedom in the Constitution 
Freedom is a founding constitutional value1665 and finds expression in a number of 
human rights and freedoms including the right to freedom from slavery, servitude 
and forced labour (section 13) and the rights of freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion (section 15); expression (section 16); association (section 18); political 
choices (section 19); movement and residence (section 21) and trade, occupation 
or profession (section 22). As a self-standing right, it is enshrined in section 12 
which provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the 
person”.1666 
 
                                            
1663  See the discussion in the text at n 1593 supra. 
1664  See also Hawthorne 2015 SUBB Iurisprudentia 14 who argues for an understanding of 
substantive equality in the law of contract which takes account of what she refers to as 
“equality of exchange”.  
1665  S 1(a) of the Constitution. 
1666  See also Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the 
existence of global values (2015) 334. 
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3 4 2 The approach to freedom by the Constitutional Court 
The most prominent case dealing with the Constitutional Court’s theoretical 
approach to freedom is Ferreira v Levin1667 which concerned the application of the 
right to freedom and security under the interim Constitution. In this respect, the 
wording of this right was similar to that contained in section 12 under the final 
Constitution.1668  
 
In his leading but separate judgment, Justice Ackermann held that the right to 
“freedom” should be read disjunctively from the right to “security of person” in that 
the right to freedom “must be construed as a separate and independent right”.1669 
After emphasising human dignity as the core value underlying the Constitution,1670 
the eminent justice emphasised the connection between human dignity and 
freedom as follows: 
 
Human dignity cannot be fully valued or respected unless individuals are 
able to develop their humanity, their 'humanness' to the full extent of its 
potential. Each human being is uniquely talented. Part of the dignity of 
every human being is the fact and awareness of this uniqueness.  An 
individual's human dignity cannot be fully respected or valued unless the 
individual is permitted to develop his or her unique talents optimally. 
Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom 
personal development and fulfilment are not possible. Without freedom, 
human dignity is little more than an abstraction. Freedom and dignity are 
inseparably linked. To deny people their freedom is to deny them their 
dignity.1671 
 
                                            
1667  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC). 
1668  S 11(1) of the Interim Constitution provided that “[e]very person shall have the right to freedom 
and security of the person which shall include the right not to be detained without trial”. 
1669  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 46. 
1670  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) paras 47-48. 
1671  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 46. 
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Relying on Isaiah Berlin’s conception of negative freedom, the justice then stated 
that freedom denotes the space within which a human being “is or should be left to 
do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons”.1672 
Nevertheless, he recognised the need for “state intervention in the economic as 
well as the civil and political spheres” to “resolve the paradox of unlimited 
freedom” but argued that such interventions must comply with the limitation clause 
in terms of section 33(1) of interim Constitution which provides that any limitation 
of the right to freedom in section 11(1) must be reasonable and necessary.1673 
Although Justice Ackermann also relied on Kant’s right to freedom as discussed 
above,1674 he ultimately followed Berlin’s conception of negative freedom when he 
defined the right to freedom in section 11(1) as a negative “right of individuals not 
to have ‘obstacles to possible choices and activities placed in their way … by the 
State”.1675 In other words, his reading of section 11(1) resulted in the protection of 
residual freedom rights not explicitly protected elsewhere in the interim 
Constitution which would include the right to freedom of contract.1676 Thus, 
according to Justice Ackermann’s interpretation of section 11(1) any limitation of 
the right to freedom of contract would not only have to be reasonable but also 
necessary. 
 
                                            
1672  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 52.  
1673 Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 52. 
1674 Kant’s definition of the right to freedom (as quoted in the text at n 1319) provides as follows: 
“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist 
with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right 
belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity”. However, as pointed out by Cornell 2008 
Acta Juridica 24, negative freedom as defined by Isiah Berlin differs from Kant’s conception of 
negative freedom (cf the discussion dealing with Kant’s conception of freedom in para  3 2 4 
2 supra). 
1675  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 54. See also the discussion of this case by Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 878. 
1676  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) paras 57 & 66. See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 878. 
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In contrast, Justice Chaskalson speaking for the majority of the court interpreted 
section 11(1) to be principally concerned with the protection of the physical 
integrity of persons, and hence, the protection of “physical liberty” and “physical 
security”.1677 Nevertheless, the court conceded that this does not imply that 
section 11(1) is only concerned with physical liberty but held that the question 
whether it can be defined more broadly should be determined in the context of the 
other constitutional provisions.1678 Consequently, the court referred to a number of 
other enumerated rights that promote freedom.1679 In terms of section 33(1) 
certain human rights may only be limited to the extent “reasonable”, while the 
limitation of others (including section 11(1)) must meet the criteria of “reasonable” 
and “necessary”.1680 This led the court to the following conclusion: 
 
Limitations of s 11(1) are subject to the ‘necessary’ test, which is an 
indication that the section in [sic] concerned with a freedom of a higher 
order than those enumerated freedoms which are not subjected to such 
an onerous test. A guarantee of the physical integrity of all persons is a 
freedom of the highest order which calls for the more onerous test of 
limitation. I am not persuaded, however, that this could be said of s 11(1) 
generally if it is given as wide a meaning as Ackermann J gives it in para 
[54] of his judgment.1681 
                                            
1677 Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 170. 
1678  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 170. 
1679 Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 171 referring to the rights to “equality, life, human dignity, privacy, religion, belief, 
opinion (including academic freedom in institutes of higher learning), freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of demonstration and petition, freedom of association, freedom 
of movement, freedom of residence, freedom to enter, remain in and leave the Republic of 
South Africa, political rights, access to courts, access to information, and administrative justice” 
and “guarantees and protection in respect of fair arrest, detention and trial procedures, 
economic activity, labour relations, property, the environment, language and culture, education 
and the rights of children”.  
1680  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 173. 
1681  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 173. 
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Specifically, the court was of the view that if Justice Ackermann’s interpretation of 
section 11(1) was to be followed, then “all regulatory laws” would need to be 
justified as “necessary” which would result in the court overstepping its boundaries 
by deciding issues that are fundamentally political in nature.1682 The court 
explained this problem as follows: 
 
Implicit in the social welfare state is the acceptance of regulation and 
redistribution in the public interest. If in the context of our Constitution 
freedom is given the wide meaning that Ackermann J suggests it should 
have, the result might be to impede such policies. Whether or not there 
should be regulation and redistribution is essentially a political question 
which falls within the domain of the Legislature and not the Court. It is not 
for the Courts to approve or disapprove of such policies. What the Courts 
must ensure is that the implementation of any political decision to 
undertake such policies conforms with the Constitution. It should not, 
however, require the Legislature to show that they are necessary if the 
Constitution does not specifically require that this be done.1683 
 
Although the majority of the court rejected Justice Ackermann’s conception of a 
residual negative right to freedom, it was shown above that the Constitutional 
Court incorporated his statements on the integral link between human dignity and 
freedom in its subsequent jurisprudence.1684 In the analysis of South African 
Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard it has been submitted that the 
Constitutional Court is in the process of developing the constitutional value of 
human dignity to denote a moral freedom as informed by Kantian dignity and 
                                            
1682  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 174. 
1683  Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC) para 180. See also Cornell 2008 Acta Juridica 27; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 878. 
1684  Cf the discussions of the constitutional court decisions of MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal, 
and others v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 63 in the text at n 1451 & Teddy Bear Clinic for 
Abused Children and another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
another 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 173 in the text at n 1462 supra. 
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ubuntu.1685 Justice Van der Westhuizen held that such moral freedom imposes a 
duty on each member of the community to respect the human dignity of others as 
well as a duty to promote the substantive equality of other community members to 
ensure the realisation of their human dignity; both duties being the result of the 
harmonisation of Kantian dignity and ubuntu.1686 These duties are also reflected in 
Albertyn’s call for the further development of the constitutional value of freedom: 
 
More so than the other fundamental values, therefore, freedom requires 
particular development both in relation to the nature and the role of the 
state and the rights and responsibilities of the individual. Not only does 
the Constitution appear to envision a more proactive, and protective 
state, but it also suggests that individuals bear some responsibility for 
others.1687 
 
3 4 3 The approach to freedom in the common law of contract 
Contractual freedom is most closely related to the founding constitutional value of 
freedom.1688 In terms of the classical liberal tradition, freedom of contract 
enhances individual autonomy.1689 Following this approach, the appeal court in 
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom, quoting Justice Cameron’s minority judgment in 
Brisley v Drotsky, stated as follows:  
 
                                            
1685  Cf the discussion of the separate but concurring judgment of Justice Van der Westhuizen in 
South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) as discussed in the 
text at n 1476 supra. 
1686  Cf the discussion of the separate but concurring judgment of Justice Van der Westhuizen in 
South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) as discussed in the 
text at n 1481 supra. 
1687  Albertyn “Values in the South African Constitution” in Davis et al Inquiry into the existence of 
global values (2015) 338. 
1688  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 877. 
1689  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 877; Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 165. Cf the discussion dealing 
with the classical law of contract in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
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[C]ontractual autonomy is part of freedom. Shorn of its obscene 
excesses, contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of 
dignity.1690  
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeal is of the view that the common law 
principle of contractual autonomy informs the founding constitutional values of 
freedom and human dignity. Furthermore, the court elevated contractual freedom 
into a constitutional value itself when it stated that “[t]he constitutional value of 
contractual freedom includes, in turn, again the principle which finds expression in 
the maxim pacta sunt servanda”.1691  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s elevation of contractual autonomy into a 
constitutional value and its view that contractual autonomy informs the 
constitutional values of freedom and human dignity are open to criticism. In the 
first place, freedom of contract is not listed in the Constitution as a constitutional 
value.1692 The right to freedom of contract is also not expressly protected in the 
Constitution1693 and it is submitted that the provisions of the Constitution do not 
support the recognition of a constitutionally entrenched right to freedom of 
contract. It seems unlikely that the Constitutional Court will read a right to freedom 
of contract into section 12 in view of the majority decision in Ferreira v Levin.1694 
This contention is further supported by the decision in Barkhuizen v Napier in 
which the court preferred indirect horizontal application of the Constitution when 
dealing with constitutional challenges to contractual terms.1695 Furthermore, 
although freedom of contract was initially put forward as a fundamental human 
                                            
1690  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 22 as discussed in para  2 3 2 2 
supra. 
1691  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 23 (my emphasis and translated 
from Afrikaans) as discussed in para  2 3 2 2 supra. 
1692  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 877. 
1693  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 877. 
1694  Cf the discussion of Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and 
others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) in para  3 4 2 supra. 
1695  Cf the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 28 in the text at n 861 
supra. 
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right and became the basic underlying principle of the common law of contract 
during the nineteenth century,1696 its inability to provide practical solutions in cases 
of blatant inequality led to legislative intervention and judicial interpretations which 
resulted in a more limited conception of freedom and sanctity of contract as 
reflected in the principles underlying the modern law of contract.1697 As a result, 
the common law of contract provides for a number of restrictions on contractual 
freedom already.1698  
 
The second point of criticism concerns the way in which the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has interpreted the founding constitutional values of freedom and human 
dignity with reference to the principle of contractual autonomy as reflected in 
classical contract theory. As put forward by Bhana and Pieterse, the common law 
conception of freedom of contract must conform to the provisions in the Bill of 
Rights, including the founding constitutional values.1699 As was seen in 
chapter one,1700 section 39(3) of the Constitution does not deny the existence of 
any other rights or freedoms that are recognised by the common law but only to 
the extent that they are consistent with the Constitution. Thus the question 
whether the common law conception of freedom of contract is consistent with the 
Constitution and the extent to which it will be constitutionally acknowledged 
depends on what content is given to the constitutional value of freedom, which 
content should be informed by the other founding constitutional values and not 
common law values.1701 Furthermore, as human dignity is regarded as the core 
value underlying the Constitution and the most important human right from which 
all other human rights derive, the constitutional value of human dignity should 
                                            
1696  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 162. 
1697  Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 167. These developments were due to the introduction of the modern 
law of contract which is discussed in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
1698  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 879 and the examples listed in n 70; Hawthorne 1995 
THRHR 167 and the examples listed there. 
1699  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 878. 
1700  Cf the discussion on the constitutional recognition of common and customary law in para  1 8 3 
1 supra.  
1701  Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 878; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420; Chaskalson 2000 SAJHR 202. 
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dictate what content should be given to the constitutional value of freedom.1702 
Accordingly, contractual autonomy should not be used to inform the constitutional 
values of freedom and human dignity although the link between contractual 
autonomy and these constitutional values is not disputed.1703 Rather, the 
interpretation of the constitutional value of human dignity should dictate what 
content should be given to the constitutional value of freedom, and in turn, these 
constitutional values should inform the interpretation of the common law 
conception of contractual autonomy.1704 Thus, it is submitted that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal over-emphasised the constitutional importance of contractual 
autonomy.1705 It did not consider how the constitutional value of freedom (as given 
meaning to by the constitutional value of human dignity) should inform contractual 
autonomy, but rather used the existing ideas on contractual autonomy in the 
common law of contract to inform these constitutional values.1706 As argued 
above,1707 this approach in conjunction with the appeal court’s formal approach to 
equality has enabled the Supreme Court of Appeal to grant constitutional 
endorsement to the classical liberal conception of contractual autonomy in a 
manner that leaves little room for fairness to play any substantive role in 
contractual dealings. As stated by Davis and Klare: 
 
The freedom-of-contract judgments deliver too much pacta and not 
enough ubuntu. The vision of liberty and human freedom informing the 
contractual-freedom judgments is a thinly updated version of ideas 
rooted in classical liberal philosophy. The ethos is individualist and 
libertarian. It prefers limited government and a negative conception of 
                                            
1702  Cf the discussion dealing with the approach to human dignity in the Constitution in the text at 
n 1439 supra. 
1703  Cf the discussion dealing in the text at n 1500 supra. 
1704 Cf the discussion dealing with the approach to human dignity in the Constitution in the text at 
n 1439 supra. 
1705  Lewis 2013 THRHR 82; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 79-80; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 865; 
Pretorius 2003 THRHR 644. 
1706  Lewis 2013 THRHR 82; Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 79-80; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 865; 
Pretorius 2003 THRHR 644. 
1707  Cf the discussions in paras  3 2 7 3 (the approach to human dignity in the law of contract) &  3 3 
4 (the approach to equality in the law of contract) supra. 
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liberty. It narrows ‘autonomy’ to freedom from governmental compulsion 
and elides the problem of socio-economic domination. It seems highly 
implausible that the Constitution is founded on this bleak social vision.1708 
 
As submitted previously,1709 a South African, transformative interpretation of the 
constitutional values of human dignity and equality should result in a more limited 
conception of the constitutional value of freedom. As emphasised by Chaskalson: 
 
Freedom does not mean total freedom. In a democratic society freedom 
can never be absolute. It must be exercised with due regard to the 
legitimate interests of other members of the society, and the 
countervailing claims of other constitutional values.1710 
 
Furthermore it was argued1711 that the Constitutional Court relied upon Kantian 
dignity and ubuntu to develop the constitutional value of human dignity into a 
multi-faceted concept of which both aspects, empowerment and constraint, must 
be applied in the common law of contract which results in a more limited 
conception of contractual freedom. As argued by Judge Davis in Advtech 
Resourcing t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn dealing with the 
enforcement of a restraint of trade clause: 
 
[T]he concept of contractual autonomy … must mean something distinct 
from a libertarian connotation, particularly if the concept of ubuntu is to 
play any role in our law.1712 
 
It was also submitted1713 that on the basis of such interpretation the open norm of 
public policy should be developed in the law of contract to reflect the juxtaposition 
                                            
1708  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 479. See also Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 473-474; Davis 2008 
SAJHR 325; Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 882. 
1709  Cf the discussions in paras  3 2 7 3 (the approach to human dignity in the law of contract) &  3 3 
4 (the approach to equality in the law of contract) supra. 
1710  Chaskalson 2000 SAJHR 202. See also Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 879. 
1711  Cf the discussion of the Constitutional Court’s approach to human dignity in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
1712  Advtech Resourcing (Pty) Ltd t/a Communicate Personnel Group v Kuhn and another 2008 2 
SA 375 (C) para 31 as quoted by Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 205. 
327 
 
of the human dignity of the contracting party wishing to enforce the contract term 
on the basis of freedom and sanctity of contract on the one hand, and the human 
dignity of the other contracting party who avers that her human dignity is infringed 
because she is treated merely as a means to an end. It was further submitted that 
this approach implicates notions of fairness and reasonableness when 
determining whether a contract term or its enforcement is against public policy 
which by necessity results in a more limited conception of contractual freedom. 
Following the same argument, it was proposed that the Constitutional Court’s 
development of the constitutional value of equality into a notion of substantive 
equality has been the result of harmonisation between Kantian dignity and 
ubuntu,1714 and similarly supports a more limited conception of contractual 
freedom, leading to a more substantive realisation of fairness in the law of 
contract.1715  
 
Although the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier supported the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s views on the role of human dignity in support of freedom and 
sanctity of contract, the above submissions have found support in the 
Constitutional Court decision in Botha v Rich, in which case the notion of human 
dignity as constraint was given recognition in the law of contract.1716 Hence, a 
more limited conception of freedom of contract was recognised which has opened 
the door to the creation of a general equitable jurisdiction. Such equitable 
jurisdiction depends on the development of good faith into a substantive rule that 
can be used to set aside an unfair contract term or its unfair enforcement. This 
development is the desired result of the harmonisation of Kantian dignity and 
ubuntu as reflected in the constitutional jurisprudence and denotes a duty on a 
contracting party to respect the human dignity of the other contracting party as 
well as a duty to promote the human dignity of the latter through the application of 
                                                                                                                                    
1713 Cf the discussion dealing with the approach to human dignity in the law of contract in para  3 2 
7 3 supra. 
1714  Cf the discussion on the Constitutional Court’s approach to equality in para  3 3 3 supra. 
1715  Cf the discussion dealing with the approach to equality in the law of contract in para  3 3 4 
supra. 
1716  Cf the discussion of this case in the text at n 1570 supra. 
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the notion of substantive equality. Therefore, it is submitted that the Constitutional 
Court has transformed the formal idea of freedom of contract, the central 
foundational principle of classical law of contract, into a more constrained concept 
of freedom of contract as reflected in modern law of contract. It is further submitted 
that this development is the result of a harmonisation of Kantian dignity and 
ubuntu. 
 
3 5 RULE OF LAW 
3 5 1 The approach to rule of law in the Constitution and by the 
Constitutional Court 
The approach to the rule of law in the Constitution and by the Constitutional Court 
has been discussed in chapter one.1717 It was shown how the constitutional 
conception of the rule of law does not only denote formal equality but also 
embraces a substantive meaning which means that the law should be interpreted 
and developed in line with constitutional values. This approach, generally referred 
to as transformative constitutionalism, requires an interpretation of law that 
promotes social transformation, and hence substantive equality, in the private 
sphere. Furthermore, it entails a normative approach that involves value 
judgments by the courts in line with constitutional values.  
 
Previously, it was shown how ubuntu can be linked to the idea of transformative 
constitutionalism.1718 Like transformative constitutionalism, ubuntu supports a 
more normative approach to law which involves the promotion of socio-economic 
rights and substantive equality with the aim to bring about a more humane society. 
Thus, the Constitutional Court has relied upon ubuntu to promote a transformative 
constitutional approach to law, especially when dealing with socio-economic 
rights.1719 Therefore, it is submitted that the Constitutional Court has developed a 
substantive approach to the rule of law that promotes socio-economic rights and 
                                            
1717  Cf the discussion on the constitutional value of rule of law in para  1 8 2 3 supra. 
1718  Cf the discussion dealing with human dignity through ubuntu in para  3 2 5 supra. 
1719  See for e.g. the discussions of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 
(CC) in the text at n 543 supra & City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 
2007 1 SA 78 (W) in the text at n 549 supra. 
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substantive equality in order to realise the human dignity of all the community 
members which approach has been informed by the underlying constitutional 
value of ubuntu. 
 
3 5 2 The approach to rule of law in the common law of contract 
As was seen throughout chapter two,1720 the Supreme Court of Appeal is leaning 
towards a more classical understanding of the rule of law. It would appear that this 
belief is founded on the fear that open norms such as good faith and fairness may 
run counter to the principle of legality and it is submitted that this fear has resulted 
in the limited role of good faith in the common law of contract.1721 In Brisley v 
Drotsky the court stated that not limiting good faith’s role to an underlying value 
would mean that whether a contract would be enforceable or not would depend on 
what a particular judge viewed as fair and just and that this would lead to 
commercial uncertainty.1722 After the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier 
questioned whether this restricted role of good faith is appropriate under the 
Constitution,1723 the Supreme Court of Appeal constitutionally endorsed the 
classical rule of law in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa.1724 In this 
respect, the court expressly rejected the idea of an equitable discretion because it 
would defeat the principle of rule of law entrenched as a founding constitutional 
value. In the subsequent decision of Potgieter v Potgieter, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal emphasised that providing a judge with an equitable discretion “will give 
rise to intolerable legal uncertainty”.1725  
                                            
1720  Cf the discussions dealing with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach to contractual 
fairness in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
1721  See also Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice (2005) 15-16; Barnard 2005 
SAJHR 282. 
1722  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24 as discussed in the text at n 825 supra. 
1723  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82 as discussed in the text at n 889 supra. 
1724  Bredenkamp and others v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 39 as 
discussed in the text at n 913 supra. 
1725  Potgieter and another v Potgieter NO and others 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) para 34. See also 
Maphango and others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 19 (SCA) para 23. 
See further the extrajudicial concerns expressed by Supreme Court of Appeal Judge Wallis in 
2016 SALJ 545ff. 
330 
 
 
Now it is true that the rule of law is enshrined as one of the foundational values of 
the Constitution, and as was shown previously,1726 that the rule of law under the 
Constitution does embody the principle of legality which would prohibit arbitrary 
decisions and the abuse of a discretionary power. However, it was also argued 
that the meaning of the rule of law under the Constitution goes further than the 
classical conception based on formal equality before the law as it is also 
concerned with substantive equality and committed to egalitarian social 
transformation in the private sphere. In the previous section, it was shown how this 
conception of the rule of law which is committed to the achievement of substantive 
equality and social transformation has been informed by ubuntu.1727 
 
Therefore, the appeal court’s persistent limitation of the role of good faith to 
address contractual unfairness is what Klare refers to as “a ‘disconnect’ between 
the Constitution’s transformative aspirations and the conservative character of 
South African legal culture”.1728 As further explained by Klare and Davis: 
 
[T]he common law as it stands today largely reflects, constitutes, and 
sustains existing social relationships, power structure, and inequalities. 
The common law’s cherished value of individual autonomy remains 
meaningless and unfulfilled in a society as radically unequal as South 
Africa, where millions live in conditions of absolute deprivation. 
Untransformed, the common law supports and shields this distributional 
status quo. Unless their legal foundations are transformed, social 
arrangements constituted (in part) by the common law will exercise a 
permanent inhibiting effect on the Constitution’s transformative project, 
possibly subverting it altogether.1729 
 
Furthermore, Davis and Klare argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
insistence on limiting the role of good faith because freedom and sanctity of 
contract would require it ignores the inherent tension between these concepts. 
                                            
1726  See the discussion on the constitutional value of the rule of law in para  1 8 2 3 supra. 
1727  Cf the discussion in para  3 5 1 supra. 
1728  Klare 1998 SAJHR 151. See also Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 468ff. 
1729  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 411.  
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They argue that any contract judgment will necessarily always take cognisance of 
the relevant policy considerations underlying the facts of the case and involve the 
weighing up of conflicting values.1730 Where freedom of contract refers to freedom 
and autonomy, sanctity of contract entails a constraint on this freedom to protect 
legitimate expectations and ensure commercial and legal certainty.1731 Therefore, 
the court will always need to balance these conflicting values and cannot merely 
rely on freedom of contract and ignore the constraints on that freedom by 
enforcing the contract.1732 They argue that the weight attached to the relevant 
values in a specific set of facts will always be determined by policy considerations 
and cannot be “deduced from the concept of contract” alone.1733 The only 
difference is that now the policy considerations must be grounded in the 
underlying values of the Constitution and must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.1734 In other words, the objective criteria that should be 
used to determine whether a contract term or the enforcement thereof is unfair 
must now be found with reference to the Constitution and its underlying values.  
 
Throughout this chapter, it has been submitted that the proper appreciation of the 
founding constitutional values of human dignity,1735 equality1736 and freedom1737 in 
the common law of contract, as informed by the underlying constitutional value of 
ubuntu, should lead to the creation of a general equitable jurisdiction and the 
development of good faith into a substantive rule that can be used to set aside an 
unfair contract term or its unfair enforcement. It was further submitted, that the 
constitutional court decision of Barkhuizen v Napier, in spite of the interpretation 
thereof by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South 
Africa, has been further developed by the Constitutional Court in Botha v Rich and 
                                            
1730  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 440, 471. Davis and Klare do not explicitly refer to sanctity of 
contract, but it would seem that this is what they mean. 
1731  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 440. 
1732  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 440. 
1733  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 441. See also Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 77-78. 
1734  Davis & Klare 2010 SAJHR 471. 
1735  As critically analysed in para  3 2 supra. 
1736  As critically analysed in para  3 3  3 2 supra. 
1737  As critically analysed in para  3 4 supra. 
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has created the possibility of an equitable jurisdiction as the result of a more 
substantive role for good faith to set aside unfair contract terms and the unfair 
enforcement of contract terms. However, the Constitutional Court did not 
expressly override the Supreme Court of Appeal’s view in Bredenkamp v Standard 
Bank of South Africa that denies the existence of the court’s equitable 
discretion.1738 As stated by Brownsword: 
 
One of the arguments that figures in the debates about general clauses 
in contract law is that, in the absence of such clauses, judges resort to 
indirect strategies to achieve results that could have been achieved 
directly had such clauses been in play. It is said, in other words, that 
such clauses promote honesty, transparency and integrity in 
adjudication. … What these arguments add up to is the claim that 
litigants and the public have a right to transparent and accurate reasons 
for legal decisions – and so, where (rightly or wrongly) decision-makers 
are going to reason from human dignity, this needs to be expressly 
represented in the law.1739 
 
Finally, acknowledging the equitable discretion of the courts should not 
necessarily lead to large scale legal and commercial uncertainty.1740 The contents 
of open norms can be developed over time and this can be done in an incremental 
manner:  
 
By its very nature, however, the system does not lend itself to radical 
change. It has an inherent restraint, in that judges who take steps 
forward do so in the knowledge that they are not only deciding the cases 
before them, but that they are laying down the ground rules for deciding 
tomorrow’s cases as well. The result is that changes by the courts are 
implemented incrementally – as far as possible – within the framework of 
existing legal principles.1741  
                                            
1738  Cf the discussion of this decision in the text at n 948 supra. 
1739  Brownsword “Human dignity from a legal perspective” in Düwell et al (eds) Cambridge 
handbook of human dignity (2014) 20. 
1740  Brand 2009 SALJ 87-88. However, see Wallis 2016 SALJ 553 where the author argues that 
the decision in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) is “spreading contractual uncertainty”. 
1741  Brand 2009 SALJ 72. See also Hawthorne 2016 THRHR 72; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 408.  
333 
 
   
This would also accord with the Constitutional Court’s approach to the 
development of the common law.1742 In addition, as was mentioned above, the 
open norm of fairness has now been incorporated into the South African law of 
contract in contracts governed by the CPA.1743 This movement is in line with 
international developments and follows other legal systems that have incorporated 
and use open norms in their law of contract to deal with contractual unfairness.1744 
 
Consequently, the open norms in the common law of contract involve a never-
ending process of concretisation which ensures compliance with the requirements 
of the rule of law.1745  At the end of the day, this constant process of concretisation 
is merely a manifestation of the law of contract’s dynamic nature in order to keep 
up with the community’s changing values1746 which values now find expression in 
the founding constitutional values1747 as informed by the underlying constitutional 
value of ubuntu.  
 
3 6 CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s constitutional endorsement of the classical model 
of contract law and the classical conception of the rule of law means that all the 
                                            
1742  Cf the discussion of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 36 in the text at n 460 supra. 
1743  Cf the discussion dealing with the provisions in the CPA in para  2 3 4 supra. 
1744  A detailed comparative study with other legal systems in respect of the use of open norms in 
the law of contract is outside the scope of this thesis but a succinct yet valuable overview of 
the position in European, German, Australian, Dutch and English law can be found in Naudé 
“Section 48” in Naudé & Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (RS 1, 
2016) para 22-30. 
1745  Hawthorne 2014 PELJ 2824; Hawthorne 2014 THRHR 414-415. 
1746  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) para 1.42 as quoted in the text at n 599 supra. See also 
Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 184 who argues that the fact that there are 
rules in the law of contract that is based on good faith indicates that the courts have used good 
faith to develop new rules over the years, and hence, the courts have relied directly on the 
principle of good faith where necessary to supplement and correct the existing legal rules 
where necessary. 
1747  Van Huyssteen et al Contract (2016) paras 14.43 & 1.47. 
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relevant foundational constitutional values, namely human dignity, equality, 
freedom and the rule of law are informed by this specific model. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach to fairness in the common law of contract 
gives “the impression that on the whole the common law of contract has passed 
constitutional muster”.1748 However, as was shown above, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal is merely paying lip-service to constitutional values instead of actively 
engaging in the duty to develop the common law of contract in line with the values 
in the Constitution, especially as informed by the underlying constitutional value of 
ubuntu.1749 In addition, the appeal court’s approach leaves little room for the 
proper use of open norms to achieve greater contractual fairness. By 
constitutionally endorsing the classical model of contract law, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal continually attempts to restrict the open norm of good faith and prevent 
its development into an independent substantive rule that can be used to strike 
down or prevent the enforcement of a contract term that would otherwise be 
enforceable. Nevertheless, it has been shown that the Constitutional Court is in 
the process of developing the founding constitutional values in the common law of 
contract with reference to the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu. After a 
critical analysis of these developments, it is submitted that the court’s approach 
has inserted the thin edge of the wedge for the development of good faith into a 
substantive rule that can be used to set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair 
enforcement of a contract term. 
                                            
1748  Lubbe 2004 SALJ 410. 
1749  Bhana 2007 SALJ 275 as supported by Kohn 2014 Speculum Juris 76 n 20. See also Bennett 
2010 PELJ 46; Davis 2008 SAJHR 328-329. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE EMERGING ROLE OF UBUNTU IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT AS ILLUMINATED 
BY A CONTEXTUAL LEGAL HISTORY OF GOOD FAITH IN 
THE ROMAN LAW OF CONTRACT 
 
By understanding what is wrong, we may be able not only to understand 
our history, but also to shape it. If we lost something long ago which we 
have been unable to do without, we should try to remember what it was 
like. We should consider why it was so important.1750 
 
4 1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, it was proposed that the Constitutional Court is in the 
process of developing the expression of the founding constitutional values in the 
common law of contract by relying on the underlying constitutional value of 
ubuntu. Furthermore, it was submitted that the court’s approach has opened the 
door for the development of good faith from an abstract principle underlying the 
common law of contract into a substantive rule that can be used to set aside an 
unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement of a contract term. In other words, it 
was argued that the Constitutional Court is in the process of developing the 
principle of good faith to reflect an equitable discretion in the law of contract 
through the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu. Returning once again to 
Justice Yacoob’s remarks in Everfresh Market Virginia v Shoprite Checkers, it is 
submitted that these developments are a reflection of the constitutionalisation, and 
hence, also the Africanisation of the common law of contract: 
 
The values embraced by an appropriate appreciation of ubuntu are also 
relevant in the process of determining the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Constitution. The development of our economy and contract law has 
thus far predominantly been shaped by colonial legal tradition 
represented by English law, Roman law and Roman Dutch law. The 
common law of contract regulates the environment within which trade 
and commerce take place. Its development should take cognisance of 
the values of the vast majority of people who are now able to take part 
without hindrance in trade and commerce. And it may well be that the 
                                            
1750  Gordley Philosophical origins of modern contract law (1991) 9. 
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approach of the majority of people in our country place a higher value on 
negotiating in good faith than would otherwise have been the case. 
Contract law cannot confine itself to colonial legal tradition alone.1751 
 
Nevertheless, as was illustrated in the previous chapters, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal would welcome such a development. As further 
reflected in the recent extrajudicial remarks by Supreme Court of Appeal Judge 
Wallis: 
 
In Makwanyane, Mokgoro J said that ubuntu is humanness, humanity 
and morality. I do not suggest that there are not circumstances in which 
they may play a role in commercial relationships – for example the law 
sets its face against fraud and misrepresentation – but when articulated 
merely as high principle in the absence of a particular context it does not 
conduce to clarity. Does it merely mean, as Davis J has suggested, that 
“in some measure” – I should add uncertain measure – “public policy 
embraces the concept of good faith and reasonableness”. If so, the 
mountain has laboured mightily to produce a constitutional mouse. But 
the concern is that these are the rumblings of a volcano that will in due 
course erupt.1752 
 
It would appear that the main reservation against the use of ubuntu in the common 
law of contract is levied at its open-endedness.1753 In other words, infusing the 
common law of contract with ubuntu would lead to unacceptable legal uncertainty. 
In addition, it would seem that Judge Wallis denies that ubuntu, as an underlying 
constitutional value, would require any development of good faith. In commenting 
on the above remarks by Justice Yacoob, he states as follows: 
 
The implications of these musings for the law of contract are simply 
baffling. Our courts have repeatedly stressed that the law of contract is 
                                            
1751  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 23 
(also quoted in the text at n 2 supra). 
1752  Wallis 2016 SALJ 560-561. 
1753  Cf the discussion dealing with general criticisms against the use of ubuntu in the legal sphere 
in para  1 8 4 1 supra. See also the discussion on the rule of law in para  3 5 supra. 
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underpinned by concepts of good faith. So it is unclear why Yacoob J 
thought that it needed to be developed.1754 
 
The resistance against the use of good faith as an open norm in the common law 
of contract was traced back to the importation of English law into the South African 
legal system during the early nineteenth century1755 which resulted in the 
introduction of the classical model of contract law into the South African common 
law of contract a few decades later.1756 Prior to these changes, good faith played a 
more prominent role in addressing contractual unfairness in the South African 
common law of contract.1757 Furthermore, it was shown1758 that the Roman-Dutch 
law that arrived at the Cape during the seventeenth century had an equitable spirit 
which was expressed in the law of contract through the principle of good faith 
(bona fides). All contracts were regarded as bonae fidei which meant that the 
contracting parties were bound to everything which good faith reasonably and 
equitably demanded. In this respect, bona fides played a subsidiary and corrective 
role where the existing rules did not cater for the specific situation or where the 
application of the existing rules would result in unfairness and injustice. In other 
words, good faith functioned as an open norm.  
 
Good faith (bona fides) originated in Roman law and the Romans developed this 
principle into an open norm that could be used to address contractual unfairness. 
This development was the result of changes in the political, economic and social 
environment during the later Roman Republic: 
 
During the later Republic, the expansion of the Roman power in the 
Mediterranean world and the social and economic changes by which it 
                                            
1754  Wallis 2016 SALJ 558. 
1755  Cf the discussion dealing with the influence of the English law on the South African law in 
general in paras  1 5 2 3 (administration of the law) &  1 5 2 4 (substantive law) supra. 
1756  Cf the discussion dealing with the gradual negation of good faith and the importation of the 
classical model of contract law in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
1757  Cf the discussion on good faith in the early South African common law of contract in para  2 2 3 
3 supra. 
1758  Cf the discussion on the characteristics and nature of the Roman-Dutch law of contract that 
arrived at the Cape in paras  1 4 2 2 &  2 2 3 2 supra. 
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was accompanied had a profound effect on the character and 
development of Roman law. By the end of this period the old system of 
law had partly been abolished or changed in such a way that its scope 
was extended to meet the needs of a complex and highly sophisticated 
society. It was in response to changed social, economic and political 
conditions that Roman law broke through the barrier of formalism, was 
secularised and internationalised, and from a system that was strictly and 
often unjustly applied, became a highly developed system marked by its 
flexibility and adaptability to new and changing conditions.1759 
 
In fact, Schermaier argues that the story of good faith in Roman law is the first 
illustration of how “equitable ideas” can revolutionise a legal system.1760  
 
It has been proposed that by investigating the principles underlying the Roman law 
of contract within their greater historical context, Roman law “can offer solutions, 
or at least give assistance for the solution, of modern legal problems”.1761 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the introduction and 
development of good faith (bona fides) in the Roman law of contract in order to 
illuminate the emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of 
contract. Four main themes are explored in order to construct a more contextual 
legal history of good faith in Roman contract law and compared to the emerging 
role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract, namely: 
(a) addressing legal pluralism; 
(b) the use of open norms to supplement and correct the existing law;  
(c) harmonising values from different legal systems; and 
(d) the ultimate goal of law: achieving justice. 
 
                                            
1759  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 181. See also Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) paras 12, 25; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) 
para 23. 
1760  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 65. 
1761  Erasmus 1989 SALJ 677 quoting Beinart 1971 Acta Juridica 140. 
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Each theme is explored with reference to the introduction and development of 
good faith in the Roman law of contract.1762 After the Roman law developments 
relevant to a specific theme have been discussed, a comparison is then drawn 
with the emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract. 
 
4 2 ADDRESSING LEGAL PLURALISM 
4 2 1 The role of good faith in addressing legal pluralism in Rome 
4 2 1 1 Introduction 
The exact age and origin of the bonae fidei actions are unknown and remain 
contentious.1763 However, today, the more generally accepted theory is that these 
actions were introduced by the peregrine praetor who had jurisdiction over 
disputes between foreigners.1764 This suggests that bona fides played an 
important role in dealing with legal pluralism in Rome and this is the idea that will 
be explored in this section. However, in order to understand where the bonae fidei 
actions fit into the greater history of Roman law, some historical context of the pre-
existing Roman law is necessary. 
 
4 2 1 2 An historical overview of the ius civile 
For the purposes of this chapter, the story of the ius civile starts in the early 
republic of Rome.1765 Prior to this period, Rome was a monarchy until 509 BC 
                                            
1762  These sections consist mainly of the traditional account on the development of bona fides as 
found in most standard Roman law sources. However, as a detailed study of Roman law no 
longer forms part of the law curriculum in South Africa it was considered necessary to provide 
a detailed overview of the development of bona fides in this chapter. 
1763  Schermaier & Dedek “Bona fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 
1155; Watson Law making (1974) 35-36, 42-44. See further Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman 
contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 68.  
1764  Schermaier & Dedek “Bona fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 
1155; Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 266; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 76; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 253, 167. See further the 
discussion at and sources referred to in n 1813 infra. 
1765  The Republican period was from 510 BC to 27 BC (Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman 
law (2015) xii; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 11).  
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when the king was expelled from Rome.1766 The early republic was characterised 
by the struggle of the orders between the patricians and the plebeians.1767 In the 
early republic, private law was based on customs (more than legislation)1768 and 
all state affairs were managed by two consuls selected annually from the patrician 
class.1769 As a result, the patricians controlled the content and administration of 
                                            
1766  Robinson Sources of Roman law (1997) 1; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 
13; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 11; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van 
die Romeinse reg (1978) paras 6, 11; Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 3; Nicholas 
Introduction to Roman law (1962) 3. This period (753 BC to 510 BC) is commonly referred to 
as the Monarchy or the period of the kings (Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) xii; Van 
Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 6). The founding date of the city of Rome is 
traditionally cited as 753 BC (Robinson Sources of Roman law (1997) 1; Nicholas Introduction 
to Roman law (1962) 1; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 6; Watson Law 
of the ancient Romans (1970) 3). 
1767  Robinson Sources of Roman law (1997) 1; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history 
(1985) 6; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 19; Warmelo Oorsprong van 
die Romeinse reg 31; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 3. Roman society was 
hierarchical in character and different classes of persons existed. The patricians (partricii) were 
the Roman aristocracy who possessed the most power and riches and constituted the minority 
of the population. In the early republic, the most important positions were filled by persons from 
the patrician class. The plebeians (plebeii) were the underprivileged and poor masses who 
were subject to the political and economic power exerted by the patricians. See Robinson 
Sources of Roman law (1997) 1; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 6; Van 
Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 19; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 7; Cushing Introduction to Roman law (1854) 29. 
1768  D 1 2 2 3 Pomponius, Manual, sole book where it is said that the law at the beginning of the 
Roman republic worked “with customs of a sort rather than with legislation” (quoted from 
Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 118; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 25; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) para 9. 
1769  D 1 2 2 3 Pomponius, Manual, sole book: “Then, after the ejection of the kings, it was 
established that there be two consuls in whom a statue laid down that the supreme authority 
should be vested” (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). There were initially 
known as praetores but later referred to as consules (presumably after the introduction of the 
office of the praetor by the leges Liciniae Sextiae in 367 BC). See also Mousourakis Historical 
context of Roman law (2003) 84; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 15-16, 
20; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 11; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van 
die Romeinse reg (1978) para 11.  
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the law.1770 One of the plebeians’ grievances was that they wanted the existing 
law to be made public so that they could have better access to justice.1771 
Consequently, one of the results of the struggle of the orders was the law of the 
Twelve Tables.1772 The law of the Twelve Tables dealt with private, public and 
sacral law with special focus on the procedures that must be followed.1773 
Although the law of the Twelve Tables was probably more a publication of the 
                                            
1770  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 118-119; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van 
die Romeinse reg (1978) para 24. 
1771  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 118-119; Robinson Sources of Roman 
law (1997) 2; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 26; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 24; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law 
(1962) 15. 
1772  A history of the introduction of the Law of the Twelve Tables is given in D 1 2 2 4, Pomponius, 
Manual, sole book: “After that, to put an end to this state of affairs, it was decided that there be 
appointed, on the authority of the people, a commission of ten men by whom were to be 
studied the laws of the Greek city states and by whom their own city was to be endowed with 
laws. They wrote out the laws in full on ivory tablets and put the tablets together in front of the 
rostra, to make the laws all the more open to inspection. They were given during that year 
sovereign rights in the civitas, to enable them to correct the laws, if there should be a need for 
that, and to interpret them without liability to any appeal such as lay from the rest of the 
magistracy. They themselves discovered a deficiency in that first batch of laws, and 
accordingly, the added two tablets to the original set. It was from this addition that the laws of 
the Twelve Tables got their name” (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). See 
also Robinson Sources of Roman law (1997) 2; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history 
(1985) 23-25; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 15; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) para 27-29; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) 
para 13; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 15. The date of the introduction of the Law 
of the Twelve Tables is estimated between 451 to 449 BC (Mousourakis Historical context of 
Roman law (2003) 119; Watson 1984 Law and History Review 2; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to 
Roman history (1985) 23; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 27; Nicholas 
Introduction to Roman law (1962) 15). No original or ancient copy of the Twelve Tables 
survived but a modern English compilation (from quotes and references in other historical 
sources) can be found in Johnson et al Roman statutes (1961) doc 8.  
1773  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 121, Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 24, 26; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 24; Nicholas 
Introduction to Roman law (1962)15-16. The first three tables dealt with procedural issues and 
Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 31 argues that this indicates that procedure was 
important to the Romans. 
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existing rather than new law,1774 later Romans viewed the law of the Twelve 
Tables as the source and origin of all Roman law and with the interpretations 
given to it by the pontiffs (and later the jurists) it comprised the ius civile.1775 The 
ius civile was strict, rigid and formalistic in nature.1776 As explained by Gaius: 
 
The actions of the practice of older times were called legis actiones, 
either because they were the creation of statutes … or because they 
were framed in the very words of statutes and were consequently treated 
as no less immutable than statutes. Hence it was held that a man who, 
when suing for the cutting down of his vines, had used the word “vines”, 
had lost his claim, because he ought to have said “trees”, seeing that the 
law of the Twelve Tables, on which his action for the cutting down of his 
vines lay, spoke of cutting down trees in general.1777  
                                            
1774  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 121; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 24; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 27; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 24; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law 
(1962) 15. 
1775  D 1 2 2 6 Pomponius, Manual, sole book: “Then about the same time actions-at-law whereby 
people could litigate among themselves were composed out of these statutes [the laws of the 
Twelve Tables]. To prevent the citizenry from initiating litigation any old how, the lawmakers' 
will was that the actions-at-law be in fixed and solemn terms. This branch of-law has the name 
legis actiones, that is, statutory actions-at-law. And so these three branches of law came into 
being at almost the same time: once the statute law of the Twelve Tables was passed, the jus 
civile started to emerge from them, and legis actiones were put together from the same source. 
In relation to all these statutes, however, knowledge of their authoritative interpretation and 
conduct of the actions at law belonged to the College of Priests, one of whom was appointed 
each year to preside over private matters” (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-
2011)). See also Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 30-31; Mousourakis Historical 
context of Roman law (2003) 124; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 83; Robinson 
Sources of Roman law (1997) 31; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 23, 30, 
81; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 18, 31; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
civil law (1980) para 9; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) paras 24, 79. 
1776  Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 398; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 26; 
Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 43; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) paras 10, 24; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) paras 24, 79. 
1777  Gaius Inst 4 11 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). See also Gaius Inst 
4 30 where he states that “the excessive technicality of the early makers of the law was carried 
so far that a party who made the slightest mistake lost his case” (quoted from De Zulueta 
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As illustrated by the above example, the formulas of the legis actiones (based on 
specific combinations of spoken words and gestures) had to be followed exactly 
and any deviation (however slight) would result in the rejection of the claim.1778 
More importantly, the ius civile could only be used where both parties to the 
dispute were Roman citizens.1779  
 
As already mentioned, the content and administration of the law was controlled by 
the patricians as the consuls were appointed from the patrician class. In 367 BC, 
the leges Liciniae Sextiae were passed in terms of which one of the consuls had to 
be appointed from the plebeian class and this was a further victory for the 
plebeians in the struggle of the orders.1780 Another consequence of the leges 
                                                                                                                                    
Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). See further Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg 
(1978) para 92; Schulz Roman legal science (1953) 24-25. 
1778  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 67; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 132, 198; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 398; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 82-83; 
Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 30; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private 
law (1984) 43, 392; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 717; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 84; Schulz Roman legal science (1953) 24-25; 
Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 362. For some examples, see Van Warmelo 
Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 718ff; Cushing Introduction to Roman law (1854) 54-
57. For more detail on the legis actio procedure see Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 84ff. 
1779  In Gaius Inst 1 1 it is said that the “law which a people establishes for itself is peculiar to it, and 
is called ius ciuile (civil law) as being the special law of that ciuitas (State)” (quoted from De 
Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)); cf D 1 1 9, Gaius, Institutes, book 1 where it is stated 
that “law which each nation has set up as a law unto itself is special to that particular civitas 
and is called jus civile, civil law, as being that which is proper to the particular civil society 
(civitas)” (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). See also Du Plessis 
Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 132, 
198; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 75; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman 
private law (1984) 19, 392; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 525-527; De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 12; Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 527 
sv “Ius civile”. However, there were exceptions to this rule which are discussed in n 1793 infra. 
1780  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 84; Brennan Praetorship (2000) 58; Kelly 
Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 20; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse 
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Liciniae Sextiae were the creation of the office of the praetor who was later 
referred to as the urban praetor (praetor urbanus).1781 The urban praetor took over 
the duties of the consuls in respect of the administration of civil disputes between 
Roman citizens.1782 The urban praetor was elected annually and was invested 
with extensive powers (imperium).1783 In terms of these powers, he had the power 
to regulate legal proceedings.1784 At the beginning of his term of office, the praetor 
would issue his edict for the year.1785 The main purpose of the edict was to set out 
the rules and procedures that would be followed to resolve private law disputes 
                                                                                                                                    
reg (1978) para 13; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 402; Nicholas Introduction to 
Roman law (1962) 6.  
1781  D 1 2 2 27, Pomponius, Manual, sole book: “And when the consuls were being called away to 
the wars with neighbouring peoples, and there was no one in the civitas empowered to attend 
to legal business in the city, what was done was that a praetor also was created, called the 
urban praetor on the ground that he exercised jurisdiction within the city” (quoted from Watson 
Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). See also Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 86; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 17, 84; Van Warmelo Principles 
of Roman civil law (1980) para 14; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 403; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 18; Watson Law making (1974) 63; Nicholas 
Introduction to Roman law (1962) 4. For a detailed discussion on the creation of the 
praetorship see Brennan Praetorship (2000) ch 3. 
1782  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 86; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 17, 84; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 30; Schiller 
Roman law mechanisms (1978) 411; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 4; Buckland & 
McNair Roman law & common law (1952) 3; Cushing Introduction to Roman law (1854) 69. 
1783  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 15; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 18. 
1784  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 87; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
civil law (1980) para 30; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 18; De 
Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 17. 
1785  Gaius Inst 1 6 where it is stated that “[t]he right of issuing edicts is possessed by magistrates of 
the Roman people” (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). See further 
Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 87-88; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to 
Roman history (1985) 91; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 20; Van Warmelo 
Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 33; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg 
(1978) para 24; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 18; Nicholas Introduction to 
Roman law (1962) 21; Buckland & McNair Roman law & common law (1952) 3. 
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during his term in office.1786 The praetor also had the right to grant a new remedy 
during his year in office if he thought it necessary.1787 He further had to ensure 
that the dispute between the parties was formulated correctly after which he had to 
appoint a judge (iudex) to adjudicate the dispute.1788 The urban praetor’s edict 
was based upon the existing ius civile and consequently contained remedies 
based on the strict and formal legis actiones.1789 Consequently, these actions are 
generally referred to as the stricti iuris (strict law) actions.1790 
 
                                            
1786  D 1 2 2 10, Pomponius, Manual, sole book: “At the same time, the magistrates also were 
settling matters of legal right, and in order to let the citizens know and allow for the jurisdiction 
which each magistrate would be exercising over any given matter, they took to publishing 
edicts. These edicts, in the case of the praetors, constituted the jus honorarium (honorary law): 
‘honorary’ is the term used, because the law in question had come from the high honor of 
praetorian office” (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). See also Mousourakis 
Historical context of Roman law (2003) 185; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) 
para 31; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 411-412; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 18; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 18; Watson Law of 
the ancient Romans (1970) 21; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 21. 
1787  Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 92; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private 
law (1984) 20; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 32; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 26; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law 
(1962) 22; Cushing Introduction to Roman law (1854) 59-60. For more on the exercise of this 
power by the urban praetor see the discussion in para  4 3 1 infra. 
1788  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 185; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 86; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 30; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 84; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 
23-24; Buckland & McNair Roman law & common law (1952) 3; Buckland Manual of Roman 
private law (1947) 362. 
1789  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 186; Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman 
contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 72; Kelly Kunkel’s 
Introduction to Roman history (1985) 87; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 31; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 84; Nicholas 
Introduction to Roman law (1962) 20. 
1790 Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 256; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law 
(1984) 174; Buckland & McNair Roman law & common law (1952) 271. 
346 
 
4 2 1 3 The development of the ius honorarium by the peregrine praetor 
During the third century BC the number of foreigners (peregrini)1791 living in Rome 
increased dramatically which resulted in a rise in business transactions between 
Roman citizens and foreigners.1792 These foreigners could not institute any of the 
legis actiones because the ius civile was only available to Roman citizens.1793 This 
meant, for the most part, that foreigners residing in Rome could not take part in 
legal transactions or institute any legal proceedings.1794 Therefore, an additional 
praetor, called the peregrine praetor (praetor peregrinus) was appointed in 
242 BC1795 to administer civil disputes where foreigners were involved.1796 
                                            
1791  The term peregrini refers to freemen (as opposed to slaves) who were not Roman citizens 
(Roby Roman Private Law vol 1 (2000) 19). 
1792  D 1 2 2 28, Pomponius, Manual, sole book: “Some years thereafter that single praetor became 
insufficient, because a great crowd of foreigners had come into the civitas as well, and so 
another praetor was established, who got the name peregrine praetor, because he mainly 
exercised jurisdiction as between foreigners (peregrini)” (quoted from Watson Digest of 
Justinian (2009-2011)). See also Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Mousourakis 
Historical context of Roman law (2003) 86-87, 186; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 75; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 14; De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 12; Stein (1996) “Equitable principles in Roman law” in 
Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 75; Nicholas Introduction to Roman 
law (1962) 7; Powell 1956 Current Legal Problems 19. 
1793  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 22, 186; Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker 
(eds) Good faith (2000) 77; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 75; 
Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 32; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 18. There were exceptions to this rule. For example, where a 
person was granted commercium (i.e. the capacity to conclude certain Roman transactions) or 
conubium (the capacity to contract a marriage which was valid under the ius civile) 
(Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 31). As a further example, a fiction of Roman 
citizenship could be attributed to a foreigner, specifically in the case of the actio furti (action for 
theft) and the actio legis Aquiliae (action for wrongful damage) (Gaius Inst 4 37; Dannenbring 
Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 33).  
1794  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 186; Powell 1956 Current Legal Problems 
19. 
1795  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 33; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 87, 186; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 84; Van Warmelo 
Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 14; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 403; Van 
347 
 
However, where the urban praetor applied the formal and strict ius civile between 
Roman citizens, the same could not prevail in the peregrine praetor’s forum.1797 
Many of the foreigners in Rome were traders and their disputes resulted from their 
commercial dealings with each other and Roman citizens.1798 A more informal and 
effective procedure was required to deal with these commercial transactions which 
                                                                                                                                    
Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 18; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 
2 (1975) 17; Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 23; Nicholas Introduction to Roman 
law (1962) 4. Although most sources cite 242 BC as the year the peregrine praetor was 
introduced, this remains a contentious issue (see Brennan Praetorship (2000) 85-89). 
1796  D 1 2 2 28, Pomponius, Manual, sole book (quoted in n 1792 supra). See also Du Plessis 
Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 33; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 87, 186; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 76, 84; Van Warmelo 
Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 14; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 403; Van 
Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 18; Watson Law making (1974) 63; 
Stein (1996) “Equitable principles in Roman law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal 
systems (1973) 75; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 4; Cushing Introduction to 
Roman law (1854) 69. The exact jurisdiction of the peregrine praetor is uncertain (Watson Law 
of the ancient Romans (1970) 23-24). First, there is a difference of opinion whether the 
jurisdictions of the two praetors were based on the status of the parties or convenience (see 
Bablitz Actors and audience (2007) 206 n 4 & 210 n 71; Brennan Praetorship (2000) 85-89; 
461-462; Gilbert 1939 Res Judicatae 50-58). Secondly, if the first view is preferred there is a 
difference of opinion whether the peregrine praetor had jurisdiction over disputes between 
foreigners as well as disputes between Roman citizens and foreigners from the start. Daube 
argues that initially the peregrine praetor had jurisdiction over disputes between foreigners only 
which was later expanded to include disputes between foreigners and citizens (Daube 1951 
Journal of Roman Studies 66-70 supported by Watson 1962 Revue Internationale des Droits 
de l'Antiquité 431 n 2; see also Watson Law making (1974) 64-82). Despite the objections by 
Daube, it is generally accepted that the peregrine praetor’s jurisdiction included disputes 
between foreigners as well as disputes between Roman citizens and foreigners from the start 
(see Brennan Praetorship (2000) 133-134 & Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 403 for a 
summary of the criticisms raised against Daube’s view; see also Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to 
Roman history (1985) 76, 84; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 14).  
1797  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history 
(1985) 75. 
1798  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 72; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 87-88, 198; Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 528 sv “Ius gentium”. 
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were governed by informal trade usages and customs.1799 As explained by Powell, 
the existing Roman law remedies were not accessible or suitable for use by 
foreigners: 
 
The parties to these old actions had to define the issue between them in 
a precise form of words, in Latin, and sometimes with oaths invoking the 
Roman gods. That was all very well for Roman citizens who spoke Latin 
and who worshipped the Roman gods. But it meant a complete denial of 
justice to the foreigner whose Latin was non-existent or imperfect and 
upon whom the Roman religion was not binding.1800 
 
This resulted in the development of the formulary (per formulam) procedure1801 by 
the peregrine praetor.1802 The formulary procedure was characterised by “its 
simplicity, economy, and adaptability”.1803 Similar to the legis actiones procedure, 
                                            
1799  Powell 1956 Current Legal Problems 19. See also Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law 
(2015) 72; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 87-88, 198; Schermaier “Bona 
fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 73; Kelly 
Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 75; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse 
reg (1978) para 25. 
1800  Powell 1956 Current Legal Problems 19. 
1801  The introduction date of the formulary procedure is uncertain (Nicholas Introduction to Roman 
law (1962) 20). However, Birks 1969 Irish Jurist 357 proposes that the formulary procedure 
predates the introduction of the peregrine praetor in 242 BC (see further n 1802 infra).  
1802  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 198; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 89; Dannenbring Kaser’s 
Roman private law (1984) 19, 395; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 726; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92 and the 
sources referred to in n 1; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 252-253; Stein 
(1996) “Equitable principles in Roman law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems 
(1973) 75. Birks 1969 Irish Jurist 357 proposes that the formulary procedure was developed by 
the urban praetor. Again, this is a contentious issue (see Brennan Praetorship (2000) 134-135; 
Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 405). 
1803  Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 20. See also Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law 
(2015) 34; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 394; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) para 726-727; Schulz Roman legal science (1953) 50. See further 
Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 73-74; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 398; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law 
(1984) 401ff; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 24-25 for a more detailed discussion 
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the parties had to formulate their claim before the praetor who then appointed a 
judge once he was satisfied with the formula.1804 However, while the formulas of 
the legis actiones consisted of spoken words and gestures that had to be followed 
exactly, the formulary procedure required that the dispute between the parties be 
reduced to writing which meant that the parties did not need to follow formal words 
and rituals in setting out their claim.1805 Through this flexibility, the peregrine 
praetor obtained a large discretion to influence the law.1806 This influence was 
indirect as the praetor had no legislative powers and could not introduce new legal 
rights.1807 However, the praetor was responsible for setting out the legal 
procedures for the administration of justice in his edict, and as a result, he had the 
power to introduce new remedies.1808 The new body of rules that emerged from 
the peregrine praetor’s edict became known as the ius honorarium or 
ius praetorium.1809 These rules took account of the customs which governed 
                                                                                                                                    
on how the formulary procedure worked. See further Schulz Roman legal science (1953) 50-51 
on the flexibility of the formulary procedure. 
1804  Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92. 
1805  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 727; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92. Cf 
De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 251. For a detailed discussion of how the 
formulary procedure worked in practice see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 728ff; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92; Buckland 
Manual of Roman private law (1947) 362. 
1806  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 727; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92. 
1807  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 185, 199; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to 
Roman history (1985) 90. 
1808  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 185, 199; Schermaier “Bona fides in 
Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 74; Schulz Roman 
legal science (1953) 50. 
1809  D 1 1 7 1, Papinian, Definitions, book 2: “Praetorian law (jus praetorium) is that which in the 
public interest the praetors have introduced in aid or supplementation or correction of the jus 
civile. This is also called honorary law (jus honorarium), being so named for the high office 
(honos) of the praetors” (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)); D 1 2 2 10, 
Pomponius, Manual, sole book (quoted in n 1786 supra). See furthermore Mousourakis 
Historical context of Roman law (2003) 187; Cushing Introduction to Roman law (1854) 76. For 
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commercial dealings with foreigners,1810 were “based largely on common sense, 
expediency and fairness” and became known as the ius gentium.1811  
 
It is possible that the bonae fidei iudiciae (bona fide actions) were introduced1812 in 
the peregrine praetor’s edict.1813 The most well-known bonae fidei contracts are 
the consensual contracts, namely sale (emptio venditio), letting and hiring (locatio 
                                                                                                                                    
a contrary view see Watson Law making (1974) 64ff who argues that the ius honorarium 
mainly derived from the urban praetor’s edict. 
1810  Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 528 sv “Ius gentium”. 
1811  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 186. See also Hahlo & Kahn South 
African legal system (1991) 134; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 76; 
Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 32; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) paras 25, 82; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 527; De Zulueta Institutes of 
Gaius part 2 (1975) 12, 253; Stein (1996) “Equitable principles in Roman law” in Newman (ed) 
Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 75; Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law 
(1953) 528 sv “Ius gentium”. 
1812  There is uncertainty as to when the bona fide iudiciae emerged (see a summary of the various 
arguments by Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) 
Good faith (2000) 71-72).  
1813  Schermaier & Dedek “Bona fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 
1155; Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 266; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 76; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 19; De Zulueta Institutes of 
Gaius part 2 (1975) 253, 167. This is a departure from Schermaier’s earlier view that the bonae 
fidei iudicia “did not originate in legal relations between foreigners and Roman citizens” 
(Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 77). There are other scholars who argue that the bonae fidei iudiciae is the work of the 
urban praetor (Watson 1984 Law and History Review 10ff; Schiller Roman law mechanisms 
(1978) 422; Watson 1964 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 254ff). This remains a 
contentious issue (Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 527-530). For the purposes of this 
thesis, the answer to this question is vital as it is generally accepted that the development of 
the ius honorarium was in part due to the expansion of Rome, the influx of foreigners into the 
city and the subsequent increase in foreign trade (Mousourakis Historical context of Roman 
law (2003) 181; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 25; for a general 
account see Walton 1893 Juridical Review 332-351). For more on the role of the urban praetor 
in the development of the ius honorarium see para  4 3 1 infra. 
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conductio), mandate (mandatum) and partnership (societas).1814 These contracts 
required no formalities and their validity was based on the agreement (consensus) 
between the parties.1815 The formulae of the bona fide actions included a clause at 
the end of the formula instructing the judge to decide the case according to what 
the defendant ought to do or give “ex fide bona” (in good faith).1816 Hence, the 
judge had to decide the case on the basis of the principle of good faith.1817 Gaius 
explains that “the iudex appears to be allowed complete discretion in assessing, 
on the bases of justice and equity, how much ought to be made good to the 
plaintiff”.1818 In this context, good faith referred to honesty and fairness,1819 which 
                                            
1814  Gaius Inst 3 135: “Obligations are created by consent in sale, hire, partnership, and mandate” 
(quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)); cf Just Inst 3 22: “Consensual 
obligations arise in sales (emptio venditio), letting and hirings (locatio conductio), partnerships 
(societas) and mandates (mandata)” (quoted from Thomas Institutes of Justinian (1975)). See 
also Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 266; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 76; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; Watson (1974) 
Law of the ancient Romans 66; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 171; Buckland 
Manual of Roman private law (1947) 277. 
1815  Gaius Inst 3 136: “The reason why we say that in these cases the obligations are contracted by 
consent is that no formality whether of words or writing is required, but it is enough that the 
persons dealing have consented” (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). 
See also Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; Buckland Manual of 
Roman private law (1947) 277. 
1816  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 263; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 200-201; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 140, 761-762; Dannenbring Kaser’s 
Roman private law (1984) 174; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; 
Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 95; Stein “Equitable principles in 
Roman law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 81; Schulz Roman 
legal science (1953) 51.  
1817  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 21; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 398; 
Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 77; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 95.  
1818  Gaius Inst 4 61 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). 
1819  Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 374 sv “Bona fides”.  
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in turn denoted an objective and ethical standard of behaviour that was expected 
from the parties.1820  
 
Thus it can be concluded that good faith played an important role in addressing 
the changing political, social and economic environment in Rome. The Romans 
showed an exceptional adaptability to deal with the changing environment by 
developing a separate flexible and fair legal system to govern legal transactions 
between Romans and foreigners. As will be seen below,1821 it did not take long 
before these flexible procedures and normative principles were incorporated into 
the existing ius civile. 
 
4 2 2 The role of ubuntu in addressing legal pluralism in South Africa 
The South African story of legal pluralism is still in the making and relatively new 
compared to the Roman one. As discussed in chapter one, South Africa is 
characterised by a multicultural and multiracial society in which different legal 
systems have been observed for the last four centuries. It is peculiar and 
ironic,1822 but due to South Africa’s history of colonialism and apartheid, that the 
term “common law” in South African law refers to the system of law based on 
Roman-Dutch and English law that was imported to South Africa under colonial 
rule and which was developed by legislation and legal precedents over time.1823 
Therefore, the term “common law” does not include the indigenous legal systems 
                                            
1820  Gaius Inst 3 137: “Further, in these contracts [consensual contracts] the parties are reciprocally 
liable for what each is bound in fairness and equity to perform for the other…” (quoted from De 
Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)); D 16 3 31pr where it is stated that “[t]he good faith 
that is required in contracts calls for level dealing in the highest degree” (quoted from Watson 
Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). See further Földi 2014 Fundamina 318 n 37; Földi 2007 
Annales Univ Budapest 58; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 399, Van Warmelo Principles of Roman 
civil law (1980) para 394. 
1821  Cf the discussion on the role of good faith in developing the ius civile in para  4 3 1 infra. 
1822  Cornell Law and revolution in South Africa (2014) 76.  
1823  Cf the definition of common law in n 442 supra. 
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collectively referred to as customary law,1824 which are followed by the majority of 
the population who are regarded as the indigenous peoples of South Africa.1825 
 
It was shown that during the pre-constitutional era,1826 customary law in South 
Africa was treated as inferior to common law. Where customary laws were 
recognised they were subject to a repugnancy clause which meant that they were 
applied as far as they were not repugnant to the principles of public policy and 
natural justice as shaped by common law ideals. As a result, common law 
influenced customary law, but no such influence was exercised in turn by 
customary law on common law. This situation was compounded by the 
conservative, positivistic and formalistic legal culture that was developed under 
British rule1827 and further exacerbated under apartheid.1828 With the advent of the 
new constitutional order, customary law was finally recognised as a separate legal 
system with the same status as that of common law.1829 However, as illustrated 
before,1830 customary law is not treated the same as common law because 
customary law is seen through the lens of common law rules and values, while 
common law is rarely assessed from the viewpoint of customary rules and values. 
This differentiation is seen as a failure to develop a plural legal culture which is 
necessary to legitimise the new legal system in South Africa.  
 
As was shown throughout chapter two, the South African common law of contract 
is no exception. For a long time, the classical model of contract law has been 
followed as underpinned by the philosophies of individualism and economic 
                                            
1824  Cf the discussion on the nature and characteristics of customary law in para  1 3 2 1 supra. 
1825  Cf the discussion in para  1 3 1 supra. 
1826  Cf the discussion dealing with the recognition of the customary law after the arrival of  the 
Dutch (para  1 4 3), during the British colonisation (paras  1 5 2 5,  1 5 3 2,  1 5 4 2 &  1 5 5 2), the 
union years (para  1 6 3) & apartheid (para  1 7 4) supra. 
1827  Cf the discussion on the British influences on the administration of justice in para  1 5 2 3 supra. 
1828  Cf the discussion dealing with the legal culture under apartheid in para  1 7 2 supra. 
1829  Cf the discussion on the constituional recognition of common and customary law under the 
Constitution in para  1 8 3 1 supra. 
1830  Cf the discussion on the unequal relationship between common and customary law in para  1 8 
3 3 supra. 
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liberalism that arrived at the Cape with the British1831 which model is still endorsed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal today.1832 The classical theory of contract law 
can be summarised as follows: Freedom of contract entails that the parties can 
decide whether, with whom and on what terms to contract which finds expression 
through consensus. This leads to the principle of sanctity of contract. Accordingly, 
good faith requires that the court should give effect to that which is agreed 
between the parties, which ensures formal equality and commercial and legal 
certainty as based on the classical conception of the rule of law. This forms the 
basis of a formalistic approach to contracts which means that substantive fairness 
is not a ground for setting aside a contract or preventing its enforcement.  
 
Nevertheless, the classical model of contract law has been under attack for some 
time as reflected in the move towards modern contract theory.1833 These attacks 
reflect greater changes in the political, economic and social environment as a 
result of inequalities created by the industrial age and as further compounded by 
apartheid. Accordingly, the modern theory of contract involves a paternalistic 
approach through state intervention in private contracts in order to correct 
injustices resulting from unequal bargaining relationships. As a result, a normative 
approach must be followed which includes the use of open norms to fill in lacunae 
in the existing legal rules and correct injustices which result from the latter’s strict 
application. In this respect, modern contract theory accords with the idea of 
transformative constitutionalism which promotes substantive equality in the private 
legal sphere.1834 
 
In Roman law, the introduction of the open norm of good faith was necessary to 
deal with the influx of foreigners into Rome who had limited access to justice 
under the Roman ius civile. It was argued that it is possible that good faith was 
                                            
1831 Cf the discussion dealing with the role of good faith the British colonisation in para  2 2 3 4 
supra. 
1832  Cf the discussion with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach to contractual fairness in paras 
 2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
1833  Cf the discussion dealing with movement towards modern law of contract in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
1834  Cf the discussion dealing with transformative constitutionalism in para  1 8 2 3 supra. 
355 
 
introduced by the peregrine praetor to deal with the increasing number of foreign 
traders and consumers who played an increasingly important role in the Roman 
economy and development. Good faith functioned as an open norm and allowed 
the judge an equitable discretion in resolving contractual disputes. The situation in 
South Africa is different but similar themes may be identified. Under colonialism 
and apartheid the majority of the indigenous people were treated unequally in 
many respects and this prevented them from taking part in the South African 
economy on the same level as their white counterparts.1835 With the introduction of 
the Constitution, the indigenous people were granted equal right of access to the 
economy but they are expected to do so in terms of existing laws that are based 
on common law values that sustain and propound the existing inequalities. By 
relying on the underlying constitutional value of ubuntu, the Constitutional Court is 
in the process of addressing these inequalities with the view to establish a more 
egalitarian society and plural legal culture.1836 As was proposed throughout 
chapter three, in the common law of contract this should result in the development 
of good faith into an equitable discretion to set aside an unfair contract term or the 
unfair enforcement of a contract term. Such an equitable discretion would require 
the courts to consider the contracting parties’ economic and social circumstances 
within the post-apartheid constitutional context which promotes substantive 
equality as envisaged by the Constitution and accords with modern contract 
theory.  
 
4 3 THE ROLE OF OPEN NORMS IN SUPPLEMENTING AND 
CORRECTING THE EXISTING LAW 
4 3 1 The role of good faith in supplementing and correcting the existing 
ius civile 
Initially, Roman citizens did not enjoy the advantages of the flexible formulary 
procedure that incorporated the principles of good faith and equity.1837 As was 
                                            
1835  Cf the discussion dealing with the apartheid era in para  1 7 supra. 
1836  Cf the discussion dealing with the introduction and development of ubuntu in the law generally 
in para  1 8 4 supra. 
1837  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg 
(1978) para 92. 
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seen earlier, the urban praetor’s edict was based upon the existing ius civile and 
consequently contained remedies based on the strict and formal legis actiones.1838 
However, it was not long before the new flexible formulary procedure was adopted 
by the urban praetor and incorporated into the ius civile.1839 In circa 150 BC1840 the 
lex Aebutia was passed in terms of which the formulary procedure was made 
available to Roman citizens.1841 With the introduction of the flexible formulary 
procedure and the power to introduce new remedies,1842 the urban praetor was 
granted an opportunity to incorporate the ius honorarium into the existing Roman 
ius civile.1843 Van Warmelo argues that as time passed the urban praetor 
exercised this discretion where it was necessary to address the changing needs of 
the society and that he looked to the ius gentium for guidance in making these 
                                            
1838  Cf the discussion at n 1789 supra. 
1839  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 34; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 726; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92; De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 253. 
1840  The exact date of the Lex Aebutia is uncertain (Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” 
in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 72 n 72; Schiller Roman law mechanisms 
(1978) 405; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92; De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 250-251). 
1841  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 35; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 199; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 90; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) para 726; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) 
para 92. As stated by Gaius in Inst 4 30: “But all these legis actiones gradually became 
unpopular. For the excessive technicality of the early makers of the law was carried so far that 
a party who made the slightest mistake lost his case. Consequently by the L. Aebutia and the 
two Ll. Iuliae they were abolished, and litigation by means of adapted pleadings, that is by 
formula, was established” (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). Van 
Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92 & Birks 1969 Irish Jurist 357 argue 
that the formulary procedure was already used in cases between Roman citizens prior to the 
enactment of the Lex Aebutia. See also Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 406 for a 
summary of the different arguments regarding the role of the Lex Aebutia & Dannenbring 
Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 395 for a different theory in respect of the Lex Aebutia. 
1842  Cf the discussion at n 1787 supra. 
1843  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 727; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 93; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 19; De Zulueta 
Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 18-19. See also the discussion of Schiller Roman law 
mechanisms (1978) 424-425 on the nature of the ius honorarium of the urban praetor.  
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changes.1844 This meant that the urban praetor introduced remedies where the ius 
civile did not provide any or refused remedies where the ius civile would normally 
provide relief.1845 The urban praetor exercised this discretion in accordance with 
what he considered right and equitable.1846 Therefore, the new remedies 
introduced by the urban praetor were less concerned with the formal and rigid 
requirements of the traditional ius civile and rather aimed to achieve fairness and 
justice between the parties.1847 As with the peregrine praetor, the body of rules 
developed by the urban praetor was also referred to as the ius honorarium.1848 
 
A good example of such a supplementation or correction of the ius civile is the 
case of a contract induced by fraud.1849 Initially, a stricti iuris contract induced by 
fraud was valid and binding as long as the formal procedures were followed.1850 
                                            
1844  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 33; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die 
Romeinse reg (1978) para 26. 
1845  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 35; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 199; Du Plessis 2002 THRHR 399-400; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history 
(1985) 90-91; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 19; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) paras 33, 731; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 418; Van 
Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 26, 93; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius 
part 2 (1975) 253; Watson Law making (1974) 42; Watson Law of the ancient Romans 
(1970) 22-23; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 19, 26; Buckland Manual of Roman 
private law (1947) 362.  
1846  Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 199; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman 
history (1985) 90-91; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 33; Van Warmelo 
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 93. 
1847  Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 90; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil 
law (1980) para 33. 
1848  Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 91; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil 
law (1980) para 33.  
1849  For further examples see Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 731-732; 
Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 423-427; Stein (1996) “Equitable principles in Roman 
law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 76-76. 
1850  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 263; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern 
Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 520-521; Zimmerman Law of 
obligations (1990) 663; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 424; Van 
Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 97; Nicholas Introduction to Roman 
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However, fraud was actionable in bonae fidei contracts.1851 The discrepancy 
between bonae fidei and stricti iuris contracts was addressed with the introduction 
of the defence of fraud (exceptio doli) for the stricti iuris contracts in 66 BC.1852 
The exceptio doli provided for the insertion of the clause “if in this matter nothing 
has been or is being done dolo malo by Aulus Agerius” into the formula on the 
request of the defendant.1853 Zimmerman distinguishes between two instances 
that are contained in the formula, namely “fraudulent behaviour before the 
institution of the action” (referring to the words “nothing has been … done”) and 
“cases where the bringing of the action itself could be taken to constitute dolus” 
(referring to the words “is being done”).1854 The first instance is commonly referred 
to as the exceptio doli specialis, while the latter is called the exceptio doli 
generalis.1855 Initially, the exceptio doli was limited to fraudulent behaviour1856 but 
as time passed the insertion of this defence (especially the exceptio doli generalis) 
“provided the judge with the same far-ranging discretion that he already had in 
bonae fidei iudicia”.1857 In other words, the judge acquired an equitable discretion 
                                                                                                                                    
law (1962) 164. Early Roman law agreements were usually concluded by the formal legal act 
of stipulation (stipulatio or sponsio), which is discussed in more detail in para  4 5 infra. 
1851  Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 60; Buckland Manual of Roman private law 
(1947) 252. 
1852  Thomas 2003 De Jure 107; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 663-664; Watson Law of the 
ancient Romans (1970) 60. For a detailed discussion of the introduction and development of 
the exceptio doli see Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 663ff; Van Warmelo Principles of 
Roman civil law (1980) para 698-704; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) 
para 97.  
1853  Gaius Inst 4 119 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958). See also 
Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 520; De Wet Estoppel by representation (1939) 83. 
1854  Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern Roman-Dutch contract law” in Rabello (ed) 
Aequitas and equity (1997) 520. See also Aronstam 1979 THRHR 28; De Wet Estoppel by 
representation (1939) 83. 
1855  Hutchison “The nature and basis of contract” in Hutchison & Pretorius (eds) Contract 
(2012) 27; De Wet Estoppel by representation (1939) 83. This distinction is a modern one and 
did not exist in Roman law (Aronstam 1979 THRHR 28). 
1856 Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 665; Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 252.  
1857  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 667. See also Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in 
modern Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 520; Dannenbring 
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to resolve the contractual dispute in a fair and reasonable manner1858 and 
therefore the exceptio doli generalis functioned as an open norm. As reflected 
many years later in the following passage of the Digest: 
 
The praetor established this defence [sic] to the end that a person’s fraud 
should not benefit him through the medium of the civil law but contrary to 
natural equity.1859 
 
By introducing these new remedies, the urban praetor (like the peregrine 
praetor)1860 was creating new legal rights despite his lack of legislative power.1861 
While his influence was indirect, it was not small: 
 
In this way he managed to change the whole character of Roman law. 
For all practical purposes he created a vast branch of law which 
extended and corrected the existing law, and filled in gaps in it.1862 
 
A further result of these developments was that the flexible formulary procedure 
was preferred over the rigid and formal legis actio procedure and gradually the 
legis actiones were replaced by the formulary procedure.1863 Finally, in 17 BC the 
                                                                                                                                    
Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 176. For a detailed discussion of the introduction and 
development of the exceptio doli see Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 663ff; 
Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 698-704; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van 
die Romeinse reg (1978) para 97.  
1858  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 263; Zimmerman “Good faith and equity in modern 
Roman-Dutch law” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 520; Zimmerman Law of 
obligations (1990) 668. 
1859  D 44 4 1, Paul, Edict, book 71 (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)), my 
emphasis. The original text speaks of “contra naturalem aequitatem” (for more on the meaning 
of “aequitas” see para  4 4 1 2 infra). See also Erasmus 1989 SALJ 674. 
1860  Cf the discussion at n 1806 supra. 
1861  Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 19; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 34; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 26; Nicholas 
Introduction to Roman law (1962) 20. 
1862  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 33. See also Kelly Kunkel’s 
Introduction to Roman history (1985) 91.  
1863  Gaius Inst 4 30 (as quoted in n 1841 supra). See also Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law 
(2015) 34; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 726; Van Warmelo 
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leges Iuliae iudiciorum publicorum et privatorum were passed which abolished the 
legis actio procedure1864 except for certain cases.1865 As the years passed, the 
edicts of the urban and peregrine praetor became more similar in content.1866 This 
explains why many years later the Digest describes the ius honorarium as “that 
which in the public interest the praetors have introduced in aid or supplementation 
or correction of the jus civile.”1867  
 
Finally, as pointed out by Van Warmelo, these developments meant that the entire 
Roman law became more flexible and fair.1868 He argues that this created a place 
                                                                                                                                    
Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92; Schulz Roman legal science (1953) 76; 
Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 362. 
1864  Gaius Inst 4 30 (as quoted in n 1841 supra). See also Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law 
(2015) 72; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 199; Kelly Kunkel’s 
Introduction to Roman history (1985) 90; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 396; 
Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 726; Schiller Roman law mechanisms 
(1978) 409; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92. 
1865  The exceptions were cases falling under the jurisdiction of the centumviral court and cases 
involving damnum infectum (a threat of damage to another’s property). Gaius Inst 4 31: “In two 
cases only may one proceed by legis actio, namely for damnum infectum and where the trial is 
to be before the centumviral court” (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). 
See also Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 199; Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction 
to Roman history (1985) 90; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 92.  
1866  Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 82; Schiller Roman law mechanisms 
(1978) 532. Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) 
Good faith (2000) 67 n 21 explains that the bona fide actions were eventually regarded as part 
of the ius civile.  
1867  D 1 1 7 1, Papinian, Definitions, book 2 (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). 
In addition, Marcian is quoted in D 1 1 8, Institutes, book 1 as stating that “the jus honorarium 
itself is the living voice of the jus civile” (quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011)). 
See also Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) 
Good faith (2000) 65; Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 79; Nicholas 
Introduction to Roman law (1962) 26-27.  
1868  Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 26. 
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for the application of aequitas (fairness) in Roman law.1869 The concept of 
aequitas is discussed in the next Roman law section.1870  
 
4 3 2 The role of ubuntu in developing the South African common law of 
contract 
Open norms are necessary where the application of the existing rules results in 
injustice despite the fact that their application is difficult to reconcile with the 
requirement of the rule of law especially in its classical conception.1871 Nicholas 
articulately describes this difficulty as follows: 
 
For the lawyer in any system, be he judge or jurist, is in the dilemma that 
he sees – and wishes to see – the law as something which has its own 
life, which exists independently of himself and is merely applied by him, 
and yet he must on occasion in practice make law, either by laying down 
a rule for a case which has never previously arisen or by altering a rule 
which has become unjust or inconvenient.1872 
 
In other words, open norms are necessary because they provide the necessary 
means to develop the formal rules of the law of contract in order to keep up with 
the community’s changing values as a result of political, economic and social 
developments. The introduction and development of good faith in Roman law is an 
excellent example in this regard. The Romans realised that their existing formal 
and rigid laws could not address the changing legal needs of the community due 
to the influx of foreigners (especially foreign traders) into Rome. In reaction to the 
changing commercial environment, they introduced flexible legal procedures and a 
more normative approach to these legal transactions to achieve fairness and 
justice between the contracting parties. This worked so well, that the new flexible 
procedures and normative principles were transferred to the existing formalistic 
                                            
1869  Van Warmelo Oorsprong van die Romeinse reg (1978) para 26.  
1870  Cf the discussion dealing with the role of bona fides to correct and adapt the ius civile in para  4 
4 1 2 infra. 
1871  Cf the discussions dealing with the rule of law in paras  1 8 2 3 &  3 5 supra. 
1872  Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 48.  
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law applicable to Roman citizens. Gradually, the existing ius civile became subject 
to a more normative interpretation in the interests of justice.  
 
The need for open norms in the law of contract is also illustrated by the historical 
development of fairness in the South African common law of contract as set out in 
chapter two. A number of open norms have been utilised throughout the years to 
address unfairness in the South African common law of contract. In the pre-
constitutional era these open norms included the exceptio doli generalis1873 and 
good faith (bona fides)1874 which originated in Roman law and the rules 
concerning legality of contracts and public policy1875 which were imported from 
English law. Despite the inclusion of these open norms in the South African 
common law of contract, their potential to ensure contractual justice was severely 
limited by the positivistic and formalistic approach by the courts as reflected in the 
classical model of contract law.1876 As emphasised throughout this thesis,1877 this 
model is informed by the ideologies of individualism and capitalism which arrived 
with the British colonisation and was adopted and subsequently developed in the 
South African legal system during the union years and apartheid. This formalistic 
and rigid approach to the common law of contract resulted in one commentator 
comparing the South African common law of contract to the rigid and formal ius 
civile prior to the changes effected by good faith: 
 
We are perhaps now back where we started in Roman days, a few 
months or weeks away from the Praetor issuing legislation to secure 
simple justice between man and man.1878 
 
                                            
1873  As dicussed in para  2 2 2 supra. 
1874  As discussed in para  2 2 3 supra. 
1875  As discussed in para  2 2 4 supra. 
1876  See esp the discussion dealing with the classical model of contract law in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
1877  Cf the discussions throughout para  2 2 supra. 
1878  Hoffmann as quoted in SALC Report on unreasonable stipulations in contracts (1998) 36. See 
also the references to this quote in Barnard Critical legal argument for contractual justice 
(2005) 239 & Barnard 2005 SAJHR 290. 
363 
 
This call for change is the result of the movement towards modern contract theory 
and the egalitarian aims of the Constitution in view of the great societal 
discrepancies in wealth and power as sustained by systemic inequalities created 
by the industrial age and further exacerbated by apartheid.1879 Nevertheless, 
despite these changes in community values as reflected in modern contract theory 
and the Constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeal remains trapped in the 
classical liberal tradition which resists the use of open norms in the common law of 
contract and has resulted in the limited role of good faith to ensure substantive 
contractual fairness.1880 The introduction and development of the customary value 
of ubuntu into an underlying constitutional value is not only a reflection of the 
move towards a plural legal culture but also confirms the Constitutional Court’s 
commitment to a normative approach to law.1881 As submitted above, ubuntu is an 
open norm that enables value judgments,1882 and as an underlying constitutional 
value it should be used to develop the common law of contract in line with the 
constitutional values as mandated by section 39(2) of the Constitution.1883 As 
proposed in the previous chapter, ubuntu should be used to develop the principle 
of good faith in the common law of contract into an open norm that can be used to 
set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement of a contract term.  
 
Returning to the issue of how open norms can be reconciled with the principle of 
the rule of law, it was argued that the recognition of open norms in the common 
                                            
1879  Cf the discussion on the modern contract law theory in para  2 2 3 6 and the constitutional aim 
of substantive equality in para  1 8 2 2(b) supra. 
1880  Cf the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach to fairness in the law of contract as discussed in 
paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 and critically analysed throughout ch 3. 
1881  Cf e.g. the discussion of Justice Mokgoro’s judgment in S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 
SA 391 (CC) para 302 in the text at n 516 supra. See also the approach of Justice Sachs in 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) as discussed in para  1 8 
4 3(a) supra. See further the influence of ubuntu on the constitutional value of the rule of law 
as discussed in para  3 5 supra. 
1882  Cf the discussion dealing the open-endedness of ubuntu in para  1 8 4 1 supra. 
1883 Cf the discussion dealing with the role of ubuntu in the private law in para  1 8 4 3(b) and its role 
in the common law of contract in particular as discussed in para  2 3 3 supra. 
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law of contract would not lead to unacceptable legal uncertainty.1884 The reason is 
that such open norms should not be informed by the judge’s personal conception 
of fairness but rather by the objective normative value system established in terms 
of the Constitution. After critically analysing the expression of the founding 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom in the common law of 
contract, it was found that these values, as informed by ubuntu, support the 
development of good faith into an equitable discretion. Hence, the proper 
appreciation of the founding constitutional values in the common law of contract 
results in a more substantive understanding of the rule of law which permits a 
normative approach in the common law of contract in order to promote the 
constitutional vision of an egalitarian society.1885 
 
Finally, as was seen above,1886 fairness as an open norm in the law of contract is 
now reflected in section 48 of the CPA when dealing with an unfair clause or the 
unfair enforcement of a clause in a contract governed by the Act. This is also a 
reflection of the move towards modern contract theory and the constitutional 
imperative to promote substantive equality. 
 
4 4 HARMONISING VALUES FROM DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS 
4 4 1 Good faith: Harmonisation between Roman and Greek ideas? 
It is generally accepted that Greek culture exerted some influence on Roman life 
during the later Republic.1887 It has been argued that this influence can also be 
identified in the Roman legal system and laws.1888 Yet, the extent to which Roman 
                                            
1884  Cf the discussion on the expression of the constitutional value of the rule of law in the common 
law of contract in para  3 5 2 supra. 
1885  Cf the critical analysis of the constitutional value of the rule in the law of contract in para  3 5 
supra. 
1886  Cf the discussion in para  2 3 4 2 supra. 
1887  Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 98-99; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman 
private law (1984) 3-4; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 8. 
1888  Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 99; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private 
law (1984) 4; Wieacker 1981 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 268; 
Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history (1985) 75-77; Schulz Roman legal science (1953) 
38-39 who refers to this period in Roman law as the “Hellenistic period”. For a general account 
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law was influenced by Greek ideas remains a controversial issue, and this is also 
the case when determining the origin and development of the concept of bona 
fides. One of the main theories states that the concept originated from the Roman 
concept of fides and is therefore indigenous to Roman law. It has also been 
argued that Greek influences can be identified in the development of bona fides, 
especially in correcting and adapting the ius civile. The next section attempts to 
trace the development from fides to bona fides after which the following section 
considers the possible foreign influences on bona fides as used to correct and 
adapt the ius civile. 
 
4 4 1 1 From fides to bona fides 
Law (ius) was not the only code that governed Roman society. Outside the sphere 
of law, there were various customs (mores)1889 that determined the social status of 
each Roman and prescribed his rights and duties: 
 
[T]he need of the Roman for liberty demands restraint in the matter of the 
creation and recognition of legal principles. He demands a wide space 
free of legal rules because of the number and power of extra-legal 
restrictions. The Romans were enmeshed in a web of such restrictions 
…1890 
 
Zimmerman explains that Roman law tended to interfere with these social aspects 
of Roman life as little as possible because they were already governed by their 
own regulatory devices, one of which was fides.1891 According to legend fides was 
the oldest virtue in Rome to be personified as a goddess.1892 Roman literary 
                                                                                                                                    
of possible Greek influences on Roman law see Kelly Kunkel’s Introduction to Roman history 
(1985) 98-105; Yntema 1967 American Journal of Comparative Law 107ff. 
1889  Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 587 sv “Mores (mos)”. 
1890  Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 21. See also Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law 
(1984) 28-29. 
1891  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 350. 
1892  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670. See also 
Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 78-79 n 96 where he argues that the goddess “Fides was probably an idolisation of the 
concept of fides”. 
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tradition dates the cult of Fides to the early monarchy when it was introduced by 
the second king of Rome, Numa Pompilius (circa 700 BC).1893 Furthermore, it is 
known that a temple was built in her honour in the city of Rome (circa 250 BC).1894 
The religious origin of fides illustrates the importance of fides to the Romans,1895 
and it would seem that fides played an important role from the time of the kings 
and continued to do so during the republican period.1896  
 
It has been argued that despite its religious origins fides developed into a moral 
and social construction,1897 which manifested in various aspects of Roman 
society.1898 As a result, it had various meanings depending on the context in which 
                                            
1893  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670; Lind “The 
republic and Roman morality” in De Vos Regsgeskiedenis literature (1989) 6; Gruen 1982 
Athenaeum 59. 
1894  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670; Griffin & 
Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991) 140 n 4; Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in 
Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 6; Gruen 1982 Athenaeum 59; Schulz Principles 
of Roman law (1936) 224. 
1895  Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 7; 
Gruen 1982 Athenaeum 59. 
1896  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670; Sič 2008 
Zbornik Radova 164-165; Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & 
Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 77-79; Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux 
(ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 6-7. 
1897  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 164-165; Litvinoff 1997 Tulane Law Review 1651; Lind “The republic 
and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 6. There is uncertainty in 
regard to the original meaning of fides and various theories exist. As explained by Gruen 1982 
Athenaeum 51: “The original meaning of fides to the Roman mind is wrapped in the obscurity 
of the antique past. Some have seen it as a kind of contract, a promise, an assurance, a 
guarantee in the widest sense, in which one can place secure trust – but morally neutral. That 
interpretation has not won universal acceptance. Different analyses find the moral component 
of fides is central and present from the start, a principal characteristic of the Roman mentality. 
In another formulation, fides has a social dimension at its core, mutual confidence and 
obligations as the cement of society”. 
1898  Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 7. 
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it was used.1899 At its most essential, fides was described as “keeping one’s word” 
or “to be bound by one’s word”.1900 In this context, Cicero is often quoted: 
 
Moreover, the keeping of faith [fides] is fundamental to justice, that is 
constancy and truth in what is said and agreed. Therefore, … let us trust 
that keeping faith (fides) is so called because what has been said is 
actually done (fiat).1901  
 
Fides was considered a central virtue in Roman society1902 and it was of utmost 
importance for a Roman citizen to keep his word.1903 Fidelity was one of the 
standard principles of Roman life1904 and failure to remain faithful to one’s word 
would result in a social blot against one’s reputation.1905 In this context fides 
recognises the moral duties of fidelity and faithfulness.1906  
 
A more social construction of fides maintains that fides has always combined two 
meanings, namely trust and trustworthiness.1907 A relationship based on fides 
                                            
1899  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670; 
Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 78; Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 223. 
1900  Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 223 who describes this definition of fides as the 
essential meaning of fides. See also Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in 
Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 78; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law 
(1984) 33. 
1901  Cicero De Officiis 1 23 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1902  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670; Lind “The 
republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 8; Kelly 1966 
Irish Jurist 352; Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 223. 
1903  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 115. 
1904  Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 223. 
1905  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670;  Schulz 
Principles of Roman law (1936) 224. 
1906  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165; Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman 
& Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 77; Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 223; Powell 
1956 Current Legal Problems 20.  
1907  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165 esp n 67, 168; Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” 
in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 79; Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties 
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meant a relationship between two parties where “the one trusted and relied upon 
the other”.1908 In this context, it has been argued that fides required that a person 
should keep his word and display consideration and leniency towards those under 
his protection1909 or towards those to whom he had a social obligation.1910 In this 
context fides was a principle that prescribed the expected behaviour in daily life, 
and in particular what behaviour was expected in specific social relationships.1911 
As both parties were bound by the principles of fides, there existed a mutual 
confidence between the parties which was reciprocal in nature.1912 In this 
framework, fides manifested as a principle that underlies social relations.1913 A 
good example of a Roman relationship that was governed by fides is the 
relationship between a patron and his clients (clientela).1914 Clients were poor 
Roman citizens (for example peasants, artisans or workers) who entered into a 
special relationship with a wealthy Roman citizen (a patron) for whom they 
executed work and in turn received social and legal protection.1915 The 
relationship based on clientela created reciprocal duties which were governed by 
fides rather than law.1916 This meaning of fides was also accentuated in the old 
fiduciary relationships (for example between guardian and ward) which later 
                                                                                                                                    
(1991) xlvi; Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature 
(1989) 7. 
1908  Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991) xlvi. See also Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman 
contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 79. 
1909  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 79. 
1910  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670. 
1911  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165.  
1912  Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 6. 
1913  Verboven “Fides” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 2670. 
1914  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 79; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 350-351; Schulz Principles of Roman law 
(1936) 231; Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 391 sv “Clientes” . 
1915  Winkel 2010 Fundamina 582; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 350-351; Berger 
Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 391 sv “Clientes”. 
1916  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 351. See also Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman 
law (1953) 391 sv “Clientes”. 
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developed into legal actions with the development of the bonae fidei iudicia.1917 
These relationships were also characterised by a specific standard of behaviour 
that was required from both parties (for example the guardian had to administer 
his ward’s affairs as if they were his own).1918  
 
It could be asked how the indigenous Roman principle of fides1919 that applied 
between Romans became a principle of the ius gentium which could be applied 
where foreigners were involved. Especially, as in early Rome, Roman fides was 
contrasted to the fides of other nations (including the Greeks).1920 It has been 
argued that Roman fides developed into a universal principle that applied to all 
nations as evidenced by its use in international treaties where the parties took a 
solemn oath to keep to the covenants of the treaty faithfully and without malice.1921 
This use of fides emphasised the essential meaning of fides, namely to keep one’s 
word.1922 Furthermore, those who surrendered to a Roman conqueror would place 
themselves under his fides (and thus his protection) which accentuated the idea of 
fides that incorporated both the ideas of keeping one’s word and leniency and 
consideration to those under one’s protection.1923 As fides was used in 
international relations it has been argued that it developed into a universal 
principle that applied to all nations (and not only Romans) and became part of the 
                                            
1917  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 80. 
1918  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 80.  
1919  Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature (1989) 6. 
1920  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165 n 68; Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) 
Studies in Latin literature (1989) 8; Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 223. Buckland & 
McNair Roman law & common law (1952) 280 explains the difference between Roman fides 
and Greek fides as follows: “[N]o Greek trusted another unless he had the matter set down in 
writing”. 
1921  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165, esp n 71.  
1922  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 78-78; Lind “The republic and Roman morality” in Deroux (ed) Studies in Latin literature 
(1989) 7. 
1923  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 78-79. 
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ius gentium. Thereafter, the ius gentium exerted an influence on the Roman fides 
by transforming it from a moral obligation into a legally bounding one: 
 
It was particularly in the contractual field that the ius gentium exercised 
its influence, primarily by strengthening the element of reciprocal 
confidence (fides) without which relations with foreigners were hardly 
possible.1924  
 
The question remains how the concept of fides developed into bona fides. There is 
much uncertainty in this respect,1925 but an attractive theory is proposed by 
Schermaier. He argues that the peregrine praetor probably modelled the bona 
fidei iudiciae on the Roman fiduciary relationships.1926 One of the fiduciary 
relationships, fiducia1927 was legally enforceable and did not rely on fides 
alone.1928 The formula of the actio fiduciae demanded bene agere from the 
transferee (i.e. that he do well).1929 This required that the transferee should act 
“carefully and prudently” and with respect for the interests of the other party.1930 
Schermaier argues that this standard of behaviour corresponds to that required 
under the bonae fidei iudiciae which indicates that the actio fiduciae was most 
                                            
1924  Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 529 sv “Ius gentium”. See also 
Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 33; Buckland Manual of Roman private law 
(1947) 260. 
1925  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 166 n 75. 
1926  Cf the discussion at n 1917 supra. 
1927  Fiducia can be described as “[a]n agreement (pactum fiduciae) in addition to a transfer of 
property through mancipatio (or in iure cessio) by which the transferee assumes certain duties 
as to the property transferred or the later retransfer thereof to the transferor” (Berger (1953) 
Encycopledic dictionary of Roman law 471 sv “Fiduciae”). See further Dannenbring Kaser’s 
Roman private law (1984) 126-127; Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 260-261.  
1928  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 80. 
1929  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 82. 
1930  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 82. See also Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 126-127. 
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likely the forerunner of the bonae fidei iudicia.1931 He further argues that the term 
bona fides was probably used to emphasise the required standard of 
behaviour.1932 Therefore, it referred not only to the meaning of fides of “keeping 
one’s word” but also that one acts in accordance with a required standard of 
behaviour.1933  
 
4 4 1 2 Bona fides as used to correct and adapt the ius civile 
Even if it is accepted that the bonae fidei iudiciae can be traced back to the 
Roman concept of fides, some Greek influences can be identified in the use of 
bona fides to correct and adapt the ius civile. At the beginning of the Digest it is 
stated “ius est ars boni et aequi”1934 which can be translated as “the law is the art 
of goodness and fairness”.1935 It has been argued that this text refers to the 
function of aequitas in the development of Roman law: 
 
When the legal norms established in earlier law, written or not written, 
became inadequate to the social and economic necessities of the later 
age, the aequitas went into operation both in private law and in civil 
procedure as well as in judicial practice.1936 
 
In this section, the function of bona fides as an expression of aequitas to correct 
the injustices of the formal law (summum ius) is investigated. Specific 
consideration is given to Cicero’s De Officiis. First, because it provides examples 
                                            
1931 Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 82. 
1932  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 82. See also Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 166 n 75; Földi 2007 Annales Univ Budapest 58; 
Coing 1987 Washington University Law Quarterly 713; Schulz Principles of Roman law (1936) 
228. 
1933  Cf the discussion at and sources referred to in n 614-615 supra. 
1934  D 1 1 1pr (quoted from Mommsen & Krueger (eds) Digest of Justinian (1985)).  
1935  Quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian (2009-2011). See also Berger Encyclopedic dictionary 
of Roman law (1953) 354 sv “Aequitas (aequum)”. 
1936  Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 354 sv “Aequitas (aequum)”. See also 
Biscardi “On Aequitas and epieikeia” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 7-8; Schiller 
Roman law mechanisms (1978) 553-554. 
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of this function of bona fides during the later republican period, and secondly, 
because it has been argued that Cicero’s use of the term aequitas led to its use as 
a legal term.1937  
 
The phrase summum ius is an abbreviation for the maxim summum ius summa 
iniuria which has been translated as “the more Justice, the more injustice”.1938 A 
more eloquent translation is “more law less justice”.1939 It refers to the over-literal 
interpretation of laws that ultimately leads to injustice. In the first book of 
De Officiis, Cicero refers to the example of a man who, after agreeing to a thirty 
day truce, destroys the enemy’s fields at night and then justifies his behaviour by 
arguing that the truce referred to days and therefore did not include nights.1940 
Consequently, Cicero argued that strict adherence to the law could lead to 
injustice.1941  
 
Two further examples from Cicero have been used as evidence that the Romans 
treated bona fides as an expression of aequitas that was used to correct the 
injustices of the summum ius.1942 First, Cicero tells of a case where the augurs 
were going to take an augury on the citadel and they ordered Tiberius Claudius 
Centumalus, whose house was on the Caelian Hill, to demolish that part of his 
house that was obstructing the auspices.1943 Claudius advertised the house and 
then sold it to Publius Calpurnius Lanarius after which the augurs made the same 
                                            
1937  Tuori “Aequitas” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 132. Thomas 
2003 De Jure 105 further argues that the De Officiis is an important source on Roman moral 
philosophy. 
1938  Quoted by Cicero De Officiis 1 33 (as translated by Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties 
(1991)). 
1939  Hiemstra & Gonin Trilingual legal dictionary (2008) 294. 
1940  Cicero De Officiis 1 33 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1941  Tuori “Aequitas” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 132.  
1942  Tuori “Aequitas” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 132; Schermaier 
“Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith (2000) 70. See 
further Winkel 1996 Fundamina 114; Schiller Roman law mechanisms (1978) 553-554. 
1943  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
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demand of Calpurnius and he complied.1944 When Calpurnius learned that 
Claudius had advertised the house after he was ordered to demolish a part of it, 
he compelled Claudius to go before an arbitrator as to “what compensation he 
ought to have made in accordance with the demands of good faith”.1945 Calpurnius 
had to formulate the action on good faith, as the ius civile did not provide him with 
a remedy.1946 Cicero explains that in accordance with the Law of the Twelve 
Tables “it was enough that one [the buyer] should accept responsibility for those 
faults that were verbally specified” and “if the seller had denied these, he should 
face a double penalty”.1947 This meant that the seller was only responsible for the 
defects whose existence he expressly denied.1948 Accordingly, Claudius would 
only be responsible for Calpurnius’ loss if he denied that there was any demand by 
the augurs for the demolishment of part of the house. The judge ordered Claudius 
to compensate Calpurnius for the loss he incurred because Claudius had known 
the facts when he sold the house to Calpurnius and had not informed him.1949 In 
other words, if the seller knew about a fault or defect in the property but kept quiet 
about it, then he was responsible for it.1950 Consequently, Cicero argues that the 
judge “established that it was a part of good faith that the buyer should learn of 
any fault that the seller knew”.1951 This example illustrates how bona fides was 
used to correct and adapt the ius civile by developing new rules to cater for new 
circumstances. Then, in a further example, Cicero illustrates how a rule developed 
by the concept of bona fides could itself become unjust and require further 
                                            
1944  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1945  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1946  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 67. 
1947  Cicero De Officiis 3 65 (quoted from Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). See further 
the discussion by Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker 
(eds) Good faith (2000) 67. 
1948  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 67. 
1949  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1950  Cicero De Officiis 3 65 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1951  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
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development in terms of the bona fides.1952 He refers to the case where Marcus 
Marius Gratidianus sold a house to Gaius Sergius Orata which he had bought 
from Orata a few years before.1953 The house was under a liability (i.e. a third 
person had some right over the property) but Marius did not state this in the 
contract of sale.1954 When the matter went to court, Orata’s representatives 
argued that the court should adhere to the rule that the buyer should learn of any 
fault that the seller knew.1955 In other words, he was arguing that the court should 
merely apply the existing rule (which rule derived from the bona fides) in 
accordance with the words and without further reference to the concept of bona 
fides. However, Gratidianus’ representative argued for the application of aequitas 
(fairness) in that Orata was not deceived because as the previous owner he knew 
that the property was subject to a liability.1956 Therefore, he was arguing for the 
adaptation of the rule in accordance with the principle of aequitas (fairness) in 
order to achieve justice.  
 
Cicero’s use of the term bona fides together with the term aequitas indicates that 
Cicero regarded bona fides as an expression of aequitas which could be used to 
correct and adapt the ius civile where it would otherwise lead to injustice.1957 In 
other words, the use of bona fides in this context refers to the idea of aequitas. 
This is so because aequitas in the legal sense is usually described as a concept 
which refers to fairness and which is specifically contrasted with the strict following 
of the letter of the law.1958 In turn, the Roman concept of aequitas has its origin in 
                                            
1952  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 68. 
1953  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1954  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1955  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1956  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)). 
1957  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 70. 
1958  Tuori “Aequitas” in Bagnall et al (eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 132; Biscardi “On 
Aequitas and epieikeia” in Rabello (ed) Aequitas and equity (1997) 7; Hahlo & Kahn South 
African legal system (1991) 133; Berger Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law (1953) 354 sv 
“Aequitas (aequum)”. 
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the Greek concept of epieíkeia (equity).1959 Aristotle defined epieíkeia as “a 
correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality”1960 and stated that: 
 
[It] makes up for the defects of a community’s written code of law. This is 
what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice 
which goes beyond the written law.1961  
 
Cicero and the other Roman orators understood aequitas as referring to 
epieíkeia.1962 This is can be deduced from the fact that Cicero uses the term 
aequitas to refer to “fairness” which he contrasts with the strict following of the 
letter of the law.1963 In other words, where bona fides was used to correct and 
adapt the ius civile, it was with reference to these Greek philosophical ideas. So 
while it would appear that the Romans used existing indigenous concepts to 
develop a more equitable law of contract, there is evidence that they borrowed 
                                            
1959  Shanske 2005 Stanford Law Review 2061; Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law 
(2003) 32 n 96; Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker 
(eds) Good faith (2000) 65 n 9; Stein Buckland’s text-book of Roman law (1996) 55; Hahlo & 
Kahn South African legal system (1991) 133-134; Yntema 1967 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 110ff; Allen Law in the making (1964) 393; Schulz Roman legal science 
(1953) 74;. However, the extent of the Greek influence on the Roman concept of aequitas is 
the subject of extensive academic debate (see for example Tuori “Aequitas” in Bagnall et al 
(eds) Encyclopedia of ancient history (2013) 132; Crook Legal advocacy (1995) 9; Schiller 
Roman law mechanisms (1978) 551-552; Shalgi 1971 Israel Law Review 62-64; Allen Law in 
the making (1964) 392; Jolowicz Roman foundations (1957) 55-56).  
1960  Artistotle Ethica Nicomachea 1137b27 (quoted from Ross “Ethica Nicomachea” in Ross (ed) 
Works of Aristotle (1963)). See further Mousourakis Historical context of Roman law (2003) 32 
n 96. 
1961  Aristotle Rhetorica 1374a24-27 (quoted from Roberts “Rhetorica” in Ross (ed) Works of 
Aristotle (1963)). 
1962  Schulz Roman legal science (1953) 74; Stein Buckland’s text-book of Roman law (1996) 55. 
Jolowicz Roman foundations (1957) 56 argues that Cicero and other rhetorical writers were 
aware of the indigenous origin of aequitas although he concedes that their thinking reflects a 
Greek influence. 
1963  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin & Atkins (eds) Cicero on duties (1991)) (see again the 
discussion at n 1956 supra). See also Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 28 who 
maintains that aequitas “denoted justice, especially that justice which the praetor applied by 
using his magisterial law to overcome the rigidity of the ius civile”. 
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from Greek philosophy in order to develop their existing rigid and formalistic legal 
system into a fairer and more flexible system that incorporated normative 
considerations based on fairness. 
 
4 4 2 The harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu in the South African 
common law of contract 
Although ubuntu as an underlying constitutional value should be used to develop 
the common law of contract in line with the Constitution, it was also shown that the 
common law of contract has proved less than enthusiastic in this respect.1964 
Bennett argued that the reason why the common law of contract has shown 
resistance towards the use of ubuntu may be because the contract law principles 
and rules already contain the necessary mechanisms to deal with the issues that 
ubuntu has been used for.1965 Specifically, he mentioned the principle of good faith 
and public policy as informed by the objective normative value system established 
under the Constitution. 
  
There are a number of reasons why this argument cannot be accepted. In the first 
place, such an approach ignores the vital need to establish a plural legal culture to 
legitimise the post-apartheid South African legal system.1966 Secondly, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal has persistently limited the role of good faith to address 
contractual unfairness, even after the establishment of the new constitutional 
order, so it is difficult to see how good faith on its own can be developed into an 
open norm to address contractual unfairness.1967 Thirdly, in conjunction with the 
previous point, the Supreme Court of Appeal has used the founding constitutional 
values to endorse the classical model of contract law in a way which leaves almost 
no scope for the development of fairness into a freestanding requirement for the 
                                            
1964  Cf the discussion dealing with the role of ubuntu in developing the private law in para  1 8 4 3(b) 
supra. 
1965  Cf the discussion in the text at n 959 supra. 
1966  Cf the discussion dealing with the unequal relationship between the common and customary 
law in para  1 8 3 3 supra. 
1967  Cf the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal to fairness in the common law of contract in 
paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
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validity or exercise of a contractual right.1968 Finally, there is a grave danger in 
assuming that fairness in terms of good faith can be equated to fairness in terms 
of ubuntu as will be argued under the next theme.1969 
 
Although there is evidence that the Romans developed bona fides from the 
indigenous Roman concept of fides, the concept of bona fides as an expression of 
aequitas was influenced by Greek philosophy. This influence can be observed in 
the role of bona fides to correct and adapt the ius civile to achieve justice and 
keep pace with the changing political, social and economic environment. In a 
similar manner, ubuntu as a reflection of the values of the indigenous community 
and the new constitutional order should be imported into the common law of 
contract to develop the role of good faith in line with the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights. This is necessary in order to develop the principle of good 
faith into a substantive rule that can be used to set aside unfair contract terms and 
the unfair enforcement of contract terms in view of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
continued resistance to the development of good faith into an open norm after the 
enactment of the Constitution. Therefore, the harmonisation of good faith and 
ubuntu in the common law of contract is essential not only to establish a plural 
legal culture but also to develop the common law of contract in line with the 
Constitution.  
 
4 5 THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF LAW: ACHIEVING JUSTICE 
4 5 1 Good faith: Balancing reciprocal individual rights and duties  
Prior to the introduction of the bonae fidei contracts, the closest the early Roman 
law came to recognising an agreement was through the formal legal act of 
stipulation (stipulatio) which was already in use by the time of the law of the 
Twelve Tables.1970 As explained by Gaius, it entailed a formal verbal exchange of 
                                            
1968  Cf the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal to fairness in the common law of contract in 
paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
1969  Cf the discussion dealing with ubuntu’s aim to achieve justice in para  4 5 2 infra. 
1970  Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 159. See also Zimmerman Law of obligations 
(1990) 68; Watson 1984 Law and History Review 3; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil 
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questions and answer between the debtor and creditor. He mentions the following 
forms:  
 
“Do you solemnly promise conveyance? I solemnly promise 
conveyance”; “Will you convey? I will convey”; “Do you promise? I 
promise”; “Do you promise on your honour? I promise on my honour”; 
“Do you guarantee on your honour? I guarantee on my honour?”; “Will 
you do? I will do.”1971 
 
As the stipulatio was a stricti iuris contract which formed part of the ius civile,1972 
the validity of the stipulatio came from the form used and not the agreement 
itself.1973 For example, it was still valid where it was induced by fraud, fear or 
                                                                                                                                    
law (1980) para 420; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 (1975) 151; Watson Law of the 
ancient Romans (1970) 5, 58; Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 251, 262. 
1971  Gaius Inst 3 92 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). See also 
Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 68; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 49; 
Watson 1984 Law and History Review 4; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 420; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 159; Buckland Manual of Roman 
private law (1947) 251, 262.  
1972  Du Plessis Borkowski’s Roman law (2015) 297; Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 91; Van 
Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 422; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 2 
(1975) 151. 
1973  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 82-84; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law 
(1984) 207; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 422; Watson Law of the 
ancient Romans (1970) 5; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 159. However, immoral, 
illegal or impossible stipulations were not valid (Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 60-
61).  
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mistaken belief.1974 On the other hand, if the debtor used the wrong verb the 
creditor could not rely on the underlying agreement.1975  
 
The stipulatio was a unilateral contract which can be defined as a contract “which 
creates only rights in one party and only duties in the other”.1976 As Zimmerman 
explains: 
 
One party (the debtor) would be bound to perform towards the other (the 
creditor), but could not, under the same stipulation, acquire a 
counterclaim. Or, the other way round: the stipulation granted the creditor 
a right, without, at the same time, imposing a duty on him.1977  
 
Where the parties wanted to enter into a bilateral contract (for example a sale) the 
parties had to create two stipulations, i.e. two unilateral contracts, one where the 
buyer promised to pay the price and another where the seller promised to deliver 
the thing.1978 This meant that the buyer could claim the thing even though he had 
                                            
1974  Cf the discussion at n 1850 supra. For further examples see Gaius Inst 3 97-101. See also 
Watson 1984 Law and History Review 4; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) paras 424, 699; Watson Roman private law 200 BC (1971) 129; Stein (1996) “Equitable 
principles in Roman law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 81; 
Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 5-6, 59; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 
160. 
1975  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 70; Watson 1984 Law and History Review 4; Van 
Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 422; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law 
(1962) 160; Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 264. 
1976  Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 162. As explained by Gauis “in verbal obligations 
the one party puts and the other gives the stipulatory promise” (Gaius Inst 3 137 (quoted from 
De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). See also Zimmerman Law of obligations 
(1990) 91; Dannenbring Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 169; Watson 1984 Law and History 
Review 4; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 420; De Zulueta Institutes of 
Gaius part 2 (1975) 151; Stein (1996) “Equitable principles in Roman law” in Newman (ed) 
Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 81; Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 58; 
Buckland & McNair Roman law & common law (1952) 271; Buckland Manual of Roman private 
law (1947) 250.  
1977  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 91. 
1978  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 91; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 422; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 162. 
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not paid the price and the seller would be obliged to deliver.1979 If the seller 
wanted to claim the price, he would need to institute a separate action and run the 
risk that the buyer could be insolvent at that time.1980 This meant that in an action 
based on the stipulation to pay the price, the judge would not be permitted to take 
any account of the other stipulation for the delivery of the thing. Later, with the 
introduction and development of the exceptio doli, the seller would be able to 
defend an action by the buyer.1981  
 
In contrast, a bona fide contract was bilateral in nature.1982 In other words, a 
contract “which gives rise to reciprocal obligations, each party having both rights 
and duties”.1983 In addition, as known, the judge in a bona fide action was directed 
to determine the case in accordance with the principle of good faith (ex fide 
bona).1984 This enabled the judge to strike a balance between the interests of the 
parties which was not possible where a unilateral contract was used. Specifically 
Gaius states that “this involves that he [the judge] may take into account any 
counter-obligation due from the plaintiff under the same transaction, and may 
condemn the defendant only in the difference”.1985 Schermaier argues that this 
required the judge to look at the relationship between the parties “in its origin and 
                                            
1979  Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 162. 
1980  Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 162. 
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law 200 BC (1971) 129 n 4; Watson Law of the ancient Romans (1970) 6; Nicholas 
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1982  Also referred to as synallagmatic contracts (Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law 
(1980) para 441). 
1983  Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 162. See also Gaius Inst 3 137 (quoted in n 615 
supra); Van Warmelo Principles of Roman civil law (1980) para 441; Stein (1996) “Equitable 
principles in Roman law” in Newman (ed) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 81; 
Buckland Manual of Roman private law (1947) 250.  
1984  See para  4 2 1 3 supra. 
1985  Gaius Inst 4 61 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius part 1 (1958)). See also 
Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 82; Nicholas Introduction to Roman law (1962) 164. 
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all its effects, within the framework of all surrounding circumstances and the 
conduct of the parties”.1986  
 
Although the judge would attempt to achieve justice and fairness between the 
parties, it is important to note that the judge would not consider the social and 
economic position or bargaining power of the parties when determining what 
would be considered fair and equitable: 
 
The Roman lawyers worked within the framework of the existing social 
and procedural structures. Problems resulting from unequal bargaining 
power fell outside their sphere of competence and experience – as did 
social reform or social engineering in general.1987 
 
Nevertheless, Winkel argues that the concept of bona fides did provide the judge 
with the necessary discretion to “take forms of undue influence or duress into 
account and so protect a weaker party”.1988 Hence bona fides could be used to 
protect a weaker party against exploitation by a stronger party and ensure justice 
and fairness between the parties. However, good faith did not focus on addressing 
the greater political, social and economic inequalities prevalent in Roman society 
itself. In other words, although bona fides could be used to protect a weaker party 
against exploitation by a stronger party in specific instances it was not used to 
address the underlying unequal relationship between the parties in order to 
achieve a more egalitarian society. As remarked by Kelly: 
 
[T]he end result was not to turn the Republic into an egalitarian 
democracy in the modern sense. In the late Republic, wide differences of 
wealth and prestige existed … and political power was shared and 
disputed among a relatively small number of important families, who 
                                            
1986  Schermaier “Bona fides in Roman contract law” in Zimmerman & Whittaker (eds) Good faith 
(2000) 84 n 129. See also Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 140, 428; Dannenbring 
Kaser’s Roman private law (1984) 174-175. 
1987  Zimmerman Law of obligations (1990) 349-350. 
1988  Winkel 2010 Fundamina 578-579. 
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exercised it by operating a complicated system of alliance and 
dependence.1989 
 
4 5 2 Ubuntu: Bringing about a more humane world 
As was seen above, under Roman law the bilateral nature of the bonae fidei 
contracts entitled a judge to strike a balance between the interests of the parties 
on the basis of justice and equity. However, when balancing these different 
interests to determine what would be considered fair and equitable the judge did 
not take account of the social and economic position or bargaining power of the 
contracting parties.  
 
In the seminal pre-constitutional appeal court judgment of Sasfin v Beukes,1990 the 
court stated that determining whether a contract term is contrary to public policy 
entails a balancing act between the public policy considerations of freedom and 
sanctity of contract and the need to do simple justice between the parties. Lubbe 
argued that the latter consideration refers to a balancing act between the specific 
interests of the contract parties which he linked to the principle of good faith.1991 
He then argued that where a contractual term constitutes an unreasonable and 
one-sided promotion of one party’s own interests at the expense of the other party 
it may be contrary to the principles of good faith and consequently also against 
public policy.1992 Important to note is that the court itself confined this balancing 
act to the specific interests of the parties as reflected in the contract terms and did 
not take account of any inequality in the bargaining relationship of the contract 
parties. In other words, the court’s conception of what fairness between 
contracting parties would entail is similar to that in Roman law in that the enquiry 
into fairness would not include any consideration of the social and economic 
circumstances of the contracting parties. This reluctance to take account of the 
relative situation of the contracting parties outside the terms of the contract can 
                                            
1989  Kelly Roman litigation (1966) 1. 
1990  Cf the discussion of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9 as discussed in the text at 
n 773 supra. 
1991  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 17 as discussed in the text at n 779 supra. 
1992  Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20-21 as discussed in the text at n 783 supra. 
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also be identified in the Supreme Court of Appeal decisions after the enactment of 
the Constitution. In Brisley v Drotsky, the court stated that the principles in Sasfin v 
Beukes should not be extended to the unfair enforcement of a contract term 
except in exceptional cases.1993 And in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom, the court held 
that the unequal bargaining position of the parties is merely a relevant factor in 
determining whether a contract term is against public policy.1994  
 
It was in Barkhuizen v Napier1995 that the Constitutional Court extended the 
enquiry into fairness to include the relative situation of the contracting parties as 
reflected in the subjective test of fairness which takes account of the bargaining 
position of the parties as well as the surrounding circumstances at both contract 
conclusion and enforcement. In other words, the subjective test for fairness was 
held to be relevant when determining the fairness of the clause itself and the 
enforcement of the clause. The subjective test for fairness means that the court 
recognised substantive equality in the law of contract and it was submitted that 
this subjective test for fairness is based upon ubuntu. As was stated 
previously,1996 ubuntu does not entail a duty only on a contracting party to respect 
the human dignity of the other contracting party which duty has been linked to the 
principle of good faith, but also includes a duty on a contracting party to promote 
the realisation of the other contracting party’s human dignity through the concept 
of substantive equality as informed by the post-apartheid constitutional context. It 
was further argued that the Constitutional Court impliedly relied on ubuntu when it 
followed this approach in Botha v Rich although it conceptualised its approach 
through the principle of good faith.1997 Accordingly, it was argued that the court’s 
decision is based upon the harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu because it 
                                            
1993  Cf the discussion of Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 31 as discussed in the text at 
n 832 supra. 
1994  Cf the discussion of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 12 as 
discussed in the text at n 842 supra. 
1995  Cf the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56-59 as discussed in the 
text at n 872 supra. 
1996  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1547 supra. 
1997  Cf the discussion of this case in the text at n 1570 supra. 
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reflects a commitment to contractual fairness which includes the idea of 
substantive equality in the common law of contract.   
 
Thus, it is submitted that the harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu in the 
common law of contract results in a conception of fairness that is not concerned 
with balancing the individual interests of the contracting parties only, but reflects a 
conception of fairness which includes a greater commitment towards an 
egalitarian society, and hence, a more humane world as envisioned by ubuntu.  
 
4 6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the introduction and development of good faith in the 
Roman law of contract within the relevant historical context in order to clarify the 
emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract. It was 
shown how the introduction of good faith in Roman law was necessary to deal with 
legal pluralism and resulted in the development of the rigid and formalistic ius 
civile into a legal system that embraced normative considerations of fairness and 
flexibility to ensure better contractual justice. It was further shown how these 
normative considerations were probably imported from Greek philosophy as the 
existing Roman legal system did not have the necessary inherent mechanisms to 
deal with these changes. It was argued that in a similar way, ubuntu can be used 
to deal with legal pluralism in the South African legal system and its application as 
an underlying constitutional value should result in the better use of the open norm 
of good faith in the common law of contract to address unfair contract terms and 
the unfair enforcement of contract terms. It was further argued that the 
harmonisation of ubuntu and good faith in the common law of contract is essential 
for such a development of good faith as the Supreme Court of Appeal has closed 
all other doors in this respect.  
 
Despite these similarities between the historical development of good faith in the 
Roman law of contract and the emerging role of ubuntu in the South African 
common law of contract, it was shown that what constituted fairness in terms of 
good faith in Roman law cannot be equated to fairness as envisaged by ubuntu. 
While fairness in terms of good faith was limited to the balancing of the individual 
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interests of the contract parties without further consideration of the political, social 
and economic inequalities in Roman society, fairness in terms of ubuntu must be 
understood as aspiring towards an egalitarian society which entails the 
development of the existing legal rules in order to achieve greater substantive 
equality and fairness between contracting parties within the post-apartheid 
constitutional context. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE GOLDEN THREAD: HUMAN DIGNITY 
 
At the heart of contract lies the idea that I have an interest in something 
of yours and that you have an interest in something of mine. The 
hegemonic capitalist over-emphasis on the things and the utter neglect of 
the persons who have these things, has provided an extremely distorted 
version of what the word “interest” in the above formulation originally 
entails.1998 
 
5 1 INTRODUCTION 
The main theme that has emerged in addressing the harmonisation of good faith 
and ubuntu in the South African common law of contract is human dignity. While 
good faith has been linked to human dignity in its Western conception as based on 
Kantian dignity, ubuntu provides an African understanding thereof that can be 
used to inform its Western counterpart. In this respect, ubuntu performs an 
important role in the achievement of two legal aims that have been referred to 
throughout this thesis. First, it plays an important role in promoting human rights in 
the South African common law of contract, and secondly, in establishing a plural 
legal culture that is to inform the development of the common law of contract. 
 
5 2 PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COMMON LAW OF 
CONTRACT 
In South Africa and globally, the year of 1948 appears to be a watershed that had 
serious repercussions in the political, social and economic spheres as reflected in 
the legal developments of that time.1999 Internationally, humanitarian efforts in the 
aftermath of the Second World War culminated in the acceptance of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which is grounded in the recognition of the inherent 
and equal human dignity of all human beings and sets out a number of 
fundamental human rights that should enjoy universal protection across the globe. 
In contrast, the South African government set out in the opposite direction 
                                            
1998  Barnard-Naude 2008 Constitutional Court Review 207. 
1999  Cf the discussion dealing with the introduction of apartheid in South African in para  1 7 1 
supra. 
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choosing apartheid as its policy. The government’s policy of apartheid was 
implemented through apartheid laws which denied the human dignity, equality and 
freedom of the indigenous people. These human rights violations were aggravated 
by the prevailing constitutional system i.e. the Westminster system of 
parliamentary sovereignty, which meant that the courts had no authority over the 
morality or substance of government enacted legislation.2000 The government’s 
implementation of racial segregation resulted in an extremely unequal society that 
privileged the white community and left the indigenous people without political 
power and subject to appalling social and economic conditions.2001  
 
In other parts of the world, the modern human rights culture grounded in human 
dignity and aimed at the protection and promotion of equality led to concomitant 
developments in law, amongst others the introduction of modern contract theory in 
the law of contract.2002 South Africa’s conservative legal culture and its cultural 
isolation as a result of the international condemnation of apartheid may explain 
why modern contract theory found no adherence in the South African common law 
of contract except for Judge Jansen’s minority judgment in Bank of Lisbon and 
South Africa v De Ornelas during the final throes of the apartheid regime.2003  
 
The Constitution with its progressive Bill of Rights which is grounded in the 
recognition of human dignity set South Africa on the course to correct the 
injustices of the past.2004 The Constitutional Court’s commitment to the 
constitutional imperative for social justice and the establishment of an egalitarian 
society has resulted in a highly regarded and sophisticated2005 jurisprudence on 
                                            
2000  Cf the discussion dealing with the legal culture under apartheid in para  1 7 2 supra. 
2001  Cf the discussion on the development during the South African republic in para  1 7 3 supra. 
2002  Cf the discussions on human dignity as empowerment (para  3 2 3 2) and constraint (para  3 2 3 
3) supra. 
2003  Cf the discussion of this case in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
2004  Cf the discussions on the enactment of the Constitution (para  1 8 1) and its objective normative 
value system (para  1 8 2) supra. 
2005  Cornell & Muvangua “Preface” in Cornell & Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the law (2012). 
388 
 
human dignity.2006 In particular, the content of the constitutional value of human 
dignity was enriched in the field of socio-economic rights and the promotion of 
substantive equality by drawing on ubuntu as an ethical and social concept.2007 
This has resulted in the transformation of many fields of law but the common law 
of contract has lagged behind. Its resistance to constitutional transformation can 
be ascribed to legal tradition as reflected in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
continued reliance on the classical model of contract law2008 which can be traced 
back to English law and was imported into South African law during the second 
half of the nineteenth century.2009 Nevertheless, it would appear that the appeal 
court’s main concern is that the use of open norms in the common law of contract 
may fall foul of the constitutional value of the rule of law and will result in large 
scale legal and commercial uncertainty which will have a detrimental effect on the 
South African economy.2010  
 
This thesis has attempted to address this problem and moreover has taken the 
African context into consideration by drawing on the underlying constitutional 
value of ubuntu to achieve an appropriate outcome. It was shown that by relying 
on ubuntu the Constitutional Court has developed the interpretation of the 
founding constitutional values of human dignity, equality, freedom and the rule of 
law in a way which supports the modern theory of contract. Since ubuntu2011 and 
modern contract theory2012 are aimed at promoting substantive equality in the 
private sphere in order to create the necessary conditions for the realisation of 
everyone’s human dignity. The Constitutional Court’s reliance on ubuntu has 
                                            
2006  The Constitutional Court’s approach to human dignity was critically analysed in para  3 2 7 2 
supra. 
2007  For a discussion dealing with the philosophical foundations of ubuntu’s modern legal 
appearance see para  3 2 5 supra. 
2008 Cf the discussions dealing with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach to fairness in the 
common law of contract in paras  2 3 2 2 &  2 3 2 4 supra. 
2009  Cf the discussion dealing with the classical model of contract law in para  2 2 3 4 supra. 
2010  Cf the discussion dealing with the approach to the rule of law in the common law of contract in 
para  3 5 2 supra. 
2011  Cf the discussion on human dignity through ubuntu in para  3 2 5 supra. 
2012  Cf the discussion on the modern theory of contract law in para  2 2 3 6 supra. 
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resulted in a multifaceted approach to human dignity2013 that promotes substantive 
equality2014 in the private sphere while respecting freedom2015 and the rule of 
law2016 albeit in a modern form. It was argued that this approach to human dignity 
should result in the development of good faith into a substantive rule that can be 
used to set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement thereof. This is 
also in line with the approach to fairness in consumer contracts as reflected in 
section 48 of the CPA,2017 which in turn, follows international trends in this 
respect.2018 
 
5 3 AFRICANISATION (OR DECOLONISATION) OF THE COMMON LAW 
OF CONTRACT 
Coming full circle, this thesis has attempted to make a contribution in addressing 
the complex problem of the Africanisation or decolonisation of the South African 
common law of contract. As reflected in Justice Yacoob’s remarks in Everfresh 
Market Virginia which introduced the research problem of this thesis,2019 the 
common law of contract is shaped predominantly by common law ideals and 
customary law has exerted no influence on the common law of contract prior to the 
new constitutional dispensation.2020 The common law and its underlying values 
were always treated as superior and more civilised than their customary 
counterparts.  
 
Under the Constitution, formal equal recognition was granted to common and 
customary law2021 but the failure to import customary values into the common law 
                                            
2013  Cf the critical analysis of the constitutional value of human dignity in para  3 2 supra. 
2014  Cf the critical analysis of the constitutional value of equality in para  3 3 supra.  
2015  Cf the critical analysis of the constitutional value of freedom in para  3 4 supra. 
2016 Cf the critical analysis of the constitutional value of the rule of law in para  3 5 supra. 
2017  Cf the discussion of the open norm of fairness in s 48 of the CPA in para  2 3 4 2 supra. 
2018  Cf the discussion in the text at n 1744 supra. 
2019  Cf the discussion in para  1 1 supra. 
2020  This has been illustrated in respect of the common law of contract in general (paras  1 4– 1 7) 
and the role of fairness in the common law of contract (para  2 2) supra. 
2021  Cf the discussion of the constitutional recognition of common and customary law in para  1 8 3 
1 supra. 
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of contract undermines the constitutional aim to establish a plural legal culture 
which can go some way to restore the human dignity of the indigenous people 
who suffered great injustice under colonial and apartheid rule.2022 By including the 
customary notion of ubuntu in the post-amble of the interim Constitution as a tool 
for restorative justice, an opportunity was created for the adoption of African 
values and ideas into the South African law outside the field of customary law.2023 
Following the judgments of the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane2024  under 
the interim Constitution and Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers2025 
under the final Constitution, ubuntu was firmly established as an underlying 
constitutional value that should be used in developing the common law to promote 
constitutional values as mandated by section 39(2).2026  
 
The constitutional value of human dignity proved to be fertile ground for the 
harmonisation of African and Western values which has resulted in the 
Constitutional Court’s development of a sophisticated understanding of human 
dignity as based on Kantian dignity and ubuntu.2027 As hoped for by Cornell and 
Van Marle, this harmonisation not only addresses the pre-constitutional 
marginalisation of customary values but also provides possible solutions to 
existing legal problems originating from the liberal legal tradition: 
 
More importantly, it [ubuntu] would provide a nuanced jurisprudence that 
would not only include African or South African values and ideals as 
important to the new South Africa, as a matter of fairness to those whose 
ideals have been marginalised, but also because those principles, ideals 
                                            
2022  Cf the discussion dealing with the unequal relationship between common and customary law in 
para  1 8 3 3 supra. 
2023  Cf the discussion dealing with the introduction of ubuntu in the interim Constitution in para  1 8 
4 2(a) supra. 
2024  S v Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) as discussed in para  1 8 4 2(b) supra. 
2025  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) as discussed in para  1 8 
4 3(a) supra. 
2026  Cf the discussion dealing with the role of ubuntu in the private law in para  1 8 4 3(b) supra. 
2027  Cf the critical analysis of the constitutional value of human dignity as developed by the 
Constitutional Court in para  3 2 7 2 supra. 
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and values may well provide with solutions to dilemmas in South Africa 
that are not solvable by liberalism.2028 
  
As mentioned in the previous section, the Constitutional Court found support in 
ubuntu to develop the constitutional value of human dignity to reflect a 
commitment to substantive equality in the private sphere while respecting freedom 
and the rule of law. The proposition put forward in this thesis is that if this 
approach to human dignity is also applied in the common law of contract it should 
result in the development of good faith into a substantive rule that can be used to 
set aside an unfair contract term or the unfair enforcement thereof.  
 
5 4 CONCLUSION 
The harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu in the South African common law of 
contract emphasises how the values, principles and rules of the common law of 
contract play an important role in the recognition and promotion of human dignity 
as the core value of the new constitutional dispensation. The harmonisation of 
these two notions is not an easy task and plays out against South Africa’s complex 
history of colonialism and apartheid as well as modern tensions between 
individualism and socialism. Nevertheless, ubuntu as a source of African values is 
well situated to address inequality that has resulted from colonial and apartheid 
rule and which flourished within the individualist and capitalist environment during 
this time. As such, I share the hopes of former Justice Mokgoro that ubuntu: 
 
if consciously harnessed can become central to the process of 
harmonising all existing legal values and practices with the Constitution 
… [and] the revival of sustainable African values as part of the broader 
process of the African renaissance.2029 
  
                                            
2028  Cornell & Van Marle 2005 AHRLJ 220. 
2029 Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 11. 
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And that, ultimately, this will result in Biko’s vision for a more humane world: 
 
We believe that in the long run the special contribution to the world by 
Africa will be in this field of human relationship. … the great gift still has 
to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face.2030 
                                            
2030  Biko I write what I like (2004) 51. 
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